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resumo 
 
 
À semelhança do que aconteceu em muitas instituições públicas, as 
universidades têm enfrentado pressões crescentes para mudar, tendo de 
repensar as suas formas de governança e de gestão, dando mais ênfase à 
implementação de sistemas de gestão do desempenho (SGD). Apesar de 
existirem vários estudos sobre o desempenho, estes têm ignorado o uso dado 
à informação recolhida. Além disso, e apesar de terem ocorrido várias 
reformas na governança destas instituições, existem ainda poucos estudos que 
relacionam a governança e o desempenho. Assim, esta pesquisa visa explorar 
a forma como as universidades medem, reportam e gerem o desempenho e 
como as estruturas de governança se relacionam com estas práticas. Para 
alcançar o objetivo proposto, um estudo comparativo entre universidades 
britânicas e portuguesas foi realizado. Os dados foram recolhidos através da 
utilização de uma metodologia qualitativa, sendo os métodos utilizados a 
análise documental e entrevistas semi-estruturadas a membros dos órgãos de 
governo e gestão de cada instituição. A análise dos dados mostrou a 
inexistência de um sistema completamente integrado de gestão de 
desempenho (SGD) em ambas as instituições, essencialmente devido à falta 
de práticas de gestão de desempenho. De facto, apesar de alguns dos 
entrevistados terem reportado o "uso positivo" de dados sobre o desempenho, 
alguns relataram o "não uso" desses dados, principalmente em relação ao 
desempenho individual, e outros o "mau uso" dessa informação, tendo sido 
reportadas práticas de gaming e deturpação dos resultados. Como forma de 
ultrapassar alguns destes problemas, verificou-se a co-existência de duas 
estruturas de governança: uma 'formal', da qual fazem parte todos os órgão de 
governo, com um valor mais 'simbólico'; e uma estrutura 'paralela', constituída 
por órgãos mais ágeis, que gerem a universidade no dia a dia. Verificou-se 
terem sido vários os fatores a afetarem, negativa e positivamente, os SGD em 
ambas as instituições, tendo sido rotulados de "inibidores" e "determinantes", 
respetivamente. A pesquisa mostrou que, apesar de as estruturas de 
governança serem importantes para a implementação e funcionamento de um 
SGD, há outros fatores que precisam de ser levados em consideração, 
nomeadamente, o nível de comunicação e o nível de envolvimento dos atores 
no processo. Estes dois fatores são considerados relevantes para a integração 
bem sucedida de práticas de medição, reporte e gestão de desempenho. Esta 
integração, juntamente com outras mudanças que ocorreram em termos de 
governança, contribuirá certamente para que se passe de um sistema em que 
se governa o desempenho para um sistema em que se governa para o 
desempenho. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
keywords 
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abstract 
 
Similarly to what happened in many public organisations, universities have 
been facing increasing pressures to change, having to rethink their traditional 
forms of governance and management, putting a new emphasis on the 
implementation of performance management systems (PMS). Although there 
are several studies on performance, these have not focused on the use of 
performance information. Moreover, and even though a lot of changes 
happened in the governance of these institutions, there are few studies that 
relate governance and performance. Thus, this research aims at exploring how 
universities are measuring, reporting and managing performance and how 
governance structures relate to it. To achieve the research aim, a comparative 
study between Portuguese and British universities was conducted. Data was 
collected through the use of a qualitative methodology, being the methods used 
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews to members of each 
institutionʼs governing and management bodies. 
Data analysis showed the inexistence of a fully integrated performance 
management system (PMS) at both institutions, mainly due to the lack of 
management practices. Indeed, despite some reports on the 'positive use' of 
performance information in both cases, some interviewees reported the 'non-
use' of the data collected, especially in relation to individual performance, and 
others the 'misuse' of that data, with practices of gaming and misrepresentation 
being reported. In order to overcome some of these problems, data showed the 
co-existence of two governance structures in both universities: a 'formal' 
structure, composed of all the governing bodies, with a more 'symbolic' role; 
and a 'parallel' structure, composed of more agile bodies that manage the 
university on a daily basis. 
Several factors were perceived to affect, either negatively or positively, PMS in 
both institutions, being labelled 'inhibitors' and determinants', respectively. The 
research showed that even though structures are important for the 
implementation and functioning of PMS, there are other factors that need to be 
taken into consideration when building a PMS, namely the level of 
communication and the level of involvement of different actors in the process. 
These two factors are regarded as particularly relevant for the integration of 
measurement, reporting and management practices. This integration of 
practices, together with other changes that started to occur in terms of 
governance, will most likely contribute to the desired move from performance 
management to performance governance, where instead of governing 
performance, institutions will be governing for performance. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
2 
"The greater danger for most of us lies  
not in setting our aim too high and falling short; 
 but in setting our aim too low, and achieving our mark."  
Michelangelo 
"His promises were, as he then was, mighty; 
 But his performance, as he is now, nothing." 
William Shakespeare  
The nature of public services has changed over the years, mainly induced by new 
government orientations and social, economic and technological changes. In fact, when 
the institutions of bureau-professional control that existed in most countries started to be 
challenged, there were a considerable number of initiatives aimed at restructuring public 
service organisations by implementing a new form of management, more concerned with 
the organisation and coordination of services towards an increased efficiency in service 
delivery (Bleiklie et al. 2000; Mwita 2000; Pollitt 2003). In order to explain the reforms that 
took place in many countries, some authors came up with concepts such as 
'managerialism' (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1990), 'New Public Management' (NPM) (Hood 
1991), 'market-based public administration' (Lan and Rosenbloom 1992), the 'post-
bureaucratic paradigm' (Barzelay 1992), or 'entrepreneurial government' (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992). The key features of the reinvention of the public sector were: "a focus on 
management, not policy, and on performance appraisal and efficiency; (…) the use of 
quasi-markets and contracting out to foster competition; cost cutting; and a style of 
management which emphasizes, amongst other things, output targets, limited-term 
contracts, monetary incentives and freedom to manage" (Rhodes 1991: 1). These new 
management ideas put the focus on making the public sector more competitive and 
responsive to citizens' needs by offering "value for money, choice flexibility, and 
transparency" (OECD 1993: 9).  
Similarly to what happened in many public organisations, universities also faced 
increasing pressures to change their 'traditional' nature (Amaral and Magalhães 2002). 
According to the existing literature, several exogenous forces have contributed to the urge 
to reform these institutions. Among these are the following: first, the shift from being 'Ivory 
Towers', inhabited by scholars with the liberty to pursue knowledge in a rigorous and 
critical way, enjoying the independence of mind that came from autonomy and intellectual 
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freedom (Barry et al. 2001; Czarniawska and Genell 2002), to being deliverers of mass 
higher education (Halsey 1995); second, the increasing difficulty of exclusively financing 
the institutions with public funds; third, European policies; and finally, the emergence of 
new approaches to public policy, such as NPM (Hood 1991; Shattock 1999; Chevaillier 
2002; Salter and Tapper 2002).  
In order to address the environmental change, many universities started to rethink their 
traditional forms of organisation, governance and management, and implemented new 
strategies that put an emphasis on the introduction of effective co-ordination and control 
systems, needed to improve organisational performance (Clark 1998; Vilalta 2001; De 
Boer 2003). As a result, the university culture has increasingly moved towards a market-
driven enterprise culture, largely reflecting the new management models that have spread 
throughout the public sector (Ackroyd and Ackroyd 1999). To several authors (e.g. Meek 
2000; Etzkowitz 2003), a trend to reorganise and restructure modern universities as 
entrepreneurial universities emerged. 
Since the public is now devoting more attention, time and money to performance 
measurement and management (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), universities are increasingly 
urged to demonstrate that there have been improvements in their performance and that 
their goals and objectives are being attained. This has made it crucial for effective 
performance measurement and management approaches to be developed and applied 
(Bovaird and Loffler 2002). As a result, performance management systems (PMS) have 
been implemented in some universities and many of these institutions started moving from 
traditional models of participative management towards more corporate models of 
management (Vilalta 2001). In several countries, a battery of performance indicators (PIs) 
was developed, mostly by government initiatives, to monitor the quantitative aspects of 
performance (Cave et al. 1988). It was the beginning of what Neave called the 'Evaluative 
State' regarding higher education (Neave 1988). Universities would be granted more 
managerial autonomy, in return for increased accountability. 
The growing interest for performance enhancement, both in the private and public sectors, 
led to prolific research, especially on the topic of performance measurement, and to the 
development of numerous performance measurement frameworks (e.g. Fitzgerald et al. 
1991; Kaplan and Norton 1992; Neely and Adams 2001). Some higher education 
researchers also studied this topic, looking mainly at the selection and use of PIs (e.g. 
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Goedegebuure et al. 1990; Johnes and Taylor 1991; Cave and Hanney 1992; Tam 2001; 
Tambi et al. 2008) or at the development, implementation and/or analysis of quality 
assurance mechanisms (e.g. Brennan and Shah 1997; Brown 2004; Filippakou and 
Tapper 2010; Langfeldt et al. 2010; Shah et al. 2011; Stensaker et al. 2011). Only more 
recently, there has been an interest in studying performance management in higher 
education (e.g. Simmons 2002; Talib 2003; Adcroft and Willis 2005; Broad et al. 2007; 
Arena et al. 2009; Breakwell and Tytherleigh 2010; Haapakorpi 2011). 
Thus, it is believed that too much attention has been put on how to measure performance 
or on how to build quality mechanisms, often forgetting to look at what is considered to be 
the most important part of the process: what is being done with the performance data 
collected during the measurement process, and who or what may be influencing those 
practices.  
Moreover, and even though there were also considerable changes in the governance of 
universities, motivated by the reforms that occurred in most higher education systems, 
there are very few studies that look at governance and performance (Knott et al. 2004; 
Aghion et al. 2009). The interest in relating these two concepts became even more 
relevant when several scholars (e.g. Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b; Sarrico 2010; 
Halligan et al. 2012) predicted a move to a new mode of governance, called by some as 
'Network Governance' (e.g. Klijn 2005) and by others 'New Public Governance' (e.g. 
Osborne 2006). Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b), even speak of a move from 
'performance management' to 'performance governance'. 
Thus, drawing upon literature on performance management and literature on governance, 
applied to the context of higher education, this research is aiming to explore how 
universities are measuring, reporting and managing performance and how governance 
structures relate to it, thus bringing new insights into governance and performance 
management literature, and contributing to the literature on public management, applied to 
the context of higher education. 
Performance is looked at from a systems perspective, adapting Bouckaert and Halligan's 
(2008b) performance management framework to higher education, and three dimensions 
of analysis are used – measurement, reporting and management. Governance structures 
are analysed by using a new analytical framework, which is composed of an 'outer ring', 
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comprising the external coordination mechanisms of higher education – the state, the 
market and Europe –, and an 'inner ring', integrating the key actors in the governance and 
management of universities – the four Estates (Academic, Administrative, Student and 
External Representatives). The proposed framework extends Clark's (1983) Triangle of 
Coordination to other internal stakeholders of the university, revisiting the concept of the 
university's Estates proposed by Neave and Rhoades (1987).  
In order to accomplish the aforementioned research aim, this thesis is organised in eight 
chapters. In Chapter 1, the traditional nature of public services and the reasons that have 
led to a reinvention of public sector organisations are looked at, followed by a similar 
analysis, but applied to the context of higher education. Chapter 2 is dedicated to 
understanding how universities are governed and managed. First, the concepts of 
'governance' and 'management' are defined and the main changes that have happened in 
higher education in relation to these issues are analysed. Then, a systemic view of higher 
education is presented, examining both the external environment and the main internal 
and external stakeholders. Finally, a new framework to analyse governance structures in 
higher education is introduced. In Chapter 3, the increased interest in performance 
management is explored; the concepts of performance measurement, reporting and 
management are clarified; performance is analysed from a systems point of view and 
some performance management models are presented; and, finally, an integrative model 
representing a performance management system for higher education is introduced. At 
the end of Chapter 3, a summary of the literature review conducted in the first three 
chapters is presented, explaining the choice of research topic in light of the gaps found in 
the literature and presenting the research questions and objectives. Chapter 4 is 
dedicated to the research design. First, it introduces the different research paradigms 
available to researchers and explains why a phenomenological paradigm and an 
interpretative approach were preferred over others. Then, it displays the reasons behind 
the choice of a qualitative methodology and a case study design, justifying the selection of 
the two cases – the University of Warwick in the UK and the University of Aveiro in 
Portugal. Finally, the research methods used to collect data are presented and the 
techniques employed to treat and analyse that data are displayed. In Chapter 5, the British 
higher education system is introduced, namely its history, governance and management, 
main evaluation exercises and funding system; the University of Warwick is characterised 
in terms of history, student and staff numbers, and finances; and the findings that resulted 
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from the fieldwork conducted for seven months at that university are displayed. The 
structure of Chapter 6 is very similar to the one of Chapter 5. The Portuguese higher 
education system is introduced, in relation to the same issues mentioned before; the 
University of Aveiro is characterised; and the findings that resulted from the fieldwork 
conducted for six months are displayed. In Chapter 7, a cross-case analysis is presented 
and the most important findings that arose from the research are discussed, confronting 
them with the existing literature, in light of the four research questions delineated at the 
end of the literature review. Finally, in Chapter 8, the main conclusions of the research are 
revealed; the contribution to knowledge and to practice are explained; the main limitations 
of the research are discussed; and possible future lines of work are proposed. 
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The changing nature of public services: 
the case of higher education 
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"Whosoever desires constant success  
must change his conduct with the times." 
Niccolo Machiavelli 
"Change begets change.  
Nothing propagates so fast." 
Charles Dickens 
New government orientations and economic, technological and social changes modified 
the nature of public services. The fiscal conditions imposed by the European Union (EU) 
on member countries to reduce public spending, the absence of a managerial attitude, 
and the need to hold someone responsible for not achieving organisational pre-
established goals or for not being able to control costs, led to an increased interest in the 
transference of management practices from the private into the public sector (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000; Doherty and Horne 2001).  
Also in higher education, there has been a questioning of its 'traditional' nature, a 
decrease in public support, both politically and financially, and accusations of having 
insufficient responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency. As a result, higher education 
institutions (HEIs) were increasingly urged to develop and apply management approaches 
(De Boer 2003; Santiago et al. 2006). 
Understanding the way HEIs are governed and managed today and how they are coping 
with growing pressures to restructure, improve performance and introduce control 
mechanisms, would not be possible without setting the context, that is, without looking at 
the changes that have occurred in public services, in a more general way, and, more 
specifically, in higher education. This is what will be done in the present chapter. 
This chapter is organised in the following manner: first, the traditional nature of public 
services will be looked at; second, the reasons that have led to a restructuring of public 
organisations will be described, focusing on the emergence of a new model of public 
management; finally, the context of higher education will be researched further, exploring, 
first, its traditional nature and, later, the changes that have taken place in this sector. 
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1.1. The traditional nature of public services 
The nature of public services has changed over time, along with the organisation and type 
of intervention of the state. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the role of the state was minimal in many countries. 
Most current public services were either private or charity services (Osborne and 
McLaughlin 2002). The state, which practiced a 'laissez-faire' policy, was little involved in 
the supply of social services (Ackroyd 1995). 
After the Second World War, most Western governments were anxious to avoid a return 
to high levels of poverty and unemployment. They started to intervene by rationalising 
many public services and introducing subsidies and price controls in others. It was the 
'welfare state' era, characterised by a compromise between the principles of inequality 
(market-driven) and equality (state guaranteed citizenship). It was a time guided by: a 
mixed economy, based on the Keynesian principles of macroeconomic planning1; a 
benevolent role of the state in managing the economy; and public spending on social and 
welfare services. Governments were believed to have an important role in the correction 
of market failures and the social obligation to provide social security, education, health 
care, and other infrastructures, increasing the need for public services' management 
(Ackroyd 1995; Clarke and Newman 1997; Doherty and Horne 2001; Osborne and 
McLaughlin 2002). 
The post-war 'welfare state' was structured by a commitment to two modes of 
coordination: the bureaucratic, exerted by administrators, characterised by top-down 
relations; and the professional, integrated by experts' advices in decision-making 
(Baldridge 1971). The decoupling of bureaucratic and professional structures was mainly 
influenced by the works of Woodrow Wilson and Frederick Taylor, in the United States 
(US), and Max Weber, in Germany (Hughes 2003; van Bockel and Noordegraaf 2006). 
In 1887, Wilson wrote in his famous article The Study of Administration that there should 
be a clear separation of politics from administration. According to this author, public 
                                                
1 Keynesian economics advocates government intervention, or demand-side management of the economy, to 
smooth out the bumps in business cycles and achieve full employment and stable prices. To stimulate the 
economy, government intervention should take the form of government spending and tax breaks. To curb 
inflation, government should cut spending and raise taxes. 
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administration had everything to do with the "detailed and systematic execution of public 
law, (…) [being] the broad plans of governmental action (…) not administrative" (Wilson 
1887). To him, political issues should be treated by politicians and administrative issues 
should be executed by professionals (Wilson 1887). 
Frederick Taylor argued, in his monograph The Principles of Scientific Management, 
written in 1911, that "the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined 
laws, rules and principles, as a foundation" (Taylor 1967). He defended, among other 
principles, the standardisation of work, which meant finding the 'one best way of working', 
the division of the work into routine tasks, and systematic control (Taylor 1967). Even 
though scientific management principles were first put forward for the private sector, they 
were later applied to the public sector, mainly because the theory advocated the 
replacement of ad hoc decision-making by efficiency and science (Hughes 2003). 
Influenced by Wilson's (1887) earlier plea for separating 'administration' from 'politics', 
Max Weber formalised ways of organising collective action and stressed the relevance of 
acting impersonally within a strict 'bureaucratic' framework, creating what became known 
as the 'bureaucratic paradigm', often referred to as the 'old orthodoxy', the 'old-time 
religion' or simply 'traditional public administration'.  
To Weber (1964), the bureaucratic type of organisation was characterized by: a clearly 
defined hierarchy; impersonal and abstract division of tasks; well defined procedures and 
rules for all thinkable situations; contractually fixed salaries for officials, who did not own 
their positions or the means of production; a regular career and a fixed job for the 
bureaucratical worker; and selection and promotion based on each worker's technical 
competence. Based on these principles, Weber believed bureaucracy constituted the most 
efficient response to the problems created by the development of the 'capitalistic system' 
and observed tendencies of bureaucratisation, not only within private sector enterprises, 
but also in the army, the church, and universities (Giddens 1972; Abrahamsson 1993). 
Picking up some of Weber's ideas, mainly concerning the degree of division of tasks 
(more centralised or decentralised) and the way tasks were coordinated (defining the 
prime coordination mechanism), Mintzberg (1979) identified five types of structural 
configurations, resulting from the different combinations of the elements mentioned above. 
The five structures were: the simple structure; the machine bureaucracy; the professional 
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bureaucracy; the divisionalised form; and adhocracy. Mintzberg's structural configurations 
also depended on the role played by the different parts of the organisation. According to 
Mintzberg (1979), these were: the 'strategic apex', constituted by full-time top managers 
responsible for the entire organisation; the 'operating core', which was the basis of the 
organisation, where people did the basic work (production of goods or service delivery); 
the 'middle line', a hierarchy of authorities between the apex and the core (middle 
management); the 'techno-structure', often directed towards standardisation of the work 
(staff); and the 'support team', which supported the organisational logistic. 
The part of the organisation that played the most important role, the dominant coordination 
mechanism, and the degree of decentralisation, would place, according to Mintzberg 
(1979), organisations within one of the five 'ideal' structural configurations. 
In the simple structure, the strategic apex had the key position, forcing vertical and 
horizontal centralisation (here the manager had a strong power position); in the machine 
bureaucracy, the technostructure had the key role, leading to the standardisation of 
working processes; in the professional bureaucracy, the operating core had the main 
position, forcing professionalisation; in the divisionalised form, based on the 
standardisation of the output, the middle-line had the key role; and, finally, in adhocracy, 
the support structure had the key position, sometimes together with the operating core, 
forcing cooperation (it was based on mutual adjustment). 
As stated above, after the Second World War, and until the mid-1970s, a bureaucratic and 
professional configuration prevailed. According to Mintzberg (1979: 348), "[the] structural 
configuration sometimes called Professional Bureaucracy [was] common in universities, 
general hospitals, school systems, public accounting firms, social work agencies, and craft 
production firms". 
This system reinforced the autonomy of practitioner groups and represented a highly 
decentralised approach to managing, leaving professionals to manage themselves, and 
using managers only for routine administration, mediation and keeping records of 
allocations between different groups of practitioners. Trust in professional self-regulation 
manifested itself not only in the willingness to accept a high level of professional 
involvement in the process of policy formulation, but also by the absence of control 
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adopted by the central government towards regulating professional practice (Kirkpatrick et 
al. 2005). 
By the 1980s, governments were not convinced that the traditional model of 
administration, based on bureaucracy and professionalism, provided an effective form of 
management for public services, when compared to the private sector, and started to 
implement changes as a result (Hughes 2003). In Section 1.2, the factors that have 
pressured governments to reform public services and the changes that have taken place 
in those services will be discussed. 
1.2. The emergence of a new model of public management 
Several issues contributed to the disenchantment with the skills and capabilities of public 
services. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) pointed out the main factors that, according to them, 
led to the process of reform in many countries. These are: global economic forces; socio-
demographic change; national socio-economic policies; new management ideas; party 
political ideas; and pressure from citizens. Let us look closer at each one of them. 
First, significant shifts happened in the economy, forcing governments to respond (Peters 
1996). The fiscal crisis in most OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s, triggered by the 
first oil shock of the 1970s, led to severe constraints, as tax revenues declined in a relative 
sense (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Pollitt 2003; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). More recently, the 
late 2000s financial crisis affected the entire world economy, with higher detriment in 
some countries than others. These economic shifts showed that it is no longer sustainable 
to maintain high levels of public spending for a long period of time.  
Secondly, a demographic change occurred in almost all industrialised countries. In fact, in 
the last decades, there has been a disturbing decrease of the 'economically active' 
population, motivated by an ageing society and by high unemployment rates. Not 
surprisingly, this has had a severe impact on government revenue, aggravating the fiscal 
crisis of the state (Peters 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). 
Thirdly, the increasing influence of supra-national bodies led to legislative or policy 
changes at the national level. For example, in the mid- and late-1990s, EU member states 
had to struggle to meet Maastricht 'convergence criteria'. This put downward pressure on 
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public spending, leading, at least in the short-term, to higher unemployment rates (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2000; Bovaird and Loffler 2002; Hughes 2003). 
Fourthly, the emergence, over the last two decades, of new management approaches and 
techniques, such as Total Quality Management or benchmarking, generated many ideas 
on how to change the management of public services (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). 
Fifthly, pre-defined ideas of political parties, which can be more or less ideologically 
charged, may influence the way they govern. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
doctrine that was influential in a number of countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the US, was 'privatisation', leading to the need to reduce the public sector's size 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Hughes 2003). 
Finally, the public reaction against public spending, demanding a more efficient and 
effective public service (especially the political left) or a shrinking of the government 
(mainly the political right), has also had an impact (Peters 1996). In fact, many citizens 
were unhappy, since they believed some services were delivered in an inequitable way 
and that civil servants were not as efficient and productive as they should be (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). The legitimacy of established modes of 
professional organising started to be challenged, since, despite their claims of neutrality 
and impartiality, the welfare professions were helping to produce relations of power and 
inequality. Concerns about the accountability of the professions and the extent to which 
they could be trusted to manage public services independently of external control 
emerged (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005).  
When the institutions of bureau-professional control that existed in most countries started 
to be challenged, there were a considerable number of initiatives aimed at restructuring 
public service organisations by implementing a new management more concerned with 
the organisation and coordination of services towards an increased efficiency in service 
delivery (Bleiklie et al. 2000; Mwita 2000; Pollitt 2003; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). 
In order to classify and explain the reforms that took place in many countries, some 
authors came up with concepts such as 'managerialism' (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1990), 'NPM' 
(Hood 1991), 'market-based public administration' (Lan and Rosenbloom 1992), the 'post-
bureaucratic paradigm' (Barzelay 1992) or 'entrepreneurial government' (Osborne and 
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Gaebler 1992). Table 1 summarises the main ideas of these new public management 
paradigms. 
Table 1 – Summary of the ideas of the new public management paradigms 
Paradigms Authors Components/Assertions 
Managerialism 
Aucoin 1990 
and Pollitt 
1990 
1) Market and market-like environments are more effective regulators than the state;  
2) Market and market-like organisations are more efficient than public sector 
organisations;  
3) Organisations need to respond to environmental changes; 
4) Market mechanisms rely heavily upon the merits of individual choice. 
NPM Hood 1991 
1) Professional management in the public sector;  
2) Explicit standards and measures of performance;  
3) Greater emphasis on output control;  
4) Disaggregation of units in the public sector;  
5) Greater competition in the public sector;  
6) Private sector styles of management practice;  
7) Greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. 
Market-based 
public 
administration 
Lan and 
Rosenbloom 
1992 
To provoke a substantive debate between advocates of new governance and 
traditionalists in public administration, Lan and Rosenbloom present a framework for 
comparing old and new ideas and observe that the chief aim of market based public 
administration approach is that public administration can achieve its historic quest for 
both efficiency and responsiveness to the public through competitive market-like 
practices. 
Post-
bureaucratic 
paradigm 
Barzelay 
1992 
Maintains similar goals of market-oriented, customer-driven, and entrepreneurial 
reforms. It is geared towards executive and political leadership and providing results 
of value to an empowered customer of public services. 
Entrepreneurial 
government 
Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992 
1) Catalytic government: steer rather than row; 
2) Community owned government: empower communities to solve their own 
problems rather than simply deliver services;  
3) Competitive government: encourage competition in service delivery; 
4) Mission-driven government: be driven by missions, rather than rules;  
5) Results-oriented government: fund outcomes rather than inputs;  
6) Customer-driven government: meet the needs of the customer, not the 
bureaucracy;  
7) Enterprising government: concentrate on earning money rather than spending it;  
8) Anticipatory government: invest in preventing problems rather than curing crises;  
9) Decentralised government: move from hierarchy to participation and teamwork;  
10) Market-oriented government: leveraging change through the market. 
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Although all these paradigms brought new ideas on how to restructure public service 
organisations in order to increase efficiency in service delivery, two of them – 
Managerialism and NPM – became more prominent in the literature of public 
management, being also the ones most commonly referred to in the higher education 
literature. Therefore, in the following sub-sections (1.2.1 and 1.2.2), these two approaches 
will be looked at in more detail.  
1.2.1. Managerialism 
The concept of 'managerialism' was brought up for the first time in 1941, by James 
Burnham. In his book, The Managerial Revolution, Burnham argued that capitalism was 
disappearing and being substituted by 'managerialism'. In his view, a new social class – 
the managerial class – was emerging, and replacing capitalists, the old ruling class 
(Burnham 1941). 
Even though this notion had already been presented in the 1940s, 'managerialism' only 
gained expression during the 1980s, with the governments of Margaret Thatcher in the UK 
and Ronald Reagan in the US. That is why some authors classify it as 'new 
managerialism' (e.g. Deem 1998; Reed 2002; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). 
Authors like Pollitt (1990), Trow (1994), Clarke and Newman (1997), Meek (2003), and 
Deem and Brehony (2005) perceive 'managerialism' as an ideology. According to Meek 
(2003), there is a difference between management and 'managerialism'. This author 
states that while 'management' can be seen as a "set of good or best practices in running 
an organisation (…) ['managerialism' is a set of] ideological principles and values that a 
group of actors imposes on another in an attempt to control their behaviour" (Meek 2003: 
11). To Trow (1994: 11) the 'ism' points to "an ideology, to a faith or belief in the truth of a 
set of ideas which are independent of specific institutions". 
Amaral et al. (2003a) state that 'managerialism's' main concern is to reach the maximum 
efficiency (measured by the output/input ratio) and performance, either individual or 
institutional. According to these authors, this ideology is based on a set of assertions: first, 
market and market-like environments are more effective regulators than the state; second, 
market and market-like organisations are more efficient than public sector organisations; 
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third, organisations need to respond to environmental changes; and fourth, market 
mechanisms rely heavily upon the merits of individual choice.  
Therefore, this ideological model of governmental and institutional order, which represents 
the response to changes in the economic, political and social environments across the 
public sector, emphasises the import of ideas and practices from the private world of 
business into the world of public service. It pursues efficiency and effectiveness in the field 
of service delivery and advocates labour force restructuring in order to facilitate teamwork 
and flexibility (Johnson and Deem 2003; Deem and Brehony 2005). Finally, it is also 
associated with new kinds of imposed external accountability, including the widespread 
use of "marketisation, performance management, league tables, developed budgets and 
targets" (Brehony and Deem 2005: 396). 
Even though the term 'managerialism' has been used by many authors, including in the 
field of higher education, to explain the administrative reforms that have taken place in the 
public sector of many OECD countries, NPM has been the most widely used designation, 
at least over the last three decades.  
1.2.2. New Public Management 
A well-known definition of NPM was presented by Hood (1991: 4-5), who defines the main 
components of the doctrine that has spread from the late 1970s onward:  
• 'Hands-on professional management' in the public sector – active, visible and 
discretionary control of organisations from named persons at the top;  
• Explicit standards and measures of performance – definition of goals, targets, 
indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative terms, especially for 
professional services;  
• Greater emphasis on output controls – resource allocation and rewards linked to 
measured performance; breakup of centralized bureaucracy-wide personnel 
management;  
• Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector – break up of formerly 
'monolithic' units. Unbundling of U-form management systems into corporatized 
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'units around products', operating on decentralized 'one-line' budgets and dealing 
with one another on an 'arms-length' basis;  
• Shift to greater competition in the public sector – move to term contracts and public 
tendering procedures;  
• Stress on private-sector styles of management practice – move away from military-
style 'public service ethic'; greater flexibility in hiring and rewards; greater use of 
public relations techniques;  
• Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use – cutting direct costs; 
raising labour discipline; resisting union demands; limiting 'compliance costs' to 
business. 
The components of NPM can be traced back to Public Choice Theory, on the one hand, 
and 'managerialism', on the other (Hood 1991; Ferlie et al. 1996). According to the Public 
Choice Theory, people are assumed to be well-informed maximizers with logically 
consistent preferences and a self-regarding behaviour (Dunleavy 1991). The 
Managerialist approach states that government would be more efficient if it would be run 
like the private sector. 
In fact, in these 'post-bureaucratic' organisations, economic efficiency is a central belief. 
The private sector is seen as better than the public sector, market mechanisms and 
strategic behaviour are preferred to bureaucracy, and performance-based pay systems 
are considered superior to wage distribution based on seniority and collective rights 
(Bleiklie et al. 2000; Reed 2002).  
These 'post-modern' organisations look a lot different from the traditional bureaucracy. 
They are decentralised (power has been transferred from a central body to sub-units or 
operational agencies, e.g. Next Steps in the UK), leadership is team based (information 
must be available at all levels of the organisation), and the nature of hierarchy has 
changed (Clegg and Hardy 1996). More attention is paid to clients, since it is believed 
public service organisations will learn to deliver better results, and clients will notice the 
change and experience increased satisfaction (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Moreover, 
public organisations are increasingly interested in developing better methods for long-term 
planning and strategic management. These incorporate the definition of the organisation's 
mission, looking ahead to the achievement of goals and objectives, and the choice of the 
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best strategy to accomplish the planned objectives (Donnelly et al. 2000; Hughes 2003). 
In these 'reformed' organisations, managers are also given a much greater role in policy-
making, in the organisation and coordination of services, and in the consideration of 
efficiency in service delivery, essentially at the expense of politicians and service 
professionals (Bovaird and Loffler 2002; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005).  
Therefore, it could be argued that the emergence of these new management ideas have 
contributed to put the focus on making the public sector more competitive and public 
administration more responsive to citizens' needs (OECD 1993).  
After having replaced public administration as the main paradigm of public policy 
implementation and public services delivery, NPM started to be criticised by several 
authors. To Hood (1995) and Kickert (1997), for example, the geographic extent of NPM is 
limited to Anglo-American, Australasian and some Scandinavian arenas, whilst public 
administration remains dominant elsewhere. Ferlie et al. (1996) argue that NPM is not one 
phenomenon or paradigm, but a cluster of several. Rhodes (1997) states that NPM is 
limited and one-dimensional in its ability to capture and contribute to the management and 
governance of public services and of public service organisations in an increasingly plural 
and pluralist world.  
In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the study and 
practice of public policy implementation and public services delivery, some authors (e.g. 
Rhodes 1996; Jones et al. 1997; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Osborne 2006; Provan and 
Kenis 2008) developed new conceptual tools. The conceptual tool developed by Osborne 
(2006) – New Public Governance (NGP) – will be explored in the next section. 
1.2.3. New public governance 
In an effort to predict the 'shadow of the future', as Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b) portray 
the difficulty in defining the successor of NPM, Osborne (2006) describes NPG. According 
to Osborne (2010), NPG is rooted firmly within organisational institutional and network 
theory. Whereas NPM may result in hollow state models (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b), 
NGP allows for a: 
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"plural state, where multiple interdependent actors contribute to the 
delivery of public services, and a pluralist state, where multiple 
processes inform the policy-making system. Drawing upon open natural 
systems theory, it is concerned with the institutional and external 
environmental pressures that enable and constrain public policy 
implementation and the delivery of public services within such a plural 
and pluralist system. As a consequence of these two forms of plurality, 
its focus is very much upon inter-organizational relationships and upon 
the governance of processes, stressing service effectiveness and 
outcomes that rely upon the interaction of [public service organisations] 
with their environment" (Osborne 2010: 9). 
Osborne (2010) believes NPG to be "both a product of and a response to the increasingly 
complex, plural and fragmented nature of public policy implementation and service 
delivery in the twenty-first century" (ibid: 9). 
Similarly to what happened in many public organisations, HEIs have also faced increasing 
external pressures aimed at institutional change (Amaral and Magalhães 2002). The next 
section will provide an overview of some of the changes that have occurred in this sector.  
1.3. Higher education: what has changed? 
The university, understood as a complex social system, has had a considerable survival 
capacity, when compared to other organisations. In fact, modern universities have very 
similar characteristics to the first universities created (Paris, Bologna or Oxford), founded 
in the XII and XIII centuries. Kerr (1982: 152) states that "about eighty-five institutions in 
the Western world established by 1520 still exist in recognizable forms, with similar 
functions and with unbroken histories, including the Catholic church, the Parliaments of 
Isle of Man, of Iceland, and of Great Britain, several Swiss cantons, and seventy 
universities."  
But even if many universities maintain the same procedures and characteristics they had 
when they were established, they had to adapt to the new forces that are reshaping higher 
education. In fact, Amaral and Magalhães (2001: 7) argue that: 
"Universities are among the oldest institutions of Western European 
history, and if they have some common internal procedures and 
characteristics (…) and demand a certain autonomy, all of which 
conveys the idea of continuity, their history, on the contrary, is in many 
ways the archetype of institutional adaptation." 
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In the next sub-sections, a brief history of universities will be presented, as well as the 
characteristics of the first universities that were created; then, the forces that led 
universities to change or to adapt to new demands and the features of the 'modern 
university' will be displayed. 
1.3.1. The traditional nature of higher education 
Cobban (1992: 1245) argues that "the university is one of the most important institutional 
legacies which the modern world has inherited from medieval Europe". 
The first European medieval institutions considered universities were established in Italy, 
France, and England in the late 11th and the 12th centuries. According to Barnett (1994), 
among these institutions are the University of Bologna (created in 1088), the University of 
Paris (founded around 1119), later associated with the Sorbonne, and the University of 
Oxford (created between 1167 and 1185). The oldest Portuguese university is the 
University of Coimbra, founded in 1290. 
The earliest universities created in Europe by the twelfth century, were defined by Cobban 
(1975: 32) as: 
"A guild organization of masters or students or of masters and students 
combined, having a high degree of juridical autonomy, the right to elect 
its own officers, statutory making powers, and a communal seal. It had 
the drawing strength to attract students from a wide area and, in 
addition to arts, offered instruction in at least one of the superior 
faculties of law, theology or medicine, maintaining a nucleus of regent 
masters to meet diverse teaching requirements." 
Therefore, the essence of the medieval university was the academic guild organised for 
the mutual protection of its members and for the supervision of teaching. But these 
'academic corporations' were soon the recipients of imperial, royal, papal and communal 
privileges (Cobban 1992). In fact, many of the medieval universities in Western Europe 
were born under the aegis of the Roman Catholic Church, usually as cathedral schools or 
by papal bull as 'Studia Generali'2. 
                                                
2 The Latin term that most accurately described the medieval university was studium generale. Studium 
indicated a school where there were organised facilities for study, and generale referred to the ability of the 
school to attract students from beyond the local region (Cobban 1992). 
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Even if subjected to heavy secular control, the later medieval universities were far freer 
than earlier universities. As a matter of fact, in the later medieval period, "the European 
episcopate had come to an acceptance of the principle that the core and essence of a 
university was its autonomy" (Cobban 1992). 
The development of the modern university can be placed at the end of the eighteenth and 
the beginning of the nineteenth centuries (Frijhoff 1992). According to several authors 
(e.g. Neave and van Vught 1994; Amaral and Magalhães 2002), the idea of the modern 
university was mainly influenced by: the reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt in Prussia; and 
Napoleon I's reorganisation of the French higher education system (1808). 
To von Humboldt, universities "should safeguard and guarantee the institutional 
autonomy and the search for knowledge 'for the sake of knowledge itself'" (Bleiklie et al. 
2000: 40). Therefore, academic autonomy was individual and not institutional. The 
relationship with the state was that of a partnership, in which the university advanced 
culture and learning, acting as a cultural entity. The state provided the legislative 
framework conditions within which universities operated, and also prevented potential 
external factions and interests that could endanger the pursuit of knowledge (Neave and 
van Vught 1994). Thus, the basic assumption of Humboldt's idea of university was the 
"central importance of knowledge and its institutionalisation, freed from church or state 
tutelage, and from pressures of social and economic demands" (Amaral and Magalhães 
2002: 4). 
Academic autonomy in the Napoleonic University was more restrictive, since there was a 
formal administrative control over the appointment and promotion of academics, regarded 
as corps d'état, and a close control over programmes and courses. Thus, teaching and 
learning were not independent from the state (Neave and van Vught 1994). 
Despite the substantial differences between the two concepts of autonomy, Neave and 
van Vught (1994: 271) state: 
"Irrespective of whether state control involved an element of partnership or 
was wholly based on a principle of subordination and upward administrative 
accountability, academic autonomy was not simply a matter of protecting the 
freedoms of teaching and learning. It was also a question of protecting the 
modernizing sector of society against the pressures, claims and special 
pleading of vested interests and inherited privilege". 
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Universities were assumed to be agents of "national reconstruction, allied with the 
overhaul of recruitment to the apparatus of state" (ibid: 268). To Amaral and Magalhães 
(2002) that meant that, apart from being the main source of manpower for the state 
sector, universities were supposed to turn students into model and active citizens. Plus, 
they were expected to play an important role in the "project of forcing the national political 
identity through the preservation and enhancement of the national culture (…) 
[contributing to the] consolidation of the nation-state" (ibid: 3). 
The relationship between the state and universities, both in the Humboldtian and 
Napoleonic models, was described by van Vught (1989) as the 'state control model'. This 
model was characterised by a strong authority of the state, which, in order to help the 
university to pursue its mission, protected academic freedom, and a relatively strong 
position of the academic oligarchy within universities. The state regulated the curriculum, 
the degree requirements, the access conditions, and the appointment and remuneration 
of academic staff, among others, while the academic community maintained a 
considerable authority in the regulation of internal university affairs, especially education 
and research. Therefore, there was a double authority, exerted by academics and state 
bureaucrats/politicians (Braun and Merrien 1999).  
The Humboldtian idea of university, first applied to the University of Berlin, was extremely 
influential in many countries, and, according to Amaral and Magalhães (2002: 4), "it is still 
viewed by academics as an ideal form of the research university". However, over the last 
few decades, higher education faced increasing external pressures aimed at institutional 
change. The next section will describe these pressures and provide an overview of the 
changes that have occurred in this sector. 
1.3.2. Pressures and changes in higher education 
As discussed in the previous section, for many years, universities were regarded as 
respected institutions in the eyes of society. Traditionally, they emphasised self-
improvement and collegial- and self-accountability. However, in the last decades, their 
governance, authority and status started to be questioned, in many countries, especially 
due to the changes that have occurred in higher education (Brennan and Shah 2000). 
Mora (2001: 95) argues that: 
 
 
23 
"Institutions that date back to the Middle Age have experienced the most 
significant shift in their entire history. They have gone from training a 
selected elite to educating a large proportion of the population, under 
what has come to be called the mass system of higher education. As a 
result of new demands being made, higher education's objectives have 
changed significantly." 
In fact, new forces reshaped higher education. According to some literature (Shattock 
1999; Amaral and Magalhães 2002; Chevaillier 2002; Salter and Tapper 2002), the most 
relevant factors that have contributed to the urge to reform HEIs were: the shift from an 
elite to a mass higher education system, expanding the student numbers, and bringing in 
new types of students requiring new types of courses; cuts in state funding, making it 
difficult to finance institutions exclusively with public funds; the replacement of the state by 
the private sector as the main employer of graduates; the emergence of new approaches, 
such as NPM, which emphasise market regulation; greater competition between 
institutions; and the political awareness of the increasing difficulty of centrally managing 
the definition of 'useful knowledge', especially in increasingly complex systems. 
As a result, there have been external pressures to: democratise the access to higher 
education (the move towards mass higher education); contain costs; be accountable for 
the money spent; increase productivity; improve the quality of teaching and research; and 
develop the third mission and show its impact on society.  
Moreover, the signing of the Bologna Declaration in 1999 put more pressure on many 
European states to establish national quality frameworks and on HEIs to introduce quality 
assurance mechanisms. The Ministers responsible for higher education from twenty-nine 
European countries (including Portugal and the UK) signed this declaration on the 19th of 
June 1999, one year after the Sorbonne Declaration3. They agreed on important joint 
objectives for the development of a coherent and cohesive European Higher Education 
Area (EHEA) by 2010, being the main objective not to harmonise national education 
systems but rather to provide tools to connect them. This meant that, by 2010, higher 
education systems in European countries should be organised in such a way that: it 
should be easy to move from one country to the other (within the EHEA), for the purpose 
of further study or employment; and more people from non-European countries would 
                                                
3 In 1998, four countries – France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom – signed the Sorbonne Declaration. 
This declaration provided the necessary push towards the Bologna Declaration and indicated the main goals 
of the European Higher Education Area. 
 
 
24 
come to study and/or work in Europe, given the increased attractiveness of the EHEA. 
This Area should provide Europe with a broad, high quality and advanced knowledge 
base, and ensure the further development of Europe as a stable, peaceful and tolerant 
community.  
Forty-six countries in the wider Europe and several international organisations4 worked 
towards establishing the EHEA, with the Ministers responsible for higher education in 
these countries meeting every second year to measure progress and set priorities for 
action. On the follow-up meetings new decisions were made. In Bergen, in 2005, the 
Ministers of Education agreed to the Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in 
the EHEA drafted by the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education 
(ENQA), in co-operation with the European University Association (EUA), the European 
Association of Institutions of Higher Education (EURASHE) and the European Students' 
Union (ESU, former ESIB). In the London meeting, in 2007, the Ministers of Education 
established the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR), 
based on a proposal drafted by ENQA, EUA, EURASHE and ESU. And, in 2009, the 
Ministers of Education held another meeting in Leuven, opening the way to the 
implementation of a ranking system, in a section entitled 'Multidimensional Transparency 
Tools':  
"We note that there are several current initiatives designed to develop 
mechanisms for providing more detailed information about higher 
education institutions across the EHEA to make their diversity more 
transparent. We believe that any such mechanisms, including those 
helping higher education systems and institutions to identify and 
compare their respective strengths, should be developed in close 
consultation with the key stakeholders" (Communiqué 2009). 
Within this trend, the European Commission funded two projects: U-Map and U-Multirank. 
Kaiser and Jongbloed (2010: 1) describe these projects: "[While] the U-Map project 
provides a mapping of institutions, the U-Multirank project aims at a ranking of 
institutions". These recent developments will most likely lead to a ranking of European 
universities and to the implementation of a stratified EHEA.  
                                                
4 These were: the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the European University Association (EUA), 
the European Association of Institutions of Higher Education (EURASHE), the European Students' Union 
(ESU, former ESIB), the UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education (UNESCO-CEPES), the European 
Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA), the Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE), and the Education International Pan-European Structure. 
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With all the changes that have happened in the last decades, the university culture has 
increasingly moved towards a market-driven enterprise culture, largely reflecting the new 
management models that have spread throughout the public sector (Ackroyd and Ackroyd 
1999). The state started to lose control in favour of market-driven decision-making. State 
regulation was seen as excessive, and the market appeared as the solution to all the 
problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness resulting from that regulation (Amaral and 
Magalhães 2001). There was a move from the 'state control model' to the 'state 
supervision model' (van Vught 1989). According to the latter model, usually found in 
countries with an Anglo-Saxon tradition, the authority is divided between the internal 
administration of universities and a strong academic community. To Braun and Merrien 
(1999: 17): 
"Typically, one finds a stronger position of deans, university presidents 
and the administration in comparison to most European universities, as 
well as a considerable influence of the Board of Trustees [in some 
countries]. The state only supervises the system in terms of assuring 
academic quality and the maintenance of a certain level of 
accountability". 
Van Vught (1989) rejected the logic of the market, in favour of the logic of a quasi-market, 
since he considers that governments always play a certain role. 
The introduction of the concepts of quasi-market and privatisation as mechanisms to 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness had a profound impact on universities. To Amaral 
and Magalhães (2002: 6), "education is no longer seen as a social right; it has become a 
service". Students started to be seen as customers or clients and HEIs viewed as service 
providers that want to meet their clients' needs and expectations (Meek 2003). 
To Neave (1998), the passage from the 'state control model' to the 'state supervision 
model' explains the rise of what he called the 'evaluative state'. While, in small elite higher 
education systems, exclusiveness was generally sufficient to justify claims for quality to 
society, the changes facing higher education – massification, cuts in funding and 
diversification – pressured institutions towards more accountability. This has led to a 
growing emphasis on the implementation of more explicit and systematic mechanisms for 
quality assessment and management within universities (Brennan and Shah 2000; Vilalta 
2001), and on the development of performance measurement and management 
approaches. 
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Before looking at the issue of performance management and analysing, in detail, the way 
HEIs are dealing with pressures to introduce performance management practices, it is 
essential to understand the way HEIs are governed and managed. This analysis will be 
carried out in the next chapter. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Governance and management in higher 
education 
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"Management of many is the same as management of few.  
It is a matter of organisation." 
Sun Tzu 
"To do great things is difficult;  
but to command great things is more difficult." 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
In order to comprehend the way universities are governed and managed, this chapter is 
structured in the following way: first, the concepts of 'governance' and 'management' will 
be defined; the major changes that have happened in higher education in terms of 
governance and management will be looked at; and the main typologies of governance 
systems developed to explain those changes and to deal with country differences and with 
the complexity of national governance arrangements will be displayed. Secondly, the 
patterns of the distribution of power of different higher education systems will be analysed. 
Thirdly, HEIs will be looked at as organisations. Their unique characteristics will be 
highlighted; the main internal and external stakeholders will be examined; the major 
governance models that attempt to explain the way universities are governed and 
managed will be outlined; and institutional behaviour will be looked at through the lens of 
neo-institutionalism. Finally, a new framework to analyse governance structures in higher 
education will be presented. 
2.1. The concepts of governance and management 
Interest in university governance is of long-standing and remains a contested subject and 
one that is still evolving to fit a changing environment (Shattock 2006). Even though there 
are several definitions of governance, usually varying according to the theoretical and/or 
ideological approach adopted (Osborne 2010) or to the level of analysis (e.g. national, 
local, institutional, sub-unit or discipline) (Reed et al. 2002), a simple definition would be to 
say that governance is not so much about what organisations do but about how they do it.  
It is important to distinguish governance from related terms such as 'management', 
'administration' and 'leadership'.  
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To Gallangher (2001: 1):  
"Governance is the structure of relationships that bring about 
organisational coherence, authorised policies, plans and decisions, and 
account for their probity, responsiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
Leadership is seeing opportunities and setting strategic directions (…). 
Management is achieving intended outcomes through the allocation of 
responsibilities and resources, and monitoring their efficiency and 
effectiveness. Administration is the implementation of authorised 
procedures and the application of systems to achieve agreed results." 
In a broader sense, governance can be considered to incorporate leadership, 
management and administration. According to Marginson and Considine (2000: 7): 
"Governance is concerned with the determination of values inside 
universities, their systems of decision-making and resource allocation, 
their mission and purposes, the patterns of authority and hierarchy, and 
the relationship of universities as institutions to the different academic 
worlds within and the worlds of government, business and communities, 
without". 
For the purpose of this research, this broader definition of governance will be adopted. 
The next section will explore the changes that have occurred in the governance and 
management of higher education. 
2.2. Changes in the governance and management of higher education 
Many authors (e.g. Baldridge 1971; Mintzberg 1989) argue that, up to the late 1980s, and 
similarly to what happened in other public service organisations (see Section 1.1), HEIs 
presented a bureau-professional structure, characterized by the co-existence of two types 
of authority: the bureaucratic, put forth by administrators, and the professional, exerted by 
academics, who had a central role in the functioning of universities.  
These two basic organisational structures (the academic and the administrative) were 
ruled by two separate concepts of organisational relationships: the collegiate and the 
hierarchical/bureaucratic. Kogan (1999: 264) defines the 'collegium' as a "group of 
academics of equal decision-making power acting together to determine standards of 
entry and accreditation, to share collective resources, and to determine divisions of labour 
and reward systems". Under the collegiate system, academics are accountable to their 
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peers. Under the bureaucratic system, decisions are taken hierarchically and there are 
generally a series of norms and principles on which the functioning of the system rests 
(Villarreal 2001), in the framework of the rule of law. 
When these 'traditional' models of university governance started to be considered unfit for 
rapidly changing environments, more entrepreneurial strategies and structures were 
perceived to be needed in many countries (De Boer and Goedegebuure 2001). This move 
from bureaucratic and collegial models of governance towards more managerial ones has, 
arguably, created opposition and tension between managerial and professional norms 
(Amaral et al. 2003a; Lapworth 2004).  
The biggest reforms took place in countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon model of 
system-level governance. For Australia and the UK, these reforms were not isolated to a 
particular public sector, but were a component of a much broader rethinking and 
restructuring of the role and function of government (Amaral et al. 2002). 
In order to explain the changes that have occurred in terms of governance and to deal 
with the inter-country variation and the complexity of national governance arrangements in 
higher education (Braun 1999a), several authors (e.g. Clark 1983; van Vught 1989; 
McNay 1995; Braun 1999b) developed typologies of governance systems. Amongst the 
first and the most often-cited ones is Burton Clark's (1983) Triangle of Coordination. 
The triangle represents the three powers operating in higher education, which are, 
according to Clark (1983), responsible for the coordination and control of its activities: the 
state, the market, and the academic oligarchy (see Figure 1)5.  
To Clark (1983), advanced industrial countries develop different forms of coordination of 
higher education, which are located between the three axes: a more market-like 
coordination (like the US), a more state-induced coordination (e.g. Sweden), and a form 
of coordination based on the rule of academic oligarchy (e.g. Italy).  
                                                
5 In his analysis, Clark separates the state authority into two components – the bureaucratic and the political – 
considering the possibility of a 'four-sided triangle' (McNay 1995). 
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Figure 1 – Burton Clark's Triangle of Coordination 
 Source: Adapted from Clark (1983), who did not position Portugal in the 
Triangle. 
To Clark (1983), Sweden would be closer to the extreme state coordination, since it 
developed a strong capacity for state officials and allied interest groups to reverse the 
strong power and privileges of professors. 
France would be located further down away from the state extreme and more towards 
oligarchy, since, "despite a strong and competent ministry, the continuing situation, [had] 
something of the character of a standoff between the formally superior powers of the 
central officials and the capacities of university personnel to ward off, reshape, and 
attenuate state-imposed rules and policies" (Clark 1983: 142). 
Italy would be closer to the extreme of the academic oligarchy, since "its prestigious and 
powerful national academic oligarchs traditionally have been more than a match for a 
relatively impotent bureaucracy" (ibid: 143). 
Japan was considered a complex case. Even though, on the one hand, national 
coordination was formally left largely to ministerial officials; on the other, the chair system, 
mixed with certain Japanese characteristics of loyalty and cohesiveness, gave senior 
professors a strong power base (Clark 1983). 
The US would be closer to the market extreme, since American academics were poorly 
represented in the control structure (Clark 1983). 
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The UK would be nearer the academic oligarchy, because of the extensive role played by 
intermediate bodies, such as the University Grants Committee (UGC), in which academics 
were dominant. Clark (1983: 143) argued that "even after the significant increase in state 
power that has occurred since the mid-1960s, deliberate coordination in Britain [remained] 
a blend of the bureaucratic and the professional". 
Although Portugal was not in Burton Clark's original Triangle of Coordination, its position 
in the triangle could be justified by the Portuguese legal framework, which traditionally has 
been very rigid, and by the organisational models adopted (Rosa 2003). To Conceição et 
al. (1998), Portuguese HEIs could be characterised by a strong weight of the academic 
oligarchy, a considerable importance of the state authority, and some distance from the 
market forces. 
Since the publication of Clark's triangle in 1983 several other typologies referring to this 
triangle were developed (e.g. van Vught 1989; Becher and Kogan 1992; McDaniel 1996). 
One of the most often quoted studies on governance of the last years was developed by 
van Vught (1989), who reduces Clark's three-dimensional space of governance to a two-
dimensional one. This author suggests that a differentiation should be made between a 
'state control model' and a 'state supervision model'. He does not consider the category of 
the market, since, according to him, universities do not function according to the logic of a 
market, but rather to the logic of a quasi-market where government always plays a certain 
role (van Vught 1989).  
The 'state control model', characterised by a strong authority of state bureaucracy, on the 
one hand, and a relatively strong position of the academic oligarchy within universities, on 
the other, was, according to van Vught (1989), present in most European states. The 
'state supervision model', characterised by a weaker authority of the state bureaucracy, 
could be mainly found in Anglo-Saxon countries (van Vught 1989). According to the 'state 
supervision model', authority is divided between a strong academic community and the 
internal administration of universities. The state only supervises the system in terms of 
assuring academic quality and the maintenance of a certain level of accountability (Braun 
and Merrien 1999). 
Some authors (e.g. Braun 1999a; Braun and Merrien 1999) criticised van Vught's (1989) 
model for reducing governance to the role the state plays in the governance of 
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universities. To these authors, this model did not take into account, for example, the 
differences between the governance system of the UK and the US, which belonged, 
according to van Vught (1989), to the 'supervisory state model'. To Braun (1999a), the 
governance model proposed by van Vught (1989) was not differentiating sufficiently and 
should not exclude the market dimension from the analysis, since this was considered 
important for the intended differentiation between higher education systems. 
Another criticism made to van Vught's (1989) model was the non-inclusion of new 
managerialism as a new form of governance (Braun and Merrien 1999). To Braun 
(1999a), van Vught (1989) did not see the 'state supervision model' as a shift in the belief 
system of governments nor as a shift in the governance of universities, regarding it as a 
model that always existed in Anglo-American countries. 
In an attempt to overcome some of the shortcomings pointed out to van Vught's (1989) 
model, Braun (1999a) gave another perspective. According to him, higher education 
systems in the beginning of the 1980s could be classified into three groups: the 'collegium 
model', the 'oligarchic-bureaucratic model' and the 'market model'. The first model, 
characterised by the predominance of the cultural belief system, the autonomy in 
substantive matters, and the minor role of the state in the regulation of internal matters, 
offers the most freedom for universities (he gives English universities in the early 1980s 
as an example). The 'oligarchic-bureaucratic model' does not lend freedom in procedural 
matters to universities, since it is constrained by administrative calculus of the state (e.g. 
West Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands). The 'market model' (e.g. 
US) is "based on the predominance of the utilitarian belief system, while substantive 
freedom might be lower in public universities in comparison with the European 
universities" (Braun 1999b: 248). 
Taking into account the different reform attempts under the pressure of NPM, Braun 
(1999b) distinguishes between two different models: a more 'efficiency-oriented model' 
and a more 'client/market-oriented model'. According to him, the first emerged in most of 
the former oligarchic-bureaucratic countries (Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland). The 
'client/market-oriented model', characterised by decentralisation, privatisation and 
attempts to create an attitude of client orientation in public and quasi-public institutions, 
emerged in countries like the US, the UK and the Netherlands. To Braun (1999b: 248), 
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"the switch in England's governance model from a 'collegium' to a 'market-oriented 
managerialism model' has been without no doubt the most radical."  
Having presented the concept of governance and the changes that have occurred in the 
governance and management of higher education, leading to the development of 
typologies of governance systems, it is important to understand how the patterns of the 
distribution of power vary between higher education systems and over time. This will 
enable a better comprehension of the functioning of the two higher education systems that 
will be looked at within the scope of this research: the British and the Portuguese. 
2.3. General patterns of the distribution of power in higher education systems 
Notwithstanding its extreme importance, Clark's (1983) framework does not explore the 
strength of HEIs as autonomous organisations. In fact, none of the vertices of the triangle 
represents the top management levels of HEIs. The introduction of this 'power' became 
increasingly important with the transition from a 'state control model' to a 'state supervision 
model' (see Section 1.3.2). This shift led to a transfer of power from the state to HEIs, 
especially to the top management level of these institutions (Kells 1992). 
Kells (1992) introduced this 'power' based on a model proposed by Clark and Youn 
(1976), and analysed the general patterns of the distribution of power in three higher 
education systems – the US, the UK and Continental Europe (Figure 2). 
In the case of the US, power was concentrated at the top of the institution, both in public 
and private organisations, even if there were some variations due, for example, to age and 
prestige. To Kells (1992), there was always a strong sense of individualism and the fear of 
centralised power in the US, and this was, according to him, reflected in the nature of 
institutions. These institutions were diverse and there was a lack of control over education 
at national and federal level. "The result is a large system with numerous institutions, few 
common standards, great flexibility and diversity in a highly competitive, market-related 
environment" (ibid: 21). American HEIs were chartered by the state and legally controlled 
by what was normally called a 'Board of Trustees'. This board hired its academics and 
executives in almost every State. 
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Figure 2 – General patterns of the distribution of power 
in higher education systems in the middle of the 
twentieth century 
Source: Kells (1992: 21) 
In the UK, there existed a considerable power in the faculties, some executive capacity, 
and a strong government influence, exerted by a planning and a funding body (see Figure 
2). Each university was responsible for its own management, deciding on issues related 
with the recruitment of academics and the curricula offered (Neave and van Vught 1994). 
To Kells (1992), for a long time, the British higher education system remained a relatively 
small, elite one, with common high academic standards enforced by the faculties across 
institutions through an exemplary external examiner system. Nevertheless, by the middle 
of the twentieth century, the higher education system had become costly and with little 
systematic regulation over large institutional issues. Neither government regulation nor the 
regulation of university councils were effective. Peer control in disciplines affected the 
form and content of the curriculum and, via peer review, the sponsor of research funds. 
Nevertheless, it did not regulate programmes or institutions (Kells 1992). 
In Continental Europe, there were, during most part of the twentieth century (some 
changes happened in the last decades), two sources of power, neither of them in the 
hands of the university as an organisation (see Figure 2). To Kells (1992), the general 
pattern was for centralised definition of degree standards, tight control over new 
programmes, and total (or essentially total) financial support of the university by the state. 
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Within this framework, an independent set of faculties, with power to function largely as 
they choose within the boundaries of their statutes, operated as a counterbalancing force. 
Even if most of the academics had tenure guaranteed, usually through civil servant status, 
they had the freedom and the responsibility to teach with very little control. They controlled 
their own programmes and structures with little if any post hoc regulation by the state, by 
the university and by their colleagues, with the exception of the peer review of any 
sponsored project's research funds (Kells 1992). As Harman (1992) stated, within the 
'continental mode' of governance, authority was shared by faculty guilds and state 
bureaucracy. 
The last quarter of the twentieth century brought, according to Kells (1992), fundamental 
changes to several countries, changing the patterns of power and regulation of the three 
profiles described in Figure 2. Figure 3 displays those changes. 
 
Figure 3 – Changes in the distribution of power in higher 
education systems from the middle to the end of the 
twentieth century 
Source: Kells (1992: 24) 
Note: Dotted lines represent the mid-twentieth century alignments. 
In the US, the push for increased accountability and the economic press on HEIs and their 
faculties (schools and departments) led, according to Kells (1992), to a relatively small 
 
 
37 
increase in the power exerted by the government and to a decrease in the executive 
power and the power exerted by faculties. 
In the UK, the reforms introduced by the Thatcher government in the 1980s led to major 
changes in the distribution of power within the British higher education system. The 
replacement of the UGC by the Universities Funding Council (UFC), a government-
responsive funding body, increased the power of the government in HEIs and contributed 
to the increase (although not as substantially) of the power of the vice-chancellor and 
other university executives. There was also a loss of power and influence by most 
faculties, since they were put under pressure to be productive and to find income in an 
entrepreneurial-like environment (Kells 1992). 
Some Continental European countries adopted systems where government guides at a 
distance the activities of each higher education system, leaving the institutions with the 
power to manage their affairs and respond to the needs of their clients and to contribute to 
the national or regional economic, political and social development: "Power has shifted 
demonstrably, but far from entirely, from ministries to institutions and to their leaders" 
(Kells 1992: 25). 
Having analysed the way power is distributed in different higher education systems and 
the way it has evolved over time, the next section will look at HEIs as organisations. Being 
the focus of this research to explore the way governance structures relate to performance 
management systems, it is considered extremely important to understand how HEIs are 
organised and structured, before looking at performance related issues. 
2.4. Universities as organisations 
Higher education institutions are complex organisations, often employing and training 
more people than some of the largest companies. Moreover, they share some unique 
characteristics that distinguish them from other organisations. These features affect the 
issues of leadership and management in academic settings and make it difficult to find a 
single governance and management model that is perfectly adapted to these 
environments. Maassen and van Vught (1992) point out the characteristics that make 
HEIs unique: 
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• The handling of knowledge is the most crucial activity in universities (Clark 1983); 
• The knowledge areas form the basic 'building blocks' of a HEI. Consequently, the 
typical organisational structure of universities is fragmented and its specialised 
cells are only loosely coupled; 
• Decision-making power is spread across a large number of units and actors; 
• Innovations in universities mainly have a 'grassroots' character. Sudden, 
comprehensive, and major changes are rare and extremely difficult to occur, 
because of the diffusion of power and the fragmentation of tasks (Clark 1983); 
• Authority is located at the lower levels of the organisation (with academic 
professionals). At the level of the institutional administration, authority is rather 
weak (this is more common in HEIs in Continental Europe). 
To van Vught (1988: 16), these characteristics limit, to a large extent, "the capacity of 
institutional planners to steer the professional experts in traditional bureaucratic ways". 
Indeed, the rise of ideals such as 'academic freedom', which is commonly built into most 
HEIs, seems to have helped to create in-built resistance to management control, and 
seems to have limited the influence of institutional and corporate management upon the 
basic activities in the institution (Lockwood 1985).  
Additionally, because of the multiplicity, ambiguity and complexity of goals of a university, 
"there is no way that anyone can assess the degree of goal achievement. No one knows if 
any or all the stated goals are accepted by significant groups within the system, and with 
what priority" (Clark 1983: 19). Due to these facts, it is difficult to maintain management 
and leadership at universities in the traditional sense of administration (Cohen and March 
1974).  
Although these aspects are relevant and should be taken into consideration when 
management is discussed and practiced in academic settings, it is not believed that all 
kinds of governance and management practices are impossible or irrelevant in the 
academic context. First, many of the features mentioned seem to be changing in different 
countries (at least there have been strong pressures for such a change, as discussed in 
Section 1.3.2). Second, it can be argued that academics already carry out a number of 
managerial roles when, for example, they are responsible for resources, curricula or 
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supervision of students. Thus, it seems that sometimes academics who reject a 
managerial label "take too narrow a definition of the term" (Kekäle 2005). 
Birnbaum (1988) argues that in order to learn how HEIs work they have to be seen as 
organisations, as systems, and as inventions. When they are studied as organisations, 
they are seen as "groups of people filling roles and working together toward the 
achievement of common objectives within a formal social structure" (ibid: 1). When they 
are looked at as systems, particular roles and structures are less important, being the 
focus on the dynamics through which the whole and the parts interact. Finally, social 
systems, such as HEIs, have to be seen as symbolic inventions that exist because people 
believe in them. 
The next section will present a systemic view of higher education, since this will be the 
one adopted for the purpose of this research. Looking at higher education as an open 
system will contribute to an understanding of the environment surrounding HEIs and the 
interactions between these institutions and the multiple subsystems. Moreover, it will 
enable the identification of the main internal and external stakeholders of HEIs, which 
have a major role in the way these institutions are governed and managed. 
2.4.1. A systemic view of higher education 
Being complex social systems, universities are in constant interaction with the 
surrounding environment, which is essential for their functioning. This environment 
comprises all the institutions and factors which are external to the organisation, but that 
might influence its activity. 
Adopting a systemic view to look at universities, Conceição et al. (1998) applied Kast and 
Rosenweig's (1972) concepts of environmental suprasystem and organisational 
subsystems (goals and values, technical, structural, psychosocial and managerial) to 
HEIs: 
• Environmental suprasystem – composed of the characteristics of the environment 
that surrounds HEIs and by the way this environment relates to the various 
subsystems and influences their structure and way of acting; 
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• Goals and values subsystem – related to the values of each individual or group 
and to the delineated goals, which will characterise the relationship between HEIs 
and society and influence strategic decision-making processes. These values and 
objectives, if accepted and shared by all or, at least, by the dominant groups, will 
become organisational values and goals; 
• Technical subsystem – represented by knowledge and by the capabilities and 
techniques needed to develop processes and tasks; 
• Structural subsystem – translated into the organisational structures of HEIs, mainly 
in terms of degree of centralisation and specialisation; 
• Psychosocial subsystem – related to the organisational climate and to the way 
individuals and groups interact and influence the structure and functioning of the 
organisation; 
• Management subsystem – built by the communication, coordination and control 
mechanisms of the organisation. It is linked to the distribution of resources and 
delegation of power. This subsystem has an integrative function within HEIs. 
Based on this typology, Conceição et al. (1998) showed how each subsystem is in 
constant communication with the environmental suprasystem and with other subsystems 
(see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 – Systemic vision of a university 
Source: Adapted from Conceição et al. (1998: 186). 
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Given that the frontiers between the organisation and its environment are often blurry – 
for example, alumni may be part of the university or of its surrounding environment; or, an 
organisation can strategically influence its environment – it is important, according to 
Conceição et al. (1998) to distinguish between two types of environments: a more general 
one, and a specific one. The general environment is composed of all the environmental 
factors that affect every organisation in a homogeneous way, and whose impact is not 
decisive for the survival of those organisations. It includes, for example, a country's 
economic growth and the cultural level of the population. The specific environment is 
composed of all the elements that directly affect the organisation's capability to be 
effective and to fulfil its goals. Thus, the latter environment comprises both environmental 
aspects and internal and external stakeholders (Conceição et al. 1998). 
The concept of 'stakeholder' was popularised by Freeman (1984), in his book Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach. In that work, he defined 'stakeholder' as "any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisations 
objectives" (ibid: 46). Amaral and Magalhães (2002) use a similar, broad definition, 
considering a stakeholder "a person or entity with a legitimate interest in higher education 
and which, as such, acquires de right to intervene" (ibid: 2).  
Amaral and Magalhães (2002) define two categories of stakeholders of higher education: 
internal and external. To these authors, 'internal stakeholders' are the members of the 
academic community, meaning those who participate in the daily life of universities 
(students, academic staff and non-academic staff); and 'external stakeholders' are those 
members that have an interest in higher education, even though they come from outside 
the university, that is, the representatives of the 'outside world' in university governance 
(these include the state, employers, taxpayers, parents, international organisations, 
among others). Figure 5 displays the internal stakeholders of a university and some of the 
most influent external stakeholders. 
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Figure 5 – University stakeholders 
Source: Adapted from Conceição et al. (1998: 110). 
The objectives and strategies of each group will depend on each university's 
characteristics. Nevertheless, some features seem to be common to every HEI: the 
increasing control exerted by professional associations, through mechanisms of degree 
accreditation; the increasing demands of students, who seek not only a degree, but also a 
job guarantee (Conceição et al. 1998); and the power exerted by international 
organisations, such as the European Commission. 
Amaral and Magalhães (2002) argue that the recent changes taking place in higher 
education (see Section 1.3.2) indicate a loss of influence of internal stakeholders and a 
bigger role for external stakeholders. The latter have arguably become more powerful in 
the face of change, since their presence is believed to make HEIs more responsive to 
environmental needs and changes.  
Having looked at higher education from a systemic point of view has helped to understand 
that HEIs are in permanent interaction with the general environment and to comprehend 
who are the main internal and external stakeholders of these institutions. Given that not 
every HEI is organised or managed in the same manner, it is now important to identify the 
different models that seek explanations for the way these institutions are governed and 
managed.  
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2.4.2. Governance models  
Higher education literature has produced several models, both analytical and managerial, 
that provide a vehicle for understanding how universities are governed and managed. 
Rhoades (1992: 1377) argues that "governance models in the higher education literature 
are grounded in conceptions of authority, of legitimate rules". 
Miller (1995) proposes the categorisation of higher education governance models into four 
groups: 
• Rational models – these models assume that HEIs are composed of rational 
individuals, who will have access to relevant information for decision-making and 
who, through a process of reasoned discussion, will come to an agreement about 
the goals and strategies to achieve them. In its more simplistic form, these models 
make the fundamental assumption of consensus. Within this group, two models 
can be found: the 'bureaucratic model' and the 'collegial model'. 
• Models that emphasise ambiguity – these models see the management of HEIs as 
an ambiguous, paradoxical and disorganised arena. They consider that, in each 
institution, there are several problems and solutions that are not necessarily 
articulated and that there is a group of actors that proposes solutions. There are 
also occasions where the institution itself has to take measures as an answer to 
situations of crisis or to pressures exerted by particular individuals or groups. Two 
models are integrated into this group: the 'garbage can model' and the 'organised 
anarchy model'. 
• Political models – these models emphasise the political and interactionist aspects 
of the relationship between individuals and groups that constitute HEIs. They place 
less emphasis on the HEI as an institutional entity. The 'political arena model' fits 
into this group. 
• Mixed models – these models attempt to include aspects of other models in either 
a sequential (Enderud 1977) or a systemic perspective (Becher and Kogan 1992). 
In the next sections, the models incorporated in each of the four groups will be explored 
further. These are: the Bureaucratic Model, the Collegial Model, the Garbage Can Model, 
the Organised Anarchy Model, the Political Arena Model, and mixed models. 
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2.4.2.1. Bureaucratic Model 
This model is based on Max Weber's (1964) analysis on bureaucracy and rational legal 
authority, which was discussed in detail in Section 1.1.  
To Miller (1995: 97), a bureaucratic organisation "has a formal organizational structure, 
specified roles with a hierarchy, and a clear chain of command with formalized written 
regulations and procedures. The authority of the official – in the case of universities, an 
administrator or academic – will rest on the holding of an office rather than personal 
charisma or traditional reverence". In the pure form, a bureaucratic organisation pursues 
rationally justified goals, being its activities related to the attainment of those goals.  
Given that this model is not flexible enough to make the necessary adjustments to a 
changing environment, it has been losing its power inside HEIs. Miller (1995) argues that 
bureaucratic models tend to be more influential when the situation is relatively stable. 
However, under conditions of severe cutbacks or rapid growth, the stresses of adaptation 
may unveil disagreements about the goals of the university, which will not be solved by 
rational discussion. 
Nevertheless, many universities still display characteristics of the bureaucratic model in 
their governance and management. 
2.4.2.2. Collegial Model 
Similarly to bureaucracy, collegiality also embodies aspects of rationality, especially since 
both models share the assumption that through the exercise of reason consensus will be 
reached. The main difference between the bureaucratic model and the collegial model is 
that the emphasis of the collegial model is on equality and democratic discussion, while 
hierarchy and subordination are the characteristics of bureaucratic forms (Miller 1995). 
The terms collegium and collegiality are often used in higher education. Sanders (1973) 
argues that collegiality is marked by mutual respect for each other's opinions; by an 
agreement on what good scholarship is; and by a willingness to be judged by peers. 
That means that, within the collegial model, almost every decision concerning the 
institution is discussed in senates, councils and assemblies, where a group of academics 
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of equal decision-making power seats. The chief representing the group – rector or vice-
chancellor – is elected from within a body of peers (Clark 1983). 
Within this model, the influence exerted by certain individuals over others is related to the 
technical skills and knowledge demonstrated. In the bureaucratic model this influence is 
related to the place occupied in the hierarchy of the institution. 
To Clark (1983), the collegial model is the professors' preferred way to run a university, 
since it gives them time to express their opinions. However, being a model where ideas 
come from the bottom to the top, collegial meetings often take too long, delaying the 
decision-making process and not leaving enough room for strategic decisions to be made. 
2.4.2.3. Garbage Can Model 
According to this model, proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen in 1972, there is no careful 
consideration of choices or strategy, like in the rational models. It considers that there are 
a variety of actors in the university who have problems or propose solutions and that there 
are occasions when the organisation has to make decisions in response to particular 
pressures or crises. At this juncture, ad hoc meetings occur within 'the garbage can' and 
there is an outcome (Cohen et al. 1972). Therefore, governance and decision-making take 
place through a 'garbage can' process in which problems, solutions, participants and 
choice opportunities are dumped together (Rhoades 1992). 
To Walford (1987: 133), in this model, "the sequence of actions is not predetermined and 
there is a discontinuous flow of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities 
without there necessarily being any 'logical' or one to one relationship between these four 
elements". 
2.4.2.4. Organised Anarchy Model 
In a book entitled Leadership and Ambiguity, published in 1974, Cohen and March identify 
a type of organisation they term as 'organized anarchy'. According to them, this type of 
organisation has the following characteristics (Cohen and March 1974): 
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• An ambiguity of goals, with inconsistent and ill-defined preferences and a 
multiplicity of objectives; 
• Activities such as teaching, consulting and other forms of professional service 
have ambiguous processes. While there are some regularities of procedure, the 
activities to be performed remain an art, learned by experience, trial and error, 
imitation and inventions born of necessity; 
• The members of the organisation differ in the degree of time and effort they devote 
to its concerns. The degree of participation is not specified by an organisational 
chart, but by the issues addressed, the choices to be made, timing and 
temperament; 
• The decisions made often secure only partial and erratic attention from 
participants, and a major share of the attention devoted to a particular issue is tied 
less to its content than its symbolic significance and its impact on group esteem; 
• It takes a great deal of force and energy to get anything changed. There is a 
tendency to continue with the policies, procedures and patterns of the past; 
• The data necessary for informed decision-making is not commonly collected 
(perhaps because of the unclear technology) and not well disseminated (because 
of the fluidity of participation). 
The Organised Anarchy Model regards the university as a very loosely structured 
institution, in contrast to private organisations or government departments. According to 
this model, universities are disconnected organisations that, apparently, have few 
consensual objectives. These institutions are formed by autonomous groups little 
articulated between them, which act according to the moment and to different factors, 
such as individual preferences.  
The defenders of this model do not ignore the fact that universities are composed of 
individuals and groups that act in order to maximise their utility; they simply consider that 
the institution, as a whole, does not have clearly defined goals (Cohen and March 1974). 
To Miller (1995), this could be a reasonable description of interactions in the 1960s and 
1970s. But, according to him, by the 1980s, with increasing government control and 
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reduced resources, the political aspects of university governance and the increased 
managerial control emerged, transforming this model into an anachronistic one. 
2.4.2.5. Political Arena Model 
The emergence of a political model of university management was accepted by key actors 
– academics, administrators and managers – in universities during the 1980s. This model 
assumes that individuals are motivated by self-interest and that any analysis must take 
into due account power relations and differences in interests. The most well-known 
political model is the Political Arena Model, proposed by Baldridge (1971). 
Baldridge (1971) applied the expression 'political arena' to universities, since, according to 
him, these institutions are the synthesis of conflicts and power relations between the 
different agents, resulting their function from the articulation and integration of conflicting 
and divergent behaviours.  
Baldridge et al. (1978) distinguish six assumptions about the political process, which 
would apply to the interactions in and of a university:  
• There is a lot of uncertainty and, for much of the time, most people are not involved 
in the policy process;  
• Individuals who spend continuous time and effort over particular issues are 
effective in influencing and controlling policy. In general they are predominantly 
senior administrative and academic staff, usually the vice-chancellor or president 
and the registrar;  
• Universities are composed of different interest groups with different interests and 
goals, which are likely to come into conflict, unless there are plentiful resources;  
• Conflict is normal, not being necessarily dysfunctional;  
• The power and authority of the formal bureaucratic system within the university will 
be modified and changed by the political action of interest groups;  
• Interest groups are located both inside and outside the university (the stakeholders 
referred to in Section 2.4.1 – see Figure 5), and there are some external groups, 
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such as political parties or trade unions, that have a powerful influence on what 
happens inside the university. 
According to Miller (1995: 102), "Baldridge's model is useful in analysing the political 
processes and management of universities during stress or crisis (…) [and] when there 
are severe reductions in resources or major reorganizations". 
Miller (1995) also argues that since this model concentrates on showing the explicit 
political processes and identifies the importance of conflict, negotiation and control of 
resources between competing interest groups, it minimizes the existence of implicit power 
relations that operate in the environment. 
Birnbaum (1988) argues that each one of the models that have been presented 
represents an idealised version of how HEIs are organised and administered. However, in 
the real world, it would not be easy to find institutions matching one exact model of 
governance. They will most likely present more characteristics of one of the models over 
the others, always or during a certain period of time, being probably necessary to 
interrelate some concepts and models. Some more sophisticated analyses of university 
organisation recognise that different models will reveal different aspects of the university 
(Enderud 1977; Birnbaum 1988; Becher and Kogan 1992). 
2.4.2.6. Mixed models 
One way to accommodate different models is to relate them as a sequence, like Enderud 
(1977) did. In some cases, one might see certain decisions proceeding through a 
sequence of ambiguity, political activity, collegiality and bureaucracy. In other cases, the 
dominance of one form and the style of management over another and hence the 
applicability of a particular model, will depend on a balance of power and influence of 
particular actors, individuals and groups (Miller 1995). 
In 1988, Birnbaum proposed a new model of governance that looks at HEIs as 'cybernetic 
institutions' that are based on systems of negative feedback, which detect and correct 
errors so that when something happens that is moving in the wrong direction, something 
else automatically happens, bringing it back on course (Birnbaum 1988). According to 
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him, "coordination is provided not by one omniscient and rational agent but by the 
spontaneous corrective action of the [university's] parts" (ibid: 179). 
In cybernetic systems, organisation subsystems respond to a limited number of inputs to 
monitor their operation and correct and adjust what is necessary; thus, organisational 
responses are not based on measuring or improving outputs, but they focus on inputs 
(Birnbaum 1988). 
Since HEIs are open systems in contact with the external environment (see Section 2.4.1), 
when there is a problem in the exterior that affects the organisation, inputs send a signal 
that will be compared to previous established criteria (Birnbaum 1988).  
Birbaum (1988) argues that this model does not substitute the other models previously 
presented. It just tries to integrate them in order to understand complex systems such as 
HEIs. 
In 1992, Becher and Kogan presented a model that helps the understanding of the 
relationship between different levels of reality – individual, basic unit, university and state. 
These authors distinguish between two modes of relating to the academic or the university 
as an organisation, which they argue can be analytically distinguished but which, in 
practice, are not that easily separated. The first mode, the 'normative mode', relates to the 
monitoring and maintenance of mode values – what people in the system regard as 
important. The second mode, the 'operational mode', refers to the business of carrying out 
practical tasks at different levels within the system – what people actually do or are 
required to do (Becher and Kogan, 1992: 10).  
According to them, these modes can be analysed in their internal and external aspects. 
The external aspect of the 'normative mode' would be for the university to take cognisance 
of current economic, social and cultural values. Internally, the university would meet the 
requirements of the external authorities and set and monitor rules of procedures and due 
process. The institution would try to ensure that the basic units (departments) would carry 
out proper procedures regarding the appointment of academics, use of funds, student 
recruitment, and so on. Increasing pressure from central authorities would mean that the 
university would exercise increasing control in these areas, developing policies and norms 
around 'managerial efficiency' and 'enterprise culture' (Becher and Kogan 1992). 
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The 'operational mode' involves internal university operations concerning the maintenance 
and development of its constituent elements and its established activities, through the 
allocation of money and personnel (Becher and Kogan 1992). 
This system analysis provides a framework for relating the individual academic to the 
department, the university, and the pressures coming from central government in terms of 
goals and activities. This perspective emphasises the university as an entity, rather than a 
collection of individuals, and deemphasises the perspective of individual academics, 
arguing that they need the security of tenure arrangement to pursue the true purpose of 
the academic enterprise and their commitment to teaching and research (Miller 1995). 
Rhoades (1992) argues that all systems consist of a mix of academic, political and 
bureaucratic types of authority. Literature on higher education suggests that what has 
changed is the difference between these types, with various forms of professional 
authority on decline, and different forms of political and managerial/bureaucratic authority 
at different levels of higher education on the rise. 
However, very little work has been done on the way the shifting balance of formal powers 
generated shifts in governance and decision-making, especially concerning the use of 
performance information. In fact, higher education literature often refers to external 
pressures on universities, to the press for accountability, but they do not attend to the 
mechanisms by which these challenges are voiced and implemented, nor interpret these 
challenges in terms of a structuring of governance by class or status groups' struggle and 
power external to the academy (Rhoades 1992).  
In order to do this analysis, it is important to look at the governance structures in HEIs, 
which comprise both authority and decision-making structures. However, before doing 
that, it would be interesting to analyse how universities, as organisations, are coping with 
increasing pressures to change their management and governance arrangements. To 
understand universities' behaviour it is important to look at these institutions through the 
lens of neo-institutionalism. 
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2.4.3. Institutional behaviour through the lens of neo-institutionalism 
In an attempt to better understand the need for institutions to adapt to the external 
environments surrounding an organisation, two perspectives could be taken into 
consideration. According to the first perspective, organisations have to adapt to economic, 
societal and cultural demands of external environments for reasons of legitimacy and 
survival. A representative theory of this perspective is 'isomorphism' (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). The second perspective argues that although organisations are dependent on 
external forces, they still have a certain discretion left to respond to those pressures, using 
decoupling strategies to cope with external pressures (Meyer and Rowan 1977). These 
two perspectives will be developed in the following sub-sections. 
2.4.3.1. Isomorphism 
Isomorphism is the sociological version of neo-institutionalism. This theoretical approach, 
developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), tries to explain structural homogeneity, that is, 
the reason for organisations to grow so similar over time and may be arguably interesting 
to explain common trends that can be found in some higher education systems. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguish between different types of isomorphism: coercive, 
mimetic and normative. 'Coercive isomorphism' happens when an organisation adapts 
and changes to conform to the external pressures applied to it. Changes in values, 
behaviours, structures and processes can occur, for example, in response to pressures 
exerted by other organisations or groups upon which the organisation depends. These 
can, for example, take the forms of laws and regulations applied by governments 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Parker 2011). 'Mimetic isomorphism' refers to a pattern of 
behaviour where an organisation voluntarily imitates other groups' or organisations' 
values, characteristics, behaviours, structures or processes. It may include copying 
another organisation's apparently successful strategy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Parker 
2011). 'Normative isomorphism' takes place through the beliefs and actions of key groups. 
Specific member groups (namely professionals) that share particular common 
professional training, background, or norms, may import those into their employing 
organisation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Parker 2011). 
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2.4.3.2. Decoupling strategies 
Larsen and Gornitzka (1995) talk about 'window dressing' to explain some voluntary 
actions taken by organisations to cope with external pressures. Parker (2011: 436) states: 
"Formal institutionalised organisational structures and processes have 
been observed at times to exist decoupled from what in fact occurs 
within an organisation. Actual informal organisational structure and 
processes may differ significantly from the formal, reported structures 
and processes that simply act as symbolic window dressing, presenting 
a mythical, ceremonial image to placate outsiders".  
Meyer and Rowan's (1977) neo-institutional take on organisational behaviour highlights 
the concept of decoupling as a coping strategy used by organisations to resolve the 
tension between formal structures and informal practices. In order to appear legitimate to 
the exterior, organisations are expected to conform to certain 'rationalised concepts', 
including how different types of organisations are expected to look and act (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). Weick (1976) defines 'loose coupling' as a situation in which elements are 
responsive, but retain evidence of separateness and identity. The concept of 'loose 
coupling' became analytically powerful because it helped scholars to understand why 
many organisations (including universities) continued to operate by familiar routines and 
practices despite waves of policy reforms and environmental pressures to change. Many 
times, these organisations avoid conflict by buffering "their formal structures from the 
uncertainties of technical activities by becoming loosely coupled, building gaps between 
their formal structures and actual work activities" (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 341). This 
perspective could be considered particularly relevant in universities, given their high 
degree of autonomy and their integration into the state hierarchy. On the one hand, 
universities must adapt themselves to the various strains of public authority. By contrast, 
the norms of academic freedom and autonomy dominate internally.  
After exploring some theoretical perspectives that could help to explain the behaviour of 
universities in face of external pressures to change, let us now look at the governance 
structures in HEIs. 
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2.4.4. Governance structures: a new framework 
De Boer (2002) regards governance structures as a "set of rules concerning authority and 
power related to the performance of a university's activities directed towards a set of 
common goals" (ibid: 44). It reflects the way an organisation divides and integrates 
responsibility and authority. 
Authors like Amaral et al. (2002) and Meek (2003) emphasise the tremendous differences 
in the organisational and structural assumptions that draw attention to institution-level 
governance arrangements. 
In the US, for example, there is a strong, centralised approach to decision-making with a 
focus on the institutional president and his or her cabinet, functioning under the 
supervision of a governing body composed of elected or appointed external members. 
The recent trends involve a movement towards even stronger central steering. Senates 
are generally regarded as weak and there is a reluctance to include faculty representation 
on university governing boards (El-Khawas 2002). 
In the UK, there is a hierarchy of committee decision-making bodies flowing from 
departmental committees, faculty academic boards, and university academic boards (the 
senate in chartered universities). The vice-chancellor (equivalent to the rector) is 
appointed by the institutions and has great executive authority. Recently, there is a trend 
for deans to be appointed instead of elected, being assigned executive management 
responsibilities (Meek 2003). 
In France, the university sector has been characterised by a straight state-control, with 
strong academic guilds represented, in structural terms, by academic units and deans. 
Recent changes, largely initiated by the government, resulted in a stronger institutional-
level governance structure, being presidential teams and participatory bodies the ones to 
make strategic decisions (Musselin and Mignot-Gérard 2002). Nevertheless, and since 
these are 'evolutionary' changes, the state continues to exercise centralised system-level 
control over certain policy areas, such as programme approval (Amaral et al. 2002). 
In Portugal, governance structures changed recently. There are now three main decision-
making bodies and authority structures at the central university level. First, there is the 
general council, which is composed of a majority of academics, external members, 
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students and non-academic staff. Second, there is the management council, which is 
responsible for the administrative, patrimonial, financial and human resources 
management of the university. Third, there is the rector, who presides over almost every 
governing body. The new structure allows for an increased participation of the outside 
world and became more centralised. 
Despite the differences in the governance structures of different higher education 
systems, the struggles to reform higher education usually involve restructuring campus 
mechanisms of governance in order to include a broader range of groups in campus 
decision-making (Rhoades 1992). Amaral et al. (2002) also argue that recent changes in 
institutional-level governance seem to have shifted the balance of power within these 
institutions through the development of new central governance structures, the 
strengthening of the role of central administration and changes in participatory governance 
arrangements.  
On the same issue, Rhoades (1992) states that there has been an expansion of "the 
legitimate political authority of various groups with respect to campus matters that had 
previously been dominated by the authority of academics, whether through personal or 
collegial rulership or some combination of the two in guild authority. In some cases this 
meant creating or expanding the powers of university councils that had representatives 
from lay community" (ibid: 1380). 
In fact, in addition to the creation of new structures, external stakeholders seem to be 
assuming an increasingly important role in governance, although in some higher 
education systems that role is often 'fictional' (see Amaral and Magalhães 2002). Plus, 
there have also been changes in the level and form of participation of internal 
constituencies. For example, in many countries, there has been a repositioning of the 
rector as a chief executive officer (Amaral et al. 2002). 
To Amaral et al. (2002), above all, there seems to be a "general trend towards the 
centralisation of authority in institution-level governing structures and administrators and a 
decline in the 'academic-voice' in institutional decision-making" (ibid: 288). 
Having looked at some of the main differences that exist in the governance structures of 
some higher education systems and the common trends, it would be interesting to go 
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deeper into the governing bodies and analyse the composition of these bodies. This will 
be done by revisiting the concept of Estates proposed by Neave and Rhoades in 1987. 
2.4.4.1. Composition of the bodies: the concept of Estates 
In 1987, Neave and Rhoades examined the academic profession in Western Europe and 
showed the differences they found, by then, between the concept and organisation of the 
academia in the Anglo-Saxon world and in Continental Europe. At the time, they found out 
that in mainland Europe there was a sense of 'corporate identity', confirmed by the close 
ties between academia and the state. Therefore, they distinguished between the 
academic profession and the academic Estate (Neave and Rhoades 1987). 
According to Neave (2009: 17) the characteristic of an Estate is "the central part played by 
prescribed and formal status". In an Estate, representation is determined by the presence 
of individuals directly mandated and formally elected on the basis of one individual one 
vote. 
Since the 1960s, two major revolutions took place: massification and managerialism (see 
Section 1.3.2). On the one hand, almost all Western European systems of higher 
education moved well beyond mass higher education. On the other hand, new 
management ideas, drove higher education towards quality, efficiency and 
entrepreneurism (Neave 1988). 
Surprisingly, the increase of student power inside the academia, resulting from 
massification, did not question the basis of the Academic Estate as an inner form of 
university governance. Instead, the solution for the tensions inside the academia from the 
late 1960s through the mid-1970s, was power-sharing. To Neave (2009), there was a 
move from what Clark (1983) called 'academic oligarchy' to an extended constituency in 
which all three Estates – Academic, Student and Administrative – have their formal 
elected place (Neave 2009). 
As discussed before (see Section 1.2), in the 1980s, several measures were undertaken 
by governments in order to reduce costs and wastage, to raise institutional efficiency and 
performance levels, and to shift budgeting modes from input financing to output financing 
(Neave 2009). Some of the motives given by governments to act were: first, to relief the 
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public budget; second, to increase the transparency of higher education systems, whose 
complexity had grown in proportion to the number of students enrolled and increasing 
public expectation; third, to satisfy increasing demands for accountability; and fourth, to 
reduce the frontiers of the state (Neave 2009). 
Some authors (e.g. Rhoades 1998; Neave 2009) argue that with the 'managerial 
revolution', academia became 'a specialised sub-sector' (Neave 2009). Rhoades (1998) 
states that academics became 'managed professionals'. 
With these changes, some functions that were part of the Academic Estate as a whole 
were relocated by the government, usually in the form of intermediary bodies, such as 
Evaluation Committees, Quality Assurance Agencies or Accreditation Agencies. 
Moreover, there was also the professionalisation of management in some universities, 
which led to contracting out professional managers or giving academics full time posts in 
management, thus increasing the degree of specialisation of academic shores and the 
division of academic labour (Neave 2009). 
The concept of Estates proposed by Neave and Rhoades (1987) will be used to develop a 
new framework designed to understand governance structures in higher education. 
2.4.4.2. A new framework representing governance structures in higher education 
From what was presented in Section 2.4, it seems undeniable that HEIs are complex 
organisations, not being easy to find a unique model that defines the way they are 
governed and managed. As Birnbaum (1988) argues, HEIs will probably present more 
characteristics of one of the models (bureaucratic, collegial, garbage can, organised 
anarchy or political) over the others always or during a certain period of time. 
Acknowledging the importance of looking at HEIs in a systemic way (as discussed in 
Section 2.4.1), it was decided to build a framework that helped to understand governance 
structures in higher education. The framework conceived by Conceição et al. (1998) 
presented the internal and external stakeholders, but did not cluster the external 
stakeholders in more general coordination mechanisms. Moreover, it represented the 
internal stakeholders as mere elements of the organisation, and not as integrative 
elements of HEIs governing and management bodies. 
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Therefore, for the purpose of this research, it was decided to develop a new analytical 
framework that would fully represent governance structures in higher education. 
The proposed framework extends Clark's (1983) Triangle of Coordination (see Section 
2.3) to other internal stakeholders of the university, revisiting the concept of the 
university's Estates proposed by Neave and Rhoades (1987). To the three Estates 
proposed – Academic, Student and Administrative –, this research adds a new one – the 
'External Representatives Estate' –, since these members have become increasingly 
important in the governance and management of universities, being part of the most 
important governing bodies of many HEIs. 
Figure 6 is thus proposed as the new analytical framework to look at governance 
structures in higher education. According to it, governance structures can be 
conceptualized by an 'inner ring' and an 'outer ring'.  
The 'inner ring' represents the internal coordination mechanisms, and is composed of the 
members of the university's governing bodies – the four Estates. These are: the Academic 
Estate, the Student Estate, the External Representatives Estate, and the Administrative 
Estate. 
The 'outer ring' embodies the external coordination mechanisms and is composed of the 
state, Europe and the market. This ring adds to Clark's (1983) external coordination 
mechanisms – the state and the market –, a new one – Europe. This third coordination 
mechanism was incorporated due to the influence it has had in most European countries, 
as explained in Section 1.3.2. In fact, European higher education policies have been one 
of the major drivers for governance changes in most European higher education systems. 
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Figure 6 – Governance structures in higher education 
Figure 6 is thus proposed as the analytical framework that will help to answer the following 
questions: What pressures, both external and internal, are there to introduce performance 
management systems in universities? How might the external and internal coordination 
mechanisms be influencing the introduction and functioning of performance management 
systems inside universities? And how has the introduction of performance management 
affected governance structures and the roles, influences and accountabilities of the 
Estates (the 'inner ring')? 
Having looked at HEIs as organisations, analysed the way they are governed and 
managed, and established a new framework to look at governance structures in higher 
education, it is now important to introduce the theme that triggered this research: 
performance management. In fact, it is the current centrality of performance and the 
importance that performance information has in the reform of higher education (see 
Section 1.3.2) that motivates this research. Our interest lies mainly on what is done with 
the performance information obtained through the measurement process.  
Therefore, the next chapter will be dedicated to the measurement, reporting and 
management of performance, focusing particularly in the higher education sector. 
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"It is an immutable law in business that words are words,  
explanations are explanations, promises are promises 
— but only performance is reality." 
Harold S. Geneen 
"It is no use saying 'we are doing our best'.  
You have to succeed in doing what is necessary." 
Winston Churchill 
Although the practice of performance management is not something new, it has been 
revived with the advent of NPM (van de Walle and van Dooren 2008), which advocated, 
amongst other things, managerial freedom based on output control (Hood 1991). In 
exchange for more autonomy and flexibility in the use of allocated resources and in 
choosing the means and methods, many public organisations had to accept more rigid 
PMS (Laegreid et al. 2008).  
In fact, in the early 1990s, and especially in OECD countries, many public service 
organisations from different areas, including higher education, focused on developing PIs 
and targets (Bouckaert and Halligan 2006). Since then, performance management 
became increasingly systematic, specialized, professionalized and institutionalized in the 
public sector (van Dooren 2006). 
This chapter is dedicated to performance management and is structured in the following 
way: first, the concept of performance will be introduced and the increasing interest in this 
topic explained. Secondly, the concepts of performance measurement, performance 
reporting and performance management will be discussed. Thirdly, performance will be 
looked at from a systems point of view and some performance management models will 
be presented. Finally, an input-process-output-outcome model representing a PMS for 
higher education will be introduced. This model, which will be used in this research, will 
arguably help to understand the complexity of managing performance in higher education. 
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3.1. The concept of performance  
There has been very little consensus on what performance is. In fact, few people agree on 
what it really means, giving its multiple and often ambiguous meanings (van Dooren et al. 
2010). As Lebas (1995: 23) argues "it can mean anything from efficiency, to robustness or 
resistance or return on investment, or plenty of other definitions never fully specified". 
According to Dubnick (2005: 391): 
"Performance can be associated with a range of actions from the simple 
and mundane act of opening a car door, to the staging of an elaborate 
reenactment of the Broadway musical 'Chicago'. In all these forms, 
performance stands in distinction from mere 'behaviour' in implying 
some degree of intent." 
Lebas (1995) argues that performance is case-specific and decision-maker specific. It is 
about "deploying and managing well the components of the casual model(s) that lead to 
the timely attainment of stated objectives with constraints specific to the [institution] and to 
the situation" (ibid: 29). According to the casual model, understanding the processes 
underlying performance is the only way to define the measures that lead to action. If only 
the final is looked at, no appropriate corrective action can be identified. For example, 
knowing whether customers are satisfied or not with the service provided is better than 
simply observing how quickly the service is delivered (Lebas 1995). Therefore, 
performance can have several meanings. 
To Lebas and Euske (2002: 67-68), performance is: measurable by either a number or an 
expression that allows communication; to accomplish something with a specific intention; 
the result of an action; the ability to accomplish or the potential of creating a result; the 
comparison of a result with some benchmark or reference selected or imposed, either 
internally or externally; a surprising result compared to expectations; a judgement by 
comparison; acting out, in psychology; a show, in 'performing arts', that includes both the 
acting or actions and the results of the actions, as well as the observation of the 
performers by outsiders. 
Talbot (2007) regards performance as: 
• Accountability – for democratic systems to work, citizens need to be given 
information not just about what is spent but also about what results are achieved. 
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In practice, few public institutions regularly publish information about their 
achievements, deepening the arguments for the need to improve public 
accountability; 
• User choice – comparative performance information should be made available, to 
enable users to make informed choices. For example, in the UK, 'league tables' of 
university performance are published every year, pressuring those performing 
worse to improve services; 
• Customer service – public organisations should make clear statements about the 
levels of service they want to supply, in terms of timeliness, accessibility and 
quality, and then report on their success against these aims; 
• Efficiency – performance contracts should specify the resources to be supplied, 
the outputs and services to be delivered, the monitoring mechanisms to be used, 
and reward or sanction mechanisms to be applied; 
• Results, effectiveness and 'what works' – there has been an excessive focus on 
inputs and processes, losing sight of the outcomes intended to achieve; 
• Resource allocation – performance information is essential for decision-making on 
resource allocation; 
• Creating public value – public services are not merely addressing 'market failure', 
but have a more positive role in creating value, which could not be made in the 
private sector. Public services add value, through issues like equity, equality, and 
building social capital. 
According to Lebas and Euske (2002: 68), performance is "the sum of all processes that 
will lead managers to taking appropriate actions in the present that will create a 
performing organization in the future". As Lebas (1995) argues, performance, especially in 
the case of management, should not be "so much about past achievements, as generally 
accepted, but about the future, about the capability of the unit being evaluated. It is so 
because (…) the purpose of management is about creating and shaping the future of the 
organization, as well as that of society" (ibid: 23). 
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Having presented the concept of performance, the next section will explain why there 
have been increased pressures to introduce performance management practices over the 
last decades. 
3.2. The increasing interest in performance 
As discussed before (see section 1.1), the post-war expansion of the welfare state raised 
expectations about the role of the government. However, in the 1980s, this expansion 
could no longer be supported (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Fiscal stress pressed the 
public budget and legitimacy crises pressured the politico-administrative system (van 
Dooren et al. 2010). In order to meet the social demand for a high-performing public 
sector, governments felt the urge to reform. Thomas (2004: 4) lists the main factors that 
have driven the current widespread interest in performance: 
• The stressed financial condition of most governments with accumulated debts and 
annual deficits; 
• The turbulent and unpredictable environment of today's public sector, which 
requires governments to have both a sense of direction and the capacity to 
respond rapidly to unforeseen changes; 
• The impact of NPM philosophies, which are leading to an insistence on results, to 
the removal of excessive central control, and to the delegation of more authority to 
public managers; 
• The need to respond to several decades of slow, but steady, decline of public trust 
and confidence in the public sector by strengthening accountability and improving 
communication; 
• The need to respond to growing public insistence that the quality of the public 
sector should improve; 
• The opportunity to take advantage of the refinements in analytical techniques and 
new information technologies, which enable more sophisticated tracking of the 
success of a programme or institution and offer opportunities to improve 
democratic dialogue over public policy. 
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Although the interest for performance increased in the public sector, there is a wide 
debate on the benefits of measuring and managing performance in that sector. One of the 
most persistent lines of attack on the performance agenda is that, being usually related to 
concepts such as efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, it does not take into account 
some other important public values, such as equity, often crossing purposes with those 
values (van Dooren et al. 2010). Radin (2006), for example, contends that, among others, 
the performance movement forgets about the context, interferes with professionalism, is 
not concerned with equity and is apolitical. Adcroft and Willis (2005) support these 
criticisms, believing that "the increased use of performance measurement and the 
importation of private-sector management principles and practices will have the dual effect 
of commodifying services and deprofessionalising public sector workers" (ibid: 396). 
These authors define commodification in terms of the transformation of relationships into 
quasi-commercial relations with an emphasis placed on the economic activity of buying 
and selling and the management activity of performance measurement. To Adcroft and 
Willis (2005), the outcome of commodification will be deprofessionalisation, since, to them, 
a professional is regarded as someone whose activities are value-driven where the crucial 
values are altruism, autonomy and authority. With respect to higher education, Talib 
(2003) makes the point that there will be some sort of shift away from professional 
activities, which may have a high social worth or intrinsic value towards those activities 
which are management-driven. Following the same line of thought, Deem (2004: 116) 
argues that universities have become "more akin to a business than an educational 
institution", and questions "whether the contemporary UK university can survive the 
domination of management [over academic leadership]" (ibid: 125). 
Notwithstanding the criticisms, there is the general acceptance that performance will 
continue to be central to government and to the management of public services, especially 
in a context of economic crisis. In fact, with public finance under pressure, the need to 
assure and demonstrate value for money is likely to be reinforced (van Dooren et al. 
2010).  
Before looking at performance management from a systems point of view, three concepts 
will be explored – performance measurement, performance reporting and performance 
management. These are considered necessary to comprehend how a PMS functions. 
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3.3. Performance measurement, reporting and management 
Radnor and Barnes (2007) suggest that a differentiation should be made between 
'performance measurement', 'performance reporting' and 'performance management', 
since each has their own set of activities and issues. 
3.3.1. Performance measurement 
With a growing demand for more effective co-ordination and control systems, arguably 
needed to improve organisational performance, performance measurement became very 
important. 
On a very simple definition, Zairi (1994) describes performance measurement as the 
systematic assignment of numbers to entities. 
Van Dooren et al. (2010: 6) argue that "measuring performance means systematically 
collecting data by observing and registering performance-related issues for some 
performance purpose". According to these authors, the result of performance 
measurement is performance information. 
To Lebas (1995), performance measurement includes measures based on key success 
factors, measures for detection of deviations, measures to track past achievements, 
measures to describe the status potential, measures of output, and measures of input. 
To this definition, Radnor and Barnes (2007) add data on the level of activity. According to 
these authors, "performance measurement is quantifying, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, the input, output or level of activity of an event or process" (ibid: 393).   
For the purpose of this research, Radnor and Barnes' (2007) definition will be used and it 
will be considered that performance measurement encompasses three main steps: 
deciding what to measure; selecting measures and targets; and collecting data. The first 
step involves deciding what will be measured. In order to do that it is important understand 
what is being measured, whether it is an organisation, a programme or a policy and then 
to target measurement efforts, since, as van Dooren et al. (2010: 57) argue, "it is 
unrealistic to pursue a measurement system that perfectly mirrors every aspect of the 
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organisation or programme, its policies and environment". The second step comprises 
selecting the measures that will be used and setting the targets in terms of the measures 
chosen. The last stage consists of collecting the data, being important to define 
appropriate data collection methods and sources, which may be internal or external.  
The next section will explore the concept of 'performance reporting'. 
3.3.2. Performance reporting 
After measuring performance, it is important to analyse the data collected and 
communicate the results to responsible decision-makers, so that they can decide what to 
do with the information being reported. To Radnor and Barnes (2007), performance 
reporting is "providing an account, and often some analysis, of the level of input, activity or 
output of an event or process usually against some form of target" (ibid: 393). 
The Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation (2002) defined nine principles for 
better performance reporting. Even though these principles were defined for the Canadian 
Government to follow, it is believed they can be applied to any institution, including 
universities. The first five principles provide guidance about what should be reported and 
the other four relate to how it should be reported. These principles are (CCAF 2002: 15-
48): focus on the few critical aspects of performance; look forward as well as back; explain 
key risk considerations; explain key capacity considerations; explain other factors critical 
to performance; integrate financial and non-financial information; provide comparative 
information; present credible information, fairly interpreted; and disclose the basis for 
reporting. 
Several authors (e.g. Hendricks 1994; van Dooren et al. 2010) argue that, when reporting, 
it is important to choose the format that will be used, since it should be appropriate to the 
target group. To these authors, it is essential to know who will be receiving the information 
(e.g. general public, media, government, managers, employees), in order to decide the 
best way to present the data (e.g. news flashes may be more appropriate for the media 
and the general public than annual reports and plans). 
Thomas (2004) recognises the need to tell the performance story and not become 
mesmerised by the numbers themselves. He argues that (ibid: 10): 
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"Formal performance reporting is only one window through which 
internal and external audiences will gain information and form 
impressions about performances. To call for more and better reporting 
assumes that the relevant audiences will read the documents and use 
them to judge performance".  
In fact, to Bouckaert and Peters (2002) the availability of performance information is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the success of many reform initiatives. Above 
all, information is fundamental to inform leaders/managers, helping them to make 
informed decisions, to provide guidance, to develop the institution's mission, vision and 
values, to communicate these to other members and to coordinate every component of 
the organisation. Moreover, information connects the management subsystems with each 
other and the management system with the outside world, helping, for example, external 
assessors in evaluating the performance of an organisation (van Dooren 2006). That is 
why performance management plays such an important role. 
3.3.3. Performance management 
Performance management can be defined as the managerial work needed to ensure that 
the organisation's top level aims (sometimes expressed as 'Vision' or 'Mission' 
statements) and objectives are attained. Usually this will require realistic time periods for 
their attainment, and the identification of sub-objectives and tasks, which, in turn, have to 
be attained in a controlled way, contributing to top-level objectives (Holloway 1999).  
Notions such as strategic management, performance budgeting, management-by-
objectives and management for results all share a common logic that public organisations 
should produce performance information to inform decision-making (Moynihan 2008) 
To Radnor and Barnes (2007: 393), "performance management is action, based on 
performance measures and reporting, aimed at improvements in behaviour, motivation 
and processes and promotes innovation." Patton (1997) claims that the 'actual use' of 
evaluation is the best way to understand the value of activities and the efforts dedicated 
to it. 
Mayston (1985) suggests eight objectives for performance management: to clarify the 
organisation's objectives; to evaluate the final outcomes resulting from the organisation's 
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activities; to enable consumers to make informed choices; to indicate performance 
standards in the licensing or contracting of privatised services, and to monitor the 
fulfilment of these terms; to indicate how well different services contribute to specific 
areas of policy; to trigger further investigation and possible remedial action to improve the 
quality of inputs and outputs; to assist in determining the most cost-effective set of service 
levels to attain a given target; and to indicate areas of potential cost saving in attaining a 
given set of intermediate outputs. 
Pollitt (1987) presents a very similar list of roles, adding another one: provide staff with 
feedback designed to enable them to develop and improve their practice. 
Behn (2003) proposes a categorisation of eight managerial uses:  
• Evaluate – to see how an organisation is performing; 
• Control – to determine whether the subordinates are doing the right thing. To 
Johnston and Clark (2008) and Pollitt (1987) this entails providing feedback so that 
action can be taken to keep the process in control. This requires a complete 
control loop, which targets, measures and takes appropriate action if needed 
(Johnston and Clark 2008); 
• Budget – to determine the kind of projects, people or programmes the organisation 
should spend the money in. The general idea is to invest in the most cost-
effectiveness activities; 
• Motivate – to motivate staff. It is believed the establishment of performance goals 
grabs people's attention and that the measurement of progress towards the goals 
provides useful feedback, concentrating their efforts on reaching these targets 
(Duncan 1989); 
• Promote – to have the public's support. Performance measures can contribute to 
such support by revealing not only when an institution is failing, but also when it is 
doing an excellent job; 
• Celebrate – rituals of celebrating an organisation's accomplishments tie people 
together, giving them a sense of their individual and collective relevance, and 
motivating future efforts; 
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• Learn – to understand why things are (or not) working. Performance measures 
contain information that can be used not only to evaluate, but also to learn; 
• Improve – to realise what should be done differently in order to improve 
performance. Performance measurement should not be an end in itself, but should 
be used to make improvements. Johnston and Clark (2008) argue that often simply 
by communicating a measure, improvements can occur. Also by linking measures 
to rewards and/or punishments, individuals could be motivated to improve 
performance, assuming they have control over what is being measured (Johnston 
and Clark 2008). 
According to Behn (2003), the first seven purposes are subordinate to the last one: "for 
the measurement of performance, the public manager's real purpose – indeed the only 
real purpose – is to improve performance. The other seven purposes are simply means 
for achieving this ultimate purpose" (Behn 2003: 588). 
To Johnston and Clark (2008), performance management is also important to 
communicate and implement the strategy, since measures inform employees as to what 
the organisation requires them to achieve and what they might be accountable for. 
Although many managers use performance information for improvement, as intended, the 
measurement of performance can also lead, according to some authors (e.g. Bouckaert 
and Balk 1991; Smith 1995; Behn and Kant 1999; Bevan and Hood 2006a), to 
dysfunctional behaviour. 
To Johnsen (2000), resistance towards performance management and possibly changes 
in the implementation process are common. Smith (1995: 283) lists eight unintended 
consequences of publishing performance data in the public sector: 
• Tunnel vision – occurs when managers, faced with many different targets, choose 
the ones that are easiest to measure and ignore the rest; 
• Sub-optimisation – happens when managers choose to operate in ways that serve 
their own operation well, but damage the performance of the overall system; 
• Myopia – occurs when, for whatever reason, managers focus their efforts on short-
term targets at the expense of longer-term objectives; 
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• Measure fixation – happens when there is an emphasis on measures of success 
rather than the underlying objective; 
• Misrepresentation – this is a form of fraud and occurs when performance data is 
either misreported or distorted to create a good impression. It is the deliberate 
manipulation of data so that reported behaviour differs from actual behaviour. It 
leads to the distortion of reported behaviour; 
• Misinterpretation – occurs when wrong policy signals are sent due to bounded 
rationality, although the agent possesses all the facts; 
• Gaming – happens when there is the deliberate manipulation of behaviour in order 
to secure strategic advantage. This leads to distortions in the actual behaviour; 
• Ossification – occurs when a performance indicator is 'past its sell-by date' and 
has lost its purpose, but no one revises or removes it. 
Talbot (2010) defies the view of many scholars (e.g. Bevan and Hood 2006a; Bevan and 
Hood 2006b; van de Walle and Roberts 2008; Pollitt 2010), who argue that the 
measurement of performance will most likely lead to unwanted effects. Talbot (2010) 
argues that many times the 'ideological' antipathy for performance measurement is so 
strong "that the need for evidence to support assertion is dispensed with or treated in 
cavalier ways" (ibid: 44). According to Talbot (2010), common errors are to list a whole 
series of possible difficulties and dysfunctions in the effects of performance information 
without providing any empirical evidence that those things happen, or to what extent; or to 
establish criteria of perfection for PMS that are so exacting that any system will surely fail. 
Talbot (2010) states that many authors "have ignored the pretty strong evidence that 
alongside gaming and other undesirable effects, there have also been significant gains in 
real performance and service delivery" (ibid: 202).  
In the next section, the concepts of performance measurement, reporting and 
management will be interlinked through a systems view of performance management. 
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3.4. A systems view of performance management 
A PMS should have a direct link between performance measurement and strategic and 
operational planning. To Thomas (2004: 18): 
"Ideally, strategic planning helps organizations to clarify their mission, 
mandate and goals, to scan the future external and internal 
environments for threats and opportunities, to identify strategic issues 
and alternative ways to deal with them, and to develop a set of outcome 
indicators to track progress towards their goals. All of these elements 
are to be linked to annual operational planning and to forthcoming 
budgets. This (…) represents the aspiration to achieve predictable, 
comprehensive, systematic and rational control over the future direction 
of the organization in all dimensions of its performance". 
In its most simple form, the managerial process works as follows: first, organisational 
objectives are identified (should be derived from the 'Vision'), and communicated to the 
staff; second, measures are developed to reflect these objectives (the following questions 
should be answered: what will be measured, how, by whom and when); third, targets are 
set in terms of those measures and management chooses action and effort intended to 
achieve targets; fourth, progress is monitored using the pre-defined measures; fifth, 
measures are reported (the following questions ought to be answered: how and by whom 
information will be reported) and used to drive action, meaning that if the results diverge 
from targets, appropriate remedial action is taken, and, when necessary, targets are 
readjusted or new targets are created. And the process goes on (Anthony and Young 
1994). Thus, the centrality of this process lies on the concept of feedback (see Figure 7). 
Thomas (2004) argues that an ideal PMS should: have clear and defined purposes and 
uses; focus on outcomes and not just on inputs and outputs; employ a limited, cost-
effective set of measures; use measures which are valid, reliable, consistent, comparable 
and controllable; produce information which is relevant, meaningful, balanced and valued 
by the leaders of the organisation; report performance information adequately; be 
integrated with the planning and the budgetary processes; and be embedded in the 
organisation, stable and widely understood and supported. Therefore, it is fundamental 
that a PMS creates a mechanism for intervention and learning (Haas and Kleingeld 1998; 
Neely 1998). This is why it is so important to interlink performance measurement, 
performance reporting and performance management. 
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Figure 7 – The functioning of a performance management system 
In the next section, several performance management frameworks will be looked at, 
showing how the study of performance measurement and management has evolved over 
time. 
3.5. Performance management models 
Performance measurement and management have been much researched and discussed 
since the early 1990s. According to Neely (1999), the equivalent of one article every five 
hours of each working day was published between 1994 and 1996, and there has been a 
proliferation of conferences on the topic since 1994. Consequently, the trend in the 
performance literature has been towards the development of various models or 
frameworks of performance. The emergence of such models, techniques and tools has 
been influenced by wider performance measurement developments, coming mainly from 
the private sector. 
The problem of how organisations should assess their performance is not something new 
(Kennerley and Neely 2002a). It has long been recognised that performance measures 
are an integral part of the planning and control cycle (Neely 1999). Indeed, Chandler 
(1977) argues that most of the basic methods used to manage big businesses today were 
in place by 1910 (ibid: 417): 
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"In 1903, three Du Pont cousins consolidated their small enterprises 
with many other small single-unit family firms. They then completely 
reorganised the American explosives industry and installed an 
organisational structure that incorporated the 'best practice' of the day. 
The highly rational managers at Du Pont continued to perfect these 
techniques, so that by 1910 that company was employing nearly all the 
basic methods that are currently used in managing big businesses". 
Traditionally, performance management was developed from cost and management 
accounting and was seen as the process of quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of 
action (Neely et al. 1995). Most public organisations relied on financial indicators to 
develop appropriate strategic directions.  
The excessive focus on financial measures was criticised by several authors (e.g. Banks 
and Wheelwright 1979; Hayes and Abernathy 1980; Kaplan and Norton 1992). Neely 
(1999) sums-up these criticisms. To him these measures (ibid: 206): encourage short-
termism (e.g. the delay of capital investment); lack strategic focus and fail to provide data 
on quality, responsiveness and flexibility; encourage local optimisation (e.g. 
'manufacturing' inventory to keep people and machines busy); encourage managers to 
minimise the variances from standard rather than seek to improve continually; are 
historically focused, whereas most managers want predictive measures that indicate what 
will happen next week, next month, or next year; and fail to provide information on what 
customers want and on how competitors are performing. 
Recognising the shortcomings of traditional measurement systems, with an excessive 
concern with the financial perspective, Eccles (1991) triggered a performance 
measurement revolution. In his 1991 article, The Performance Measurement Manifesto, 
Eccles argued: "during the past few years, academics and practitioners have begun to 
demonstrate that accrual-based performance measures are at best obsolete – and more 
often harmful" (Eccles 1991: 132). Attention turned to how organisations could replace 
their traditional measurement systems with ones that reflected their current objectives and 
environment (Kennerley and Neely 2002a).  
According to Eccles (1991), several factors contributed to the performance measurement 
revolution (ibid: 132-133):  
• The increasing commitment towards quality, not just due to the pressure of global 
competitors, but also due to the growth of the Total Quality Movement and related 
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programmes (e.g. the Malcom Baldrige National Quality Award6), and to more rigid 
quality requirements; 
• Efforts to generate measures of customer satisfaction, such as customer retention 
rates, market-share and perceived value of goods and services. Eccles even 
stated that "what quality was for the 1980s, customer satisfaction will be for the 
1990s" (ibid: 133); 
• The development of competitive benchmarking, which involves identifying 
competitors in other organisations that exemplify best practice in some activity, 
function, or process and then comparing one's own performance to theirs. This 
externally oriented approach made people aware of improvements they would not 
have thought possible;  
• The advances made in information technology (e.g. improved price-performance 
ratios in hardware and breakthroughs in software and database technology) made 
it possible for organisations to generate, disseminate, analyse, and store more 
information from more sources, for more people, more quickly and cheaper than 
ever conceivable before. 
Other authors, such as Fitzgerald et al. (1991) and Porter (1998), also claim that services 
are now competing on factors such as quality, innovation and flexibility, which have forced 
a change in emphasis from internal performance measures, like efficiency, to external, 
market-based measures, such as customer's satisfaction with quality.  
In order to incorporate other criteria rather than financial information, various 
multidimensional models were developed, such as Fitzgerald et al.'s (1991) Results and 
Determinants Framework, Kaplan and Norton's (1992) Balanced Scorecard, Brown's 
(1996) Input-Process-Output-Outcome Framework, and Neely and Adams's (2001) 
Performance Prism.  
In a study of several service delivery organisations in the UK, Fitzgerald et al. (1991) 
advocate the need to establish integrated organisational PMS, which should include a 
                                                
6 The Baldrige Award was established by the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Improvement Act of 1987 – 
Public Law 100-107. It had its origin in the 'quality' movement, but has also been influenced by the 
benchmarking movement, which emphasised the development of "a model which allowed each individual 
organisation to measure its activities against a wide set of standardized criteria through which to compare" 
(Talbot 2007: 506). 
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range of varied performance measures, and point to an explicit cause-and-effect 
framework between organisational results and the determinants of those results (Sarrico 
2010). They suggest six generic performance dimensions: competitive performance; 
financial performance; quality of service; flexibility; resource utilisation; and innovation. 
The first two reflect the success of the chosen strategy (results); the other four determine 
competitive success (determinants). To these authors, only by managing well the 
determinants will an organisation obtain better results. 
The relationship of causality between predetermined measures and their ensuing results 
highlighted by the Results and Determinants Framework was further developed by Brown 
(1996). The Input-Process-Output-Outcome Framework, as he called it, determines the 
five stages of the business process: inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes and goal, which 
are represented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 – The input-process-output-outcome framework 
Source: Brown (1996) 
Input measures include employees' satisfaction, suppliers' performance and finance; 
process measures integrate production and operational matters; output measures look at 
product and service, as well as at financial results; and outcome measures are concerned 
with customer satisfaction.  
 
 
76 
Johnston and Clark (2008) argue that there is little use in driving an organisation only by 
knowing the results (financial and external data) because there is no means of knowing 
what is determining those results. Conversely, driving an organisation by determinants 
alone gives no understanding of the results of actions taken. These authors say that 
organisations must learn to balance the use of both financial and non-financial measures, 
in order to get a competitive advantage, customer-focused and competitor-based. 
Needing to select performance measures according to strategic intentions, service 
organisations must ensure that one dimension of performance is not stressed to the 
excessive detriment of another.  
The best-known framework that encourages the use of a mix of measures is the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC). This model, developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992), should, according 
to these authors, translate an organisation's mission and strategy into tangible objectives 
and a coherent set of performance measures, providing a framework for a strategic 
management system (Kaplan and Norton 1996; Radnor and Lovell 2003). The model 
points to a balance of measures: financial measures (total costs, total revenues, cost per 
customer, revenue per customer); customer or external measures (customer satisfaction, 
customer loyalty, retention rates, new customers, and number and types of complaints, for 
example); operational or internal measures (equipment or staff availability, number of 
faults, and number of staff by process); and development or learning measures (staff 
satisfaction, number of suggestions, number of improvements, staff turnover, and number 
of service innovations) (Johnston and Clark 2008). 
Despite its widespread use, authors like Neely et al. (1995) and Kennerly and Neely 
(2002b) identified shortcomings in the BSC, namely: the absence of a competitive 
dimension (Neely et al. 1995); and the lack of measurement of the human resources 
perspective/employees' satisfaction, product/service quality and environmental/community 
perspective (Maisel 1992; Lingle and Schiemann 1996). In order to address the 
shortcomings of the BSC and other frameworks, Neely and Adams (2001) introduced 
another multi-faceted framework: the Performance Prism. This model adopts a 
stakeholder-centric view of performance measurement.  
The Performance Prism explains that an organisation's results (stakeholder satisfaction) 
are a function of the determinants (strategies, processes and capabilities). Neely and 
Adams (2001: 153) consider this framework to be "multi-dimensional, reflecting all of the 
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areas of performance that influence the performance of an organisation, [enabling] a 
balanced picture of the business to be provided, highlighting external (stakeholder) and 
internal (strategy, process and capability) measures, as well as enabling financial and 
non-financial measures and measures of efficiency and effectiveness throughout the 
organization". 
Given that, in this research, it has been decided to look at performance from a systems 
point of view, an Input-Process-Output-Outcome framework was considered appropriate 
to look at the way performance is measured, reported and managed. Neely et al. (2000) 
and Neely et al. (2007) argue that this type of framework is useful to distinguish between 
different categories of measures and has proved popular in public sector businesses. In 
the next section, the Input-Process-Output-Outcome model proposed by Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2000) for the public sector will be displayed.  
3.6. Performance management systems in the public sector: an input-process-
output-outcome model 
Figure 9 represents the input-process-output-outcome model proposed by Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, in 2000, for the public sector, in their book Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis, and later modified by Bouckaert and Halligan in 2008, in their work 
Managing Performance: International Comparisons. 
In relation to Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2000) initial model, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b) 
made two significant modifications: first, the inclusion of 'trust' as an integral element of 
performance management; and second, the addition of 'the environment' as directly 
impacting on (and being impacted by) the identification of needs, the level of trust in the 
system and the outcome/effects of policy and implementation interventions. 
This model, based on systems-theory, provides tools for a dynamic and systemic 
'thinking', since it acknowledges the existence of a closed loop between the actions of 
performance measuring, taking corrective action and achieving outcome response 
(Boland and Fowler 2000). It comprises five main components: inputs, processes, outputs, 
outcomes and trust. 
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Figure 9 – The input-process-output-outcome model 
Source: Adapted from Bouckaert and Halligan (2008: 33). 
This framework assumes that institutions are set up to address specific needs. In order to 
do so, they establish goals, concerned with those needs, and acquire inputs (staff, 
buildings, and so on), which they will use in the pursuit of those goals. Processes are 
those activities that take place inside institutions in order to generate outputs. Outputs are 
the products of those processes, that is, what the institution delivers to the outside world. 
These outputs, services or products, then leave the 'grey box' and interact with the 
environment (especially with the individuals and groups to whom they are specifically 
aimed – their stakeholders), leading to outcomes, which may be defined as the impact that 
outputs have in meeting a perceived need (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000).  
Given that outcomes are generally thought of in qualitative terms they are difficult to 
measure. Furthermore, the process is also complicated by the length of time it takes for 
such impacts to be identified. Finally, the fact that external factors may have an influence 
on outcomes also complicates the process (Boland and Fowler 2000). As a result, there 
seems to be a major disconnection between outputs on the one side, and a disrupted 
sequence of outcomes on the other side. This divide, termed by Bouckaert and Halligan 
(2008b) as a 'Grand Canyon', may be caused by a variety of reasons: stakeholders that 
inhibit the full attainment of outcomes because of their reactions; an absence of (quasi-) 
market mechanisms; and politicians that over or under grade outcomes. 
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Nevertheless, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b) argue that outcomes, even if fundamental, 
are not an end in itself in public services. For them, the ultimate ambition is to guarantee a 
functional level of trust in public institutions, providing the link between outcomes and 
trust, which they have termed as "the second Grand Canyon in the public sector" (ibid: 
17). The role of all stakeholders in helping to overcome this Canyon seems clear, but if 
there is a divergence between politicians, professionals, administrators and clients in 
creating outcomes and in constructing trust, the other side of the Grand Canyon will 
remain unreachable (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b). 
In order to assess performance, some criteria are usually used. In public services, it 
normally relates to the three Es: economy, which is concerned with the input of resources 
and with ensuring that those resources are obtained at the lowest possible cost; 
efficiency, concerned with how much output is achieved for a given level of input at a 
specified level of volume and quality; and effectiveness, concerned with the extent to 
which services confer the benefits which they are intended to confer7. Some authors (e.g. 
Holloway 1999) incorporate a fourth E – equity – since they believe that public services 
should offer a fair and non-discriminatory treatment of people8. Emphasising the need of 
the fourth E, Smith (1995) argues that, even though "efficiency and effectiveness may be 
important objectives of many stakeholders in a public sector organization (…), the pursuit 
of economic efficiency is only one aspect of control. In particular, an important 
consideration in many public sector organizations is that users of the service should be 
treated equitably" (ibid: 279). 
In their input-process-output-outcome model, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b) consider 
four criteria: relevance, which can be assessed by confronting the objectives with the 
needs; efficiency, which is measured by the ratio of outputs over inputs, focusing 
measures around the productivity of a process and/or the utilisation of resources; 
effectiveness, measured by the confrontation between objectives and outcomes; and 
economy, which is the ratio of a monetary input over another input. Stretching the span up 
to the concept of trust, three other criteria linking inputs, outputs and outcomes to trust are 
considered: input/trust, output/trust, and outcome/trust. Even though there are no 
empirical studies corroborating these relationships, to Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b), the 
                                                
7 In recent years, some governments have added a 'customer satisfaction' component to effectiveness. 
8 Thomas (2004) argues that omitting equity may have an impact on another E in government, namely 
electability. 
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inclusion of these three criteria is important to assess performance, since trust is very 
present in the broad discourse of public sector performance and it is also a significant 
driver in performance-based public sector reform policies. 
The ratios that are more easily measured are economy and efficiency. Relevance is not 
difficult to assess if the organisation defines clear objectives a-priori. Effectiveness and 
the three ratios related to trust are probably the hardest to verify. In the case of 
effectiveness, it is often difficult to determine if a certain objective has led to a certain 
outcome or if other factors may have had an impact. In the case of the other ratios, it is 
not easy to establish a relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes and the degree 
of trust in public institutions. 
Having defined Figure 9 as their analytical framework, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b) 
propose four ideal types of managing performance, using them to describe the state of 
performance management in the six countries they studied (Australia, Canada, The 
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, and the US). These ideal types were constructed taking 
into consideration the features of what are, according to them, the core dimensions of a 
PMS: measurement (collecting data by observing and registering performance related 
issues), incorporation (intentionally importing performance-related data into documents 
and procedures with the purpose of using them) and use of performance (using 
performance-related data). They define as the four ideal types: Public Administration; 
Managements of Performances; Performance Management; and Performance 
Governance. 
Within Performance Administration, a commitment to measurement and performance is 
expected, but the relationship may not be explicit or well developed and the application is 
often ad hoc. There is a systematic administrative registration of data, mostly on inputs 
and processes. There is a limited level of incorporation that is formal and procedural, but 
which is not necessarily at the core of decision-making. The measurement and 
incorporation of performance does not happen because organisations need it for policy-
making or managing, but because there are laws and regulations requiring it. The 
administration of organisations is based on the importance of rules, regulations and laws, 
mostly within a legal framework. As a consequence, the intended and potential use of 
performance data is limited. A classical Weberian bureaucracy fits this model (Bouckaert 
and Halligan 2008b). 
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According to the Managements of Performances ideal type, management and 
performance are linked, but the connection between them is underdeveloped and 
concurrent systems operate. It implies different types of performances according to 
different and unconnected management functions. This results in a diverse range of 
managements of performances like performances in personnel management, financial 
management, strategic and operational management, customer management, and 
communication management. Asymmetrical development of these function-based 
measurement systems makes it not very consistent, coherent, comprehensive, and 
integrated. However, within some functions there may be a high level of sophistication and 
development, even up to the level of driving an improvement and reform processes 
(Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b). 
Performance Management is defined by the presence of distinctive features: coherence, 
integration, consistency, convergence, and comprehensiveness. Measurement is high 
within this ideal type, since indicators and measurement systems are not just technically 
sound and functional, but also legitimate. It includes an integration of performance 
information, which goes beyond ad hoc connectedness, for the purpose of using it for 
improvement purposes. Performance management is conceived as a framework with 
system properties. There is a functional and optimal equilibrium between trust-based and 
performance-based control systems, even if there are some tensions (Bouckaert and 
Halligan 2008b). The ultimate challenge is, according to Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b), 
the sustainability of a complex PMS within a governance context. 
To Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b), Performance Governance provides a distinct ideal 
alternative that a few countries aspire to. According to these authors, this ideal type of 
managing performance is grounded on four elements: organisational relationships exist 
both within and beyond the public sector, covering a range of collaborations through 
networks, partnerships and coordination mechanisms; participation and citizen 
engagement, through, for example, community feedback; integration of performance 
across several organisational levels; and demonstration of performance management's 
impact on society. According to Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b: 184), "Performance 
Governance covers a shift from governing of performance to governing for performance". 
Each ideal type has an "increasing span and depth of performance and improved levels of 
coherence, substance and consolidation" (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008a: 73), meaning 
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that these types can be applied to the historical development of, and to trace the evolution 
of managing performance over time. According to these authors, the ideal types are also 
the basis for analysing and comparing country orientations to performance as a means of 
thinking analytically about performance management and its components. In essence, a 
country will advance to the next ideal type by expanding and integrating the level and type 
of measurements used while also improving on the processes of reporting, feedback, 
accountability and learning (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b), being Performance 
Governance the aspirational ideal type. In fact, apart from Bouckaert and Halligan 
(2008b), several other authors (e.g. Rhodes 1997; Moreira 2002; Osborne 2006; Sarrico 
2010; Talbot 2010; Halligan et al. 2012) hint at a Performance Governance paradigm, 
although not necessarily calling it that. Indeed, as stated in Section 1.2.3, Osborne (2006) 
predicts an era of 'new public governance', which will replace those of 'public 
administration' and of NPM. 
Given the importance of linking the measurement process with strategic planning and the 
need to look at several levels of performance, it was considered adequate to use an input-
process-output-outcome model to look at the performance of universities. Therefore, in the 
next section, Bouckaert and Halligan's (2008b) model will be adapted to higher education. 
3.7. A systems view of performance management in higher education 
Built upon the input-process-output-outcome model presented in Section 3.6 (see Figure 
9) and the work of Dochy et al. (1990), Figure 10 gives a systems view of performance 
management in universities, relating inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes and trust. 
According to this model, there is an ex-ante stage where, for example, the state 
determines the budget allocation for universities, with which universities may or not agree. 
This authorises expenses for inputs, which are transformed into processes and outputs, 
resulting in outcomes and in levels of trust. This is monitored and controlled, sometimes 
for the purpose of redirecting resources (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b). 
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Figure 10 – Systems view of performance management in universities 
Higher education here is seen as a process for transforming inputs (notably students' 
time, academics' time, consumables, and equipment and buildings) into outputs, which 
can be broadly classified as relating to the three components of every university's mission 
– teaching, research and third mission. The former includes the value-added of all those 
receiving instruction from HEIs, that is to say, any increment in the knowledge of students, 
whether or not they complete their studies. Research incorporates any increase in 
knowledge generated by the institution, in the form of publications or patents, for example 
(Cave and Hanney 1992), and third mission includes, for instance, educational or 
consultancy activities for outside organisations. Outcomes are the products of a university 
in the long-run, and comprise, for example, building a well-educated society or 
contributing to economic development (Boland and Fowler 2000). Outcomes are affected 
by the environment, which should also be affected by them. Needs are derived from the 
environment and are also supposedly affected by outcomes. Needs result in strategic and 
operational objectives of policies that are realised through outcomes (Bouckaert and 
Halligan 2008b). 
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All this process is monitored and controlled. At the end, the outputs and the outcomes are 
measured against pre-established targets and, if there is a difference between these and 
the actual outputs/outcomes, corrective action should occur. Similarly to what was 
described by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b) for public sector organisations, in 
universities, effectiveness should be a primary dimension of performance, being efficiency 
or productivity a secondary dimension. Nevertheless, and as stated in Section 3.6, the 
ratios that are more easily measured are economy and efficiency. This happens mainly 
due to the fact that organisations are only able to control inputs, processes and outputs, 
depending all other factors on other agents. 
Given that performance measurement can widen the gap between managers and 
professionals, constructing trust between them is considered essential for a well-
succeeded PMS. Therefore, it is desirable, at various crucial moments in the performance 
measurement process, to arrange for interaction between academics and managers. This 
means that professionals ought to be invited to say what constitutes a good product 
definition and what they want to be assessed on: "If management and professionals (…) 
arrive at product definitions and performance indicators by mutual agreement, there is a 
greater chance that they will be taken seriously, which will help them [to] fulfil their 
function" (De Bruijn 2007: 58). Plus, there should be a clear identification of the functions 
of performance measurement and the intended forums for dealing with the performance 
measurement results. This way, the manager and professional can trust that any deviation 
from it will demand consultation. As stated in Section 3.6, the three criteria linking inputs, 
outputs and outcomes to trust, although considered important, are extremely hard to 
measure. 
In the last stage of the system's view there is an ex-post audit and/or evaluation, with an 
internal and external dimension. In higher education these tasks can be performed by 
external auditors or by an accreditation agency, which usually starts off the evaluation 
process by analysing a self-assessment report produced by each university. To Bouckaert 
and Halligan (2008b), ideally this feeds forward to the next cycle. 
If working well, a PMS should provide information on important matters, promote 
appropriate behaviour, provide mechanisms for accountability and control, and create a 
mechanism for intervention and learning (Fisher 1995; Haas and Kleingeld 1998; Neely 
1998). In fact, monitoring should only take place in order to provide organisational 
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learning, which may be defined as the "processing of information which changes an 
entity's range of potential behaviour" (Johnsen 2000: 269). In other words, performance 
should be not only measured and reported, but also managed, that is, used for 
improvement purposes (Radnor and Barnes 2007). 
But, how is performance being measured, reported and managed in universities? And, 
how do these systems relate to the governance structures of universities? Answering 
these questions will be the focus of this research. 
Before moving into the methodology chapter, in order to explain how the research was 
carried out, it is important to understand what performance measures are usually used in 
universities and what ex-post evaluation procedures are normally carried out. 
3.7.1. Performance measures used in higher education 
Several tools can be used to measure performance in universities. Barnett (1992) argues 
that there are three forms of quality assessment in higher education: peer review, 
judgements of the market and PIs (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 – Performance measures in higher education 
Source: Barnett (1992: 4) and Rosa (2003: 61) 
Barnett (1992) based his analysis on the triangle proposed by Clark (1983) (see Section 
2.3), who argues that there are three coordinating mechanisms in higher education: the 
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state, the market and the academic oligarchy. According to Barnett (1992), the type of 
performance measures used will depend on the prevailing coordination mechanism. To 
him, "the state will tend to favour performance indicators as a means of assessing quality; 
(…) the academic community will tend to favour peer review; and the market-led system 
will generate consumer oriented approaches to quality assessment" (ibid: 3). 
Therefore, determined to promote a more efficient system, the state will tend to regard as 
high quality institutions those that have PIs showing that they are able to drive increasing 
numbers of students into the labour market at reducing unit costs. The peer review system 
will reflect the values around which the academic class is oriented, namely knowledge 
development. The market system will favour the collective voice of the consumers (Barnett 
1992). 
Rosa (2003) positioned five countries in Barnett's triangle: Portugal, The Netherlands, 
France, the UK and the US. According to her, the first two countries favoured peer review; 
France and the UK preferred PIs; and the US favoured market judgements.  
Barnett (1992) recognises that his analysis is over-simplistic, since "the academic 
community may not rest content with peer review and may embrace PIs; the state, 
correspondingly, will be likely to support quasi-peer reviews, in the form of inspection, 
accreditation or audit whether at institutional or programme level. At the same time, there 
will be accreditation exercises carried out by the relevant professional bodies" (ibid: 4). 
Nevertheless, he argues that his triangle offers a comprehensive summary of the key 
social forces in higher education and their dominant approaches. 
The next sub-sections will take a closer look at each of the measures that can be used in 
higher education – peer review, judgements of the market and PIs, following Barnett's 
(1992) triangle. 
3.7.1.1. Peer review 
Peer review is a method used for assessing the quality of higher education, consisting in 
evaluations by peers, who are experts in a specific field of knowledge (Brennan et al. 
1993). 
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Cole (2003), cited in Blackmore (2005), regards peer review as an essential process for 
reviewing ideas and finding mistakes, leading to the improvement of the quality of a 
product. Cole (2003) argues that a 'culture of criticism' is an important ingredient for 
successful peer reviewing and a critical factor to favour a quality improvement culture. 
To Pagani (2002), peer review is a tool for change, providing a method of assessing 
policies or performances in order to help each other to improve and to ensure compliance 
to standards. Blackmore (2005) argues that one positive spin off from such a practice is 
that good practice can be identified and shared. To Brennan et al. (1993: 133): 
"The traditional example of peer review is the referee system of 
scientific journals. An anonymous output of scientific activity (a 
manuscript) is judged by a few anonymous fellow scientists (peers) who 
are reputed to possess sufficient expertise with regard to the questions 
addressed in the article".  
Nevertheless, this method is also used with other purposes. It can be used: in the 
allocation of research funding; to assess the research rating of university departments 
(e.g. it has been used as part of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) to judge the 
quality of research in the UK); to assess the quality of teaching and learning; or to judge 
the quality of a department, programme or course. 
Given that peer review involves human judgement its outputs are often regarded as being 
subjective. Some authors (e.g. Conrad and Blackburn 1985; Skolnick 1989; Elsworth 
1994) argue that, in the case of the evaluation of teaching and learning, peer reviews are 
frequently indicators of reputation rather than of performance.  
Conrad and Blackburn (1985) list a number of limitations of this approach, including: 
evaluator bias and limited evaluator perspective; and the frequent use of academic staff 
as the single reputation criterion. Skolnick (1989) highlights the potential for conservatism, 
meaning that peer review tends to stifle diversity and innovation. Elsworth (1994: 165) 
adds: "at the centre of this conservatism appears to be the arbitrary (…) nature and lack of 
public validity of the evaluative criteria used".  
Bingham and Ottewill (2001) recognise that the assessment of peers might be too self-
congratulatory, needing to be some checks and balances in place to prevent this from 
occurring.  
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Cave et al. (1997: 201), for example, state that peer review of departments should involve 
the following: those being reviewed knowing who are the reviewers; the reviewers getting 
to know the full range of the work of those being reviewed; those reviewed having the 
opportunity of being interrogated on their work so that misunderstandings can be adjusted 
and the reviewers become knowledgeable about what they are judging; reviews should be 
done by 'genuine' peers (who are not too different in status from those being reviewed) 
and yet experts in the field being reviewed. 
Even though the purpose of the review varies across the higher education sector, being 
either a management tool for target and objective setting (Shelley 1999) or a self-
evaluation tool for the individual (Blackmore 2005), most authors (Cave et al. 1997; 
Shelley 1999; Blackmore 2005) agree that the review process should be educative, based 
on trust and openness between the reviewer and those who are reviewed.  
3.7.1.2. Performance indicators 
Performance indicators (PIs) are considered essential to clarify the gap between current 
and desired practice, that is to say, the extent to which operational units (universities, 
faculties, departments, individuals, etc.) are achieving desired results. Cave et al. (1997) 
define a 'performance indicator' in the following way: 
"Measure – usually in quantitative form – of an aspect of a higher 
education institution. The measure may be either ordinal or cardinal, 
absolute or comparative. It thus includes the mechanic applications of 
formulae (…) and can inform, and be derived from, such informal and 
subjective procedures as peer evaluations or reputational rankings." 
Even though, when speaking of PIs, there is the temptation of thinking first of quantitative 
measures, qualitative PIs also exist (Brennan et al. 1993). As a matter of fact, leaving 
behind the reductionist view that PIs are quantitative, and preferentially, financial data, 
Brennan et al. (1993: 133) state that "performance indicators are empirical, quantitative, or 
qualitative data that point to the goal achievement of a system". 
In higher education, PIs became an essential part of governmental initiatives with the 
passage from the 'state control model' to the 'state supervision model' (Neave 1988), as 
explained in Section 1.3.2. With this change, governments started to introduce evaluative 
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mechanisms to reinforce the accountability of public institutions for the economic, effective 
and efficient use of public resources.  
Several reasons have been advanced for the development of PIs. These include the 
enhancement of managerial control, the opening up of institutions to consumer review, 
and the strengthening of professional judgement (Cave et al. 1988).  
To Cave and Hanney (1992), in order to define PIs, it is important to classify them into 
three categories, which are related to the systems view of performance presented in 
Section 3.7: input, process and output indicators. Input indicators have to do with the 
resources, human and financial, employed by universities. Process indicators relate to the 
intensity or productivity of resource use and to the management effort applied to the 
inputs or to the operation of the organisation. Output indicators concern what is being 
achieved, that is to say, the products of the institution. In this research outcome indicators 
have been added to the table, even though, as discussed before, they are not easily 
measured. Table 2 shows some examples of all these types of indicators. 
Table 2 – Examples of performance indicators within the input-process-output-
outcome model 
Input Process Output Outcome 
Resources (e.g. 
financial and 
material facilities; 
students; staff) 
Organisational and 
administrative 
(management) aspects 
for three primary tasks 
of higher education 
institutions: research; 
teaching and learning; 
and third mission 
Products of 
research, education 
and services (e.g. 
amount of 
publications; 
employability of 
graduates) 
Products of the 
university in the 
long-run (e.g. help 
building a well-
educated society; 
contribute to 
economic 
development) 
 Source: Adapted from Dochy et al. (1990: 145), who did not consider outcome indicators. 
To Dochy et al. (1990: 145), individual PIs or sets of PIs should satisfy certain criteria to 
fulfil their evaluative role. These criteria include: 
• Type of indicator (input, process, quantity, quality, etc.); 
• Relevance (how accurately is the attainment of objectives measured?); 
• Ambiguity (is the direction of improvement clear?) 
 
 
90 
• Manipulability (can units costlessly adjust or misrepresent performance?) 
• Cost of collection and availability of comparative data; 
• Level of aggregation (at what level should they be applied?) 
• Relation to other indicators (do certain indicators overlap with other PIs?) 
Even though a wide range of PIs is used in many universities, the adoption of systems of 
PIs is far from universal. 
Kells (1992) states that countries differ enormously in respect to three variables: technical 
development; the political decision to create structures that allow and encourage the use 
of PIs; and the adoption of policies which will, hopefully, lead to the advancement of PIs.  
Systems of higher education also vary in other related issues, including the degree of 
autonomy of institutions and individual academics. Within Western Europe, the drive 
towards the 'Evaluative State' is most advanced in countries like the Netherlands and the 
UK (Neave 1988). Also Teichler (1988) identifies the UK and The Netherlands as the two 
countries where performance measures have had the most impact on policy and 
research. 
These differences between countries suggest that it would be interesting to compare 
higher education systems that have arguably adopted different systems of PIs, in order to 
understand the reasons that led to such differences.  
3.7.1.3. Judgements of the market 
Fiscal constraints, public policies that foster a greater role for market forces, changing 
levels of demand, and increasing competition, push institutions to pursue strategies they 
believe will best position them in the competitive marketplace, such as hiring 'star' 
professors or investing in high-cost amenities, such as recreational facilities, residence 
halls and improved information technology infrastructures (Eckel 2007). 
In this increasingly competitive environment, it could be argued that it is important to look 
at the market and listen to what the consumers have to say, in order to understand their 
needs and meet their requirements. Those who favour the market as the main form to 
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assess quality argue that the voice of consumers is what counts as quality, especially 
since the market system is anarchic and no predictions can be made about its 
preferences (Barnett 1992).  
The success in the market pre-empts deeper consideration of the questions 'who 
benefits?' and 'whose values are served?' (Houston 2008). According to Eckel (2007: 88), 
"students and their families seek the highest quality institution. Yet, quality is often defined 
with little attention to how much students learn or the impact of the students' education on 
their personal, professional and civic lives". This implies listening to graduates, future 
students and their families, current and future employers. 
3.7.1.4. The combination of performance measurement tools: qualitative and 
quantitative 
Performance measures can be either qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative models, 
usually based on formulas, have the advantage of providing objective criteria for 
measurement, enabling an unbiased comparison between different institutions. Qualitative 
tools, such as peer review, tend to pay less attention to minor issues, mainly because of 
the holistic judgements they make. Plus, since they are based on human judgements, it is 
often difficult for the evaluators to be objective and consistent through the application of 
their evaluation policy (Rosa and Sarrico 2007). 
It thus seems clear that qualitative and quantitative tools do not have to be mutually 
exclusive. Instead, they can complement each other contributing to a better assessment of 
performance.  
The actual trend in higher education is to associate PIs to other evaluation forms (e.g. 
qualitative indicators resulting from 'peer review'), which translate each institution's context 
and allows a broader vision of universities (Cave and Hanney 1992). 
After looking at the tools that are used to measure performance in higher education, the 
next section will explain how the ex-post evaluation, referred to in Figure 10, occurs in 
most HEIs. 
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3.7.2. Ex-post evaluation in higher education 
McDavid and Hawthorn (2006: 293) point some differences between performance 
measurement and evaluation: PMS are ongoing while evaluation is episodic; performance 
measures are routinised while evaluation measures are customized for each evaluation; 
resources for performance measurement are usually part of the organisational 
infrastructure while resources for evaluation are targeted; managers often play a key role 
in performance measurement while evaluators and managers are less connected; and the 
uses of performance information evolve over time while the intended purposes of 
evaluation are usually negotiated upfront. 
Most European countries have been influenced by the ideas contained in a 'general 
model' of evaluation, supported and promoted by the EU. This model has four main 
elements: first, there is a national body (independent of government) with the 
responsibility of coordinating and setting out the procedures and methods to be used by 
HEIs, in order to assure quality; second, based on the procedures and methods set out by 
the national body, institutions should undertake regular self-evaluation, carried out by the 
academic staff of the institution, and report to the co-ordinating body on a regular basis; 
third, the institutional self-evaluation would be the basis for an external peer evaluation. 
The external peers, selected to represent specific expertise (management, academic, 
etc.), would have discussions with academic and administrative staff, alumni and 
students; fourth, and last, a report should be published, setting out the findings of the peer 
review visit. Its main purpose should be to make recommendations to institutions in order 
to improve their quality (Brennan and Shah 2000). The evaluation procedure for 
universities could be as shown in Figure 12.  
Even though evaluation procedures may differ between countries, the model displayed 
represents the system of evaluation present in many higher education systems. 
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Figure 12 – Evaluation procedure for universities 
Source: Adapted from Pile and Teixeira (1998: 115). 
From what has been described in the literature review chapters, it seems undeniable that 
similarly to what happened in other public services (see Section 1.2), pressures to reform 
higher education have become more acute in recent years. Amongst others, there have 
been pressures to democratise access to higher education; to contain costs; to be 
accountable for the money spent; to increase productivity; to improve the quality of 
teaching and research; and to develop the third mission and show its impact on society. 
These pressures have not only challenged universities to change their traditional models 
of governance, but have also raised the interest in introducing performance measurement, 
reporting and management practices, as discussed in Section 1.3.2. 
The increasing interest for performance enhancement, both in the private and public 
sectors, led to prolific research, especially on the topic of performance measurement, and 
to the development of numerous performance management frameworks (e.g. Fitzgerald et 
al. 1991; Kaplan and Norton 1992; Brown 1996; Neely and Adams 2001), as seen in 
Section 3.5.  
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Despite the growing base for research into the topic of performance in higher education, 
there still seem to be some gaps in the literature, especially regarding the management of 
performance and its link to strategic planning. Actually, in higher education, the focus has 
been primarily on the selection and use of PIs (e.g. Goedegebuure et al. 1990; Johnes 
and Taylor 1991; Cave and Hanney 1992; Tam 2001) or on the development, 
implementation and/or analysis of quality assurance mechanisms (e.g. Brennan and Shah 
1997; Brown 2004; Filippakou and Tapper 2010; Langfeldt et al. 2010; Shah et al. 2011; 
Stensaker et al. 2011). Only more recently, there has been an interest for studying 
performance management in higher education (see Table 3). Nevertheless, studies like 
these are not common and tend to focus on the implementation of management models, 
such as the BSC; look at the performance of specific areas (e.g. research, central 
administrative services or performance appraisal of staff); or look at specific actors (e.g. 
heads of departments or vice-chancellors). 
Thus, and even though the literature review (e.g. Fisher 1995; Haas and Kleingeld 1998; 
Neely 1998) has shown that a well-built and well-functioning PMS is one where 
performance is measured and reported, and where performance information is integrated 
into decision-making, using it for learning purposes (as discussed in Section 3.7), it is 
believed too much attention has been put on how to measure performance or on how to 
build quality mechanisms, mainly in order to prepare for external evaluation exercises, 
often forgetting to look at what is considered to be the most important part of the process: 
what is being done with the performance data collected during the measurement process, 
and what and who may be influencing measurement, reporting and management 
processes.  
As a matter of fact, not only are there few studies looking at performance management in 
universities from a systems perspective, but also there seem to be no studies relating 
performance measurement, reporting and management to governance structures, despite 
the huge body of literature on university governance (e.g. Bargh et al. 1996; Braun and 
Merrien 1999; Shattock 1999; Kogan and Hanney 2000; Amaral et al. 2002; Kehm and 
Lanzendorf 2006) and a rather small number of studies that look at both governance and 
performance (Knott et al. 2004; Aghion et al. 2009). The relationship between 
performance and governance became even more relevant when several scholars (e.g. 
Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b; Sarrico 2010; Halligan et al. 2012) are predicting a move 
from performance management to performance governance, as discussed in Section 3.6. 
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Table 3 – Literature review on performance management in higher education 
Authors Aim 
Simmons (2002) Looks at the performance appraisal systems for academic staff. 
Talib (2003) Explores the use of performance models and goal setting in universities, focusing on the RAE. 
Knott et al. (2004) Study the impact of state governance structures on the management and performance of higher education institutions in the US.  
Adcroft and Willis 
(2005) 
Considers four key issues: the context and content of performance 
measurement in the public sector; the specific examples of health care 
and higher education; the limitations of performance measurement 
systems; and the likely outcomes of performance measurement systems. 
Broad et al. (2007) 
Examine the relationship between strategic planning, accounting and 
performance measurement systems in local government and higher 
education. 
Aghion et al. (2009) 
Look at the relationship between governance and performance. To them, 
performance is based on the positions on the Shanghai rankings and is, 
therefore, basically research performance. Governance is mainly defined 
in terms of public status and budget, building, hiring and wage setting 
autonomy. 
Arena et al. (2009) Develop and test a PMS for central administrative services, drawing on actor network theory. 
Yu et al. (2009) Describe the implementation of the BSC in a university department. 
Breakwell and 
Tytherleigh (2010) 
Analyse whether the socio-demographic characteristics favoured by those 
responsible for selecting vice-chancellors are related to the performance of 
institutions. 
Sousa et al. (2010) Explore how universities have implemented research performance systems. 
Cugini et al. (2011) Look at the suitability of the BSC for measuring and managing the performance excellence of academic staff. 
Haapakorpi (2011) 
Explores the direct and indirect outcomes of quality assurance processes 
in Finnish universities and the impact of organisational conditions on these 
assurance processes. 
Given that universities are complex organisations (as seen in Section 2.4), being 
influenced by both external and internal coordination mechanisms, it is believed that, 
when analysing internal mechanisms, the research should go beyond the university top 
managers' perceptions concerning the implementation and functioning of PMS, looking not 
only at a single level of decision-making, but at the different levels that compose a 
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university's governance structure and at the different Estates that integrate those levels 
(Academic Estate, Administrative Estate, Student Estate and External Representatives 
Estate), as explained in Section 2.4.4.2. The analysis of multiple levels and actors is 
considered essential to understand how the introduction of PMS in universities, often 
encouraged by external pressures, has affected the configuration of the governance 
structures and the roles, influences and accountabilities of the key actors in these 
structures (the four Estates). The understanding of these changes will, arguably, 
contribute to comprehend the way each level and Estate looks at PMS and the decisions 
they make concerning the implementation and functioning of those systems. To our 
knowledge, this analysis has not been made yet, being a gap in the literature. 
Therefore, this research attempts to address the gaps in current knowledge, being its 
focus to explore how universities are measuring, reporting and managing performance 
and how governance structures relate to it. 
Guided by the research aim, four specific questions were considered relevant to 
encompass the various dimensions involved in the research: 
1. How have the changes in different higher education systems impacted on the 
governance of universities? 
It is important to look at how higher education systems have evolved over time, in 
order to understand the way universities are governed and managed within those 
systems. 
2. How are performance management systems functioning in universities? 
To understand the functioning of PMS in universities, several aspects need to be 
analysed, namely: the way universities define their strategy; how they measure, 
report and manage their performance; the way the governing and management 
bodies and the four Estates that compose those bodies are involved in the 
measurement, reporting and management of performance; and the way 
measurement, reporting and management practices are integrated and linked to 
strategic steering. 
3. What factors are influencing the implementation and functioning of performance 
management systems in universities? 
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To comprehend the reason(s) for PMS to be functioning effectively (or not) it is 
important to analyse the factors that may influence, either positively or negatively, 
the implementation and functioning of those systems.  
4. How do governance structures influence and are influenced by the implementation 
and functioning of performance management systems in universities? 
The aim of this question is to understand the way universities are structured both 
in governance and management terms, and how these structures and the Estates 
that constitute them (Academic, Administrative, Student and External 
Representatives) may be affected by the introduction of PMS and may influence 
(both positively and negatively) the implementation and functioning of those 
systems.  
Following the aforementioned research questions, it is possible to define several specific 
objectives: 
1. Analyse how the British and the Portuguese higher education systems have 
evolved over time and how the changes that occurred in those systems might have 
impacted on the way universities are governed and managed. 
2. Identify performance measurement and reporting practices and the way 
performance information is being used to inform decision-making in universities, 
and discuss the existence of fully accomplished PMS in these institutions. 
3. Identify and categorise the factors that affect the implementation and functioning of 
PMS in universities. 
4. Identify and analyse the pressures that exist to introduce performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices. 
5. Analyse the influence of the introduction of performance measurement, reporting 
and management practices on the existing governance structure. 
6. Discuss the influence of performance measurement, reporting and management 
practices on the roles and influences of the four Estates (Academic Estate, 
Administrative Estate, Student Estate and External Representatives Estate) and 
the influence of the Estates on decision-making. 
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7. Analyse the influence of the existing governance structure and Estates on the 
implementation and functioning of PMS. 
The framework used integrates, on the one hand, literature on performance management 
and, on the other, literature on governance, applied to the context of higher education. 
Performance management is presented through the systems view shown in Section 3.7 
(see Figure 10), using three main dimensions – measurement, reporting and 
management; and performance measures are defined and identified within the input-
process-output-outcome model (Dochy et al. 1990; Cave and Hanney 1992; Bouckaert 
and Halligan 2008b). The areas that are looked at in terms of performance measurement, 
reporting and management are the main activities that compose the mission of a 
university (teaching and learning, research and scholarship and third mission), the 
employees (academic and non-academic staff), the 'customers' (students), services, other 
important stakeholders (employers and alumni) and finance. 
Governance structures are analysed by using the analytical framework proposed in 
Section 2.4.4.2 (see Figure 6). First, the relationship between universities and the external 
coordination mechanisms that compose the 'outer ring' – the state, the market and Europe 
– are explored; secondly, the type, size and composition of governing and management 
bodies are disclosed, and the reforms that have taken place are discussed; and thirdly, 
the roles and influences of the key actors that sit in governing and management bodies 
are looked at (especially in relation to PMS). These actors are the four Estates that 
compose the 'inner ring' of the analytical framework: Academic Estate, Administrative 
Estate, Student Estate and External Representatives Estate.  
The process by which the research questions and objectives aforementioned have been 
transferred into a systematic study will be addressed in the following chapter, which 
discusses research paradigms, research methodology, data collection methods, and data 
treatment techniques, ensuring they are aligned with the research aim and objectives. 
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"We can be absolutely certain only  
about things we do not understand." 
Henry Miller 
"Research is the process of going up alleys  
to see if they are blind." 
Marston Bates 
In the previous chapters, the main literature that frames the current study, centred on the 
relationship between governance structures and PMS, was reviewed.  
The objective of this chapter is to explain why the research design used is considered 
adequate for the research aim and demonstrate that the decisions that informed the 
research design were conducted in a rigorous manner, in full awareness of the options 
available.  
The chapter is structured as follows: First, the paradigms available to researchers will be 
compared and the choice of a phenomenological paradigm and of an interpretative 
approach justified. Secondly, the reasons for having chosen a qualitative methodology 
and an exploratory study will be presented, followed by an explanation of the decision to 
use a case study design and a presentation of the reasons that support the selection of 
cases. Thirdly, the choice of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews to 
collect data will be justified. Finally, the data treatment techniques used will be explained 
and the way data was analysed and interpreted shown, whilst acknowledging issues such 
as validity and reliability. 
4.1. Research paradigm 
The research paradigm adopted by a researcher is fundamental since paradigms "are 
central to the notion of research design" (Easterby-Smith et al. 2001: 56). Kuhn (1996) 
defines a paradigm as a set of assumptions embraced by a community of scientists about 
how problems are to be understood, about what theory best describes the world and, 
therefore, about which research questions and methodologies are appropriate. In human 
and social sciences, paradigms help to understand phenomena: "They advance 
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assumptions about the social world, how science should be conducted, and what 
constitutes legitimate problems, solutions and criteria of 'proof'" (Creswell 1994: 1). As 
such, paradigms include both theories and methods, helping to clarify the research 
design. 
Although there is considerable blurring, two paradigms dominate the literature: the 
positivist and the phenomenological (Hussey and Hussey 1997). Some authors, like 
Creswell (1994) use other terms, such as quantitative and qualitative paradigms. Table 4 
shows the numerous alternative terms that are used. 
Table 4 – Alternative terms for the main research paradigms 
Positivist paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Quantitative 
Objectivist 
Scientific 
Experimentalist 
Traditionalist 
Qualitative 
Subjectivist 
Humanistic  
Interpretivist 
 
 Source: Adapted from Hussey and Hussey (1997: 47). 
Each paradigm adopts a different stance with regard to the key assumptions that guide 
the way in which social research is conducted.  
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) argue that a paradigm encompasses three assumptions (the 
fundamental questions): ontology, epistemology, and methodology.  
Ontology raises basic questions about the nature of reality. Does the researcher believe 
that reality can be objectively considered, or is reality subjective or dependent on the 
participant (Creswell 1994)? Even though we accept that there is a reality out there 
independently of our observation of it, agreeing to an extent with positivist assumptions, it 
is believed performance has a socially constructed element, which can only be understood 
by examining the perceptions of human actors, as advocated by the phenomenological 
perspective. 
Epistemology is concerned with the study of knowledge and what is accepted as being 
valid knowledge. This involves examining the relationship between the researcher and 
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what is being researched (Collis and Hussey 2003). Since what is important in the multiple 
elements and dimensions of performance, and how each of these elements and 
dimensions is measured, reported and managed, is believed to be socially constructed, it 
was considered important to "report faithfully these realities and to rely on voices and 
interpretations from informants" (Creswell 1994). This perspective is in accordance with 
the phenomenological paradigm. 
Methodology focuses on the entire process of research. Given that the intent of the study 
is not to develop generalisations that contribute to theory, as supported by positivist 
assumptions, but to explore how universities are measuring, reporting and managing 
performance and how governance structures relate to it, a qualitative methodology was 
preferred over a quantitative one. The reasons that justify this choice are explained in 
Section 4.2.1. 
Within the phenomenological paradigm there are a number of philosophies that come 
under this umbrella, such as ethnography, hermeneutics, social constructivism and 
interpretivism. Whilst all have slightly different perspectives in the way they approach the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions, they all share the belief that methods of the 
natural sciences are inadequate for the study of social reality (Lee 1993). 
Unlike atoms, molecules and electrons, people create and attach their own meanings to 
the world around them and to the behaviour that they manifest in that world (Lee 1993). In 
other words, the same human action can have different meanings for different human 
subjects, as well as for the observing social scientist. Being the focus of this study to 
interpret the perceptions of different actors (academics, non-academics, students and 
external members) concerning the implementation and functioning of PMS, the approach 
that this research aligns itself with is that of interpretivism. 
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4.2. Research methodology 
4.2.1. Qualitative methodology 
Several reasons explain the choice of a qualitative analysis for this research. 
The first set of reasons is related to the relative absence of studies that relate governance 
structures to PMS. In this sense, a qualitative approach was considered more adequate, 
since it enables a more profound and rich analysis of the phenomena being studied than a 
quantitative approach, especially when the study field is not scientifically well structured 
(Denscombe 1999; Silverman 2006).  
A second set of reasons has to do with the nature of the study. It was considered that in 
order to get the perceptions of all the actors that sit in the existing governing and 
management bodies and/or have a close link to the management of the university (these 
being academics, non-academic staff, students or external members), a qualitative 
methodology would provide a richer understanding of the reality than a quantitative 
approach. In fact, by using a qualitative methodology, the researcher is able to carry out a 
more in-depth study, arguably allowing for a better interpretation of the way the actors 
perceive PMS and are involved in the implementation and functioning of these systems.  
The last set of reasons is related to the scientific domain of the present study – social 
sciences. Actually, there is a strong tradition in social sciences of using a qualitative 
approach (Alasuutari 1995). Having started in the Chicago School, in the 1920s, the 
qualitative approach became more preeminent in the 1970s. The interest in this 
methodology arose as a reaction against the priority attached to the scientific or positivist 
methodology present in sociological textbooks. In these textbooks, sections on qualitative 
or 'soft' techniques – if existed at all – were referred to as being of interest only in 
providing intuitions for the formulation of hypotheses, which could then be tested more 
rigorously using quantitative or 'hard' data (Gherardi and Turner 1999; Scott and Marshall 
2005). The growing interest in phenomenological approaches in the 1970s led to 
scepticism about the relevance of the natural scientific model of research for social 
sciences (Scott and Marshall 2005). As a matter of fact, in the last decades, several books 
have been written on the importance of qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 1994; 
Miles and Huberman 1994; Mason 1996). 
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Even though, for the purpose of this research, a qualitative methodology was preferred 
over a quantitative approach, that does not mean that certain rules and procedures have 
not been followed in order to ensure the reliability and the validity of the data (Silverman 
2006), as will be explained in Section 4.4.3. The intent was to minimise the subjectiveness 
usually associated with a qualitative methodology, given that data collection can be 
influenced by the characteristics of the researcher (Denscombe 1999). Nevertheless, it is 
recognised and accepted that no qualitative study can be entirely objective. 
4.2.2. An exploratory study 
Robson (1993) argues that, in addition to the objective of contributing to knowledge, there 
are three purposes for undertaking research: to explore; to describe; or to explain events 
and/or situations (Table 5).  
Table 5 – Purposes of the research 
Purpose Key Characteristics 
Exploratory 
• To find out what is happening 
• To seek new insights 
• To ask questions  
• To assess phenomena in a new light 
• Usually, but not necessarily qualitative 
Descriptive 
• To portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations 
• Requires extensive previous knowledge of the situation to be researched 
or described, so that you know the particular aspects on which to gather 
information 
• May be qualitative and/or quantitative 
Explanatory 
• Seeks an explanation of a situation or problem, usually in the   form of 
causal relationships 
• May be qualitative and/or quantitative 
Source: Robson (1993: 42) 
Given the novelty of the topic area, this research is exploratory. In fact, as the literature 
review highlighted (see end of Chapter 3), there is still a lack of understanding relating to 
how universities are measuring, reporting and using the data that is collected during the 
measurement process and how governance structures relate to it. The primary purpose of 
 
 
105 
the study is, therefore, to 'explore' the concepts and develop ideas rather than to 'explain' 
or 'describe' what is happening and why. In 'exploring', the study aims at developing an 
understanding of the relationship between governance structures and PMS rather than 
testing hypothesis or confirming them, which would be more characteristic of a positivistic 
study (Collis and Hussey 2003). This research is believed to lead to new insights of 
knowledge to the way PMS should be implemented in HEIs.  
Having opted for a qualitative methodology, a case study design was considered the best 
option to approach the object of study. In the next section, the reasons that justify this 
choice will be presented and the process used to choose the cases explained. 
4.2.3. Case study design 
4.2.3.1. Justification 
Case-studies include descriptive reports on typical, illustrative, or deviant examples; 
descriptions of good practice in policy research; evaluations of policies after 
implementation in an organisation; studies that focus on extreme or strategic cases; the 
rigorous test of a well-defined hypothesis through the use of carefully selected contrasting 
cases; and studies of natural experiments (Scott and Marshall 2005).  
To carry out this qualitative research, a case study design was chosen for three main 
reasons. First, it is in line with the aim of the research, which is to explore in-depth a 
specific phenomenon of interest – how are universities measuring, reporting and 
managing their performance and how governance structures relate to it. 
Second, case studies are important to analyse complex social phenomena, like to one we 
are looking at. In fact, the way universities measure, report and manage their performance 
"is sensitive to the context in which management behaviour takes place and to its 
temporal restraints" (Bonoma 1985: 204), not being clearly evident the boundary between 
phenomenon and context (Yin 1994).  
Third, the case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events – such as individual life cycles, organisational and 
managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations, and the maturation 
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of industries (Yin 1994). In this study, case studies are used in order to understand 
organisational and managerial processes in a specific kind of organisations – universities 
(Melo et al. 2008). 
A case study research design can include both single and multiple-case studies. Since the 
aim of this research is to investigate a particular phenomenon (PMS and their relationship 
with governance structures), it was considered important to analyse that phenomenon in 
different higher education settings (the British and the Portuguese, in this case), in order 
to see how different contexts and policies can impact on the way universities deal with 
PMS and how governance structures may influence and be influenced by those systems. 
Therefore, a multiple-case approach was chosen, since it enables the development of 
more sophisticated descriptions and explanations. To Miles and Huberman (1994: 172), 
multiple cases help the researcher to "pin down the conditions under which that finding will 
occur".  
In the trade-off between broadness, which means choosing a large number of cases with 
limited deepness, and depth, which entails choosing a small number of cases with 
significant deepness, the latter was preferred. Given the complexity of the analysis, which 
involved several levels of the organisation (central, departmental and individual), and 
different actors (academics, non-academics, students and external members), an 
adequate understanding of a university is only considered possible if a significant amount 
of time was spent at each location, which meant fewer cases (Melo et al. 2008). As Yin 
(1994) points out, by examining a relatively small number of cases, and comparing and 
contrasting them, the researcher learns about significant features of the phenomenon and 
how it varies under different circumstances. 
Therefore, two cases were selected – the University of Warwick (UW) and the University 
of Aveiro (UA) – enabling an in-depth analysis. In fact, and even though with some 
disagreement, it is generally thought that in-depth case studies are extremely powerful for 
inductive theory building (Zhao and Calantone 2003), such as this research attempts.  
4.2.3.2. Selection of cases 
As discussed in Section 2.2, not every country or institution responded to reform demands 
in the same way. Perhaps, the most profound reforms in higher education have taken 
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place in countries associated with the Anglo-Saxon model of system-level governance. 
For the UK, for example, these reforms were not isolated to a particular public sector but 
were a component of a much broader rethinking and restructuring of the role and function 
of the government (Amaral et al. 2002). In fact, profound reforms were implemented in the 
public sector (Pollitt 2003), first under the Thatcher Government, in the 1980s, and, later, 
under Tony Blair's 'Third Way'. Other countries, such as Portugal, have recently started to 
debate the need for deep changes in order to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, 
accountability and performance of HEIs. Indeed, the Portuguese government just started 
to put into practice a profound restructuring of the higher education sector.  
Taking these differences into account, and the particular interest of the researcher to look 
at the Portuguese higher education system, where it is integrated, a comparative study 
between British and Portuguese universities was conducted, in order to assess if the way 
universities deal with performance measurement, reporting and management practices is 
that different in countries with different contextual settings, and to understand the 
influence those practices may have on governance structures, and the influence those 
structures may have on PMS, under different scenarios. It could be argued that, in this 
case, comparison is a powerful conceptual mechanism, fixing attention upon the few 
attributes being compared (Stake 1994). 
This research was limited to state funded universities. Several reasons justified this 
choice: first, the research field needed to be limited due to time constraints and limited 
resources; secondly, in the Portuguese case, state funded universities are more well-
established and more representative of the Portuguese higher education system; thirdly, 
the polytechnics were left out of the study, given that they ceased to exist in the UK after 
1992. 
Even though depth was preferred over broadness, as explained in the previous section, 
other type of constraints justified the choice of two cases, namely: limited time; limited 
resources to do research; and, above all, difficulties in accessing other universities. 
Therefore, two cases were selected: the University of Warwick, in the UK, and the 
University of Aveiro, in Portugal. As Yin (1994) points out, by examining a relatively small 
number of cases, and comparing and contrasting them, the researcher learns about 
significant features of the phenomenon and how it varies under different circumstances. 
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These institutions were chosen for several reasons. First and foremost, they are both 
considered quite successful, entrepreneurial and innovative universities. In fact, when this 
study started both institutions belonged to the European Consortium of Innovative 
Universities (ECIU). UW left the consortium very recently. Secondly, they both have quite 
a flat structure, where departments play a major role. Thirdly, they are about the same age 
– UW dates back to 1965 and UA to 1973. Fourthly, due to facilitated access of the 
researcher to these institutions. 
The ECIU was founded in 1997 by ten European universities, being its goal to create a 
European network, where participating institutions could exchange experience and best 
practice of projects within education, research and regional development. It is a 
consortium of "research universities focussed on collaboration in innovative teaching and 
learning, enhancement of university-society interaction, internationalisation of the student 
and staff experience, and active engagement in policy development and practice within 
the evolving European Higher Education Area"9. At present, ECIU consists of eleven 
members, amongst which are UA, and three overseas associate partners. One would 
expect that these successful and innovative institutions in their countries would have 
implemented adequate systems to measure, report and manage performance.  
It is not claimed that the selected institutions constitute a representative sample. 
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to ensure that, within each case, different 
characteristics were included. In fact, in each location, different subjects were considered, 
meaning that different departments, teaching different disciplines, were selected. The 
reason for choosing different subjects had to do with the fact that it would be expected that 
'hard' subjects would have implemented more easily and deal better with PMS than 'soft' 
subjects, mainly because the first are more used to metrics than the latter. 
To select the disciplines, the categorisation used by Becher and Trowler (2001) was 
applied. They distinguish between 'hard-pure' (pure sciences, such as physics, biology, 
mathematics or chemistry), 'soft-pure' (humanities, such as history and philosophy, and 
pure social sciences, such as psychology or anthropology), 'hard-applied' (technologies, 
such as engineering, agriculture, medicine or computer science), and 'soft-applied' 
(applied social sciences, such as education, accounting, journalism, management or law) 
                                                
9 In http://eciu.web.ua.pt/upload/fl_c3_133.pdf (accessed 16 December 2011). 
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subjects. Thus, similar departments were considered in both universities, being twelve 
departments selected in each location (see Table 6)10. 
Table 6 – Selected departments 
 Hard Soft 
Pure 
• Chemistry (UW and UA) 
• Mathematics (UW and UA) 
• Biological Sciences (UW)/Biology 
(UA) 
• Politics and International Studies 
(UW)/Social, Political and Territorial 
Studies (UA) 
• French Studies (UW)/Languages and 
Cultures (UA) 
• Economics (UW)/Communication and Art 
(UA) 
Applied 
• Computer Science 
(UW)/Electronics, 
Telecommunications and 
Informatics Engineering (UA) 
• Engineering (UW)/Mechanical 
Engineering (UA) 
• HRI (UW)/Civil Engineering (UA) 
• Education (UW)/Education Sciences (UA) 
• Business (UW)/Economics, Management 
and Industrial Engineering (UA) 
• Health and Social Studies (UW)/Health 
Sciences (UA) 
When choosing departments, their governance structures were also taken into 
consideration. The sample includes: bigger departments, usually with devolved budgets 
and 'heavier' structures (in the British case); and smaller departments, with very flat 
structures and more dependent from the centre. This diversity favours different scenarios, 
possibly contributing to drawing conclusions and answering the research questions. 
In UA, the heads of two other departments (Geosciences and Didactics and Educational 
Technology) were interviewed. Even though these departments were not part of the initial 
sample, they were considered of interest. The first department was chosen due to its old 
age and small size and the second because it was already known that it would be merged 
with the Department of Education Sciences, to form the Department of Education, being 
considered interesting to interview the heads of two departments about to merge. 
                                                
10 Even though in the Portuguese case departments are organised around a main scientific area, there are 
some departments where 'soft-applied' and 'hard-applied' disciplines can be found (e.g. the Department of 
Economics, Management and Industrial Engineering teaches those three subjects). 
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The next section focuses on the methods used to collect the data needed to answer the 
research questions. 
4.3. Research methods 
Yin (1994) argues that it is not advisable to restrict the case study to one individual source 
of evidence. Rather, "a major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to 
use many different sources of evidence" (ibid: 91), giving the researcher "further 
confidence that we've really understood what [is] going on" (Miles and Huberman 1994: 
10). 
Thus, in this research, mixed methods were used. Rossman and Wilson (1991) suggest 
three broad reasons for using mixed methods, namely: to enable confirmation or 
corroboration of each other via what Denzin (1978) called 'triangulation'; to elaborate or 
develop analysis, by providing richer detail; and to initiate new lines of thinking through 
attention to surprises or paradoxes. 
According to McEwan and McEwan (2003), by allowing triangulation, a multi-method 
approach increases credibility by reducing the risk of jumping into conclusions based on 
insubstantial evidence. 
To Yin (1994), there are six main sources of evidence: documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observations, participant-observation and physical artefacts. In this 
research, the methods used to assemble information were documentary analysis and 
interviews. Each one of these methods will be explored in the following sub-sections. 
4.3.1. Documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis is an important means of increasing the available information for 
comparison. It consists in the use of existing material, and it can be characterised as 
(Verschuren and Doorewaard 1999): being relatively easily accessible; allowing a look to 
the material from a different perspective than at the time of its production; and not needing 
contact with the research object. Within the scope of this research, several documents 
were analysed, at European, national and case level: 
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• European level – the major European higher education policy documents and 
pieces of legislation that are thought to have affected most higher education 
systems were analysed, in order to understand how European policies regarding 
higher education impacted on national higher education policies; 
• National level – the most important governmental documents that have arguably 
had an impact in both the British and Portuguese higher education systems were 
examined. Plus, external reports concerning the evaluation of both countries' 
higher education systems and official statistics related to both systems were 
looked at. The objective of this analysis was to understand the contextual 
differences between the two systems, especially in order to comprehend how the 
context affected the way universities are organised within each system, and how 
issues related to performance measurement, reporting and management are dealt 
with in each higher education system. 
• University level – policy and strategic documents, minutes of meetings, the results 
of internal surveys, and statistical data related to each site were studied. The goal 
was to comprehend the way both institutions functioned, allowing a cross-analysis 
between these secondary data sources and the other source used to collect data 
(the interviews). 
Table 7 summarises the types of documents that were consulted at all levels. A complete 
list of the documents analysed can be found in Annex 2. 
Given that the documents consulted were entirely produced by others, they present some 
limitations: first, the researcher cannot influence the way they are produced; second, it 
cannot be guaranteed that the information there fits the research questions; third, it may 
not allow comparisons across universities, since the criteria used may differ across 
institutions; and fourth, the documents may lack accuracy and include bias. They are 
however good sources to "corroborate and augment evidence from other sources" (Yin 
1994: 81). 
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Table 7 – Types of documents analysed 
Documents Examples Level Why 
European 
legislation and 
policy documents 
Laws, policy documents 
(e.g. Bologna Declaration) European 
To understand the European 
policy in terms of higher 
education and analyse its 
impact on national higher 
education systems 
National legislation 
referring to higher 
education 
Laws, Decree-Laws, White 
Papers, etc. 
National: 
UK and 
Portugal 
To understand the legislative 
framework and to see how 
evaluation mechanisms 
evolved over time 
External reports on 
higher education 
systems and 
higher education 
institutions 
ENQA, OECD, EUA, etc. 
National: 
UK and 
Portugal 
Case: 
UA 
To understand how external 
entities see the functioning of 
each higher education system 
and of specific institutions. 
This enables a comparison 
between externally collected 
data and internal reports 
Official statistics 
Statistics concerning higher 
education: number of 
institutions, students, etc. 
National: 
UK and 
Portugal 
Characterise both higher 
education systems 
Institutional 
statistics 
Statistics concerning each 
university: enrolments, 
number of departments, 
number of staff, etc. 
Case: 
UW and 
UA 
Characterise each university 
Institutional 
documents 
Internal evaluation reports, 
diagrammatic 
representations of the 
structures, other internal 
documents concerning 
performance evaluation 
Case: 
UW and 
UA 
To understand how 
universities are structured, 
how the different structural 
elements are linked, and how 
each institution measures and 
reports its performance  
Since a comparative case study design requires collecting data on the same variables 
across HEIs, another method was used to collect information: interviews. 
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4.3.2. Semi-structured interviews 
4.3.2.1. Justification 
From all the data collection methods that could be used in a qualitative study, the 
interview was considered the most adequate for this research. This tool not only enables 
the collection of richer and more in-depth data on the research topic and promotes direct 
contact with the actors being researched (Ghiglione and Matalon 1992; Denscombe 1999; 
Silverman 2006), but is also an ideal tool to understand the perceptions, motivations, 
actions and attitudes of individuals towards a certain 'social object' (Best and Kahn 1989; 
Silverman 2006).  
In fact, the interview is usually the main tool used to collect data for interpretive research, 
following the tradition of phenomenological research. It is also an essential source of case 
study evidence, since most case studies are about human affairs. According to Yin (1994: 
85): "these human affairs should be reported and interpreted through the eyes of specific 
interviewees, and well-informed respondents can provide important insights into a 
situation. They can also provide shortcuts to the prior history of the situation, helping the 
investigator to identify other relevant sources of evidence". 
Within this research, it was decided to collect data by conducting qualitative interviews to 
key actors. The term 'qualitative interviewing' usually refers to in-depth, semi-structured or 
loosely structured forms of interviewing. Burgess (1984: 102) calls them "conversations 
with a purpose". Generally, these types of interviews are characterised by: a relatively 
informal style, for example, with the appearance of a conversation or discussion, rather 
than a formal question and answer format; and the assumption that data is generated via 
interaction, because either the interviewee(s) or the interaction itself are the data sources 
(Mason 1996).  
For the purpose of this study, semi-structured interviews were preferred over other type of 
interviews (e.g. structured or unstructured), given the particular characteristics of the 
research. This type of interviews has the advantage of guiding the interviewees' discourse 
towards the theme of the research, while, at the same time, giving them some freedom 
and flexibility to develop their ideas and interpretations of the phenomenon being studied, 
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within their own linguistic and mental frameworks (Ghiglione and Matalon 1992; Quivy and 
Campenhoudt 1992; Denscombe 1999).  
In order to minimise possible bias and to ensure the validity of the data collected, the 
interview outline was carefully structured, based on the literature review, and the 
interviews were carefully conducted. 
4.3.2.2. Interview schedule 
The interview schedule (see Annex 1) integrates questions organised in five sections, with 
the intent of gathering perceptions that enable answering the research questions.  
The questions asked in the first section aimed at collecting information on the 
interviewees, namely their role in the university, time at the university, academic and 
professional background, and participation in governing and management bodies.  
The second set of questions focused on the interviewees' perceptions on the university's 
strategy/vision and strategic plan and on the way that strategy/vision and strategic plan 
are/were developed.  
The third group of questions was centred on performance measurement, reporting and 
management practices, at all levels, and on the importance attributed by the interviewees 
to those practices. In order to help the interviewees answer this group of questions, a 
Prompt Card was shown to them (see Annex 1). They were then asked to discuss the 
performance measurement, reporting and management of the areas represented in the 
Prompt Card, or any other areas they considered important (there was an 'other' square in 
the card with that intent). They were given freedom to discuss the areas they wanted. The 
Prompt Card integrated the main activities that compose the mission of a university 
(teaching and learning, research and scholarship and third mission), the employees of a 
university (academic staff and non-academic staff), the 'customers' (students), the 
services (support services), finance (which one of the interviewees stated to be 'the 
cornerstone of everything'), and other important stakeholders (employers and alumni). 
These areas were drawn from the performance models reviewed in Chapter 3. 
The fourth set of questions focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the integration of 
performance measurement, reporting and management practices; on the factors thought 
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to influence the implementation and function of PMS; and on the pressures (both internal 
and external) felt to measure, report and manage performance.  
The last set of questions was related to: the functioning and composition of the existing 
governing and management bodies; the strengths and weaknesses of those bodies; the 
relationship between academics and non-academics; the influences exerted on decision-
making by each one of the groups responsible for the governance and management of the 
university (academics, non-academics, students and external members); the position of 
these groups towards PMS; and the impact the introduction of measurement, reporting 
and management practices might have had on these groups. 
4.3.2.3. Interviewing process 
The contact with the interviewees happened after getting permission from both institutions 
to do the fieldwork there. The approach to the individuals was different in both universities. 
At UW, the Registrar's Office helped to establish contacts and schedule the interviews. At 
UA, the researcher established the contacts directly with the interviewees. In both cases, 
the interviewees participated voluntarily in the study. 
The interviews were conducted by the researcher in two different languages (English and 
Portuguese), given the different nationalities of the interviewees. Nevertheless, the 
researcher tried to translate the questions in the most accurate way possible, in order to 
ensure comparability. 
The more 'formal' structure of the interview did not mean that the questions were asked in 
the same order as they appear in the schedule or that they have all been asked to all the 
interviewees. The selection of questions and their sequence varied amongst interviewees, 
and resulted from the interaction established between the interviewer and the interviewee. 
Moreover, in order to guarantee the reliability of the data, the questions were sometimes 
repeated and posed in a slightly different way from the one written in the schedule (Best 
and Kahn 1989). That happened especially with the questions related to the 
strategy/vision and strategic plan, and with the questions related to PMS. This occurred 
because many of the interviewees were not particularly familiar with those concepts, 
especially in the Portuguese case. 
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The interviews were all face-to-face, being conducted in different locations inside each 
university, but always in a dedicated interview room to provide privacy for the interviews to 
take place. 
In order to avoid the pre-structuring of their discourses, thus guaranteeing the reliability of 
the data, the interview schedule was never shown to the interviewees prior to the 
interview, even though some of the interviewees asked for it. At the beginning of every 
interview, a small introduction was always made about the aim of the research and the 
objectives of the study.  
All the interviewees were also asked permission to record the interviews. Even though all 
of them agreed, thus enabling easy storage and playback of the interviews, whenever 
asked to do so, the researcher switched off the recorder and took notes by hand. 
Moreover, anonymity and confidentiality were assured to the interviewees. These 
guarantees are not only an ethical principle of every research, but they also tend to leave 
the interviewees more at ease, 'freeing' them from a more 'formatted' or 'institutional' 
discourse. In order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality all the quotes used in the 
research were coded.  
Although the interviewer interacted with every interviewee, adopting a friendly posture, it 
tried to avoid answering some questions related to the research findings, in order to 
guarantee the reliability of the data.  
A reflective field diary was also kept during the interviewing process. The diary contained 
all the information considered relevant by the researcher in relation to each interview (e.g. 
context, emotions, facial expressions, documents and people mentioned). This diary 
proved to be very helpful during the content analysis of the interviews. 
4.3.2.4. Interviewees 
As explained in Section 4.2.3.2, the qualitative approach taken and the depth of the 
research, led to the choice of two institutions – UW and UA. Given that the intent of the 
study is to assess the way performance is being measured, reported and managed at 
each university and the way governance structures are being influenced by these 
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practices and are influencing them, it was decided to interview the key actors in the 
governance and management of each institution.  
The key actors were divided into four groups – the Estates of Figure 6 (Academic, 
Administrative, Student and External Representatives), since the researcher wanted to 
analyse: the differences and similarities in the way each group perceives performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices in the institution; their position 
towards the introduction of PMS; the way their roles and influences have changed owing 
to the introduction of control practices in the institution; and the way they influence and 
control the introduction and functioning of PMS. 
Therefore, in our study, the interviews were conducted to academics, non-academic staff, 
students and external members, being the common element their participation in 
governing and management bodies and/or their close link to the management of the 
university. These have been chosen for several reasons: first, they are arguably more 
familiar with the way the university is governed and managed, since they participate in 
bodies where decisions are made and/or have to take managerial decisions quite 
regularly; secondly, they are likely to be the first ones to feel both external and internal 
pressures to introduce control mechanisms, thus being able to tell the interviewer what 
those pressures are (if any); thirdly, they are arguably more familiar with the concept of 
PMS and with the way performance is measured, reported and managed internally; 
fourthly, they are expected to play a certain role in the process of decision-making 
concerning the choice of procedures in order to enhance performance (namely those in 
top and middle management positions).  
In relation to academics, these were divided into two sub-groups: academic heads (heads 
or directors of department/deans) and other academics (vice-chancellor/rector, deputy 
vice-chancellor, pro-vice-chancellors/vice-rectors, pro-rectors, presidents of governing 
bodies and participants in commissions related to evaluation procedures). The main 
objective of this divide was to see if their perceptions differed and to also analyse if, within 
the group of academic heads, there were differences amongst departments (according to 
the categorisation presented in Table 6 – see Section 4.2.3.2). It should be stated that 
some of the interviewees played more than one role (one interviewee, for example, was 
head of department and head of a governing body). In this case, the interviewee was 
coded as 'academic head', since that was the main role performed within the institution. 
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Non-academic staff included the registrar/administrator of each institution, directors of 
support services (e.g. finance director, academic registrar) and people in charge of offices 
that look at evaluation issues in each university. 
In relation to students, the President of the Students' Union and other students that 
participated in the different governing and management bodies were interviewed in both 
locations.  
Finally, external members sitting in governing bodies were also interviewed. 
Taking into consideration the groups of interviewees aforementioned, all the quotes used 
in the research were coded in the following way: S refers to students, L to external 
members, and NA to non-academic staff. Academics were divided into two categories: 
heads of department and other academics. Therefore, AH was used to identify the 
academic heads of department and A to identify other academics. 
The study also included two pilot interviews (one in each institution) in order to assess the 
suitability and clarity of questions to respondents. In UW the pilot interview was conducted 
to the Registrar and in UA to a Vice-Rector. 
Table 8 presents a summary of the number of interviews that were conducted to each of 
the four groups abovementioned. 
Table 8 – Number of interviewees, per group 
Academic staff 
 
AH A Total 
Non-academic 
staff Students 
External 
members Total 
UW 12 11 23 7 3 4 37 
UA 14 10 24 9 4 2 39 
Total 26 21 47 16 7 6 76 
The selected sample is non-probabilistic (non-representative) and intentional (Quivy and 
Campenhoudt 1992; Miles and Huberman 1994; Denscombe 1999; Silverman 2006). The 
individuals were selected according to: the conceptual framework (academics, non-
academics, students and external members); the departments selected for analysis (see 
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Table 6), in the case of heads of department; research interests (those sitting in governing 
and management bodies and/or linked to units or committees that deal with evaluation 
issues); their weight inside those bodies (in the case of academics, students and external 
members); and their influence in the management of the institution. For example, even 
though many of the non-academic interviewees do not sit in governing bodies or are there 
ex officio, they were considered key actors in the management of the university, thus 
having a knowledge of performance measurement, reporting and management practices 
in most areas. 
The next section will discuss the techniques used to treat and analyse the data. 
4.4. Data treatment and analysis 
4.4.1. Interview transcriptions 
The seventy-six interviews conducted to academics, non-academic staff, students and 
external members of both universities totalised eighty-five hours of recordings. This meant 
that each interview lasted, on average, one hour and seven minutes. 
The interviews were all conducted and taped by the researcher, being most of them also 
transcribed by her. In fact, due to the huge amount of data involved in the study, a 
professional was asked to transcribe some of the interviews. Nevertheless, in these 
cases, each interview was double checked by the researcher in order to guarantee the 
perfect transcription of the recordings. This verification proved to be useful since some 
mistakes were detected and immediately corrected.  
The transcription work lasted six months. The transcription of each interview took, on 
average, ten hours and the review process of those interviews that were not transcribed 
by the researcher took, on average, four hours. All this time spent listening to the 
recordings and writing, brought the researcher very close to the data, facilitating its 
subsequent analysis, coding and interpretation. 
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4.4.2. Data analysis 
Qualitative analysis techniques were used to treat the data collected during the 
interviewing process. The technique used in this study was content analysis. This process 
was supported by the use of the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 8®. 
Content analysis or textual analysis is a methodology used for studying the content of 
communication. Babbie (2003: 350) defines it as "the study of recorded human 
communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws" (ibid: 350). To Holsti 
(1969: 14), it is "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically 
identifying specified characteristics of messages".  
Given that this method enables the researcher to compress large amounts of text into 
fewer content categories, based on explicit rules of coding, it has been widely used, 
namely in social sciences, and was considered adequate for this study. Its adequacy is 
related not only to the qualitative approach adopted (Bardin 1995), but also to the aim of 
the research, which involves analysing the perceptions of key actors in the governance of 
universities in relation to the introduction and functioning of PMS. 
Codes are labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study. Codes are usually attached to 'chunks' of varying size – words, 
sentences, paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Since, for the purpose of this study, it is not the words themselves, but 
their meaning that matters, the coding unit chosen was the theme, rather than the physical 
linguistic units (e.g. word, sentence, or paragraph). An instance of a theme might be 
expressed in a single word, a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph, or an entire document. 
When using theme as the coding unit, the researcher is primarily looking for the 
expressions of an idea (Minichiello et al. 1990). This enables the researcher to assign a 
code to a text chunk of any size, as long as that chunk represents a single theme or issue 
of relevance to the research questions. Therefore, the content analysis grid was structured 
in themes, which were grouped into categories, then clustered into dimensions. 
Open and closed methods of analysis were used to create the categories. In fact, while 
some categories derived from the conceptual framework, others were inductively derived 
from the data.  
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In order to build the categories, all interviews were read individually and transversally, with 
the objective of establishing liaisons between all of them. During this process, several 
analysis grids were designed, until the final grid was complete. 
Even though qualitative content analysis allows the assignment of a unit of text to more 
than one category simultaneously (Tesch 1990), the researcher kept this practice to a 
minimum, in order to assure mutual exclusivity. 
During the coding process, the codes were revised repeatedly, since "some codes do not 
work; others decay. No field material fits them, or the way they slice up the phenomenon 
is not the adequate way the phenomenon appears empirically. (…) Other codes flourish, 
sometimes too much so" (Miles and Huberman 1994: 61). Table 9 shows the dimensions, 
categories and themes that were created for this study. 
Table 9 – Dimensions, categories and themes 
FIRST DIMENSION: Components of a Performance Management System 
Measurement, reporting and management practices, where performance information is closely linked 
to strategic steering 
CATEGORY: Strategy 
Perceptions on the existence of a strategy/vision and of a strategic plan; importance of having a 
strategy/vision and a strategic plan; development of the strategy/vision and of the strategic plan; and 
strengths and weaknesses of the strategy/vision and of the strategic plan 
THEMES  
Strategy Existence Perceptions on the existence of a strategy (formal and/or informal) and of a strategic plan and reasons justifying it. 
Strategy Importance Perceived importance of having a strategy/vision and a strategic plan. 
Strategy Development Bodies (governing and management) and actors responsible for the development of the strategy/vision and of the strategic plan. 
Strategy's Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
Strengths and weaknesses of the university's strategy/vision and 
strategic plan. 
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CATEGORY: Performance Measurement Practices 
Perceptions on the existence of performance measurement practices in the university; areas where 
performance is measured; types of measures used; actors and bodies involved in the definition of 
measures and in the measurement process; and perceptions on the adequacy of the measures used  
THEMES  
Measurement Practices Perceptions on the existence of performance measurement practices in the university and reasons justifying it. 
Areas Measured Areas of the university where performance is measured and degree of measurement. 
Measures Used Measures (quantitative and/or qualitative) used to assess the performance of all areas of the university. 
Delineation and 
Measurement Process 
Bodies (governing and management) and actors (external and 
internal) responsible for deciding on the measures used and for 
measuring performance. 
Adequacy of Measures Adequacy of the measures used to assess the performance of all areas of the university. 
CATEGORY: Performance Reporting Practices 
Perceptions on the existence of performance reporting practices in the university; areas where 
performance is reported; and actors and bodies involved in the development of the reports and in their 
discussion 
THEMES  
Reporting Practices Perceived existence of performance reports in the university and reasons justifying it. 
Areas Reported Areas of the university where performance is reported.  
Reports Development and 
Discussion  
Bodies (governing and management) and actors (external and 
internal) involved in the development and in the discussion of 
performance reports. 
Reports' Pertinence Pertinence ascribed to the performance reports produced. 
CATEGORY: Performance Management Practices 
Perceptions on the use of performance data in the university; areas where performance information is 
used; and actors and bodies that act upon performance data 
THEMES  
Performance Data Use Perceived use of performance data to inform decision-making, both operational and strategic, in the university and reasons justifying it. 
Areas Acted Upon Areas of the university where performance data is used to inform decision-making (both operational and strategic). 
Users of Performance Data Bodies (governing and management) and actors (external and internal) that act upon performance data. 
Adequacy of Use Adequacy of the use of performance data to inform decision-making (both operational and strategic). 
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SECOND DIMENSION: Integration of Practices and Context of Influence 
Integration of practices, where performance information is closely linked to strategic steering, and 
context of influence of performance management systems 
CATEGORY: Integration of Practices 
Perceptions on the importance of having integrated practices; and adequacy of the way performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices are integrated and linked to strategic steering 
THEMES  
Importance of Integrated 
Practices 
Perceptions on the importance of integrating performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices. 
Adequacy of Integrated 
Practices 
Positive and negative aspects concerning the integration of 
measurement, reporting and management practices and links to 
strategic steering in the university. 
CATEGORY: Context of influence 
Perceptions on the pressures towards the introduction of performance management systems and on 
the factors that influence the introduction and implementation of these systems 
Pressures Pressures (both internal and external) to introduce performance management systems  
Influences Factors that influence the introduction and implementation of performance management systems (positively and negatively) 
THIRD DIMENSION: Governance Structures and Performance Management Systems 
Relationship between the way an organisation divides and integrates responsibility and authority at 
different levels – structural level (governing and management bodies) and individual level (actors that 
compose the four Estates – academics, non-academics, students and external members) – and 
performance management systems 
CATEGORY: Governing Bodies 
Functioning dynamic of the governing bodies that exist at the university and of upcoming ones (in 
case of foreseen change); and perceptions on the strengths and weaknesses of these bodies 
THEMES  
Functioning Dynamic of 
Governing Bodies 
Type, composition and links between the governing bodies that exist 
at the university, and change that have/will happen in these bodies (in 
the case of foreseen change). 
Appropriateness of 
Governing Bodies 
Strengths and weaknesses of the existing governing bodies and of 
upcoming ones (in case of foreseen change). 
CATEGORY: Management Bodies 
Characterisation of the management bodies that exist at the university and of upcoming ones (in case 
of foreseen change); and perceptions on the suitability of those bodies 
THEMES  
Management Bodies' 
Characteristics 
Type, composition and links between the management bodies that 
exist at the university, and change that have/will happen in these 
bodies (in the case of foreseen change). 
Suitability of Management 
Bodies 
Strengths and weaknesses of the existing management bodies and of 
the upcoming ones (in case of foreseen change). 
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CATEGORY: The Four Estates and Performance Management Systems 
Perceptions on the relationship between academics and non-academics; on the influence on decision-
making exerted by each one of the groups that compose the governing and management bodies of 
the university or that are closely linked to the management of the institution (the four Estates: 
Academic, Administrative, Student and External Representatives); on the position of these groups 
concerning the introduction of performance management systems; and on the impact of the 
introduction of performance measurement, reporting and management practices on the roles and 
influences of these Estates 
THEMES  
Interaction Between 
Academics and Non-
Academics 
Relationship and level of communication between academics and 
non-academics in the university. 
Influence on Decision-
Making 
Influence of the four Estates on decision-making, both operational and 
strategic. 
Position Towards 
Performance Management 
Systems 
Position of the four Estates concerning the implementation of 
performance management systems and reasons justifying it. 
Performance Management 
Systems' Impact 
Impact of the introduction of performance measurement, reporting and 
management practices on the governance structure and on the four 
Estates. 
4.4.3. Validation and reliability 
The final stage of the case study process consisted in the validation of results by the 
organisations that participated in the study. Validity is concerned with the extent to which 
the research findings accurately represent what is happening (Hussey and Hussey 1997); 
in other words, whether it is a true picture of what is being studied. Data validation was 
done by presenting a report to each of the institutions involved in the research. This 
offered both universities the time to refute or acknowledge the case study findings, and 
more importantly, it allowed a confidence in the research findings that could otherwise be 
lacking.  
Further elements of validity were incorporated into the case studies through the research 
design itself. The triangulation of data methods (incorporating other sources of data 
collection), already discussed in Section 4.3, provided multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon, helping to ensure validity (Yin 1994).  
The issue of reliability differs depending on which research paradigm the researcher 
chooses. Whereas for positivists notions of reliability assume an underlying universe 
where inquiry could be replicated, reliability here refers to whether the process of 
interpretation is transparent to others, can be understood, and whether the same process 
conducted on similar data would lead to the same results. It is believed the way this 
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research was conducted (as described in this chapter) ensures the reliability of the data 
collected. 
After having provided an overview of the research design that was used to guide and 
operationalise this research, the next two chapters present the findings of both case 
studies, based on the analysis, interpretation and discussion of the data collected, using 
the categories and dimensions defined in this section (see Table 9). 
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The British Case: University of Warwick 
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"When people talk, listen completely.  
Most people never listen." 
Ernest Hemingway 
"From the outset the Warwick road was not easy,  
and there were major bumps along the way. (…)  
Warwick is a study of struggle and triumph over serious obstacles – 
a study in self-determination." 
Burton Clark (1998: 11) 
In this chapter, the findings that resulted from the fieldwork conducted at UW are 
displayed. Data was collected personally by the researcher, during her stay at the 
University of Warwick, from January to July 2008. During that period she was a Visiting 
Fellow at the Warwick Business School. 
Before presenting the findings, it is important to set the context. Therefore, to start with, 
the British higher education system will be introduced. This will be done, first, by 
discussing the main policy documents and pieces of legislation that have influenced 
British higher education over the last decades; secondly, by explaining the evaluation 
exercises that were and/or are conducted at a national level; and, thirdly, by exploring the 
British higher education funding system. Then, UW will be characterised, in terms of 
history, student and staff numbers, finances, and governance and administrative 
management structures. Finally, the findings that resulted from the thirty-seven semi-
structured interviews conducted at the university will be displayed. 
5.1. The British higher education system 
5.1.1. Brief history 
In the UK, with the exceptions of Oxford and Cambridge, the four ancient Scottish 
universities and church colleges, British HEIs were established largely through lay 
endeavour that took two main forms: 
 
 
129 
"The first, typical of the civic universities established in the nineteenth 
century, was an alliance between local political, professional, 
commercial and industrial elites, first to press for the grant of a Royal 
Charter and, when successful, to mobilise the resources required to 
establish a university. The second form of lay endeavour, typical of 'new 
universities', was municipal enterprise" (Bargh et al. 1996: 4). 
In these institutions, the state and its agencies and the academic profession played 
subordinate roles. The state granted university charters, established local government 
structures and, modestly, contributed with some resources. The academics' contribution 
was more related to the impact of charismatic individuals than to the weight of an 
organised profession. Therefore, lay councils dominated the early universities.  
After the Second World War, the dependence of universities on national funding 
accelerated: "The post-war expansion of higher education, especially after the publication 
of the Robbins Report in 1963, required the creation of planning structures national in 
scope, leaving councils and governing bodies with a subordinate role" (Bargh et al. 1996: 
2).  
When Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, British universities were still exceptional 
institutions11. They were largely independent and self-regulating, owing to the institutional 
charters bestowed on them by the Crown, and continued to enjoy freedom to select staff 
and students, to determine curriculum content, and to allocate funds. The degree of their 
financial dependence upon the state remained to some extent masked by the major 
mechanism through which government resources were allocated to them – the University 
Grants Committee (UGC) – and the academic dominance of that mechanism. In fact, 
operating under the auspices of, first, the Treasury and then the Department of Education, 
the UGC worked on principles of trust, discretion and informality and the essential role of 
academic judgement in determining resource needs and allocation (Kogan and Hanney 
2000). In order to distribute financial allocations, its judgements were, in fact, "peer 
judgements made on a reputational basis, although framed by analysis of likely student 
demand for different courses and expectations of the resources to be made available by 
the Government" (Cave et al. 1997: 5). 
                                                
11 At the time, and unlike universities, polytechnics were funded by local education authorities and their 
degrees had to be accredited by the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA). 
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In 1981, university budgets were sharply reminded that institutional success could no 
longer be taken for granted. According to Kogan and Kogan (1983), there were financial 
cuts on universities of approximately 13 per cent. Since then, several changes happened 
in the British higher education system (see Figure 13).  
In 1985, two major events happened. First, the publication of the Green Paper, The 
Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, which stressed the need for positive 
attitudes to business, entrepreneurialism and vocationalism in higher education and the 
need for a more general focus on students' acquisition of competencies, skills and 
applicable and relevant knowledge. It also advocated the development of PIs. Second, the 
publication of the Jarratt Report, commissioned by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP), at the request of the Secretary of State for Education. This report 
advocated new managerial models of governance in universities, designed to strengthen 
their institutional capacity to act collectively and decisively in the face of changing and 
financial pressures. Universities were to see themselves as 'corporate universities' and 
governing bodies should reassert themselves against "the Senates' natural conservatism" 
and "the potential for [them] to resist change" (CVCP 1985 – see Annex 2). Moreover, 
vice-chancellors should exercise the role of chief executives, and deans and heads of 
department the role of middle managers, becoming the Senates primarily advisory bodies.
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Figure 13 – Major legislation and policy documents in British higher education history 
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On 20 May 1986, Sir Keith Joseph12 told the House of Commons that the Government 
should consider, together with UGC and CVCP, some further financial provision for 
universities in 1987-1988 and the following years, but that such provision would depend 
on evidence of real progress in implementing the needed changes. Following this 
announcement, UGC and CVCP came to accept what became known as the Concordat, 
meaning that if changes in university management as requested by the Government were 
met, further finance would be released to universities. By November 1986, both 
committees were able to report progress to Kenneth Baker13, the successor of Sir Keith, 
being among the developments reported the publication of a report on the use of PIs 
relating to both inputs and outputs in teaching and research (Cave et al. 1997). In fact, in 
1987, a Joint Working Party, representing the Government, CVCP and UGC, listed 39 PIs 
for publication. These were published by CVCP under the name University Management 
Statistics and Performance Indicators: UK Universities.  
In 1988, the University Funding Council (UFC), which replaced UGC, and the Polytechnics 
and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) were established under the Education Reform Act, 
and, in 1989, they assumed funding responsibilities for British universities, and for the 
polytechnics and higher education colleges in England. 
In May 1991, a Government White Paper entitled Higher Education – A New Framework 
proposed a number of substantial changes, being the most important the abolition of the 
so-called 'binary line' between the universities, and the polytechnics and colleges. The 
goal was to establish a unitary system of higher education. Apart from that, it also 
proposed the establishment of new funding councils, and the allocation of research 
funding entirely on a selective basis. Moreover, it suggested that quality audit should be 
the responsibility of the institutions and quality assessment of funding councils, which 
would inform funding based on two approaches: first, the use of PIs and calculations of 
value added; and second, external judgements on the basis of direct observations (Sarrico 
1998). 
In 1992, the Further and Higher Education Act joined UFC and PCFC to create a unitary 
system of provision. This Act also allowed bids for university designation from former 
                                                
12 Sir Keith Joseph was Secretary of State for Education and Science from 1981 to 1986. 
13 He served as Secretary of State for Education from 1986 to 1989. 
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polytechnics and colleges so that more universities existed, labelled 'modern', to 
distinguish them from a previous group known as 'new' (McNay 1995).  
The Further and Higher Education Act also abolished the Council for National Academic 
Awards (CNAA), which had been a degree awarding authority in the UK since 196414, and 
universities established the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) to take over the 
audit role of CVCP, and the access and quality enhancement roles of CNAA (Liston 
1999). In addition, UGC was replaced by the Higher Education Funding Councils for 
England, Scotland and Wales (HEFCE, SHEFC, HEFCW). These councils were to 
incorporate transparency into resource allocation, through formula funding, based heavily 
on measures of performance and quality. Even though the purpose was to allocate 
funding for teaching and research on the basis of systematic evaluation, this was only 
implemented in the case of research.  
Also in 1992, the Joint Performance Indicators Working Group of CVCP, the Standing 
Conference of Principals, and the Committee of Scottish Higher Education Principals were 
established, to build on earlier work and develop performance measures and indicators for 
both teaching and research, for the new merged university sector. By 1993, the national 
totals for the number of publications for each cost centre in 20 categories and averages 
for 3 indicators circulated. However, institutional figures were not published and the 
exercise was never repeated (Sarrico 1998). 
In 1997, the report of the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, entitled 
Higher Education in the Learning Society, which became mainly known as the 'Dearing 
Report', tried to change some aspects concerning teaching and student intake and 
created another body – the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), formally defined as 
independent. This body is financed by subscriptions from HEIs and contracts with the 
funding councils, to which it makes a detailed annual report. Its governing board consists 
of senior members of HEIs and representatives of business, the professions and public 
bodies. QAA took on the Councils' responsibilities for the quality assessment of higher 
education and also the functions of institutional audit and quality enhancement, previously 
carried out by HEQC (Henkel 2007). 
                                                
14 It awarded academic degrees at polytechnics and other non-university institutions, such as Colleges of 
Higher Education, until they were awarded university status.  
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In 1999, the UK signed the Bologna Declaration, together with other twenty-eight 
European Countries, agreeing on the creation of an EHEA by 2010 (as discussed in 
Section 1.3.2). 
In 2003, a White Paper entitled The Future of Higher Education set out plans to 
"modernise English universities and their staff by offering more funding directed at 
teaching per se rather than at students, establishing Centres for Teaching Excellence and 
a Higher Education Academy, setting up a new bureaucracy to monitor widening student 
participation and requiring accreditation of new academic staff in teaching by 2006" 
(Brehony and Deem 2005: 405).  
The Higher Education Act 2004 incorporated several key changes to the financial 
arrangements of higher education students. The changes took effect in 2006, and applied 
to England and Wales. The main measures taken were the following: up-front fees to be 
replaced by an income-linked deferred payment; fixed rate of £1,125 to be replaced by 
variable fees between 0 and £3,000; the creation of a new body called the Office for Fair 
Access, responsible for approving and reviewing the 'plans' of the universities that wish to 
charge more than the basic amount (equivalent to the current fixed rate); and increased 
levels of financial aid.  
In May 2005, the UK and other forty-four European countries, committed to adopt the 
Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the EHEA, as proposed by the 
European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education – ENQA (discussed in 
Section 1.3.2). 
In 2010, a report by the Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student 
Finance, entitled Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education, also known as the 
'Browne Review', recommended sweeping changes to the university funding system. The 
changes included, among others: removing the cap on the level of fees that universities 
can charge; the provision, by the Government, of upfront loans to cover tuition fees and 
living costs of students; increasing the income level at which graduates must begin to pay 
their loans to £21,000; and the replacement of the four existing higher education bodies by 
a single Higher Education Council. 
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Following on Lord Browne's recommendations, a new Higher Education White Paper, 
entitled Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, was published in June 
2011. The reforms proposed tackle three challenges: 
"First, putting higher education on a sustainable footing. We inherited 
the largest budget deficit in post-war history, requiring spending cuts 
across government. By shifting public spending away from teaching 
grants and towards repayable tuition loans, we have ensured that higher 
education receives the funding it needs even as substantial savings are 
made to public expenditure. Second, institutions must deliver a better 
student experience, improving teaching, assessment, feedback and 
preparation for the world of work. Third, they must take more 
responsibility for increasing social mobility" (White Paper 2011: 4 – see 
Annex 2). 
This White Paper set out the UK Government's policies for the reform of higher education. 
5.1.2. Governance and management 
The UK's HEIs are not owned or run by the government. They are independent legal 
entities, with councils or governing bodies that have responsibility for determining the 
strategic direction of the institutions, monitoring their financial health and ensuring they are 
effectively managed (UK HE International Unit 2011).  
For many purposes, higher education policy is now developed separately in each of the 
countries making up the UK, with the Scottish Government, Welsh Assembly Government 
and the Northern Ireland Executive each having specific and differing responsibilities for 
certain parts of higher education and student policies. These governmental bodies have 
no direct role either in determining the courses offered by HEIs or directing the research 
undertaken by individual academics. Academic and support staff is employed by individual 
institutions and not by the state. Their pay is negotiated nationally through a joint body 
representing both management and trade unions, with the resulting agreements taking the 
form of recommendations to participating universities and colleges (UK HE International 
Unit 2011). 
This governance structure means that UK universities are relatively autonomous and 
independent institutions. Each institution makes its own decisions about entry 
requirements, for example, setting the level of required qualifications to secure a place on 
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a programme, and is responsible for its own admissions procedures. The vast majority of 
applications to full-time undergraduate degrees in the UK – whether by home, 
international or EU students – are made via a central coordinating agency, the Universities 
and Colleges Admissions Service (UK HE International Unit 2011). 
5.1.3. Evaluation exercises 
Following the recommendations of the Dearing Report (published in 1997), the 
Government asked the funding councils to develop suitable indicators and benchmarks of 
performance in the higher education sector. The Performance Indicators Steering Group 
was established in 1998, with membership drawn from government departments, the 
funding councils and representative bodies. 
In 1999, the first formally condoned group of key performance indicators (KPIs) for UK 
universities was established by HEFCE. They focussed on five broad aspects of 
institutional performance: participation of under-represented groups; student progression; 
learning outcomes; efficiency of learning and teaching; and research output. A sixth, an 
employment indicator, was added later. These KPIs reflected the political policy 
preoccupations of the time, related to social equity, value for money, economic impact and 
international standing (Breakwell and Tytherleigh 2010). 
Subsequently, there has been a further specification of PIs. Since 2002/2003, the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) has published, on an annual basis, PIs on behalf of 
HEFCE, who published them previously. According to HEFCE (2007), the role of these 
PIs is to: provide reliable information on the nature and performance of the UK higher 
education sector; allow comparison between individual institutions of similar nature, where 
appropriate; enable institutions to benchmark their own performance; inform policy 
developments; and contribute to the public accountability of higher education. The current 
indicators cover (HEFCE 2007):  
• Widening participation indicators – show the proportion of entrants coming from 
various under-represented groups such as state schools or colleges, specified 
socio-economic classes, and low-participation neighbourhoods. They also cover 
students who are in receipt of Disabled Students' Allowance; 
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• Non-continuation rates (including projected outcomes) – these are presented in 
two ways. The first considers students who start in a particular year, and looks at 
whether they are still in higher education one year later. The second method looks 
at projected outcomes over a longer period. Another way to look at non-
continuation rates is to use information on current movements of students to 
project what would happen in the long run. Thus, the indicators project what 
proportion of students will eventually gain a degree, what proportion will leave their 
current university or college but transfer into higher education elsewhere, and what 
proportion will leave higher education altogether without any qualification;  
• Module completion rates – it applies to part-time students. The provision of this 
information is dependent on how student data is returned to HESA. Only 
institutions in Wales are required to return a module record; 
• Research output – the main indicators of research in UK higher education are the 
ratings from the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The research indicators 
that are produced as part of PIs provide additional information on the quantity of 
research outputs relative to the resources consumed. These are different from the 
ratings of quality produced by the RAE and are designed to complement, rather 
than replace, them; 
• Employment of graduates – since 2005/2006, the employment indicator is based 
on the new Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education Survey (DLHE), which 
replaced the First Destinations Survey. DLHE is carried out among graduates six 
months after the end of the academic year in which they graduate.  
HESA advises a careful interpretation of the indicators15: 
"Because of the diversity of UK HEIs, there is no one measure of what is 
'best'. (…) In making comparisons, care should be taken to ensure that 
two institutions are alike enough to compare, or at least that the 
differences are made explicit. (…) To help decide if two institutions are 
alike enough to be compared, the benchmarks may be used. In general, 
if two institutions have substantially different benchmarks they should 
not be compared". 
                                                
15 In http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2073&Itemid=141 (accessed 17 
December 2011). 
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In the UK, PIs are complemented by other types of information, which also provide a 
further set of KPIs. At a national level there are three student surveys – the National 
Student Survey (NSS) and the International Student BarometerTM (ISB), which measure 
student satisfaction in different areas; and the DLHE, which collects information on alumni. 
The NSS is a survey conducted by HEFCE, being its aim to gather feedback on the quality 
of students' courses, in order to contribute to public accountability, and to help inform the 
choices of future applicants to HE. The first NSS took place in 2005. 
The ISB is an independent and confidential feedback process for education providers, 
conducted by the International Graduate Insight Group Limited, tracking the decision-
making, perceptions, expectations and experiences of students studying outside their 
home country, and allowing for comparisons. 
DLHE collects information on what leavers from higher education programmes are doing 
six months after qualifying from their HE course (employed, engaged in further study, and 
so on). Individual HEIs administer their own surveys, using materials provided by HESA.  
The results of the three surveys are published online and are looked at by prospective 
students. Moreover, the results from two external audit exercises are also made public: 
the RAE and the assessment performed by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA). 
Since 1986, the quality of research carried out in the UK higher education sector has been 
assessed through a formalised process, based on expert peer review, known as the RAE. 
Undertaken jointly by the four UK higher education funding bodies (for England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland), six RAEs have taken place since 1986. The parameters 
that are looked at include: size of research contracts (number of contracts, research 
funding and income generation) and quality of research outputs, translated by the number 
of publications and citations. The funding of research in the UK is selectively allocated on 
the basis of performance. The results of the 2008 RAE (the last one conducted) were 
used to allocate more than £1.5 billion annually for research infrastructure in UK's 
universities and colleges.  
Commencing in 2014, the RAE is due to be replaced by a new system: the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF). REF will consist of a single framework for the funding and 
assessment of research across all subjects. The quality of research outputs will continue 
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to be the primary factor used in the assessment, as with the RAE, with judgments being 
made by expert panels against international standards of excellence. It is likely, however, 
that greater use will be made of quantitative indicators, including the so-called 
'bibliometric' data (Baskerville et al. 2011). 
The QAA took on the responsibilities for the quality assessment of higher education and 
also the functions of institutional audit and quality enhancement, previously carried out by 
HEQC. The QAA is an independent body funded by subscriptions from universities and 
colleges of higher education, and through contracts with the main higher education 
funding bodies. All universities and higher education colleges in the UK subscribe to the 
QAA. Although its reviews and audits take a slightly different form in different parts of the 
UK, they include: making regular visits to HEIs and further education colleges offering 
higher education; publishing reports on the confidence that can be placed in each 
institution's ability to maintain standards and quality; following up any areas which need 
attention to ensure that HEIs take satisfactory steps to address any shortcomings; and 
providing information to the UK funding bodies.  
Apart from the QAA, there are also Professional, Statutory and Regulatory Bodies 
(PSRBs), which visit universities periodically, in order to ensure that their graduates are 
properly prepared for employment. These include organisations such as the Engineering 
Council, the Health Professions Council and the Architects Registration Board. For those 
professions regulated by law, only those graduating from courses accredited by the 
relevant body – the General Medical Council, in the case of medicine – are given a 
'licence to practise' (Baskerville et al. 2011). 
With all these external pressures to measure performance, many universities have 
introduced coordination mechanisms of their own, mainly to prepare for these external 
audits, even though it is not clear how effectively they are actually functioning. This will be 
later explored. 
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5.1.4. Funding system 
While all UK HEIs – with one exception16 – receive some state funding as a percentage of 
their total income, the government does not manage this money directly, but works 
through a series of funding councils to provide both financial support and general 
guidance to institutions.  
According to HESA finance data (HESA 2011), UK universities and colleges received a 
total of £26.8 billion in funding in 2009/2010, more than a third of which came from the 
Government's Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and was distributed in 
the form of grants by the four UK funding bodies (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 – Income of UK HEIs by source, 2009/2010 
Source: Data from HESA (2011) 
Taken together, the money channelled through the funding councils currently represents 
the largest single source of income to HEIs, though, across the sector, universities vary in 
the percentage of their overall funding received from public sources. 
The funding councils allocate most of their funds for teaching and research using set 
formulae. The allocation of resources for teaching and learning depends largely on the 
                                                
16 The University of Buckingham is UK's only independent HEI, i.e., it does not receive state funding. 
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number of students at an institution and on the mix of subjects it teaches (UK HE 
International Unit 2011). 
Almost all the financial support for research is related to the quality and volume of that 
research. Government funding for research is administered under what is known as the 
'dual support' system. One strand of it comes in the form of an annual 'block grant' from 
the funding councils. This supports UK's research infrastructure and enables individual 
universities to carry out research as they determine. The other strand provides grants for 
specific research projects, contracts and postgraduate programmes and is delivered via 
the seven research councils – public bodies charged with investing public money in UK 
science and research – with additional funding available from charities, industry, the EU 
and other UK government departments (UK HE International Unit 2011). Since 1986, the 
funding councils' allocation of funding to institutions for research infrastructure has been 
informed by the RAE.  
Although UK HEIs receive significant public funding, they also receive substantial private 
income from different sources. These include: the provision of residence and catering 
facilities; the delivery of services to business, such as contract research, consultancy and 
training; endowments; and a variety of charitable sources (UK HE International Unit 2011). 
Tuition fees also represent a significant source of income for most HEIs. These fees were 
introduced by the Government in 1998, following the recommendations of the Dearing 
Report, which argued that there was a case for students to make a contribution to the 
costs of higher education. Initially, a flat rate annual tuition fee of £1,000 was introduced, 
with means-tested grants to help disadvantaged families (OECD 2006b)17. In 2003, the 
White Paper entitled The Future of Higher Education recommended a new policy on 
tuition fees for full-time students, which was introduced by the Higher Education Act 2004. 
Since 2006, individual universities and colleges in England have the discretion to set their 
own tuition fees up to a limit of £3,000 per year with loans available to students to ensure 
that no student or parent have to pay an up-front fee (OECD 2006b).  
The UK government recently announced its intention to change the present funding 
mechanism in England from 2012/2013 onwards so as to increase tuition income routed 
                                                
17 Students studying at HEIs in England, Wales and Northern Ireland pay tuition fee contributions. Scottish and 
EU students studying at HEIs in Scotland do not currently pay such contributions. 
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through students while reducing the amount paid in grants to institutions through the 
funding councils. As the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills made clear 
in his grant letters to HEFCE, student choice is set to become a key driver of quality as 
well as of funding, and HEIs will "need to become more responsive to the changing 
demands of students and employers for high level skills and employability, to ensure they 
remain competitive as providers in the new funding environment"18. A White Paper setting 
out the Government's overall thinking and future plans for publicly funded higher education 
in England was published in June 2011. The extent to which this will influence the 
development of policy elsewhere in the UK remains to be seen. 
After presenting the British higher education system, our first case study – the University 
of Warwick – will be characterised in the following section. 
5.2. Characterisation of the University of Warwick 
5.2.1. Brief history and figures 
Britain had long been careful in adding new universities to the list of recognised 
institutions, but, in the optimism of the 1950s, the idea of developing new universities from 
scratch was gradually accepted. The group of institutions that attempted to be recognised 
as universities, at the time, became known as the 'seven sisters'19 (Clark 1998) or 
'plateglass universities'20 (Beloff 1968). Warwick was amongst them. They all had in 
common the fact of being established outside cities, with student residences (Clark 1998). 
The University of Warwick (UW) was given approval by the government in 1961 and 
received its Royal Charter in 1965. In its first decade it had a discipline-centred base, 
strong on research. Beyond this academic base the issue of relating to industry arose. 
The close relationship between Jack Butterworth, the first Vice-Chancellor, and leading 
                                                
18 In http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/higher-education/docs/h/10-1359-hefce-grant-letter-20-dec-2010.pdf 
(accessed 17 December 2011). 
The Funding Council's circular "Funding for universities and colleges for 2010/11 and 2011/12" (05/2011) can 
be downloaded from http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/circlets/2011/cl05_11/ (accessed 17 December 2011). 
19 These were Sussex, York, Lancaster, Essex, East Anglia, Kent and Warwick. 
20 This designation was used to reflect the modern architectural design of the new universities, which 
contrasted with the (largely Victorian) red brick universities and the older ancient universities. 
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industrialists in the Coventry area, contributed to instil a pro-industry attitude at the 
university. Even though this relationship was heavily criticized, at the time, by many, 
institutional life went on and the university started to grow, assuming the shape of a 
medium-sized research university. In fact, the student body rose from about 450 in 1965 
to approximately 2,100 in 1970, and academic staff from around 60 to more or less 240 
(Clark 1998).  
Today, UW is regarded as one of the best universities in the UK. The Independent (which 
publishes The Complete University Guide), The Sunday Times and The Times place UW 
in the 8th place in the 2012 UK University Rankings. According to The Guardian, which 
uses criteria that do not include a measure of research output, and includes a 'value-
added' factor that compares students' degree results with their entry qualifications, UW is 
the 6th best university in the UK in 2011/2012. 
Also internationally, UW is well positioned in the rankings. The Times Higher Education 
World University Rankings 2011-2012 place it in the 157th position.  
Moreover, UW is also a member of the Russell Group, an association formed in 1992, 
which comprises the 20 major research-intensive universities of the UK and was, until 
recently, one of the members the European Consortium of Innovative Universities (ECIU). 
UW is divided into four faculties – Arts, Medicine, Science and Social Sciences – which 
incorporate 30 academic departments (see Annex 3) and 76 research centres and 
institutes. 
According to the Academic Statistics 201021, in the academic year 2010/2011, 22,648 
students, 12,823 undergraduates and 9,825 postgraduates, were registered at the 
university.  
As Figure 15 shows, the total number of students rose steadily from 2002/2003 to 
2007/2008 (around 2 per cent), rising around 8 per cent until 2009/2010 and around 5 per 
cent in the last academic year. This increase in the number of students is mainly due to 
the strategy followed by the university to increase the number of postgraduate students. 
                                                
21 In http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/mip/contact-new/academicstatistics/2010/ (accessed 16 September 
2011). 
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As a matter of fact, this number increased 42.6 per cent between 2002/2003 and 
2010/2011. 
 
Figure 15 – Evolution of registered students at UW (2002-2011) 
Source: Academic Statistics (from 2002 to 2010) 
In terms of internationalisation, UW is a very international university. Indeed, from the total 
number of students registered in 2010/2011, 27 per cent were overseas (i.e. non-EU) 
students.  
Regarding human resources, in the academic year 2010/2011, and according to the 
Academic Statistics 2010, UW employed 4,912 members of staff: 980 academics, 687 
researchers, 195 teaching only staff and 3,050 non-academics. 
In financial terms, UW was able to find a way to survive the financial cuts on universities 
throughout times. Burton Clark (1998) called it 'The Warwick Way'. 
In 1981, when the University Grants Committee (UGC) was permitted to distribute the 
reductions differentially, Warwick's cut was 10 per cent. All the universities were facing the 
problem of how to handle the immediate cuts, and, more importantly, how to act in the 
future. Warwick decided to take action and settled that it would cover the 10 per cent 
reduction by a 'save half, make half policy', which meant making savings to eliminate half 
the shortfall and generate new income to cover the other half. This idea was sharpened 
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with the strategic decision to generate new income not through fundraising, as other 
universities did, but actually by earning it. Since student tuitions were out of the question, 
due to the national policy at the time (already discussed in Section 5.1.4), Warwick 
implemented the 'Earning Income Policy', within which various parts of the university could 
generate an annual surplus that could then be used by the entire university (Clark 1998). 
This policy, devised by Butterworth and Michael Shattock, the Registrar at the time, 
pointed strongly towards entrepreneurial action. A fundamental contribution to the earned 
income scheme was the Warwick Manufacturing Group, created in 1980, which was fully 
committed to research and development in close collaboration with major industrial firms 
(Clark 1998). Other important contributors to this policy were and still are: the Business 
School; conference centres; the Warwick Science Park; and the Arts Complex. 
Additionally, the university provides catering services and has established outside 
services on campus, such as banks and a bookstore. 
In order to implement the 'Earning Income Policy', professional managers were hired to 
run the various units and the Earned Income Group. Within this structure, the earned 
money, together with the income from governmental annual allocations, passed over to 
committees focused on overall budget review and internal allocation. 
By adopting this policy, aimed at seeking third-stream sources, UW was successful in 
filling the gap left by the reduction of state support in the early 1980s (see Table 10).  
Table 10 – Sources of financial support at UW 
Core support Research Grants and Contracts Other Sources Total Year 
Million £ % Million £ % Million £ % Million £ % 
1970 2.0 69 0.3 10 0.6 21 2.9 100 
1980 14.6 70 2.0 10 4.3 20 20.9 100 
1990 36.0 43 14.6 18 31.9 39 82.5 100 
1995 51.3 38 19.7 15 63.0 47 134.0 100 
2010 89.8 22 79.8 19 238.9 59 408.5 100 
 Source: Clark (1998) and UW's Statement of Accounts 2009/2010 
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In UK's state funded universities, the income streams usually take three main forms: 
mainline state allocation; funds obtained from governmental research councils; and 
income from other sources. Figure 16 shows the sources of financial support of UW for 
the year ended 31 July 2010. 
Warwick's income figures for the academic year 2009/2010 show that, in a total budget of 
£408.5 million, just £89.8 million (22 per cent) came from HEFCE (much below the 34 per 
cent registered at a national level – see Figure 14). Income from research grants and 
contracts comes to £79.8 million (19 per cent, slightly over the 16 per cent registered at a 
national level – see Figure 14), and income from third-stream sources amounts to £238.9 
million (59 per cent). These include academic fees22 and support grants, which come to 
£133.3 million (33 per cent, a little over the 31 per cent registered at a national level – see 
Figure 14), and other income sources, in a total of £105.7 million (26 per cent). These 
other income sources, which comprise mainly income from residences, catering, 
conferences, and management training centres, are well over the national figures of 18 
per cent (see Figure 14), showing the success of the 'Earning Income Policy' adopted by 
UW. 
 
Figure 16 – Sources of income at UW, 2010 
Source: UW's Statement of Accounts 2009/2010 
                                                
22 For the academic year 2011/2012, home/EU students pay a tuition fee of £3,375 for undergraduate 
degrees, and between £6,080 and £15,000 for postgraduate degrees. Fees for overseas students are much 
higher. 
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Additionally, in the mid-1990s, Warwick decided to commit to a long-term effort along 
fundraising. By then, the university had built a reputation and had a good network of 
alumni.  
In terms of expenditure, staff costs are the largest single expenses item (see Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17 – Expenditure structure at UW, 2010 
Source: UW's Statement of Accounts 2009/2010 
Even though the expenditure with staff has increased in absolute terms (staff costs 
amounted to £145.1 million in the academic year 2004/2005), in relative terms, they 
represent the same percentage of the total expenditure as they do now.  
The other expenses include depreciation (7 per cent), interest payable (1 per cent) and 
other operating expenses (39 per cent). The latter include, among others, costs with: 
teaching and research activities; residences, catering and conferences; premises; and 
retail operations. 
In the next section, the governance, management and administrative management 
structures of the university will be presented. 
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5.2.2. Structure 
5.2.2.1. Governance structure 
Like in most pre-1992 universities23, i.e. HEIs that had university status before the Further 
and Higher Education Act of 1992, Warwick is governed by a Council and a Senate24. 
Figure 18 shows UW's committee structure. 
The Council is the executive governing body of the university, with particular managerial 
responsibilities for finance and the university estate, and also a more general remit to 
oversee the conduct of university business in concert with the Senate. It also appoints, 
after consultation with the Senate, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor, the Treasurer and the Pro-Vice-Chancellors, and makes the university 
statutes, subjected to the provisions of the Charter.  
The Council, which meets up to five times each year, is chaired by the Pro-Chancellor (an 
external member), and has a full membership of 33 – including 9 ex officio members (the 
Pro-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, the Treasurer and 5 
Pro-Vice-Chancellors); 6 academic members appointed by the Senate, 1 member of the 
non-academic staff appointed by the Senate; 2 students (including the President of the 
Students' Union and another student elected by the Students' Union); and 15 lay members 
(UW's University Calendar 2011-2012). 
In order to carry out its responsibilities, and ensure the necessary dialogue with the 
Senate, the Council has specialist-standing committees, principal amongst which are the 
Finance and General Purposes Committee (FGPC), the Building Committee and the Audit 
Committee (see Figure 18). The detailed work of the Council is mostly carried out through 
these standing committees and a range of Council sub-committees, usually with a mixture 
of external and academic membership. These sub-committees have an important role in 
overseeing the conduct of specific areas of business (see Figure 18). 
 
                                                
23 Those HEIs that acquired university status as a result of the provisions of the Further and Higher Education 
Act 1992 are called 'post-1992 universities', 'new universities', or 'modern universities'. 
24 Before 15 October 2009, UW was also governed by a Court, which was an administrative body that acted on 
behalf of the institution's stakeholders. After submitting a request to the Privy Council to make revisions to its 
Charter and Statutes, the Court was abolished from the university's governance structure. 
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Figure 18 – Committee structure at the University of Warwick 
Source: In http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/gov/howgoverned/GovStr11-12_v3.pdf (accessed 18 December 2011).  
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Whilst the Council is ultimately accountable for the efficient management and good 
conduct of all aspects of UW's operation, the Senate is the supreme academic authority of 
the university. It is responsible for the academic activities of the institution, including all 
aspects of the operations of the university that have a bearing on teaching, research, and 
the welfare, supervision and discipline of students (UW's University Calendar 2011-2012 – 
see Annex 2).  
The Senate, which meets up to five times a year, is chaired by the Vice-Chancellor and 
has a full membership of 46, elected from the Faculty Boards and the Assembly – 
including 13 ex officio members (the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, 5 Pro-
Vice-Chancellors, the Librarian and the 4 Chairs of the Boards of the Faculties); 24 
members of the academic staff, appointed by the Boards of the Faculties; 6 members 
appointed by the Assembly, of whom not more than 2 are professors; and 3 students, 
including the President of the Students' Union and 2 registered students of the university 
elected by registered students of the university (UW's University Calendar 2011-2012 – 
see Annex 2).  
Similarly to the Council, the greater part of Senate's business arises from reports from the 
range of Senate committees responsible for specific academic matters (e.g. Academic 
Quality and Standards Committee – AQSC; and the Board of Graduate Studies – BGS). 
The most important Senate committee is the Senate Steering Committee, commonly 
referred to as the Steering Committee (see Figure 18). This committee, comprising the 
Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, the five Pro-Vice-Chancellors, the Chairs of 
the Faculty Boards, the Chair of the Graduate School and the President of the Students' 
Union, meets on a weekly basis during term time and as required during vacations. The 
Committee's main responsibilities are to make recommendations to the Senate on items of 
business arising from more junior bodies and to act on behalf of the Senate in 'steering' 
business (UW's University Calendar 2011-2012). 
The Boards of the Faculties of Arts, Medicine, Science and Social Sciences are headed by 
appointed Chairs, nominated on an annual basis. Membership of each of the Faculty 
Boards is drawn from representatives of academic departments and research centres 
within each faculty. The Faculty Boards are responsible to the Senate for academic 
matters within the Faculty, namely teaching, research, curricula and examinations. 
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Departments are managed by a head of department, which is chosen from amongst the 
professorial members of the department, for a period of five years. The process is as 
follows: in the Autumn Term of the academic year in which the head of department's 
appointment expires, the Vice-Chancellor advises eligible members of the department that 
a consultation on the appointment of head of the department will be held and appoints the 
independent head that will chair the process. Then, the Registrar shall invite members of 
the department to submit nominations to the independent Chair. After this, the Chair 
prepares, in consultation with the Departmental Management Committee, a report on the 
results of the consultation for submission to the Committee on Appointment of the Head of 
the Department. The report shall contain the names of all those who have indicated a wish 
to go forward in nomination for appointment and shall make such recommendations as 
may find appropriate. After that, the Vice-Chancellor establishes a Committee on the 
Appointment of Head of Department, which is responsible for approving such 
recommendations. This committee is composed of: the Vice-Chancellor or Deputy Vice-
Chancellor; a senior member of the university from outside the department, who has been 
appointed to act as independent Chair for the consultation process; the Registrar; and 
three members of the department appointed by the Vice-Chancellor, who are not 
themselves nominees for appointment to head of the department (Ordinance 11 – see 
Annex 2). After being appointed, the head of department appoints a management group to 
advise him or her. The head of department may delegate defined areas of responsibility to 
the Deputy, members of a management group, other members of department and, in 
general, determine the administrative and management structures and processes within 
the department.  
5.2.2.2. Management structure 
The university is essentially managed by a Senior Management Team, which comprises 
the 'academic structure' – the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, five Pro-Vice-
Chancellors, and the Chairs of the four Faculty Boards –, and the Registrar, the Deputy 
Registrar and the Finance Director. The Senior Management Team meets on a weekly 
basis. 
The Vice-Chancellor is the chief academic and administrative officer of the university. The 
Statutes prescribe that he has "a general responsibility to the Council and the Senate for 
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monitoring and promoting the efficiency and good order of the University". The Vice-
Chancellor is responsible for ensuring that the university complies with the terms and 
conditions specified by the Funding Council for the use of Funding Council funds. He or 
she is a member of all university committees and chairs the Senate and a number of 
Council and Senate committees. 
The Deputy Vice-Chancellor, appointed by the Vice-Chancellor, performs such duties as 
the Vice-Chancellor may delegate to him or her. In addition, the Pro-Vice-Chancellors 
have a reporting line to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor to facilitate improved coordination of 
academic matters (see Figure 19). 
There are currently five Pro-Vice-Chancellors, who are appointed by the Council, from 
amongst the professors, on a part-time basis, for periods of two years up to a maximum of 
six years. Pro-Vice-Chancellors perform such duties as the Vice-Chancellor may delegate 
to them. Their current portfolios are as follows: Education and Student Experience; 
Research: Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences; Research: Faculties of Science and 
Medicine; Access, Widening Participation and Development; and Academic Resourcing 
(see Figure 19). 
The Chairs of the Faculty Boards and the Chair of the Board of Graduate Studies are part-
time elected positions with no specific limit on their term of office, even though a three-
year period is considered the norm.  
The other members of the Senior Management Team are the Registrar and the Director of 
Finance and Financial Strategy. The first, subject to the direction of the Vice-Chancellor, 
has responsibility, under University Statutes, for the administration of the university. The 
latter is responsible for overseeing all the financial arrangements of the institution. 
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Figure 19 – Academic structure at the University of Warwick 
Source: In http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/gov/universitymanagement/academic_structure_2011_as_at_14oct2011.pdf (accessed 18 
December 2011). 
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5.2.2.3. Administrative management structure 
Administrative departments represent an important component of the university's 
structure. The university's administrative and managerial structure is headed by the Vice-
Chancellor, supported by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar, and the Director of 
Finance and Financial Strategy. The Registrar is assisted by the following Senior Officers: 
Deputy Registrar; Director of Estates; Librarian; Academic Registrar; Director of Human 
Resources; Director of IT Services; Director of Development, Communications and 
Strategy; and the Director of Finance and Financial Strategy (see Figure 20). 
At departments there are also technical and administrative staff, which ensure, in 
cooperation with the central services, or autonomously (in the case of some devolved 
departments), the functioning of these units' infrastructures and the necessary means for 
the accomplishment of the university's functions. 
Having presented the British higher education system and characterised UW, the next 
sections will present the main findings that resulted from the case study conducted at this 
university.  
Before presenting these findings, an explanation should be given on the way data is 
displayed. First, it should be noted that, as stated in the research design chapter, the 
coding unit chosen was the theme. In order to facilitate the organisation of the themes, the 
researcher opted to build tables, drawn as matrices from NVivo 8®, which show the 
number of interviewees that referred to a certain theme. These tables do not intend to 
replace the rich qualitative content analysis of the interviewees' perceptions, but rather 
complement it. Moreover, it should be recalled that all the questions related to the 
measurement, reporting and management of performance were guided by a Prompt Card 
(already discussed in Chapter 4 – see Annex 1). Based on this card, the interviewees 
were free to refer to the areas they wished to discuss in relation to those topics, not being 
obliged to discuss them all. They could also bring in more areas, if they wanted to. This 
fact explains the differences that are found in the number of interviewees that discussed 
the measurement, reporting and management of each area's performance. 
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Figure 20 – Administrative and managerial structure at the University of Warwick 
Source: In http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/gov/universitymanagement/registrars_office_org_chart_updated_11_oct_2011.pdf (accessed 18 
December 2011). 
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5.3. Strategy 
5.3.1. Existence of a strategy 
When the new Vice-Chancellor, Nigel Thrift, arrived in 2006, he was very clear on the 
scale of ambition he wanted to achieve as Vice-Chancellor and on the institutional 
development he wanted for Warwick. As an academic stated: "The university had been 
fairly torn apart by the decision about whether it should open a campus in Singapore" 
(A12). That debate, mentioned in almost every interview, raised lots of issues about where 
the institution was heading and how that should fit into an overall strategy. The new Vice-
Chancellor clearly came in and felt that he had to move away from that debate: "The 
process of formulating the strategy and developing the strategy would move the institution 
beyond what had been a fairly divisive (…) major issue within the institution" (A12).  
Therefore, one year after arriving, a formal strategic document was produced, entitled 
Vision 2015: A Strategy for Warwick. In there, the Vice-Chancellor defined as an 
overarching aim to the institution that "(…) by 2015 Warwick [would] be in the top 50 world 
universities" (Vision 2015: 2). That date was set since it marks Warwick's fiftieth 
anniversary. According to the formal document: 
"Warwick's international reputation [can only be achieved] by carrying 
out only the very best research and teaching (…) [and by continuing] to 
attract only the highest quality staff and students, who will be drawn to 
the university by its reputation and its supportive and challenging 
community" (Vision 2015: 3).  
The vision also states the will "to consolidate existing support and find new partners to 
help take their plans forward. [For that, it needs to] reach out to all relevant stakeholders – 
and these include business and industry, government and government services, donors 
and alumni" (ibid: 3). Moreover, it recognises the need to generate a substantial increase 
in income: "We will need to see at least a doubling of our 2004-2005 annual income by 
2015, in real terms" (ibid: 3). 
The core values of Vision 2015 are excellence, ambition and drive, entrepreneurial flair, 
cosmopolitanism, service, accessibility, community and independence. These values were 
translated into 44 more specific ideas, having each idea its project team and its project 
managers. There are two project managers per project, being one of them administrative 
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and the other academic: "They are champions in each area and each of those project 
leaders is asked to complete a section on key performance indicators and milestones for 
programme teams to approve and look for synergies across projects' ideas" (NA37).  
Therefore, not surprisingly, when asked about the existence of a strategy at UW, all the 
interviewees mentioned the existence of a formal one (see Table 11), and referred to 
Vision 2015 as the main strategic document. 
Table 11 – Existence of a strategy at UW 
Academic  Head Other Total 
Non-
academic Students 
External 
Members Total 
Yes 10 13 23 7 3 4 37 
Formal 10 13 23 7 3 4 37 
Informal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 10 13 23 7 3 4 37 
According to the interviewees, the factors that contributed to the definition of the strategy 
were the following: 
• Vice-Chancellor – the vast majority of the interviewees stated that the arrival of the 
new Vice-Chancellor was the main driver for the development and implementation 
of the strategy: "It is obviously associated with the Vice-Chancellor" (AH18); 
• Need to change – some interviewees also mentioned the need to change as a 
driver of the strategy. An academic argued: "The actual resulting document comes 
from a desire for the university to increase its profile globally" (AH20).  
Even though all interviewees recognised the existence of a formal strategy, it was 
considered important to understand the importance attributed by them to such an 
instrument. That is what will be analysed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
158 
5.3.2. Importance of a strategy 
All the interviewees that commented on the importance of having a strategic plan 
reaffirmed the importance of having one. To most of these interviewees, a strategy was 
important to establish a strategic direction, in order to know which direction to follow in the 
future and to have a focus: 
"I think… overall it is extremely important to have this sort of vision, this 
notion of where we are going." (A7) 
"It gives [everyone] a mantra, a bible to refer to." (AH21) 
To other interviewees, the university also needed a strategy for organisational 
development, since "(…) it was not focusing on building up [its] international profile" (A2). 
It was felt that the university needed to be forward looking and to re-examine where it was 
at and where it wanted to go:  
"I think that any university that wants to get better in the future needs to 
be able to clarify its future direction (…) that in some ways is distinctive 
from its core competitors." (NA37) 
Moreover, the strategy was also considered important to mobilise people:  
"I think it connects staff and students and alumni more than even before. 
They all know this is a way we're going, this is our direction, and so I 
think it's really positive." (S32) 
Although the interviewees agreed on the importance of having a strategy, the researcher 
was also interested in understanding how the strategy had been developed and the level 
of engagement of the interviewees in that process. Section 5.3.3 explores these issues.  
5.3.3. Development and level of involvement 
The new Vice-Chancellor saw the need for the university to take a somewhat different 
strategic direction, but he did not want to introduce a new strategy immediately after his 
arrival. Therefore, he took a different approach. He waited a little while to "(…) feel for the 
lion and the lamb" (L31).  
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Practically all the interviewees agreed on the way the strategic plan was developed at 
UW. To them, Nigel Thrift thought the university needed to make an impact in research 
and reputation for its research and set the headline goals to raise the university's 
international reputation, being excellence a non-negotiable issue alongside with some 
other goals. Consequently, he set down some parameters of what a globally challenging 
institution should look like, produced a think piece of three pages and circulated it through 
the university magazine, asking for comments and ideas. People could submit ideas either 
in person or online. The university received "(…) 350 submissions from individuals and 19 
from departments" (NA13). Then, there was a system of focus and discussion groups to 
consider the strategy. First, a panel was created to look at every single idea and decide 
which ones were valid. Then, a smaller group of ideas was presented to a senior panel, 
chaired by the Vice-Chancellor, which selected the ones that could fit with the 
development of the strategy. Some of the Vice-Chancellor's ideas were incorporated as 
well, because, according to some interviewees, there were strategic issues that he wanted 
to include in there. The strategy was then formally produced and was shared with the 
wider university community. It was discussed at various levels of the university to seek 
support and endorsement, mainly from the Senate. It was ultimately taken to the Council 
and discussed there. It was then refined and published. The final document – Vision 2015 
– was finally presented to HEFCE. 
When asked about the development of the strategy, the majority of the interviewees 
referred there was a great deal of active consultation (see Table 12).  
Table 12 – Development of the strategy at UW 
Academic  Head Other Total 
Non-
academic Students 
External 
Members Total 
Consultative 6 10 16 6 3 3 28 
Centralised 3 2 5 0 0 0 5 
Total 9 12 21 6 3 3 33 
According to these interviewees, the Vice-Chancellor had a very wide consultation 
process where everyone across the university was encouraged to put ideas forward. They 
believed the consultative approach was a way to generate ownership, since the "(…) 
implementation is to a critical degree dependent on staff buy-in" (AH25). Some of the 
interviewees were more sceptical on "(…) how much difference that [consultation] made to 
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the final product" (AH21), arguing that minor modifications were made to the original 
document. 
A number of academic interviewees felt that the development of the strategy was 
fundamentally a top-down exercise (see Table 12), essentially led and instigated by the 
Vice-Chancellor and developed centrally by the Vice-Chancellor and the Senior 
Management Team:  
"The strategy seems to have been constructed by a small group of 
university administrators, possibly involving the Vice-Chancellor and 
others, but not really… not really one which involved a great deal of 
consultation with the broader university." (AH23) 
However, most of these academics recognised that they did not get involved willingly.  
In the next section, the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategy will be 
presented. 
5.3.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the strategy 
Vision 2015 was generally considered a very high-level, professionally produced, 
document. Interviewees used terms such as 'ambitious', 'aspirational', 'challenging', 
'directional', 'comprehensive', and 'explicit' to describe it. 
Nevertheless, some interviewees pointed out the weaknesses of the strategic plan. The 
majority argued that it would be very difficult to achieve all of the goals set: "Undoubtedly, 
in some areas, we will not hit the targets unless we are extremely lucky" (A7). 
Nevertheless, most of these interviewees recognised that that is normal: "It's a vision, and 
it might not all happen" (L31).  
Some interviewees also complained about the difficulty in resourcing all the objectives 
proposed. In fact, it was consensual that the new strategy needs a lot of extra money, 
requiring financial planning and a heavy investment in some areas to create capacities 
and deliver. To an external member: "We are planning for the future at a time when 
financial constraints seem to be really very serious" (L31). For some of these 
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interviewees, the solution would be to prioritize some of the objectives, even though all 
considered this a difficult task. 
Other interviewees also felt the balance between the goals was not right, with a clear 
tendency towards research. The goals that seemed to raise more concern amongst the 
interviewees were the ones that were very clearly measurable, being the most contested 
one the '45 ISI Highly Cited researchers by 2015':  
"Personally I am not convinced that is a very valid way of assessing 
quality. You can be cited for a number of reasons, and not necessarily 
quality." (AH16) 
The interviewees mentioned other weaknesses, even though these were considered less 
important than the previous ones. One of them was the fact that the strategy was 
considered not particularly distinctive from other universities: "We are in danger of 
claiming that our strategy is a bit more distinctive than it is, because I know that Sheffield 
(…) and Manchester have all got their new strategies [and] they all say very similar things 
to what the Warwick strategy says" (A7). The second weakness, referred to by students, 
was the lack of the word 'student' in the final document. The third weakness was, 
according to two academics, a management capacity problem. According to them, even 
though the strategy offered a number of challenges for the future, it did not really provide 
training and development for middle managers, even though departments played a major 
role in the university, given Warwick's flat structure. Finally, to an external member there 
were no rigorous mechanisms to deal with poor performers, "(…) who either are 
underperforming or (…) people who have been good, but are now plateaued [sic] and are 
not going to deliver the strategy (…). [These] will act as a drag on the strategy" (L29). 
Even though most heads of department stated that their departments were trying to align 
their strategic decision-making with the university's priorities, there seemed to be some 
concerns about some aspects of the strategy: 
"Probably most academics will not engage with [the strategy] and will 
adopt a wait-and-see attitude, until it starts to really have an impact on 
the way they work." (A11) 
This arguably presents a challenge for the Senior Management Team, and, particularly, 
for the Vice-Chancellor, to ensure that there is a continual buy-in from most academics 
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and most departments. Otherwise, it can be something that will difficult the process of 
pushing forward a changing scene.  
After having analysed the way UW devised its strategy, the next three sections will look at 
the interviewees' perceptions in relation to the way the university deals with the 
measurement, reporting and management of performance. 
5.4. Measurement of performance 
The analysis of the interviews showed that the existence of measurement (see Table 13) 
and the degree of measurement (see Annex 4) varied considerably according to the area. 
Table 13 – Areas where performance is measured at UW 
 Yes No Do not know Total 
Teaching and learning 32 0 2 34 
Research and scholarship 33 0 1 34 
Third mission 15 10 2 27 
Academic staff 35 0 1 36 
Non-academic staff 20 0 3 23 
Students 25 0 0 25 
Support services 19 2 1 22 
Employers 19 6 1 26 
Alumni 22 6 0 28 
Finance 25 0 0 25 
Note: It should be noted that the answers to this question were guided 
by the Prompt Card (see Annex 1). 
5.4.1. Teaching and learning 
According to the majority of the interviewees, the performance of 'teaching and learning' 
was measured at the university (see Table 13), being the instruments used to evaluate it 
perceived to be both internal and external (see Table 14).  
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Table 14 – Instruments used to assess the performance of teaching and learning at 
UW 
n(1) = 32  Number of occurrences (2) 
Internal instruments 25 
Student surveys at the end of each course 22 
Internal database (e.g. retention rates, dropout rates) 6 
Curricular review (departmental level) 3 
Assessment performed by AQSC 3 
Postgraduate Research Experience Survey 2 
External instruments 26 
External assessment performed by the QAA 20 
National Student Survey 15 
Assessment performed by professional and statutory bodies 2 
(1) n equals the number of interviewees that discussed the topic/theme.  
(2) For the purpose of this research, the 'number of occurrences' corresponds to the number 
of interviewees that mentioned a certain theme. 
In terms of internal instruments, the majority of the interviewees mentioned the student 
survey. Even though it was not mandatory, most departments asked their students to fill in 
a questionnaire (which was not standardised) about the content of the course and about 
the members of staff that taught that course, at the end of each module.  
Other internal instruments pointed out by the interviewees were: the records kept by the 
Academic Office (e.g. retention rates, dropout rates, and pass rates); the curricular review 
done at departmental level from time to time; the Postgraduate Research Experience 
Survey, aimed at assessing the experience of postgraduate students in relation to 
teaching and learning; and the assessment performed by the Academic Quality and 
Standards Committee (AQSC). This committee, chaired by the Pro-Vice-Chancellor for 
Student Experience, asked heads of departments, through an annual review process, "to 
comment on the effectiveness of teaching and learning methodologies employed in their 
departments, and, indeed, on the performance of individual staff in that context" (NA13). 
The AQSC, which reported to The Senate, was, according to the interviewees, 
responsible for the delivery and enhancement of teaching and learning within the 
university.  
Externally, to most interviewees, teaching and learning was mainly assessed through the 
external assessment performed by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) and through the 
National Student Survey (these instruments have already been described in Section 
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5.1.3). Fewer interviewees (2) mentioned the Professional, Statutory and Regulatory 
Bodies (PSRBs), which visited the university periodically. 
According to the interviewees, internal measures regarding teaching and learning were 
defined in an interaction between departmental and central levels. In fact, and even 
though these measures could be decided individually by each department (e.g. the centre 
did not impose the exact nature of feedback forms to departments), some of this 
information had to comply, for example, with QAA and PSRBs guidelines. This information 
was then delivered to the central administration, which prepared it for the quality 
assessment performed by the QAA. In governance terms, there was a Pro-Vice-
Chancellor responsible for the Student Experience. 
To the interviewees, external measures were defined by external assessors (e.g. the QAA 
and PSRBs). 
When commenting on the measures used to assess teaching and learning, interviewees 
mentioned, as strength, the long tradition in producing Academic Statistics. Produced on 
an annual basis, the Academic Statistics gave an in-depth report on the students and staff 
of UW, alongside data on the destinations of leavers, research grants and contracts, 
league tables and other comparative information. The Academic Database was first 
produced following a Senate's decision in 1980, which stated that UW needed to pay more 
explicit regard to PIs in its academic planning and resource allocation. Over the years, the 
Academic Database evolved and, in 2001, it was reviewed and renamed Academic 
Statistics. 
Amongst the weaknesses, the one most referred to by the interviewees was the difficulty 
in measuring the quality of teaching and learning: "It is the hardest one to measure" (A12). 
Other interviewees (all heads of department) argued that students' feedback (talking about 
Student Surveys) was a problematic instrument to use, claiming that it should not be taken 
into account on its own. They believed things like the topic being taught – because "(…) 
there are topics that are more easy to teach than others" (AH22) – and students' 
expectations – "(…) a student may well expect more of a university like Warwick, than he 
would of some lesser-ranked university" (AH27) – should also be taken into consideration.  
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5.4.2. Research and scholarship 
Similarly to what happened with teaching and learning, the majority of the interviewees 
stated that UW measured the performance of 'research and scholarship' (see Table 13), 
having the interviewees mentioned both internal and external instruments used to assess 
that performance (see Table 15). 
Table 15 – Instruments used to assess the performance of research and 
scholarship at UW 
n = 32 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 22 
Internal databases (e.g. costs, outputs, grants, income 
generated) 22 
External instruments 29 
RAE 29 
International citation databases 2 
From the external instruments referred to by the interviewees, the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) gathered consensus. The parameters looked at, in terms of the RAE, 
were: (1) size of research contracts, translated into the grants and contracts applied for; 
number of grants and contracts won; success rate in winning those grants and contracts; 
and the actual expenditure on grants and contracts that went through the university's 
accounts; and (2) the quality of research outputs, translated in the number of publications 
and citations and the impact factor of the journal. 
Internally, the university also had, according to some interviewees, a pre-award system 
called InfoEd, which recorded all the applications for grants and contracts, the amount 
needed, who the sponsor was, who the researchers were, and the amounts awarded. To 
a number of interviewees, expenditure on research was also recorded through the 
university's financial system.  
Data analysis showed a big drive on the research side in UW, especially because of 
Vision 2015. Being a goal of the strategy to double the research income, a lot of focus was 
put on monitoring that issue. To an external member: "Council is very aware of that" (L28).  
Even though each department was responsible for assessing its own research and 
scholarship, deciding on which indicators to use, strategies to develop, and ways to 
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monitor it, "(…) ultimately… that would be in the hands of the central administration prior 
to a submission to the RAE" (AH23). Therefore, most departments tended to conform to 
the requirements of the RAE. The Senate then confirmed the appropriateness of the 
measures selected. In governance terms, there were two Pro-Vice-Chancellors 
responsible for research – one for the faculties of Arts and Social Sciences, and the other 
for the faculties of Science and Medicine. 
As for the instruments used, most interviewees considered the RAE as a reliable and well-
established assessment instrument that "(…) has real consequences" (L29), since it is 
linked to financing. Some interviewees also saw the RAE as being important to "(…) build 
a reputation" (NA34), both institutional and individual, and "(…) to do good research" 
(AH27). 
Few interviewees also complained about the RAE, considering it extremely demanding 
and time consuming: "Everybody tends to focus on the RAE to the exclusion of everything 
else" (L31). 
5.4.3. Third mission 
Third mission was the area of the university that more interviewees perceived as not being 
measured (See Table 13). Even those who argued that this area's performance was 
measured stated that the measurement was random and that no real measures had really 
been devised yet. To them, the few instruments used were essentially internal (see Table 
16). 
Table 16 – Instruments used to assess the performance of third mission at UW 
n = 12 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 12 
Database on volunteer work 8 
Database on generated income  4 
Directory of people's links to external 
organisations 3 
External instruments 1 
Higher Education-Business and 
Community Interaction (HE-BCI) Survey  1 
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The internal instrument referred to by most of the interviewees, was the database that 
recorded the number of volunteers in community programmes and the places they were 
working in. This was, according to them, done through Warwick Volunteers, which 
provided opportunities for students and staff at the university to volunteer in a variety of 
roles, within the local community. They also mentioned the existence of a publication 
called 'Community', with examples of all the different types of community-based activities. 
Other interviewees referred to a database where the income generated from the third 
stream was registered and the directory of people's contacts with industry kept by some 
departments, being some of this data then required for the RAE. Some interviewees also 
stated that the records concerning spin-outs and technology transfer were also kept. To 
them, this was mainly done through Warwick Ventures, which ensured that the intellectual 
property resulting from the university's annual research spend was properly protected and 
commercialised. 
The only external instrument mentioned, and only by one interviewee, was the Higher 
Education-Business and Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI Survey). This survey was 
undertaken annually across the UK Higher Education Sector to collect data on strategies 
and activities pursued by institutions during the academic year to commercialise 
knowledge. It recorded spin-outs, staff and graduate start-ups, and other 
commercialisation of knowledge generated by HEIs. HEIs' engagement with SMEs and 
other organisations was also covered by the survey. 
According to the interviewees, the internal measures used were mainly decided centrally, 
by the Steering Committee. The HE-BCI Survey was developed by HEFCE. 
5.4.4. Academic staff 
It was practically consensual among the interviewees that academic staff's performance 
was measured at UW (see Table 13), being the instruments used to assess it essentially 
internal (see Table 17). 
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Table 17 – Instruments used to assess academic staff's performance at UW 
n = 31 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 31 
Student surveys at the end of each course 22 
Appraisal system 21 
Pulse Survey 11 
Internal database (e.g. number, gender, research data, 
number of PhD students) 9 
Recruitment process 2 
External instruments 9 
International citation databases 6 
From the internal instruments referred to by the interviewees, those that stood out more 
were student surveys, handed out in paper at the end of each course or module in order to 
assess academics' performance in terms of teaching; and the annual appraisal system 
that full professors had to go through every year. In relation to the latter, and according to 
the interviewees, every professor had to write an annual report on his or her activities, 
being then rated from 1 to 5 in three different areas: "(…) obviously research, and 
administration, and, presumably, the third one is teaching" (AH20). To an academic, the 
report "(…) is [then] read by the Academic Staff Committee, and they decide [on] (…) how 
much they're going to give you by way of a pay rise" (A5).  
For academics that were not professors, the majority of the interviewees agreed: "There is 
not an adequate appraisal system at all" (A3), except for junior staff, who are on 
probation.  
At the time the interviews were conducted, the university was trying to change the existing 
appraisal system, by extending the annual review to all members of staff.  
Apart from student surveys and the appraisal system, some interviewees also mentioned 
the Pulse Survey, aimed at assessing the satisfaction of all staff, both academic and non-
academic. According to these interviewees, this survey gave the staff an opportunity to 
have a say on a wide range of work-related issues, including job satisfaction, work-life 
balance and working conditions, pay, communications, staff development and equality and 
diversity. The survey was run by an independent research consultancy that acted on UW's 
behalf. 
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A number of interviewees also mentioned the information on academic staff collected by 
the Academic Office, including demographical data, profiled by department, and the data 
collected by departments on individual members of staff (e.g. number of PhD students, 
amount of research income, number of publications, number of citations, and courses 
taught). That data was usually collected to prepare for the dossier needed for the RAE. 
Other interviewees referred to the huge concern with the recruitment process at UW. 
According to them, recruitment was done internationally, and if the candidates were not 
found suitable for a post, no one would be hired. In fact, when looking at the strategy, it 
seems clear that the quality of staff became increasingly important, with one of the main 
goals of Vision 2015 being to get '45 ISI Highly Cited researchers by 2015'. 
In terms of external instruments, a few interviewees mentioned international citation 
databases, where information concerning the research of each individual could be taken 
from. 
In relation to the development of measures concerning academic staff's performance, the 
interviewees agreed that departments decided on which measures to use and that the 
Senate confirmed their appropriateness. 
To the interviewees, the instruments used to assess the performance of academic staff 
had several weaknesses. To them: the instruments were too research focused, being "(…) 
sometimes teaching (…) not considered important, especially in research focused 
universities" (AH15); there was a weak appraisal system "(…) for academic staff other 
than professors" (AH17); and satisfaction surveys were not entirely reliable, since 
responses were dependent on things like the topic being taught and students' 
expectations. 
5.4.5. Non-academic staff 
Fewer interviewees manifested interest in discussing the performance measurement of 
non-academic staff when compared to those who discussed the performance 
measurement of teaching and learning, research and scholarship, academic staff, or even, 
third mission (see Table 13). Nevertheless, almost all of those who talked about it stated 
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that it was measured (see Table 13), exclusively through internal instruments (see Table 
18). 
Table 18 – Instruments used to assess non-academic staff's performance at UW 
n = 21 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 21 
Pulse Survey 11 
Appraisal system 10 
Internal database (e.g. number, gender) 6 
External instruments 0 
The interviewees mentioned three instruments, being the most relevant ones the Pulse 
Survey, used to assess the level of satisfaction of all staff, and the appraisal system that 
administrative staff went through annually. Considering the latter, the interviewees made a 
distinction between the way non-academic staff working in central administration and staff 
working in departments were assessed. According to them, non-academic staff's 
performance was effectively measured within the central administration: "There is a 
management structure in administrative staff. You can see line management there (talking 
about central administration)" (AH16). In the central administration, each member of staff 
discussed with the director of his or her service his or her objectives for the following year 
and ways to reach them, being their performance then compared to pre-established 
objectives. Within departments, non-academic staff was subjected to an annual review 
process, being assessed by the head of department. If anyone was thought to be doing a 
good job, then he or she could be considered for extra payments (merit awards) or 
increments on the salary scale. The third instrument mentioned was the internal database 
developed by the Academic Office, which kept records on non-academic staff (e.g. 
numbers, gender, ethnicity, age).  
According to the interviewees, measures concerning non-academic staff were agreed 
between staff and heads of department or service managers. The Registrar and the Vice-
Chancellor would then confirm the appropriateness of the measures. 
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In relation to the measures used, the interviewees pointed out the following weaknesses: 
• Softness of the appraisal system in departments – some interviewees believed 
there was not an effective assessment outside central administration: "Within 
central administration I think there is a very effective performance measurement. 
Outside, I don't think there is… certainly not in departments" (A12); 
• Difficulty to measure – to other interviewees, the performance of non-academic 
staff was quite difficult to measure: "(…) it's a collective outcome, being very hard 
to attribute to a specific element" (AH27); 
• System does not reward cooperation – some people stated that the system did not 
reward cooperation: "I think we actually have a system of rewards to report bad 
behaviour. Rewards selfish, individualistic (…) behaviour, and does not reward, 
and sometimes punishes, cooperation" (AH17); 
• Staff satisfaction measures are ambiguous – other interviewees believed the 
measures of staff satisfaction to be ambiguous: "You can look at staff satisfaction 
(…) but whether that's telling you anything real about how they do their job is 
another matter" (AH27). 
5.4.6. Students 
All the interviewees that commented on the measurement of students' performance stated 
that this area's performance was assessed (see Table 13) exclusively through internal 
instruments (see Table 19). 
Table 19 – Instruments used to measure students' performance at UW 
n = 20 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 20 
Internal database (e.g. number of students, attendance 
rates) 13 
Measures of educational success (e.g. degree results, 
completion rates, retention rates) 10 
Recruitment process 3 
Student tutoring system 2 
External instruments 0 
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One of the instruments more often referred to by the interviewees was the internal 
database that collected student numbers, gender and ethnicity, attendance rates, and so 
on. To the interviewees, students were very closely monitored in terms of numbers, 
especially undergraduate students: 
"Students are our critical revenue stream, as a university, in terms of 
(…) income, because each student comes with money attached to him 
or her." (AH22)  
Other information collected was, according to other interviewees, related to educational 
success. It included mainly student outputs – degree results, completion rates, and 
retention rates. It contained data by student, by course, by department, by faculty and by 
level of study. The interviewees stated that all students' records were kept in a database 
called SITS.  
Other two instruments came up in the interviews: student recruitment and the student 
tutoring system. To a few interviewees, UW was very careful with the students it chose on 
entrance. Only students who got top marks at entrance exams would get into the 
university. Other interviewees stated that student welfare was also monitored through the 
system of personal tutoring. 
According to the interviewees, targets around students were negotiated between the 
centre and departments. The Council would then confirm their appropriateness. 
5.4.7. Support services 
Similarly to what happened with non-academic staff, a lot of interviewees chose not to 
comment on the way the performance of support services was measured (see Table 13). 
Nonetheless, the majority of those who commented on that, stated that this area's 
performance was assessed (see Table 13), namely through internal instruments (see 
Table 20).  
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Table 20 – Instruments used to assess the performance of support services at UW 
n = 16 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 14 
ASDAR 12 
Complaints 2 
External instruments 3 
International Student BarometerTM 3 
There was no doubt amongst the interviewees concerning the tool that was more used to 
measure the performance of support services – the Administrative and Service 
Departments Annual Review (ASDAR) –, developed and controlled by the central 
administration. This instrument was not applied to academic departments. One 
interviewee explained how ASDAR worked:  
"Every year, the plans of non-academic departments are reviewed, 
making sure that they are in alignment with the university strategy, in 
terms of their aims, their objectives… making sure that they are doing 
what they are doing the most efficient way possible… making sure that 
there is as little waste as possible in those areas." (NA13) 
Each service set certain targets for decision-making and set up a system to be able to 
report against success in achieving those: 
"It is both a qualitative and quantitative process, in a sense that 
individual services will demonstrate in a quantitative way how they have 
measured performance… [and] give a qualitative analysis of that 
performance as well." (NA34) 
Some interviewees also mentioned other instruments used, namely the number of 
complaints and the results of the International Student BarometerTM, which measured 
international students' perceptions on several items, including support services. 
Concerning the development of measures, the interviewees argued that the directors of 
each service would come up with their budget and devise their targets. The Registrar and 
the Vice-Chancellor would then confirm the appropriateness of the measures. 
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The interviewees attributed several weaknesses to the instruments used to assess the 
performance of support services: 
• Does not allow benchmarking – some interviewees complained about the existing 
system not allowing benchmarking with other support services, especially from 
other universities: "It is very difficult to get comparable data and benchmark… 
because we have different structures and different methods" (NA35); 
• Lack of customer satisfaction surveys – to other interviewees there should be 
customer satisfaction surveys: "In terms of commercial performance (…) I don't 
see a lot of these things like customer satisfaction surveys (…). They are not very 
customer focused, they're very financially focused" (S40); 
• ASDAR is not a measurement system – some interviewees argued that ASDAR 
was not a measurement system: "I wouldn't say that [ASDAR] is a performance 
measure. I would say it is an excuse for an annual conversation between the 
Registrar and its staff. (…) I am not sure what measures are coming out of that" 
(AH21); 
• ASDAR is not attributable to individuals – to other interviewees, ASDAR should be 
attributable to specific individuals: "(…) the ASDAR system by its nature tends to… 
almost encourages comment and measurement on a collective basis, possibly 
because it is not attributable. And, you know, one of the big advantages of any 
decent annual review (…) is that it's entirely attributable" (NA39). 
5.4.8. Employers 
Apart from third mission, 'links to employers' was one of the areas of the university that 
more interviewees perceived as not being measured (see Table 13). Even most of those 
who argued that the university measured those links stated that it did not do it 
systematically. In fact, the majority of the interviewees argued that they had little contact 
with employers.  
In terms of the instruments used to assess links to employers, most interviewees 
mentioned internal ones, namely a database that gathered statistics on where students 
went, sorted by sector, and the employment rate of students (see Table 21). That data 
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was, according to these interviewees, pulled out from the different departments through 
the Careers Service, being mainly collected because it was annually demanded by 
HEFCE.  
Table 21 – Instruments used to assess links to employers at UW 
n = 18 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 18 
Internal databases (e.g. employment information) 13 
Employment rate 7 
External instruments 0 
According to the interviewees, the Careers Centre decided on the measures used to 
assess the links to employers, together with the Steering Committee and Senate. 
In relation to the adequacy of the instruments used to assess links to employers, many of 
the interviewees recognised that the engagement with employers was still quite poor and 
that there was "(…) a lot of improvement to make in that area" (NA37). They believed it to 
be an area where the institution needed to grow. The interviewees felt that the university 
should be looking at "(…) issues about careers, pathways for… graduates, trying to target 
where selected employers are" (NA35). 
5.4.9. Alumni 
Similarly to what happened with third mission and employers, links to alumni were also 
one of the areas that more interviewees perceived as not being measured (see Table 13). 
Even those who argued that this area was measured agreed that this was hardly done. 
The majority of the interviewees that commented on the instruments used to assess links 
to alumni mentioned fundraising activities (see Table 22). To these interviewees, this area 
was assessed only in terms of numbers and contacts of alumni and donations.  
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Table 22 – Instruments used to assess links to alumni at UW 
n = 20 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 20 
Fundraising activities 16 
Internal databases (e.g. contacts) 9 
External instruments 3 
DLHE 3 
Data on alumni was, according to the interviewees, stored in a database called Raiser's 
Edge. The Development and Alumni Relations Office (DARO) managed this database. 
In terms of external instruments, three interviewees mentioned the Destinations of 
Leavers in Higher Education Statistics (DLHE), already explained in Section 5.1.3. To 
these interviewees, the Careers Centre collected information on the initial careers of 
graduates and postgraduates six months after graduation, and compiled and analysed it to 
form the DLHE Statistics, then sent to HESA.  
To the interviewees, the measures used to measure links to alumni were decided by 
DARO, together with the Steering Committee and Senate. 
When asked about their thoughts concerning the measures used to assess this area, 
some interviewees stated that Warwick's linkages with alumni were not as strong as in 
other universities: 
"As an alumnus what I get is a sort periodic printed thing… old 
fashioned. Other universities use technology much more." (L29) 
"For a university with a global strategy… we should be able to make a 
better strategic use of an alumni network of 125,000 people and growing 
every year, a quarter of which are international… a quarter of which live 
outside of the UK… which is a phenomenal network." (NA37) 
Nevertheless, all the interviewees agreed on the importance of alumni: "(…) alumni are 
critically important to the institution… and its future direction" (NA37). 
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5.4.10. Finance 
It was consensual that finance was clearly measured, both at university and departmental 
levels (see Table 13). According to the interviewees, the concern about finance increased 
with the new strategy:  
"We have people thinking very carefully about how we can grow the 
income streams at the university. How we can improve the financial 
situation. How we can be more entrepreneurial and more income 
generating for all that side of things." (NA2) 
All interviewees believed there was a very strong awareness of finance throughout the 
organisation: 
"People at Warwick understand that there are consequences from 
financial performance (…). They may not be close to it, but they know it 
is important, and they know that achieving financial plans is critical." 
(L29) 
This awareness could arguably be explained by the 'Earning Income Policy' implemented 
in UW to face the financial cuts of 1981, as discussed in Section 5.2.1. 
According to the interviewees, the KPIs used to measure financial performance came 
automatically out from the budget and were things like surplus as a percentage of income, 
staff cost as a percentage of income, and variances against budget (see Table 23). 
Some interviewees explained how financial performance was measured and by whom: 
Having set the budgets, there was a Budget Steering Group that met every quarter to 
monitor the financial performance of the various areas of the university against budgets. 
There was also a Financial Planning Sub-Committee, which "(…) looks harder at… the 
economic situation… and [comes up] with a plan for the coming five years" (NA13). Both 
the Budget Steering Group and the Financial Planning Sub-Committee came into the 
aegis of the Finance and General Purposes Committee (FGPC), which, in turn, reported to 
The Council. 
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Table 23 – Types of measures used to assess financial performance at UW 
n = 16 Number of occurrences 
Internal measures 16 
Financial measures (e.g. surplus as a percentage of 
income, staff cost as a percentage of income, and 
variances against budget) 
16 
External measures 0 
According to the interviewees, there was also a clear system in place to follow the 
financial position of departments. Every head of department had to devise the 
departmental financial plan for the upcoming five years, setting targets. Departments with 
devolved budgets had their own Finance Team and managed their own finances, even 
though they were closely monitored by the central administration, interacting with the 
Finance Director very closely. Non-devolved departments took their financial plans to the 
Academic Resourcing Committee (ARC). So, even though the money was handled at a 
departmental level, departments could not do what they wanted. Most decisions had to 
have the approval of ARC. All the financial information was stored in the university's 
finance system. 
To the interviewees, the KPIs used by the Finance Office were developed by that office 
and agreed by The Council.  
Even though external members stated that the measurement of finance was "(…) probably 
not as rigorous as you would expect in the private sector" (L29), the way UW managed the 
financial side was well regarded outside the institution, and other universities tended to 
visit the university to see how that was done.  
In the next section, the way interviewees perceived performance to be reported in UW will 
be discussed. 
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5.5. Reporting of performance 
Similarly to what happened with measurement, reporting also varied according to the 
area. 
Several interviewees confirmed receiving or seeing reports on teaching and learning. Most 
of them mentioned they saw the results of the student surveys conducted internally, since 
data from those surveys was normally "(…) charted within the department and compiled 
into a series of statistics" (NA41). Additionally, the university tried to give feedback to 
students concerning the survey: 
"Any comments that the course or module organiser writes, [are] put on 
the board for everyone to see, so that students can read the comments 
from the course organisers, as well, and see the scores that are given." 
(AH16) 
According to the interviewees, reports concerning teaching and learning usually came 
through the Academic Quality and Standards Committee (AQSC), in co-ordination with 
relevant committees, departments and centres. AQSC then reported to The Senate. 
The interviewees also referred to the Academic Statistics published annually by the 
Academic Office, in collaboration with the Research and Development Services Office, the 
Careers Advisory Service and the Personnel Office. These statistics were available on the 
university website. 
Externally, HEFCE published some results concerning teaching and learning in Unistats. 
This site, aimed at comparing and reviewing universities and subjects in order to help 
students choose the best UK university and subject, brought together authoritative, official 
information and it included the results of the National Student Survey (NSS). Results from 
the NSS were also passed out to departments with a letter from the Pro-Vice-Chancellor 
for Student Experience. 
Additionally, the QAA presented a report on the findings of the quality assessment of 
teaching and learning. The full report was published on the university website. 
The majority of the interviewees also argued that they saw reports on research and 
scholarship, stating that most of the data on this area came through the RAE route and 
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was accessible online, thus enabling benchmarking between subjects and institutions. 
Reports on this issue usually went to the Senate through the Steering Committee. 
Within the university there was also a Research Committee, which looked at periodic 
reports on research performance, research quality and the generation of research income, 
in order to advise the Pro-Vice-Chancellors for Research on areas where improvements 
could be made. 
Almost no reports were produced on third mission, according to the interviewees. Two 
academics mentioned the Warwick Volunteers' report, where all the volunteering activities 
were described. In relation to the volunteering programme, students were usually asked to 
"(…) collate information of what they would like to do and on how those activities went" 
(A4). Most reports on third mission came, according to the interviewees, through the 
Steering Committee. 
Some data on academic staff was compiled in the Academic Statistics, being available 
online. Moreover, professors had to write an annual review report (as described in Section 
5.4.4) and send it to the head of their department, who signed off appraisals, gave a grade 
from 1 to 5, and reported to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor. The reviews were then analysed 
by the Academic Staff Committee (ASC), which reported to The Senate. 
Results from the student surveys were also sent to the academic staff and to the head of 
department, even though they were largely kept within the department. 
Finally, everyone could see the broad results of the Pulse Survey, since the university 
published them online. 
In terms of non-academic staff, most interviewees stated that they saw no reports on that 
area. The clerical and technical staffs working in departments reported to heads of 
department, who signed off appraisals, and to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor. Staff working 
outside academic departments reported to the director of their service. The latter reported 
directly to the Registrar. The appraisal reports were then analysed by the Finance and 
General Purposes Committee (FGPC), which was responsible to The Council for 
promotion policies. 
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To the interviewees, some data on students was compiled in the Academic Statistics. 
Additionally, the Board of Undergraduate Studies (BUS) and the Board of Graduate 
Studies (BGS) also produced reports destined to improve students' experience, making 
recommendations to The Senate.  
Concerning support services, not many reports were produced, according to the 
interviewees. Each Pro-Vice-Chancellor received information on the services related to 
them (see Figure 19). The director of each support service reported to the Registrar, who, 
in turn, reported to the Steering Committee. Commercial services reported to the Finance 
and General Purposes Committee (FGPC). The polling company that ran the International 
Student BarometerTM presented a report to the university and gave a detailed presentation 
of the findings. A summary form of the results was published on the International Office 
website. 
Not many interviewees mentioned seeing reports on employers. The Careers Centre 
produced a report on employers annually, and took it to the Steering Committee and to the 
Senate.  
Similarly to what happened with employers, not many interviewees stated that they saw 
reports on alumni. Data on this area was produced by the Development and Alumni 
Relations Office (DARO). This office produced an annual report that was sent to the 
Steering Committee and to the Senate. Reports with the results from the Destination of 
Leavers in Higher Education Survey (DLHE) "(…) are published nationally [by HESA] and 
used actively in league tables" (NA35). The results of DLHE were then reported to the 
Steering Committee and to Senate. 
In relation to finance, the majority of the interviewees confirmed seeing financial reports. 
Each non-devolved department produced its financial plan and took it to the Academic 
Resourcing Committee (ARC). This committee then reported to the Finance and General 
Purposes Committee (FGPC), which, in turn, reported to the Senate and Council. 
Departments with devolved budgets reported to the Finance Office, which then reported to 
the Council. Additionally, the Finance Office produced a Statement of Accounts annually, 
publishing it on its website. 
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Having looked at the way UW reported the performance information collected during the 
measurement process, Section 5.6 will analyse the way the interviewees perceived 
performance information to be used. 
5.6. Management of performance 
Data analysis showed that performance information was not used in the same way across 
the different areas of the university. 
In terms of using the data concerning teaching and learning, some interviewees argued 
that the university acted upon it, even if, to them, some things could improve. For 
example, to some interviewees, the use of the information collected through the student 
surveys was not homogeneous. While some departments analysed and acted upon that 
data, others did not: "(…) some just leave it. (…) There's a broad spectrum there" (A6). 
Also, a more systematic approach to the data collected through the National Student 
Survey (NSS) could be taken, according to some interviewees. Whereas some 
departments looked at the data and discussed it in their Student-Staff Liaison Committee, 
others did not. Nonetheless, some of the issues raised by students in the NSS were 
analysed by the Board of Undergraduate Students (BUS) and some action was taken. An 
interviewee gave an example of how NSS data was used: "(…) the one area where 
[students] expressed dissatisfaction was in assessments and feedback… feeling over 
assessed and feeling they haven't an adequate feedback in order to progress" (NA34). 
What the university did was talk to the Senior Tutor, who was responsible for the Personal 
Tutoring System within departments, and asked him to try and solve this problem.  
According to some interviewees, the absence of a more systematic approach to deal with 
the data concerning teaching and learning made it difficult to have an overall picture of the 
university: 
"There isn't a lot of discussion, for example at AQSC, about the overall 
picture of the university; so, for example, as a university do we really 
know how high our drop out rate really is? Do we know whether in 
relation to other universities in the country we give more firsts? (…) In 
my experience with the QAA we don't do a lot of that at a high level of 
aggregation. (…) We do it at faculty level." (A11) 
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In terms of research and scholarship, most interviewees believed academic departments 
used the results from the RAE to improve their performance: "(…) obviously there's a big 
drive on the research side" (NA41). In fact, in the quest to increase research productivity, 
some departments were, according to a few interviewees, promoting support to their staff, 
through "(…) peer evaluation of journal articles [and] joint research applications" (AH18). 
Some heads of department also confirmed signing off all grant applications prior to 
submission and monitoring success in terms of awards granted against submissions.  
Moreover, the university also monitored citation rates and "(…) [was] trying to quantify for 
those disciplines where citation rates [were] not particularly relevant or reliable" (NA35). 
The Academic Office was also working on ways to "(…) benchmark outputs across 
disciplines" (NA35). 
Third mission was not acted upon, according to the interviewees, unless "(…) Warwick 
[developed] a negative reputation" (S40). The action consisted basically in looking for 
good opportunities to cooperate with external institutions. Nevertheless, most interviewees 
agreed that this was an area where the university needed to do more. 
The performance of academic staff was officially handled at departmental level. When 
there was a massive problem that could not be solved within the department, heads of 
department usually took the issue to a member of the Personnel Office. If the problem 
could not be solved there, they would go to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor. 
With the exception of one, all heads of department felt they could not do much if an 
academic was underperforming. That opinion was also shared by other academics. They 
stated that it was sometimes very difficult to do anything about poor performance since the 
university did not have any mechanisms for looking at academic staff's performance. 
According to them, there were no sanctions that the department could take against the 
person that was not performing. They could talk or write to the person, telling him or her 
that there was an issue that needed sorting out, but they felt that if that person did not take 
it on board, then there would be very little else they could do besides writing to him or her 
again. According to them, there was not a disciplinary procedure. They felt it was virtually 
impossible to remove somebody from their job because they were not doing well as 
academics. A person would have to have done something very serious to be sanctioned. 
Two interviewees shared these feelings: 
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"All that can be done with the information collected is go and talk with 
some members of staff and discuss what they are doing. (…) There is 
nothing compulsory (…) or any sanction I can impose on the staff." 
(AH16) 
"There is nothing we can do, other than withholding the merit payment." 
(A3) 
In fact, the interviewees complained about a lack of management structures inside the 
university to deal with academics' performance:  
"[On one occasion], having decided that I was going to do something 
about it, I was not sufficiently supported by the university, and probably, 
pragmatically, in the future, I would decide not to do it that way." (A25) 
These complaints are congruent with the results from the Pulse Survey. There, the highest 
negative rating of staff was the university's effectiveness in dealing with poor performance. 
The reason for this lack of support was, according to the interviewees, related to the fear 
of having 'bad publicity': 
"If you fire somebody, then they are quite entitled to go to the papers, 
and they are quite entitled to write bad things about the university. They 
are quite entitled to get, if they can afford it, a very expensive lawyer, 
and this will become a very huge case. And the university, quite rightly, 
will balance and make a judgment. The governance structures will 
analyse the cost-benefit of doing that." (AH22) 
"It depends, of course, on how big your pockets are. Of course you can 
pay people to go away and people do, but as you probably know, in the 
UK, the system has changed in the last few years (…). It has become 
very expensive to buy people out of their contracts before age sixty. So 
that's a bit of a difficulty." (AH19) 
What heads of department could do was to allocate certain responsibilities, teaching and 
administrative to academics. Two interviewees stated that, in relation to this issue, the 
problem was the lack of clarity on what comprised an academic role:  
"Part of the problem also is the vagueness of many job descriptions and 
this is, as you know, a huge piece of work that has been undertaken. 
But unlike Portugal, for example, or many of the other universities 
across Europe, academics don't have a stipulated number of hours. 
They… the definition… the allocation of teaching is in the hands of the 
head of department. Now, this means, for example… I can tell you that 
there is one department in this university where the professors do no 
teaching." (A3) 
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Heads of department reported problems particularly in relation to administrative roles, 
mainly in ensuring that they were distributed equitably, and that people did them properly: 
"People clearly want to concentrate on research and scholarship, and 
this is sometimes used as a lever not to do an administrative role, or do 
an administrative role poorly." (AH18) 
So, heads of department felt they had to deal with these issues through diplomacy. 
In terms of sanctions, heads of department stated that the only thing they could do was to 
withhold promotion or give poor performers more teaching load or more administrative 
responsibilities. In terms of rewards, it was much easier. They could, for example, attribute 
merit pays, promote people through the Academic Staff Committee (ASC), or reduce 
teaching loads. Some departments also had mentors in place to help academics when 
they needed. 
In relation to non-academic staff, an interviewee stated: "I do not think non-academic staff 
gets away with poor performance, certainly not in the centre" (NA41). The Registrar had 
the ultimate managerial responsibility for people in support services. If some members of 
staff were not performing accordingly to required standards, they could be relocated or 
have their job responsibilities slightly shifted. In extreme cases, people could be dismissed 
or a mutual agreement could be reached, even though some interviewees believed that 
seldom happened. An academic even stated: "What we can't do, of course, is fire people 
who are performing badly" (A3). To a non-academic: 
"[It] depends on what the reasons for the non-performance may be, but 
if it's general capability type of stuff, then [the Human Resources Office] 
supports the line manager in seeking to get the improvement from the 
individual to the required standard, always [using] an advisory and 
support method, because we don't have executive responsibility. Quite 
rightly! The only exceptions to that are where there can be some… big 
sensitivities around individuals in a situation domestically or health wise 
or whatever (…), but we tend to move that into more specialist 
counselling or occupational health environment to support the 
individual." (NA39) 
If people performed well, it would be much easier, since they could be rewarded and 
promoted. There were mechanisms in place for doing that.  
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The results of the Pulse Survey were also a base for action. For example, the last survey 
showed that Warwick staff, both academic and non-academic, was working too hard. That 
led to fairly high levels of occupational stress. As a result, the university set in place a 
number of initiatives in order to try and reduce staff's workload. 
Concerning students, they were very highly monitored, according to the interviewees, and 
the university looked carefully at the data: 
"The metrics of students are extensive, whether it's their exam results, 
or the number we're getting in, or the number we're expecting to recruit 
through admissions, there's a big drive here (…) because that is the 
university's single biggest income source." (NA41) 
Moreover, departments could decide on which students to take and on what numbers they 
were going for, and there was a careful selection on entrance: 
"Obviously we have choices to make on the students side, about who 
we take and who we don't and what numbers we're going for and things 
of that kind." (A19) 
Also, departments that struggled to get students communicated that message "(…) to the 
rest of the department and (…) [worked] very hard (…) to keep students in" (AH24). 
Moreover, to some interviewees, tutors also promoted the academic welfare of students, 
individually and collectively. They were usually people to whom students could turn to in 
confidence for support regarding difficulties with their studies.  
The Senate was the body where people agreed if some formal action could be taken 
concerning students. 
In relation to support services, at the end of the academic year, performance was 
measured against the objectives and targets established at the beginning of the year, 
enabling the director of each service to act:  
"Things have changed since the results of ASDAR… directors left 
departments… departments have been closed down… [or] have been 
merged…. so, it has some teeth and the university is prepared to back 
up on the changes of what it finds out." (NA37) 
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Moreover, if data on a specific support service kept on coming up negative in the surveys 
conducted to students, the Registrar had the managerial responsibility of acting upon it: 
"There are examples of… the need for service improvement and 
changing things around [Coughs], either people or structures, or both, to 
make sure we get those improvements." (NA13) 
As for the ISB, some interviewees stated that, even though the International Office took 
upon the results from this survey, there was not a systematic methodology to use the 
data. 
According to the interviewees, the university did not actively act upon employers or 
alumni. In relation to employers, it would only act if "(…) students were not getting jobs" 
(NA41). Data concerning alumni was not acted upon, since the data that existed was 
relatively scarce, as discussed in Section 5.4.9: 
"I think we're not following up our students enough (…) and we're meant 
to do that (…). We could do with more of that." (AH18) 
"We analyse them and then do nothing about it… we just say 'Oh, that's 
terrible!'" (NA14) 
Finally, contrarily to what happened with employers and alumni, the interviewees 
perceived finance to be well acted upon in the university, since:  
"It is the heart of everything, and if you haven't got money, and you're 
going bankrupt, you cannot do anything, and you're going down the 
tubes." (NA41) 
Some interviewees explained the process: the Academic Resourcing Committee (ARC) 
allocated departmental budgets for the support of academic activities within the overall 
envelope of funding for non-devolved departments and within the context of the 
university's strategic goals and priorities. It also monitored income and expenditure and 
the achievement of plans by departments. An academic confirmed this:  
"I spend a lot of time on the Academic Resourcing Committee, and there 
every department is subject to a pretty close review of its budgets, 
etc.… and targets are set. (…) Whether targets are met is another 
question." (A12) 
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The Finance and General Purposes Committee (FGPC) looked at performance in more 
detail and performance against budgets, once a term. It acted as a general purpose and 
executive committee with power to act on all day-to-day matters not within the province of 
any other Council committee. It advised and made recommendations to the Council 
regarding the financial policy and management of the university within the context of the 
university financial plan. 
5.7. Performance management systems 
After having explored UW's strategy and the way performance was measured, reported 
and managed at the university, the next sub-sections will look at: the importance attributed 
by the interviewees to PMS; the pressures felt by them to implement PMS; the factors that 
the interviewees believe to influence the implementation and functioning of PMS; and the 
perceived strengths and weaknesses of the PMS. 
5.7.1. Importance of performance management systems 
When asked about the importance of PMS, the vast majority of the interviews that 
commented on that issue stated that they considered it either 'important' or 'extremely 
important'. The only ones that showed some discomfort with the subject were two heads 
of department, one from a 'hard-pure' subject and the other one from a 'soft-pure' subject. 
Performance management systems were considered important for a number of reasons, 
being the primary reason, according to the interviewees, to inform decision-making: 
"The more information we get, the better decision we'll make." (A36) 
"If you don't have measures of performance, or at least something to… 
aim at, in terms of planning, then you are lost." (AH22) 
Some interviewees also believed PMS would help in the achievement of the strategy: 
"Within the structure of the strategy document it's going to be absolutely 
essential. We can't do without it, and there must be an element of 
performance management. (…) Historically, of course, that has never 
existed in universities." (AH16) 
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Other interviewees mentioned the ability of PMS to ensure accountability and 
transparency: 
"In terms of both the government investment but also the people who 
are paying fees, international students, home students paying fees, we 
have to have demonstrable value." (NA34) 
Other reasons presented were: to allow comparisons and ensure equity; to lead staff; and 
to build a reputation: 
"It's important to have a device within which you are able to say 'well, 
you may be doing the teaching hours that you are required to do, but 
actually you're very low on admin, and you haven't got the same kind of 
administration responsibilities as other people and we need to ensure 
that aspect'." (AH18) 
"Performance management systems are important in shaping the way 
staff… you know, do their job." (S32) 
"Things like the Research Assessment Exercise [have been important] 
to build a reputation." (NA34) 
Even though data analysis showed that most interviewees, from the four groups 
(academics, non-academic, students and external members), perceived PMS as 
something important, that helped organisations to think strategically and move forward, 
some interviewees argued that the university and individuals should be careful with some 
of the unintended effects that could emerge with the introduction of PMS. According to 
them, measurement should not be seen as an end in itself, since sometimes metrics did 
not tell the whole story:  
"There is a real danger of becoming a number of tick boxes or scoring 
mechanisms (…), which then people try to work to. (…) It is almost a 
force towards mediocrity" (AH24).  
Other interviewees believed PMS "(…) could be used to bully people (…), to put additional 
pressure on people. (…) Performance management tools are only as good as the working 
relationship through which they are implemented" (AH18). 
A few interviewees feared that PMS could lead to the end of futuristic research:  
"With so much measurement, people will stop doing more futuristic 
research, because no one is going to read it and it does not make them 
look good, and that's a shame, really." (AH15) 
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Some interviewees also believed PMS could lead to deliberate strategies to conform to 
what was demanded, and gave examples of this type of behaviour: 
"It is very hard to manage the administrative load for an academic, so, 
given that most academics are smart enough to work that out… you 
know, there's nothing to stop them from saying 'well, I am simply not 
going to do that, and I will focus my attention on things that will give me 
better results, so that's research income and output'." (AH16) 
"A decision (…) will be justified as a good decision (…) by manipulating 
the performance measures that are then used to assess whether this 
was successful or not (…). This happens throughout every department 
of the university." (AH22) 
In the next section, the pressures felt by the interviewees to measure, report and manage 
performance will be discussed. 
5.7.2. Pressures to measure and manage performance 
All the interviewees agreed there were several pressures, both internal and external, to 
measure, report and manage performance, being the latter the most influential ones (see 
Table 24). 
Table 24 – Types of pressures at UW 
n = 37 Number of occurrences 
External pressures 34 
Internal pressures 30 
In the next sub-sections, these pressures will be discussed more thoroughly. 
5.7.2.1. External pressures  
Interviewees from the four groups (academics, non-academics, students and external 
members) concurred there were external pressures to introduce PMS in universities. To 
them, these came mainly from the state and from the market.  
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State 
The RAE was the main pressure referred to in the interviews, especially for an institution 
like Warwick, because "(…) [the university] has decided to play that game and uses that 
game to define its reputation" (A7). One interviewee argued that, because of the RAE, the 
quality of British universities' research had been "(…) levered up dramatically over recent 
years" (AH27). 
The assessment conducted by the QAA was also reported as a pressure, given the 
amount of preparation involved. Nevertheless, one interviewee stated: "[Even though] it 
creates pressure (…) it also creates an opportunity to reflect on what [we] are doing" (A7). 
To other interviewees, HEFCE also created a heavy regulatory burden to the university:  
"It (talking about HEFCE) is always keen to see how effective our 
teaching and learning and our research are." (L28) 
"Between the government and the university there is a thing called the 
Higher Education Funding Council. (…). It's a little bit of a buffer 
between the two. We have to be careful that (…) there isn't too much 
intervention by the Higher Education Funding Council, but I happen to 
think that if we didn't help them, it would be a awful lot worse, because 
the universities would be straight in the firing line from the Ministry and, 
at least, the Funding Council protects us a bit, in that respect. But still… 
can create a heavy-ish regulatory burden." (NA13) 
Other pressures announced by the interviewees were the two surveys – the NSS and the 
ISB. To these interviewees, since the results were published online they created an 
enormous tension for universities, by "(…) [allowing] students to see how universities are 
ranked in terms of student satisfaction" (AH27). 
Some interviewees also mentioned the pressure exerted by the Department of Innovation, 
Universities and Skills: 
"There is a Ministry now… the Department of Innovation, Universities 
and Skills. It's the first time that we've had a Ministry that… has had the 
word 'university' in its title. (…) It has got five ministers [Smiles]. (…) A 
small department, five ministers. (…) The interest they naturally have… 
can quite quickly turn into… interference… tension. In trying to do the 
right thing, they actually load more requests, more requirements onto 
the university. (…) That can become debilitating, tiring… counter-
productive." (NA13) 
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Finally, a few academics also considered professional bodies to be a strain, because "(…) 
they are amazingly time consuming" (A4). 
Market 
Virtually all the interviewees agreed that the market became increasingly important over 
the years, playing an influential role in most universities. According to them, the 
competition between universities became tougher and every institution was trying to 
achieve the best quality they could. The majority of the interviewees argued that, in the 
UK, universities were increasingly competitive: 
"There is a need to have our brand out there in the press. That, in a 
sense, feeds the image of the university." (NA13) 
To these interviewees, there was a market for students, for staff and for funding: 
"We are trying to make sure we attract the best possible students (…) 
the strongest undergraduates, and I think if we look at the A-level scores 
of our home students, we do get the strongest students. [Moreover], we 
need to develop reputation internationally so that we get the strongest 
international students." (A2) 
"Any indicator that a department or university can be better than its 
competitors will appear in the marketplace, therefore attracting 
students." (AH23) 
"In many, many cases now, we are recruiting our staff from around the 
world, rather than just from the UK." (A2) 
"We need to compete for funding from business, funding from industry, 
funding from charities." (A2) 
To several interviewees, the pressure to compete, mainly in terms of student recruitment, 
became more acute when "(…) the language of performance [was] taken out by the media 
and turned into league tables" (AH23). 
Also with the advent of tuition fees, and their recent increase (as discussed in Section 
5.1.4), students started to think more carefully about the value of the programme they 
were taking and parents started to get more interested in what people were doing. A 
number of interviewees argued that they were now "(…) seeing a lot more parental 
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influence in decision-making" (L29). Parents started coming more to the university on 
open days and became increasingly interested in the employability of their children. 
To a few interviewees, market philosophies have also pressured universities to introduce 
control mechanisms: 
"The idea that businesses and business models should be adopted by 
universities, and the whole of the public sector (…), [has] been very 
powerful." (AH17) 
"The market philosophy is the overwhelming model of our times." 
(AH24) 
Other forces that were referred to by some interviewees were alumni, who were, 
according to them, interested in improving the reputation of the university they had studied 
in, and employers, interested in knowing that the people they were employing had good 
degrees. 
5.7.2.2. Internal pressures 
Several interviewees also mentioned internal pressures (see Table 24), even though 
many of these believed external pressures were the ones forcing the university to look 
internally and discover what it did and how it wanted to move forward. Other interviewees 
stated that external pressures also led to internal ones unnecessarily:  
"We create pressures for ourselves, trying to respond to the pressures 
from outside." (NA13) 
The internal pressure more mentioned by the interviewees was the new strategy, which, 
according to them, led to the need to measure its achievement over a period of seven or 
eight years. Consequently, the Vice-Chancellor and the Council became more concerned 
with measurement; the Senior Management Team and the central administration expected 
increased value for money from the people employed; and the Audit Committee wanted 
some measurement of internal audit value. As a result, the interviewees felt there was an 
increased internal pressure to measure and improve performance, coming from the centre 
to departments, and from these to individuals: 
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"[The] competitive pressure cascades down through the department to 
every individual academic within it…. We all feel that we are in a 
struggle for the status for funding and for reputation. And we all 
therefore work hard at our jobs to do the best." (AH27) 
To an academic "(…) that sort of competition can work in quite a healthy manner" (A7). 
According a number of interviewees, financial pressures have also driven the university to 
measure, report and manage performance: 
"Warwick has always had a philosophy of being quite prudent in the way 
it uses its money. It's significantly more economical with its use of 
money than a lot of other institutions." (NA34) 
This prudency is arguably related to the 'Earning Income Policy' adopted by the university 
since the 1980s, as reported in Section 5.2.1. 
Section 5.7.3 will look at the factors perceived to influence the implementation and 
functioning of PMS. 
5.7.3. Factors that can influence PMS 
The interviewees pointed out several factors believed to influence, either negatively or 
positively, the introduction and functioning of PMS. On the negative side, the factor most 
referred to by the interviewees was resistance to changes. To them, academics tended to 
dislike PMS due to the fear of losing their academic freedom:  
"Academics, particularly, don't like to be managed and will constantly 
resist the tendency to do so in the name of academic freedom." (AH17) 
"Historical attitudes towards the status quo that certain things shouldn't 
be done." (S40) 
Other interviewees, all non-academic, mentioned the financial constraints of collecting 
some data, and the lack of means to implement it: 
"Sometimes you can't get hold of the data… the cost of getting the data 
may be viewed as being too excessive to justify the results or what you 
can do with those results." (NA37) 
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"The university sometimes does (…) too much too fast, or at least too 
much anyway. And I think that (…) can lead to a lack of sufficient 
resources, in a certain area, because it's quite a diverse organisation 
(…) [that] manages quite a diverse set of operations." (S40) 
To a number of interviewees, the governance and management structure could also 
negatively influence the introduction and functioning of PMS, namely the complexity of the 
governance structure and the lack of a clear responsibility structure: 
"Targets are… debated at (…) the bottom of the committee structure… 
it's very hierarchical (…) and it takes a long time to have something 
approved, and by that point it is out of date." (S32) 
"The university purchased a supercomputer for about a million pounds 
(…) and it did not realise at the time that it had to purchase, say, a 
certain piece of equipment to actually have the system in operation (…). 
Now, that's a sort of worrisome issue, in terms of performance 
management, for me… that should have never happened. When 
something like that happens, and (…) there's no clear sense of why this 
happened, other than just the fact that someone somewhere hadn't 
done something right. (…) It was very frustrating." (S40) 
Finally, a few interviewees mentioned the international economic trends, which have not 
been very favourable lately, thus contributing to the financial problems felt by many 
institutions. 
On the positive side, several factors were mentioned, especially the organisational culture. 
According to a number of interviewees, UW was always aware of the need to have a 
PMS: 
"There is a clear wish [inside the university] to have available 
information, so that it can be used for the betterment of the university." 
(L30) 
"Warwick has always been fairly clear about performance management 
data as being important." (NA35) 
Other interviewees also indicated the importance of having strong leadership and the 
political or institutional will to implement a PMS: 
"The trick (…) is to set out strong leadership (…) but recognise that… 
respect and the ability to persuade people to follow will need to be 
earned and will not be a God Given Right." (NA37) 
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"The main factor that affects it (talking about PMS) (…) is the 
institutional will [Laughs]. (…) There is no way a head of department can 
institute performance management unless the university is going to back 
him up." (AH16) 
The need to have and train high quality people, to engage people in the process of 
building a PMS and the existence of a system of incentives, were also referred to by a 
number of interviewees as essential for a well-built and well-functioning PMS: 
"The quality of its people, the training and development of its people are 
important." (L28)  
"A robust system (…) trains those people who will be doing performance 
management at the local level, maybe the head of department, maybe 
the head of the division within the department, but trains people in its 
management processes." (A7) 
"People have to get on board, and [be] willing to participate… and that's 
a process of… discussion, argument, negotiation (…) and it is slow. It is 
very slow." (AH16) 
"Very many of the strategic goals of the department, of the university 
(…) require us to (…) get people to do this or that. And for that you need 
incentives (…). If people have no incentives and they don't see it in their 
own interest, they won't do it." (AH26)  
Finally, a few interviewees also regarded the legal obligation to implement measurement, 
reporting and management practices as something positive: 
"Performance measurement only became a factor in universities when it 
became externally audited. (…) A lot of the performance measures we 
have to achieve are actually externally generated and externally 
imposed on us anyway, so you certainly have to do it." (AH22) 
The next section will focus on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the PMS. 
5.7.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the PMS 
Although most interviewees did not acknowledge the existence of a fully developed PMS 
in UW, they reported the existence of several measurement, reporting and management 
practices in different areas across the university (as seen in previous sections). Therefore, 
when discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the PMS, interviewees were referring 
to the existing practices (see Table 25). 
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Table 25 – Strengths and weaknesses of the PMS at UW 
n=31 Number of occurrences 
Strengths 21 
Weaknesses 29 
5.7.4.1. Strengths 
The major strength pinpointed by the interviewees was the fact that the university was 
developing a PMS. They gave the example of the new appraisal system for academic 
staff, which was going to be implemented. 
To other interviewees, the system was well-balanced: "(…) it seeks to create a balance 
across a range of things that are important for the institution, so it looks at the whole range 
of things that matter" (NA34).  
Moreover, some interviewees believed the university was already very strong in 
measuring, reporting and managing some areas, namely those related to financial 
performance and research and scholarship, being also strong in dealing with the quality 
assessment exercise conducted by the QAA.  
To a number of interviewees, UW was also quite good at measuring institutional 
performance, "(…) as opposed to measuring the performance of individual academics" 
(A7). Some interviewees (all heads of department), regarded the flexibility of the 
measurement system as its major strength: 
"The strength is that the annual review for professors is quite light, 
which is okay." (AH15) 
"It's very flexible, I mean, we do have got an amazing amount of 
freedom. We can do what we want virtually, and I think that is 
beneficial." (AH20) 
5.7.4.2. Weaknesses 
The fact that a PMS was not developed in Warwick yet was one of the weaknesses 
highlighted. The main complaints of the interviewees were not the measures, even though 
a few interviewees considered that "(…) in some areas it probably needs to become more 
robust" (NA34), but the poor use of the data: 
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"The weakness in the system has… to do not with the measures. It has 
to do with the lack of management tools… to do anything about it." 
(A12) 
"The collection of data is easy… its use is more difficult." (L30) 
From these interviewees, the majority believed the biggest weakness of the system was in 
managing individual performance: 
"I think as a university we probably have a difficulty in managing 
individuals who just don't perform up to standard, whether they are 
academics or on the support side. I think you'll probably find this in most 
universities. Certainly in most good universities, because good 
universities depend on hiring people and then letting them work, and the 
very fact that you hire people and let them work means that you're not 
very good at correcting mistakes. The crucial thing is to hire the right 
people at the outset. If you don't hire the right people at the outset you're 
stuck with them, and there's not a lot you can do." (AH27) 
"The area where we could do best is people… performance of people. 
(…) Things would be better for the institution if we did take it seriously." 
(L28) 
Heads of department also complained about the excessive bureaucracy for academics: 
"I think the biggest drawback by large is simply that there is a very small 
administration (…) that tends to put more of a burden on academics to 
do routine administration. (…) We pick up the slack because there is not 
a sufficient number of administrators to play the role that many 
academics would want them to play." (AH23) 
This comment is interesting given that the ratio of academic staff to non-academic staff is 
1:3 in UW, as seen in Section 5.2.1. In spite of this ratio, heads of department complained 
about the increasing bureaucratic burden for academics. 
The interviewees pointed out other weaknesses: an excessive focus on research, which 
they justified by saying UW was a research university; lack of comparable data; not 
enough targets set; lack of generalisation of good practices across the university due to a 
lack of communication; and lack of discussion of PIs in the Council. 
The following section will look at the interviewees' views on the way the university is 
governed and managed. 
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5.8. Governance and management structures 
This section explores the interviewees' perceptions concerning the existing governance 
and management structures, namely the type and composition of governing and 
management bodies and their strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the interviewees' 
views on the key actors in the governance and management of the university (academics, 
non-academics, students and external members) are looked at, namely in relation to: their 
influence on decision-making; the relationship between academics and non-academics; 
and their position towards PMS. 
5.8.1. Characterisation of the governance structure 
5.8.1.1. Council 
All the interviewees that commented on the composition of the Council stated that it was 
well balanced:  
"Council is an even balance between lay members and academic 
members. It just feels reasonably balanced." (A4) 
Most of the interviewees, however, referred to the Council's big size, which used to be 
even bigger: 
"There's a majority of lay members, but if you are going to have a 
certain number of representation from the Senate and you are going to 
have a majority of lay members, that immediately drives you to 
something like twenty-five people, which is not a very effective decision-
making body." (L29) 
In fact, all the surveys conducted to Council members showed they preferred a smaller 
body: 
"Thirty-four... it's still too big, but it used to be fifty-three, so... our 
previous Vice-Chancellor wanted it to be eighty-three [Laughs]. So, 
everyone… the various sort of reports, and various other things, pointed 
everyone down towards twenty-two, twenty-four. We [didn't] get there 
yet, and there's no stomach for it either." (NA34)  
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In terms of composition, external members were the majority in the Council and were 
considered important by most interviewees for bringing in different perspectives and 
different areas of professional expertise, which could challenge the internal expertise and 
support the work of senior academics and the administration of management: 
"It's just too easy to get wrapped up in institutional politics, basically. 
Therefore, having… sense checked from outside, and particularly those 
who have been through… similar activities in a management sense 
rather than a specific academic sense, I think is important." (A6) 
"They bring in different areas of professional expertise, which we might 
have internally, but actually we need to challenge our internal expertise. 
(…) If you get the quality right, and you get people who can commit to 
the time (…) than we've got the right number." (A7) 
According to a non-academic, the process of selection of external members, conducted by 
the Nominations Committee, was not easy: 
"The university tried to pitch for very high quality people, who are in very 
influential positions in different places, and our process of selection is 
fairly robust. We go through lots and lots of iterations of people. The 
Vice-Chancellor and the Chair of Council will meet a lot of very high 
profile people, and then say no. So, it's quite a difficult process." (NA34)  
Academics were the second most represented group in the Council. To an external 
member: "(…) one of the issues for the university is this sort of two gears steering, but 
academics are currently more senior, more important than non-academic staff, and so 
that's all right" (L29). 
Even though non-academic staff did not formally sit in committees, they were involved in 
administering the university and their opinion was heard in those bodies: 
"They (talking about non-academics) are not formally members of most 
of our committees, but (…) they are attendees at all our committees. 
And, of course, if you are attendee and you say… it's not like a Court of 
Law or anything like that. (…) Although they are formally not members, 
if administratives claim they thought they should have more… input into 
the committee structure, it's pompous to say that they are perfectly… 
the only think they… we never vote. We vote once every few years over 
some contentious issue. Okay, in that case they are not members of the 
committee, but we never vote, so it makes no difference." (A6) 
To the interviewees, the number of students was also correct: "(…) you could not have 
less than two students. I mean one student, on his or her own, would be very lonely. (...) 
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More than two would not be very sensible" (L28). Moreover, even if, in terms of weight, 
students were thought to have the least weight amongst all the members, since they were 
outnumbered, their voice was respected and the university recognised that the few 
students that sat in committees were representing several thousand students.  
5.8.1.2. Senate 
As an interviewee put it: "Senate is the academic voice" (A4). No external member sat on 
this body:  
"Senate is clearly the academic decision-making body of the university 
and therefore whilst I may speak, I'm not an academic. There's always 
that slight sort of issue. I have to be quite thoughtful in my approach to 
try to influence things there." (NA35) 
"They (talking about academics) have an agenda, which is theirs, and 
they don't let ignorant people like me [Laughs] know what they are 
doing. But it seems to work (…) and we clearly have people in the 
Council who are nominated by the Senate. So we have a good 
interchange between Senate and Council there." (L28) 
5.8.1.3. Steering Committee 
Even though the Steering Committee was a Senate committee, all the interviewees 
considered it an extremely important one: 
"That is really where a lot of decisions are taken now. That has grown 
out of the structure to be the most important committee because of 
those who sit on it." (S39) 
"It's where all the university's decisions (...) get past through on their 
way to ratification." (NA37)  
A non-academic member of staff explained why this body became increasingly important: 
"Steering is a bit of an interesting body (…). A lot of universities have 
what we would call a Vice-Chancellor's Advisory Group or something 
like that, that similarly meets on a Monday morning, and has a range of 
people in it. (…) Steering was established (…) on behalf of the Senate. 
(…) It was brought in around about 1973, I think, and it was basically 
because the pace of decisions that the Vice-Chancellor had to make 
was running significantly faster than the meeting times for the Senate. 
(…) The Senate used to meet twice a term. Now it generally meets once 
a term with the exception of the Summer Term, where it meets twice 
for… for specific reasons." (NA34) 
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In terms of composition: "Steering is much more around heads of faculties, as well as 
senior officers" (A4). 
The importance given to students in UW became clearer when looking at the composition 
of Steering. In fact, the University of Warwick was the only university in the UK where the 
President of the Students' Union sat in the Steering Committee, seeing "(…) properly 
ninety-five per cent of the business that goes through that. (…) We have a section of 
reserved business every week, but that's for things like looking at examination results and 
stuff like that" (NA34). 
5.8.2. Characterisation of the management structure 
In terms of management structure, all interviewees regarded the one that exists at 
Warwick as a typical structure of UK universities, well understood by everyone. The 
interviewees saw that structure as fairly lean, with a lot of power lying on top, in the Vice-
Chancellor and the Registrar, and, at a lower level, in heads of department.  
Changes occurred in the management structure of the university, both in terms of 
academic management and administrative management, particularly in the last six or 
seven years. For example, the number of Pro-Vice-Chancellors changed and they 
assumed a more professional approach to their time commitment. Most interviewees 
appreciated the fact that Pro-Vice-Chancellors came from departments within the 
university and were still academics. They felt that raised their credibility. 
The management body referred to by almost every interviewee was the Senior 
Management Team, since, even though it was not a formal university committee, it "(…) 
has (…) a fairly sort of significant influence" (NA35). Most interviewees believed "(…) the 
membership of the Senior Management Team [to be] just about right" (A5). This body was 
regarded as effective, by most interviewees, helping to speed things up. Its role became 
increasingly important in a time where decisions within higher education were no longer 
week-to-week but day-to-day.  
Heads of department were in the middle level of management and they argued that they 
should be given more responsibilities in terms of decision-making. 
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In fact, some interviewees thought the management structure should be reviewed, since it 
probably worked better when Warwick was a smaller organisation. Nevertheless, 
everyone recognised that the university was well managed and able to grow, by using a 
"(…) strange combination of a quite centralized organisation with a lot of scope for 
individuals to be entrepreneurial" (AH17). 
In the next section, the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the existing governance 
and management structures will be discussed. 
5.8.3. Strengths and weaknesses of governance and management structures 
5.8.3.1. Strengths 
When talking about governance and management structures, the interviewees pointed out 
several strengths. Several interviewees highlighted the importance of having academic 
bodies with decision-making power and capacity to take independent decisions, visibly 
talking about the Senate. Even if "(…) it doesn't yield authority very much (…) it can, and 
when it has been tested it has done that" (NA34), clearly referring to the Senate's 
opposition to the decision of opening a Campus in Singapore. That campus never opened. 
A number of interviewees mentioned the inclusiveness of the bodies, since they believed 
that by involving a lot of people, with different perspectives, the structure enabled the 
development of some good decisions: "You very rarely miss anything" (S39). 
Interviewees also regarded the different perspectives brought by external members as 
strength, namely their "(…) willingness to challenge the university as a critical friend, 
based on the enormous experience that the members of Council bring" (A7). 
The flat management structure was also praised by some interviewees: 
"In terms of being able to pick up the phone and talk to someone. In that 
sense it is not as hierarchical as it would be in other institutions." (AH23) 
"What's distinctive about Warwick is how centralised and how lacking 
hierarchy it is. When I want a decision I go straight to the Vice-
Chancellor and to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor. I don't have to go to the 
Dean of the Faculty or anything like that." (A6) 
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Finally, some interviewees highlighted the existence of bodies with the necessary agility to 
decide, such as the Steering Committee and the Senior Management Team. To them, 
these bodies sped decision-making, since they were "(…) able to react quite quickly to 
things and take action" (A11). An academic even went further, stating: "The Steering 
Committee is (…) effectively replacing Senate as a decision-making body at the 
university" (A12). 
5.8.3.2. Weaknesses 
The majority of the interviewees also pointed out the weaknesses of the governance and 
management structures, being the most relevant to them the ineffectiveness of the 
committee structure. These interviewees believed there were too many committees and 
that these committees were too large, leading to excessive bureaucracy, and duplication. 
Moreover, the committee structure was perceived to be too time consuming, contributing 
to delay decision-making: "(…) the problem is how that [governance structure] fits with the 
more sort of project-based faster moving, more flexible kind of requirements" (AH17). 
Another problem reported by the interviewees was the poor communication inside the 
university. This issue came up not only in the interviews, but also in the Pulse Survey. 
People complained about the communication at different levels: between the centre and 
departments; between departments and individuals; between individuals; and between 
committees. Several quotes illustrate this idea: 
"There is very little communication between the Senate and the 
Council." (L30) 
"The communication largely consists in sending minutes and papers 
that one committee as discussed somewhere else. I think there are 
better ways of stealing the essence of discussion and decision." (L29) 
"I suspect [academics] don't even know decisions are being made, 
because there is no mechanism to tell them. (…) I don't think the 
information (…) is getting down… and I put heads of department in that 
as well. We don't get to hear certain things until very late." (AH16) 
Some interviewees also referred to the rubberstamping character of some bodies: "(…) 
there are very few committees in which decisions are taken" (AH21). Talking about the 
Council, two interviewees stated:  
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"Councils are typically very large. (…) That's a kind of classic way of 
keeping a committee ineffective. Then [they] can fulfil [their] decorative 
function very well." (AH17) 
"Very often the issues (…) are discussed for ratification purposes rather 
than for actual deliberative decision-making processes." (A5) 
That can be linked to what other interviewees stated concerning the lack of efficient use of 
external members. A student stated: "(…) they are underused because these people are 
very high up in organisations (…). Their networks, contacts, and relationships could be 
used much better" (S32). 
A number of interviewees also complained about the excessive centralisation of decision-
making. They believed power was concentrated in a very small group of people (namely 
those sitting in the Senior Management Team and in the Steering Committee).  
Moreover, a few interviewees believed academics in management roles should be given 
"(…) some training and support expertise" (AH17). They felt that was missing. 
Additionally, some interviewees recognised the lack of engagement of some people in 
decision-making. The statement of an interviewee is clear: 
"They want everybody to be involved in every decision, the same 
decision trundles through… and it gets to the stage where the naughty 
people like me don't read their Council papers until during the meeting 
sometimes, because I know that everything that's there I've seen 
several times before. It's a shock when you get to a paper that you 
haven't actually seen and you were supposed to have done something, 
but I usually get those before hand. And what happens is nobody reads 
the papers, because they're then taken for granted. So, actually, people 
aren't paying attention in the meeting, and are doing other things, 
because they a) have got no other time to work and they are totally 
overloaded; and b) it's going through the motions… therefore, there 
needs to be a dramatic cut in the models and more delegated authority. 
More things will go wrong, but then, does it matter? You have to let go 
of the little things, otherwise you will never choose the big things." 
(NA14) 
Finally, some isolated interviewees highlighted other weaknesses: rigid time frame of 
committees, which put a lot of pressure on the administration to have things ready for the 
committees; no succession planning for the Vice-Chancellor or for Pro-Vice-Chancellors; 
meetings called at short notice; lack of gender and ethnic diversity in committees.  
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After looking at the interviewees' perceptions in relation to the governance and 
management structures of UW, the next section will focus on the views of the interviewees 
concerning the key actors in the governance and management of the university. First, the 
perceived influence of actors on decision-making will be discussed; secondly, the view of 
the interviewees on the relationship between academics and non-academics will be 
analysed; thirdly, the perceived position of the different actors towards PMS will be 
presented; and fourthly, the changes that occurred in the role of the actors that sit in 
governing and management bodies – the four Estates (Academic, Administrative, Student 
and External Representatives) will be explained. 
5.8.4. Key actors in the governance and management of the university: the four 
Estates 
5.8.4.1. Influence of actors on decision-making 
In relation to the influence on decision-making, some interviewees, the majority of which 
academics, stated that academics, namely senior academics (especially those sitting in 
the Steering Committee and the Senior Management Team), were still the most powerful 
group inside the university. According to them, decision-making processes were still 
controlled by academics: 
"There is still that academic judgment (…). What academics think about 
something still makes a difference to whether it is implemented or not." 
(AH25) 
"As our environment has become more competitive, the scope of special 
interests has shrunk (…). So, (…) the university probably has become a 
little more managerial, and I don't mean that necessarily in a bad sense. 
I think that there is strong pressure on the university to become efficient 
in the administration. (…) You go back half a century and the idea of 
what the university was… it was a sort of self-governing body of 
academics, and I think what academics want to do more (…) is their 
own research and teaching and rightly so; and let somebody else do the 
administration. So, I don't see the voice of academics shrinking; if 
anything I think it is and should remain decisive." (AH27) 
An interviewee highlighted the importance of the Vice-Chancellor being an academic and 
not a manager like in most post-1992 universities:  
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"It is probably our good fortune that our Vice-Chancellor is a proper 
academic, a real academic. And that's not always the case in all British 
institutions (…) [where] a lot of Vice-Chancellors are from completely 
different areas of life, and that may be less, kind of, integrated in terms 
of academic ways of thinking." (A11) 
Some interviewees (academics, external members and students) believed the power was 
shared between academics and administrators, namely through the Steering Committee 
or the Senior Management Team. According to these interviewees, even though decisions 
made there usually went to the Senate or to the Council afterwards, they rarely were 
changed.  
Very few interviewees believed administrative management to influence decision-making 
the most. Nevertheless, some did, and interestingly, a non-academic member of staff 
stated:  
"I think it's designed for an external consumption of image that (…) the 
academy is actually running the university, and here's the evidence and 
proof. Well, I don't think it adds up, I don't think it's true. It's (…) the 
Registrar and all that." (NA39) 
In the next section, the way the interviewees regarded the relationship between 
academics and non-academics will be explored. 
5.8.4.2. Relationship between academics and non-academics 
Opinions were divided concerning the relationship between academics and non-
academics. Some interviewees defined this relationship as pretty good. To these 
interviewees, this was mainly due to the existence of mutual respect and trust and to the 
fact that each group knew its role. To an external member, Warwick always had a history 
of strong administrations and their role was probably stronger than in many other pre-
1992 universities, where "(…) academics run everything and the administrators, even 
senior administrators, are kind of servants of the academics" (L29). This interviewee 
believed administrators had a strong place at Warwick, but: "(…) they know they have got 
to take the academics with them, because if a gap opens up it is really quite dangerous for 
everybody" (L29). On the other hand, "(…) the majority of academics, the majority of time, 
have considerable respect for the administrators and recognise that they are exceptionally 
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talented people" (A7). Some of the interviewees argued that Warwick's success was, in 
effect, a result of the combined efforts of both groups. 
Other interviewees stated that the relationship between the two groups was bad, 
recognising that there were tensions between them from time to time. Some academics 
believed there was a tendency for administrative staff to move into areas that should not 
be theirs and to tell academics what they should do most of the time. According to these 
interviewees, tensions emerged mainly because they had different jobs and different 
objectives, and due to a lack of understanding of what each other did. To them, 
academics did not understand what administrative staff did, largely because they were not 
trained as administrators, and administrators did not really understand academics very 
well, because their only experience of academics was when they were at the university. 
Moreover, there was, according to some, poor internal communication, and the culture of 
complaining about others: 
"Academics complain about administrators, who they see as 
burdensome and unproductive. Administrators complain about 
academics, who they see as out of touch and sort of dreamers. 
Everybody complains about students. Students complain about 
everybody. This is what makes us work as a university." (AH27) 
Finally, some interviewees believed the relationship varied. To them, it depended on: a 
mutual understanding of each other's roles; people's personalities; and knowing whom 
you were dealing with.  
In the following section, the interviewees' perceptions on each group's position towards 
PMS will be analysed. 
5.8.4.3. Position towards performance management systems 
According to most interviewees, external members would be the ones to push more 
towards the introduction of PMS: "they come from a business background" (AH26).  
Contrarily, according to several interviewees, academics would be the group that would 
present more resistance to the introduction of a PMS: 
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"People are not keen on things that are changing. (...) The other aspect 
is that there is deep concern about the motives behind it, as with any 
employer/employee type of relationship (...) and so that touches a bit on 
the trust issue (...), and there is a very, very strong fierce feeling that 
academics should be given freedom to speak. (...) It is the concept of 
academic freedom, which is very important. (...) I think they don't 
necessarily understand why it's being done... or if they are told why it is 
being done, they don't necessarily believe in it." (AH16) 
A few number of interviewees also believed non-academics to be against these systems:  
"The accountability is on the academic and the non-academic staff. So, 
quite naturally, there's an element of feeling concerned about... being 
measured, about performance management (...) and, inevitably, people 
feel quite protective of their own particular area." (NA35) 
In the next section, the changes that occurred in the roles of the four Estates (Academic, 
Administrative, Student and External Representatives) will be analysed. 
5.8.4.4. Changes in the roles of the Estates 
Several changes occurred in the role of the four Estates that integrate the governing and 
management bodies of UW. 
Academic Estate 
Data analysis showed that the role of being an academic changed:  
"There is a much greater expectation now that academics will take on 
duties that are external; that they will think about fund raising; that they 
will be aware that they cannot do anything they like because the QAA 
will monitor what they do." (A3) 
The majority of the academics interviewed argued that they were used to having a lot 
more autonomy and academic freedom, having now to 'share' their decision-making 
power with different groups, which included administrators and external members. One 
academic stated: "Administrators should leave the academic operations to us and make it 
easier for us to perform various roles in the university" (AH23).  
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Administrative Estate 
Even though UW has always had a history of strong administrators, being their role 
probably stronger here than in many other pre-1992 universities (ruled by statutes and 
charters), the influence of non-academic staff became, according to some interviewees, 
increasingly important as the university grew, competition increased, and decisions 
needed to be made faster:  
"There is a genuine concern that there is more management. More top-
down management... but there has to be, because of the whole political 
situation and the funding situation, [which] is so different." (A3)  
However, most interviewees considered that even though administrators had a strong 
place, they worked very closely with academics.  
Student Estate 
According to most interviewees, students' role also changed over the years, especially 
since they began to be seen as consumers of higher education. Students started to look 
more at league tables, and to worry more about the quality of the education they have and 
about the kind of job they can get after graduation.  
External Representatives Estate 
External members were the majority in the Council, the ultimate decision-making body, 
and chaired key Council committees, such as the Finance and General Purposes 
Committee (FGPC). Even though most interviewees considered them important to the 
university, especially due to the fact that they bring in completely different perspectives 
from insiders, some of the interviewees, including external members, felt they could be 
better used, especially their networks, contacts and relationships. 
5.9. Summary of the findings at the University of Warwick 
The analysis of the data collected at UW showed that the university had a formal strategy, 
with clearly established goals. Even though some of these goals were not consensual, as 
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discussed in Section 5.3.4, they were well known by the entire community and people 
knew what they were striving for. 
Data also showed a considerable increase in the measurement of performance in the 
university over the years. Most areas were assessed, albeit many interviewees agreed 
that better measures could be in place in some of them. The areas that lacked 
measurement were third mission, alumni and employers, even though most interviewees 
considered these important areas to explore in the future. 
This increased level of measurement was greatly influenced by the external environment 
(see Figure 10), being mainly a consequence of the greater competition between 
universities, and demands to become more efficient, effective and accountable, translated 
from the policies implemented by the British government since the 1980s (as seen in 
Section 5.1.1). Additionally, the role of the market grew over the years, with universities 
becoming more concerned with their image. Therefore, it could be stated that the main 
pressures to measure came essentially from the state and the market (two of the external 
coordination mechanisms of the 'outer ring' of Figure 6). Internally, pressures to measure 
came largely from the Council, composed by a majority of external members, and 
increased with the arrival of the new Vice-Chancellor and with the formalisation of the new 
strategy. 
In terms of reporting, reports on performance were produced in relation to most areas, 
being, not surprisingly, third mission, alumni and employers the areas where there was 
less reporting.  
In relation to performance management, many of the interviewees mentioned the lack of 
action regarding the data. This issue was particularly raised regarding individual 
performance, both of academic and non-academic staff.  
These results suggest that the focus is on measurement, leading to the collection of a 
large amount of data with some reporting but insufficient action. Even though most 
interviewees regarded PMS as something positive, and several examples of performance 
improvement were given, the interviewees also mentioned the existence of unintended 
consequences, such as obsession with numbers, and deliberate strategies to conform to 
what was demanded. Thus, it could be stated that there was not yet a fully developed 
PMS at UW. As a matter of fact, despite the existence of clear and formally defined 
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strategic goals, closely linked to the measurement process (as foreseen when looking at 
performance management from a systems perspective – see Figure 10), and the 
measurement and reporting of most areas' performance, there was still a lack of 
management practices in some areas, namely individual performance. 
In terms of the factors believed to inhibit the introduction and functioning of PMS, the 
interviewees mentioned contextual factors, such as international economic trends, and the 
absence of clear job descriptions for academics; institutional factors, such as the lack of 
resources (financial, human and physical) and the committee structure, considered too 
complex and lacking a clear responsibility structure; and personal factors, related to 
resistance to changes, especially from academics, who feared losing their 'academic 
freedom' to administrators and external members. 
In relation to the factors that enabled the introduction of PMS, the interviewees mentioned: 
the need for an external 'push'; cultural and political factors, which included the existence 
of a 'performance culture' within the organisation, and the political and institutional will to 
implement control mechanisms; trust building, accomplished through effective leadership, 
communication and incentives; and the preoccupation with the inputs of the system, 
translated into hiring high quality people and training them. In fact, in terms of the 
components of the PMS (see Figure 10), findings indicate a concern with the 'inputs' of the 
system at UW, with multi-references to the quality of incoming students and staff. The 
quality of the inputs could be one of the reasons explaining the success of the university 
over the years. Analysing Figure 10 further, apart from the inputs, the university also 
showed some concern with the processes and with outputs. In relation of the former, 
several committees accompanied the main components of the university mission, 
especially teaching and learning and research and scholarship (third mission was not that 
developed). Regarding outputs, several areas were measured, the exceptions being third 
mission, alumni and employers. Outcomes were not measured, given the difficulties in 
doing it, as explained in Section 3.6. 
As far as the governance structure was concerned, the excessive number of committees 
and their size was regarded as inefficient, inflexible and time consuming, arguably 
preventing decisions from being made faster, thus promoting ossification and constraining 
the implementation of a PMS. Nevertheless, the university seems to have managed to get 
around this hierarchy, by centralising decision-making, operating on a day-to-day basis 
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through the Steering Committee and the Senior Management Team, considered more 
agile. Here the importance of the relationship between PMS and governance starts to 
become apparent. The governance structures of the university should be using the data 
not only to drive performance and improvement, but also to reflect on the relevance and 
adequacy of the structure of the university itself.  
Even though there were some reviews of the governance structure, namely of The 
Council, which decreased its membership, the introduction of PMS led not so much to 
changes in terms of the existing governance structures, but more in terms of the roles and 
influences played by each one of the Estates that governs and manages the university.  
Pressures to become more efficient, effective and accountable changed the role and 
influence of the Administrative Estate, even though administrators have always had a 
strong role at the university. As the university grew and decisions needed to be made 
faster, the influence of non-academic staff became increasingly important. They represent 
62 per cent of the university staff (as seen in Section 5.2.1), and some academics were 
concerned that administrators would 'step too far' over the line, endangering the 
'collegiality' element. Nevertheless, the 'collegial type' of coordination still persisted at this 
university, contributing to a fairly consensual partnership between managers and 
academics, sometimes shadowed by a lack of communication (intentional or not).  
Also the roles and influences of the Student Estate and the External Representatives 
Estate changed. Even though students had the least weight in decision-making, they were 
increasingly heard in the governing bodies, as they became 'customers' of the higher 
education system. They paid high fees and demanded value for money. In what external 
members were concerned, they were the majority in the ultimate decision-making body of 
the university – The Council. Nevertheless, there was the general feeling that they could 
be more active in the university.  
After analysing the external coordination mechanisms and the role and influence of the 
four Estates in decision-making, UW could be placed in the governance framework 
presented in Figure 6 (see Section 2.4.4.2).  
The 'outer ring' of Figure 21 represents the role of the state and the market as external 
coordination mechanisms for UW, being the role of the market slightly more prominent 
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than that of the state, given the tough competition between British HEIs. It also shows the 
absence of Europe as a pressure to introduce control mechanisms. 
 
Figure 21 – Governance structures in higher education: UW 
The 'inner ring' represents the internal coordination exerted by the four Estates – 
Academic, Administrative, Student and External Representatives – and shows that UW 
could be placed between the Academic Estate and the Administrative Estate, since 
decision-making was mainly taken by academics and non-academic staff. External 
members also exerted some influence in institutional governance, even though some 
interviewees argued that they could and should have a more active role in strategic 
decision-making. 
In the next chapter, the findings of the second case study – the University of Aveiro – will 
be presented. 
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"Hear the meaning within the word." 
William Shakespeare 
"From its origins, [UA] has pioneered and 
 promoted research and education in innovative interdisciplinary areas  
and has achieved international standards in some of them." 
EUA Evaluation Report 
In this chapter the findings that resulted from the fieldwork conducted at UA are 
presented. The researcher personally collected all the data, from January to June 2009. 
Similarly to what was done in the previous chapter, before presenting the findings, the 
context will be set. Therefore, to start with, the Portuguese higher education system will be 
presented. This will be done, first, by discussing the main pieces of legislation and policy 
documents that have influenced the Portuguese higher education, especially since 2007; 
secondly, by describing the evaluation exercises that were/are conducted at a national 
level; and, thirdly, by explaining the Portuguese higher education funding system. After 
setting the context, UA will be characterised, in terms of history, student and staff 
numbers, finances, and governance, management and administrative structures. Then, 
the findings resulting from the thirty-nine semi-structured interviews conducted at UA will 
be displayed. 
6.1. The Portuguese higher education system 
6.1.1. Brief history 
In Portugal, the collegial traditions of universities are related to the social dynamics 
created after the 1974 Revolution. It was by then that rectors began to be elected by their 
peers, instead of being appointed by the government (Decree-Law 781/76, of 28 October). 
Figure 22 presents the main laws and events that have influenced Portuguese higher 
education from 1976 (the year of the first free elections) until now. 
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Figure 22 – Major legislation in Portuguese higher education history 
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From 1976 to 1986, the binary system, which included universities and polytechnics, both 
public and private, consolidated and government policies moved away from centralised 
control. There was also the creation of democratic collective decision-making bodies at all 
levels, with strong participation of students and non-academic staff. The election 
mechanism became the main source of legitimating power. 
From 1986 to 1989, the government conceded more autonomy to universities, mainly 
through the University Autonomy Act (Law 108/88, of 24 September). This Act reinforced 
collegiality as the norm for managing and governing HEIs. The Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Higher Education (MCTES) approved all new study programmes and 
degrees, although these decisions were not based on quality evaluations or 
accreditations, but mostly on the fulfilment of legal requirements.  
From 1989 to 1999, "institutional autonomy was reinforced while two coordinating bodies, 
the Council of Rectors of the Portuguese Universities (CRUP) and the Coordinating 
Council of the Polytechnic Institutes (CCISP), emerged as important actors in the 
definition of higher education policies" (Amaral et al. 2003b: 136). 
In 1999, Portugal signed the Bologna Declaration, together with other twenty-eight 
European Countries, agreeing on the creation of a European Higher Education Area 
(EHEA) by 2010. 
In 2003, the Law for the Funding of Higher Education (Law 37/2003, of 22 August) 
established the foundations for the financing of higher education under two basic 
principles: the adoption of objective criteria, PIs and standard values concerning the 
quality and excellence of the education provided. 
In 2005, Decree-Law 42/2005, of 22 February, established the principles that regulated 
the development of the instruments that would contribute to the creation of the EHEA, 
namely the new European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS). 
In May 2005, Portugal, and other forty-four European countries, committed to adopt the 
Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the EHEA, as proposed by the 
European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education – ENQA (see Annex 2). 
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In order to address questions related to the quality of the system, in June 2005, MCTES 
commissioned an overall assessment and quality review of the Portuguese higher 
education system. The first task was commissioned to OECD and the second to ENQA.  
Following the recommendations of ENQA, Law 38/2007, of 16 August, approved an 
evaluation framework for the Portuguese HEIs. Immediately after this, MCTES created the 
National Agency for the Evaluation and Accreditation of Higher Education – A3ES 
(Decree-Law 369/2007, of 5 November). 
In September 2007, a new Legal Regime of Higher Education Institutions (RJIES) was 
approved (Law 62/2007, of 10 September). According to this Law, universities could 
choose to continue as public institutions subject to public law or become public 
foundations subject to private law, in terms of financial, patrimonial and human resources 
management. The decision to become a public foundation is subject to the approval of the 
Portuguese government. If accepted as such, public foundations are administered by a 
Council of Curators, nominated by the government. The financing of the foundations by 
the state is determined through contracts, of no less than three-years, according to pre-
determined performance objectives. Decree-Law 97/2009, of 27 April, approved the 
transition of three institutions to the foundational regime: the University of Aveiro, the 
University of Porto and Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa (ISCTE). 
So far, only these became foundations.  
In August 2009, the University Teaching Staff Statute (ECDU) was reviewed through 
Decree-Law 205/200925, of 31 August, thirty years after its initial publication26. The new 
ECDU aims at "contributing decisively to create the conditions for the modern scientific 
development of Portugal, by inscribing scientific research as a central element of the 
university career and by establishing conditions for the exclusive dedication of academic 
staff" (ECDU 2009 – see Annex 2).  
In January 2010, MCTES signed a Contract of Confidence with universities and 
polytechnics aimed at increasing the levels of qualification in Portugal until 2014 (the 
government wishes to increase the number of graduates by 100,000 between 2010 and 
                                                
25 Law 8/2010, of 13 May, introduced some changes to Decree-Law 205/2009. 
26 The Polytechnic Teaching Staff Statute (ECDESP) was reviewed through Decree-Law 207/2009, of 31 
August, twenty years after its initial publication. 
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2014). In this contract, the government reaffirms the need to develop higher education and 
science, since they are "fundamental instruments for the country's future" (Contract of 
Confidence: Universities 2010 – see Annex 2). The Contract of Confidence included the 
basis of the Development Plan for Higher Education 2010-2014 (published by MCTES in 
September 2010), which was translated into individual Development Programmes (one 
per institution). In exchange for their commitment, HEIs would be given extra 100 M€ in 
2010, in comparison to 2009. With the sovereign debt crisis that Portugal is facing, this 
extra payment was never made. 
6.1.2. Evaluation exercises 
The first report on higher education evaluation was produced in 1989 by a Commission 
nominated by the former Minister of Education Roberto Carneiro. This Commission 
recommended that evaluation should be made at three levels: the 'cabinet level', where 
the main guidelines for higher education and for each HEI would be defined, based on 
statistical information; the 'horizontal level', where the performance of institutions working 
in the same disciplinary area would be measured, allowing comparisons; and the 
'institutional level', where each institution, voluntarily, would do self-evaluation (mission 
evaluation) (Lopes 1998). It recommended that the evaluation process should be mainly 
conducted by external panels, constituted not only by peers, but also by other individuals 
that would bring perspectives from professional agents and/or employers. Moreover, it 
suggested that this evaluation should be based on the critical analysis made by each 
institution (Lopes 1998). 
In 1993, the Council of Rectors of the Portuguese Universities (CRUP) launched a pilot 
project, with the support of the Ministry of Higher Education, covering five scientific 
disciplines: Physics, Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Economics and French. 
The pilot project was designed with the assistance of the Dutch Agency for the Evaluation 
of Universities (VSNU) and the research institute CHEPS from the Dutch University of 
Twente (also a member of the ECIU).  
In 1994, quality became a key issue for rectors and institutional managers, with the 
promulgation of the Higher Education Evaluation Act (Law 38/94, of 21 November), which 
established the rules for the Portuguese quality assessment system for both public and 
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private institutions. It determined that the evaluation of higher education should include 
procedures of self- and external-evaluation. The Evaluation Act also legitimated 
governmental action according to evaluation results.  
Soon after the publication of Law 38/94, the Minister of Education signed a protocol with 
the presidents of CRUP and the Foundation of Portuguese Universities (FUP), recognising 
FUP as the representative entity for public universities and the Catholic University, and 
defining the general guidelines of the evaluation system. The pilot project that had been 
launched by CRUP in 1993 was integrated into the new framework and regarded as the 
'first round of evaluations'. This first round, which adopted a programme-oriented 
approach, took place from 1995 to 2000, and included public universities and the Catholic 
University.  
In 1998, Decree-Law 205/98, of 11 July, created the National Council for the Evaluation of 
Higher Education (CNAVES), regarded as the global coordinating body of the evaluation 
system, and instituted the general rules for the implementation of the higher education 
evaluation and monitoring system. 
In 1999, Decree-Law 125/99, of 20 April, defined the legal regime for research institutions, 
including the basis for the evaluation of research units. 
In 2003, the Law for the Development and Quality in Higher Education (Law 1/2003, of 6 
January) introduced an amendment to Law 38/94. This new Law clarified the 
consequences of the results of the evaluation process and determined the rating of the 
evaluated programmes. It also introduced the concept of academic accreditation. Since it 
was not regulated afterwards, in practice, it produced no effects. 
In 2005, the second round of programme evaluations, which had started in 2000, came to 
an end. However, after two rounds of evaluations, and according to ENQA (2006: 86 – 
see Annex 2): 
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"A systematic approach to monitor and to support higher education 
institutions was never developed. Follow-up of the assessments was 
inexistent and, in many cases, the reports failed to provide consistent, 
clear and sufficient information to the stakeholders. The reports were 
not easy to read, and it is doubtful that the different stakeholders of 
higher education, including employers, students and their parents, used 
them consistently. (...) Most significant was the general perception that 
the evaluation results had no consequences. There were no plans of 
action drawn up to overcome or attenuate weaknesses or reinforce 
strengths. There were neither procedures nor timings for follow-up 
actions. Neither governments nor higher education institutions took any 
follow-up action. Consequently, the impact of the evaluation approach 
was negligible". 
In June 2005, and in order to address questions related to the quality of the system, the 
Minister of Science, Technology and Higher Education commissioned an overall 
assessment and quality review of the Portuguese higher education system. The first task 
was commissioned to OECD, and the second to ENQA, as already discussed in the 
previous section. 
OECD was approached to conduct a review of the Portuguese higher education system, 
under the Education Committee's programme of national reviews. The OECD review 
team's report was drawn upon the Background Report prepared by Portuguese 
authorities, literature searches and evidence gathered during a two-week study visit to 
Portugal in May 2006. Published by OECD in 2007, the report, entitled Reviews of 
National Policies for Education: Tertiary Education in Portugal, contains the analysis and 
recommendations of the review team. 
ENQA was invited to appoint a panel of international experts with two interrelated tasks. 
First, to review the existing Portuguese quality assurance practices as conducted by the 
National Council for the Evaluation of Higher Education – CNAVES (ENQA's main 
conclusions on CNAVES quality assurance practices are displayed above). Secondly, to 
provide recommendations to the Portuguese government on the organisation, processes 
and methods of establishment of a national accreditation system, which should meet the 
European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the EHEA. ENQA's report, 
entitled Quality Assurance of Higher Education in Portugal: An Assessment of the Existing 
System and Recommendations for a Future System, was published in 2006. 
According to Dispatch 484/2006, of 9 January, there should also be voluntary institutional 
evaluations, conducted by the European University Association (EUA), and supported by 
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the European Association of Institutions of Higher Education (EURASHE) and by 
specialists from the US, Canada and Australia. In 2006/2007, MCTES commissioned and 
co-financed the first evaluations, which integrated ten HEIs, including public and private 
universities and polytechnics. Since then, thirty institutions have been evaluated by EUA, 
being co-financed by MCTES. The other HEIs that have voluntarily asked to be evaluated 
by EUA have totally supported the costs of the evaluation. 
Research is also assessed nationally. Research institutions are placed under MCTES and 
organised in Research Units and Associated Laboratories27. These units are evaluated by 
the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) every three years. The last 
exercise occurred in 2007. 
The FCT evaluation system, established in 1994, comprises a periodic evaluation of 
reports and activity plans by panels of international experts, including direct contact with 
researchers through visits to all units. This process culminates with the panel attributing a 
qualitative grade ('Excellent', 'Very Good', 'Good', 'Fair' or 'Weak'), which determines the 
amount of multi-annual funding to be granted. This evaluation process is usually preceded 
by a self-evaluation report developed by each unit. 
6.1.3. Funding system 
Even though, in the last three decades, Portugal followed the Western European 
generalised trend towards the development of a policy model based on institutional 
autonomy and stronger self-regulation, with the state reducing its level of intrusive 
regulation and moving to a more supervisory role, the funding system of higher education 
is still a very powerful steering instrument to implement national higher education policies 
(Teixeira et al. 2004). In fact, the funding coming directly from the government is by far the 
largest funding source. Despite a slow steady decrease, the combined effect of public 
funds for current expenses and for investment still represented 63.9 per cent in 2004 (it 
was 70.7 per cent in 2001) (OECD 2006a). This means that, although the Portuguese 
public higher education system became slightly less reliant on governmental sources 
                                                
27 Associate laboratories are "research units which demonstrate (...) capacity to cooperate, in a stable, 
competent and effective manner, by carrying on specific objectives of the scientific and technological policy 
laid down by the government". In http://www.fct.pt/apoios/unidades/index.phtml.en (accessed 21 December 
2011). 
 
 
224 
during this period, it is still largely dependent on this source of funding. If the system 
seems to be more proactive in terms of alternative fundraising, this still has limited 
visibility in terms of the funding structure (Teixeira et al. 2006). 
The funding of Portuguese public universities that comes from the state budget consists of 
three separate strands: funding for teaching, covering salaries and other current 
expenditures, funding for research and funding for investment.  
The funding formula has been through several changes and adaptations, but it is fair to 
say that until 2003 it was based on inputs and did not contain indicators that explicitly took 
into account the quality or efficiency of the institution. Even though the 2006 formula is 
based on the overall number of students, it also includes quality factors, such as the 
qualification of teaching staff (measured by the percentage of academic staff holding a 
doctoral degree) and graduation rates. 
In terms of research, apart from direct funding, two categories were implemented since 
1996: core funding and competitive funding. Core funding is dependent on the specific 
allocation of funds by FCT to research institutions and is based on the number of 
researchers and results of the evaluation conducted by FCT. Competitive funding consists 
of individual scholarships and advanced training research and development projects, 
prizes, and other. This type of funding is carried out through public tender calls (OECD 
2007).  
In September 2007, with the approval of the new Legal Regime of Higher Education 
Institutions (RJIES), universities could choose to continue as public institutions subjected 
to public law or become public foundations subject to private law, as discussed in Section 
6.1.1. The financing of the foundations by the state is determined through contracts, with 
the duration of no less than three years, according to pre-determined performance 
objectives. 
Having presented the Portuguese higher education system, in order to set the context, our 
second case study – the University of Aveiro – will be characterised in the following 
section, in terms of history, student and staff numbers, finances, and governance, 
management and administrative structures. 
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6.2. Characterisation of the University of Aveiro 
6.2.1. Brief history and figures 
The University of Aveiro (UA) is a new generation public university, established in 197328. 
Its main campus (Campus Santiago) is located in Aveiro, a medium-sized city in Portugal's 
Centro Region, known for being an industrial and prosperous centre for commerce and 
services.  
The university is positioned between two large, traditional and prestigious public 
universities (Coimbra and Porto). Even though this represents a constraint in the 
competition for attracting students, particularly high quality students, it has always been 
regarded as an opportunity for innovation and for the development of a strong relationship 
with the socio-economic fabric of the region, characterised by a not highly qualified 
workforce. 
UA built a profile based on science and technology and in pioneering areas. The university 
chose to take advantage of transdisciplinary approaches and to prioritize a small number 
of innovative fields. This strategy allowed it to achieve international quality standards in 
some domains. Today, telecommunications engineering, environment, materials science 
and education sciences are recognised as areas of excellence, confirming the initial 
strategic choices of the university (EUA 2007 – see Annex 2). 
In fact, according to recent national and international rankings, UA is consistently ranked 
as one of the best universities in Portugal in terms of scientific productivity, mainly in the 
fields of science, engineering and high-tech. In 2010, UA occupied the 172nd place in the 
Performance Ranking of Scientific Papers for World Universities, produced by the Higher 
Education Evaluation & Accreditation Council of Taiwan, in the area of Engineering, 
Computing & Technology. Moreover, it has recently been considered the best Portuguese 
university by the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2011-2012 (being 
placed between rank 301 and 350).  
                                                
28 Before 1973, there were only four universities in Portugal – the University of Coimbra, the University of 
Lisbon, the University of Porto and the Technical University of Lisbon. 
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Additionally, UA is the only Portuguese institution in the European Consortium of 
Innovative Universities (ECIU), already described in Section 4.2.3.2.  
UA is divided into 15 departments, 1 autonomous section29, 4 polytechnic schools (see 
Annex 5), 12 research units and 4 associated labs. These units encompass a range of 
educational possibilities: university, polytechnic and post-secondary.  
In the academic year 2009/2010, 10,820 undergraduate and 3,822 postgraduate students 
were registered at the university.  
 
Figure 23 – Evolution of registered students at UA (1973-2009) 
Source: UA's database 
Note: From the academic year 2000/2001 on, the number of registered students 
includes a polytechnic school: ISCA-UA. 
As Figure 23 shows, the total number of students rose steadily over the first fifteen years 
of existence, and increased rapidly in the 1990s. Since 2000/2001, the number of 
undergraduate students has stabilised around 10,600 students and the number of 
graduate students rose from 910 in 2000/2001 to 3,676 in 2009/2010. This growth pattern 
reflects the general trend in Portugal, where a period of rapid expansion in higher 
education was followed by a slowing of undergraduate intake, especially in the areas of 
exact sciences and engineering, owing mainly to demographic factors and to an 
                                                
29 Units that have not yet fulfilled the criteria needed to become departments. 
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imbalance between supply and demand, where the first clearly exceeded the latter. In fact, 
the declining birth rate in Portugal, low levels of immigration and the increased life 
expectancy of the population are leading to the ageing of the population. This, combined 
with the percentage of students failing to earn a high school diploma and the poor 
performance of those who stay in school, represents a particular challenge to the higher 
education sector in Portugal and is increasing competition for students among universities 
(OECD 2006a).  
As a response to this trend, and having already reached the target of 12,500 students, set 
in 1998, UA adopted two strategies: first, it tried to adapt its undergraduate offer to 
demand; and second, it expanded and varied its postgraduate programmes. Both 
strategies were successful. For example, UA's admission rate is now around 100 per cent 
and, between 2006/2007 and 2009/2010, the number of PhD students grew 62.3 per cent 
and the number of Master students 96.7 per cent30. 
In terms of internationalisation, the number of international students and international 
academics is still quite small at UA31. On 31 December 2010, the university had 15,176 
registered students, only five per cent of which international students (this was less than in 
secondary education, where eight per cent were international students).  
Regarding human resources, in the academic year 2009/2010, the university employed 
1,604 members of staff: 994 academics, 499 non-academics and 111 researchers. This 
analysis shows that the ratio of non-academic to academic staff was almost 1:2. Even 
though this ratio is in line with other Portuguese universities, it is quite low when 
compared, for example, with UW, where it is almost 3:1 (see Section 5.2.1). 
In terms of finance, from a total budget of €97.6 million in 2009, the largest revenue 
stream came from the state (around 75 per cent of the total). The state allocation was 
divided into three components: current funding (representing 50 per cent32) and 
investment funding (2 per cent), both coming directly from the state budget; and other 
funds (23 per cent), provided by FCT (see Figure 24).  
                                                
30 This increase in the number of Master students was influenced by the reorganisation of degrees and study 
programmes according to the Bologna Process. 
31 UA kindly provided this data to the researcher on demand. 
32 Accomplishing the criteria needed to become a foundation. 
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Figure 24 – Sources of financial support at UA, 2009 
Source: UA's database 
The state allocation is attributed to the university in a lump sum (and according to an 
overall ceiling established for all HEIs) before the start of the civil year and transferred on 
a monthly basis. This sum is calculated through a formula based on the number of 
students, cost of subject areas, pedagogical efficiency and quality of academic staff. The 
percentage of state current funding has fallen significantly since 1999, when it was around 
69 per cent of the total revenue sources (see Annex 6).  
The investment funds allocation (PIDDAC), which is attributed to the university annually in 
a lump sum on the same date as current funding, is tied to the execution of a number of 
investment projects, previously approved by the Ministry. It is also paid on a monthly 
basis, on request, through demonstration of the necessity of the expenses to specific 
projects. The remaining funds, directly linked to competitive money from research 
projects, are reimbursed in accordance with a previously established contract, after 
presentation of accounts. FCT funding has been increasing, being, in 2009, around 23 per 
cent of total revenue (see Annex 6). The other revenue streams were: tuition fees33, which 
represented 13 per cent of the total revenues; EU funding (4 per cent), which contributed 
mainly to research and development; and other funding sources (6 per cent), integrating 
                                                
33 Students pay a tuition fee of 987 Euros for first and second cycle degrees and study programmes, and 
between 2,000 and 2,750 Euros at doctoral level. 
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contract services and other types of cooperation with society. The weight of tuition fees 
has been rising. In 1999 they represented 6 per cent of the total revenue, and in 2009 
around 13 per cent (see Annex 6). Other funding sources included private subsidies, 
which integrated contracts with companies, other student revenues (e.g. certificates, 
fines), and extraordinary sources of revenue. 
Personnel costs were the largest single expenses item (see Figure 25) and have been 
steadily rising, from 55 per cent in 1999 to 63 per cent in 2009 (see Annex 7). This 
increase was partly justified by the rise of social security costs and the contracts signed 
with researchers, under the Contract-Programme "Doctorates for the National Scientific 
and Technological System (SCTN)". Additionally, the higher qualifications of staff led to 
pay grade increases. 
 
Figure 25 – Expenditure structure at UA, 2009 
Source: UA's database 
Current funding from the state budget is earmarked to pay personnel costs and finance 
the running of the university. In 2009, this funding only covered 82 per cent of personnel 
costs.  
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6.2.2. Structure 
UA does not have the traditional faculty structure, being organised in departments and 
polytechnic schools. Departments are the university's basic organisational units, created 
and developed around a main scientific area, even though more than one area can be 
found in some of them. Study programmes and research units are organised in an 
interdisciplinary and transdepartmental way, following a matrix organisation (see Annex 
8), arguably allowing for a better management of resources. 
The university has a very centralised organisational functioning, in which central-level 
governing bodies, mainly the Senate and the Rector, in the former structure, and the 
Council and the Rector, in the new one, are the most important decision-making bodies, 
being heads of department (now called departmental directors) their main interlocutors 
(UA Statutes 1989 and 2009 – see Annex 2). 
The previous structure contemplated an intermediary level of coordinating structures in 
key functional areas, which stood between central governing bodies and departments. 
These have disappeared in the new structure (UA Statutes 1989 and 2009). 
Central decision-making processes are assisted by support services and other services, 
physically located in the central administration building and in departments, as an 
extension of central services (UA Statutes 1989 and 2009). 
6.2.2.1. Governance and management structures 
Before RJIES 
At the time the interviews took place (between January and June 2009), and similarly to 
what happened in every Portuguese university, the university governance was exercised 
by five bodies: the University Assembly, the University Senate, the University Council, the 
Administrative Council, and the Rector (Figure 26).  
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Figure 26 – Bodies, Committees and Functional Units at the University of Aveiro (old structure) 
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The University Assembly was composed of a large number of members (approximately 
110, comprising academics, students and non-academic staff). This body only held formal 
meetings on occasions such as the election of the Rector or the approval of the University 
Statutes and their alteration, which meant meeting ordinarily not more than twice a year 
(UA Statutes 1989). 
The University Senate was the most important collective decision-making body, since it 
decided not only on academic matters, but also on the approval of the budget, annual 
plans and strategic plans. The University Senate was composed of nearly 50 members 
(academics, non-academic staff, students and external members). It met in a plenary 
session once every trimester and, more regularly, once a trimester, in committees, 
namely: the Management and Planning Committee, the Scientific and Development 
Committee, the Disciplinary Committee and the Pedagogic and Academic Committee. 
The University Council, restructured in 2007 by Normative Dispatch 14 669-BB/07, of 6 
July (see Annex 2), aimed "to contribute actively to the definition of the global strategy, to 
promote the permanent relationship with the exterior and to accompany the governance 
and management of the university" (Article 19). The total number of members should not 
exceed seven, the majority of whom should be external to the university. It rarely met. 
The Administrative Council was responsible for executing the directives of the Senate 
regarding the administrative, financial and patrimonial management of the university. Its 
membership included the Rector, Vice-Rectors, the Administrator, heads of services, and 
a representative of the Students' Union Board. 
The Rector, who served a four-year term, represented, directed, oriented and coordinated 
the university's activities (UA Statutes 1989). He or she could appoint up to five Vice-
Rectors for a four-year term, and Pro-Rectors, for specific tasks and for shorter mandates 
(see Figure 27).  
The university also had two coordination bodies: the Scientific Council and the Pedagogic 
Council (see Figure 26).  
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Figure 27 – Rectory at the University of Aveiro (old structure) 
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The Scientific Council was composed of all teaching staff with a doctoral degree (over 600 
members). According to the 1989 Statutes, this body aimed "to stimulate and increase 
research and training development, having, in general, to deliberate about all scientific 
matters (…)" (Article 22). It met twice a year in plenary sessions, and monthly in a 
Coordinating Committee (comprising one representative from each department) and in 
Departmental Committees (comprising all academic staff holding a doctoral degree in 
each department).  
The Pedagogic Council was a consultative body, expected to "coordinate all degrees and 
[to] define the rules for all the teaching and learning activities of the university, in order to 
supervise the quality of teaching" (Article 24). It was composed of an equal number of 
teaching staff members (all study programme directors) and student representatives (one 
for each study programme), which meant a membership of around 100 people. It 
functioned in plenary sessions and through Coordinating Committees and Study 
Programme Committees (UA Statutes 1989).  
The Statutes also contemplated a second type of structures, at an intermediate level, 
which had the role of coordinating the basic functions of the university: education, 
research and cooperation with society. These functional units included: the Research 
Institute, the Undergraduate University Education Institute (IFIU), the Postgraduate 
University Education Institute (IFPG) and the Polytechnic Higher Education Institute 
(IFSP) (see Figure 26). 
Additionally, there were other functional units (see Figure 26), with the mission of 
administering specific programmes or services by using the university resources for that 
particular effect. These were: the Integrated Centre for Teacher Education (CIFOP); the 
Multimedia Centre for Distance Learning (CEMED); the Central Analysis Laboratory (LCA) 
and the Computing and Communications Centre (CICUA). 
The running of departments was, according to the 1989 University Statutes, guaranteed 
through four management bodies (see Figure 26): first, the Plenary, whose main 
competence was to approve Departmental Statutes; second, the Assembly of 
Representatives, whose main aim was to elect the head of department and approve the 
annual activity plan and the annual financial report; third, the Department Board, the main 
executive body; and fourth, the Scientific-Pedagogical Council, which could act in plenary, 
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or through two sub-committees (scientific and pedagogic). In practice, the Plenary and the 
Assembly of Representatives did not function in most departments. The Scientific 
Committee was the only one that met regularly. 
After RJIES 
The new legal regime (RJIES) introduced changes to the existing decision-making bodies 
and authority structures. According to the 2009 Statutes, the university has now three 
governing bodies: the General Council, the Management Council, and the Rector (see 
Figure 28).  
The General Council, elected in July 2009, is composed of 19 members (10 academics, 3 
students, 1 non-academic staff and 5 external representatives) and is presided by an 
external member. This Council has the power to elect the Rector and to approve the 
budget, annual plans and strategic plans. It is also responsible for creating, transforming 
and closing units and for approving the strategy of the institution concerning scientific, 
pedagogic, patrimonial and financial matters. While other members are elected by their 
peers, following a proportional representativeness system, external members are co-
opted. The General Council meets ordinarily four times a year (UA Statutes 2009). 
The Management Council's functions are very similar to the former Administrative 
Council's responsibilities. It is responsible for the administrative, patrimonial and financial 
management of the university, and for human resources management. It is nominated and 
exonerated by the Council of Curators, following a Rector's proposal, and is composed of 
3 members: the Rector, who presides; a Vice-Rector; and the Administrator (UA Statutes 
2009). 
The Rector, who serves a four-year term, "represents the university externally and 
presides over the Management Council and the Scientific and Pedagogic Councils" 
(Article 23). Moreover, "it leads the institutional policy, directs and represents the 
university, speaking on its behalf" (Article 23). It maintains the possibility of appointing 
Vice-Rectors and Pro-Rectors to assist him or her (see Figure 29).  
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Figure 28 – Bodies, Committees and Functional Units at the University of Aveiro (new structure) 
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Figure 29 – Rectory at the University of Aveiro (new structure) 
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The 2009 Statutes maintained two bodies that already existed, even though with slightly 
different competences and composition: the Scientific Council and the Pedagogic Council 
(see Figure 28). The Scientific Council is now much smaller, being composed of 33 
members (academics and researchers), whose mandate is 3 years. The Pedagogic 
Council also shrunk considerably, being composed of 25 members (the Rector, who 
presides, 12 students and 12 academics).  
The university also decided to nominate a Student Ombudsman (an external member) and 
to create three consultative bodies: the Ethics and Deontology Council, the Cooperation 
Council and the Disciplinary Committee (see Figure 28). 
The functional units are now only two: the Integrated Unit for Continuous Education 
(UNIFOC) and the Central Analysis Laboratory (LCA) (see Figure 28). 
The running of departments and polytechnic schools is now guaranteed through three 
management bodies: the Director, the Executive Committee and the Unit Council. The 
Autonomous Section only has a Director, nominated and exonerated by the Rector, and 
the Unit Council (see Figure 28). The Director, who is responsible for governing and 
representing the department or school, is now nominated, for a four-year mandate, by a 
committee composed of the Rector, two permanent members, appointed by the Rector, 
and two members from the department or polytechnic school.  
Statutes also contemplate research units (basic or transversal) and a transversal unit of 
teaching and research – the Doctoral School (see Figure 28), which coordinates all 
teaching and research activities related to the third cycle.  
Being a foundation, the university is obliged by law to have two other governing bodies: 
the Council of Curators and 'Fiscal Único' (an External Auditor) (see Figure 28). 
6.2.2.2. Administrative management structure 
Structure – Old Statutes 
Before the homologation of the new Statutes, the Rectory used to be assisted by support 
services directly linked to it (see Figure 30).  
 
 
239 
 
Figure 30 – Administrative Management Structure at the University of Aveiro (old structure) 
!
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Figure 31 – Administrative Management Structure at the University of Aveiro (new structure) 
!
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These support services comprised: the Secretariat; the Office for Quality, Evaluation and 
Procedures (GaQAP); the Office for Information Management and Management Indicators 
(GaGI); the Legal Advisory Office; the Pedagogical Office; and the Office for Technology 
Transfer (UAtec). Executive services, which included, for example, the Academic and 
Administrative Services, and the Financial and Patrimony Services, were managed by the 
Administrator (see Figure 30). 
At departments, autonomous sections and polytechnic schools there were also technical 
and administrative staff, which ensured, in cooperation with central services, the 
functioning of these units' infrastructures and the necessary means for the 
accomplishment of the university's functions (see Figure 30). 
Structure – New Statutes 
The Rectory is now assisted by the following support services (see Figure 31): Support 
Office; Strategic Planning Office (GPE); Legal Advisory Office; Pedagogical Office; and 
Office for Technology Transfer (UAtec). The executive services have been restructured. 
For example, Human Resources are now under the aegis of the Human and Financial 
Resources Services. The Administrator still coordinates and supervises these services, 
under the direction of the Rector. 
Units (departments, the autonomous section and polytechnic schools) still have technical 
and administrative staff, working in cooperation with central services (see Figure 31). 
Having presented the Portuguese higher education system and characterised UA, the 
next sections will present the main findings that resulted from the case study conducted at 
this university.  
6.3. Strategy 
6.3.1. Existence of a strategy 
As stated in Section 6.1.2, in 2006/2007, MCTES commissioned and co-financed the 
evaluation of ten HEIs, including public and private universities and polytechnics. Given 
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that UA was not included in those ten institutions, it voluntarily required an evaluation by 
the European University Association (EUA), to be included in the national evaluation 
scheme. That evaluation happened in 2007, being the final report published in November 
2007. A Self-Evaluation Report, produced by a Steering Committee especially constituted 
for that purpose, and published in February 2007, preceded EUA's Report.  
After the publication of EUA's Report, the Rector asked a group of people from the 
Statutory Assembly to build up a Development Plan for UA. This Plan, entitled 
Development Project for the University of Aveiro (dated January 2008), was structured 
around three main ideas: development and consolidation of the university; transformation 
of the university into an international excellence centre; and intervention in cooperation 
with society. This Development Plan was delivered to MCTES, serving as a baseline study 
for the building of the Contract-Programme. 
This Contract-Programme, signed in September 2009, established objectives for five 
areas, with targets set for three and five years. The five year targets were the following: 
increase the number of post-graduate students from 4,000 to 5,025; increase the number 
of publications from 4,400 to 6,800; increase the number of citations from 15,900 to 
38,000; increase the number of foreign students from 850 to 1,100; and, finally, increase 
the amount of external contracting from 35,500 K€ to 41,800 K€ (Contract-Programme 
2009 – see Annex 2). 
Additionally to these objectives, and as demanded by the Contract of Confidence signed 
with MCTES (already discussed in 6.1.1), UA delivered a Development Programme to the 
Ministry, committing itself to increase the number of graduates by 4,382, between 2010 
and 2014 (UA 2010 – see Annex 2).  
Thus, when the new Rector presented an action plan for his candidacy in January 2010, 
entitled Action Plan 2010-2014, he based it on the documents mentioned above. The 
Action Plan had two major goals: to consolidate Project UA; and to transform UA into an 
international reference. In order to achieve the first goal, ten strategies were proposed: 
reassert the attractiveness of the university; reinforce research; improve the educational 
offer; contribute more to the development of society; guarantee a greater integration 
between the three components of the mission – teaching, research and third mission; pay 
special attention to the area of Health; promote quality and management capability; value 
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university assets; recruit the best, qualify people and take care of the human environment; 
increase institutional autonomy and guarantee financial sustainability. To transform the 
university into a world-class institution, four actions were proposed: increase the 
international character of UA; reinforce institutional partnerships and define an alliance 
policy; reassert itself as an institution of reference, in specific domains; prioritize the 
development of the Doctoral School (Assunção 2010 – see Annex 2). 
In the Activity Plan for 2010, approved by the General Council, three strategic initiatives 
were presented as being part of the development project for UA: development and 
consolidation of the university; reassertion of the university as an international centre of 
excellence; and building partnerships with society (these goals had already been 
proposed in the Development Plan for UA 2008). 
When asked if the university had a strategy, all the interviewees stated that the university 
had one (see Table 26).  
Table 26 – Existence of a strategy at UA 
Academic  Head Other Total 
Non-
academic Students 
External 
Members Total 
Yes 13 11 24 9 4 1 38 
Formal 4 4 8 1 1 0 10 
Informal 9 7 16 8 3 1 28 
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 11 13 24 9 4 1 38 
Nevertheless, most argued that this strategy was informal, not being formally written in 
any document: 
"It is not a process with a great formality." (NA50) 
"Strategic goals, in the last eight years, have been built in what the 
British call 'follow your nose' (…). Maybe there are some, but… they are 
not explicit." (AH63) 
"The university has been playing it by ear." (AH71) 
In fact, only a number of interviewees stated that there was a formal strategy, being some 
of them academics in top-management roles.  
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According to the interviewees, several factors contributed to the definition of the strategy, 
being the university structure one of them: "(…) the university has the advantage of not 
having an intermediate structure! It does not have faculties! (…) The interactions between 
the Rectory and units are more frequent" (A46), helping the existence of a more coherent 
strategy. Also, according to a head of department, the new structure will also contribute to 
the definition of a strategic plan: "(…) the existence of a General Council and the election 
of the Rector by the General Council (…) will require the existence of a strategic plan, well 
defined and assembled" (AH67).  
Some interviewees also mentioned the Contract-Programme, which led, according to 
them, to the need to define clear strategic goals: "(…) you have very clear goals and 
indicators" (AH71). 
The Rector's personality was also referred to by a number of interviewees: "(…) the 
university has always had excellent rectors that have set strategies that have marked [its] 
development" (A48).  
Also, the need to change was considered important for the development of a strategy by 
some interviewees. According to them, the urge to be more competitive and more 
internationally recognised, led to the need to change and develop clear goals and targets:  
"The university has to position itself in the modern world (…) by 
changing (…) by questioning what exists (…). It has to face bigger risks 
(…) [instead of doing just] a small cosmetic operation." (L81) 
The strong links to the region and the geographic location were also highlighted by a 
number of interviewees. In relation to the former, the interviewees believed the university 
defined itself as a "(…) regional university" (AH66) since the beginning, owing to its clear 
links to the region: "The three stronger thematic areas of the university had to do with the 
region… Electronics and Telecommunications… where the university started functioning… 
Ceramics and Glass… and Environment!" (A48). The latter, since, according to the 
interviewees, the location of UA between two well-established universities (Porto and 
Coimbra), constituted an opportunity for the definition of a strategy that would differentiate 
it from the others. 
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A few interviewees also mentioned the legal imposition as a driver to the definition of the 
strategy, since the changes imposed by law led to the need to define strategic goals more 
clearly.  
Finally, a couple of interviewees referred to the implicit framework of values that existed at 
the university, which had arguably helped the development of a strategy: 
"There is an implicit framework of values (…). This university was 
'marked' by the colleagues that came from Mozambique (the 
'Mozambique generation')! (…) [For example], the fact that most of our 
professors work exclusively for the university and do it naturally." (A48) 
Thus, it seems that, even though not formally written, the university has always had a 
strategy (as stated by all the interviewees – see Table 26). To a head of department: the 
university "(…) has always had a clear strategic orientation" (AH62). The problem seems 
to be the perceived inexistence of a formal strategic document. 
Actually, strangely enough, when asked about a strategic formal plan the interviewees' 
answers varied: 
"There have been several formal documents over the years." (A44) 
"[The strategy] results, very directly, from the candidacy programme of 
the Rector." (A43) 
"It's [now] more tuned, with the passage to foundation." (AH62) 
The documents that the interviewees saw as being mostly related to the strategy were: the 
Candidacy Programme of the Rector, being the strategic plan usually the Action Plan 
developed by the Rector for a four-year mandate; the Contract-Programme where the 
university had to define strategic lines for the coming three and five years; development 
plans, namely the Development Plan 2000-2006, developed by Professor Júlio Pedrosa (a 
former Rector), and the Development Project for the University of Aveiro; the Self-
Evaluation Report that preceded EUA's Report; and EUA's Report, considered important 
to the establishment of guidelines for the university's development plan; 
After the completion of the interviews, the interviewer had the perception that quite often 
people confused strategy with strategic plan. In fact, even though some started by saying 
there was a strategic plan, when asked about the location of that plan, the majority could 
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not name or find it. Some mentioned they "(…) vaguely remember to hear about it" (A51) 
or "(…) have some version of that document" (NA58), or are "(…) almost sure that there 
was a development plan four years ago" (AH64), but when asked for it, they were unable 
to show the researcher any plan. 
Data supported this 'mix-up' of concepts, since one would expect that those who stated 
that there was a formal strategy (10) would be the ones confirming the existence of a 
strategic plan. However, when asked if the university had a strategic plan, more than 
expected argued that there was one. 
Another apparent misconception was the mixing-up of operational and strategic goals. A 
non-academic member of staff, who stated that "(…) sometimes [people] confuse what is 
operational with what is strategic" (NA55), corroborated this perception. 
But not all the interviewees confirmed the existence of a strategic plan. In fact, the majority 
of the respondents stated very clearly that there was none: 
"There are two answers to that question. One is that I've heard there is 
one! The other one is that I have (…) the perception that the way things 
happen at the University of Aveiro have nothing to do with a strategic 
plan." (A51)  
"Explicitly drafted, as many of us would like, there isn't one." (NA58) 
The interviewees identified several reasons for the inexistence of a strategic plan, being 
one of them the external context. To some interviewees, the strong dependency on the 
government made the university very susceptible to legislative and financial changes, 
which were many in the last years: 
"The strategic plan does not depend solely on the university. It depends 
a lot on the context and on the policies applied. Unfortunately, we have 
had policies that go here and then go there (…). We don't know very 
well where we are." (AH52) 
"After being evaluated by EUA, [the university was preparing the 
development of a strategy when] a profound alteration was made to 
Portuguese Law." (S77) 
Other interviewees mentioned the Portuguese history and the Portuguese culture. To 
some interviewees, after the 1974 Revolution, Portugal had to react in the short run to fulfil 
basic needs. Afterwards, in the 1990s: "(…) even though there were some attempts to 
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build strategic plans, there were no competences or professional skills to do it" (A48). To 
other interviewees, Portuguese find it hard to think strategically. People seem to fear the 
unknown and usually do not like difficult challenges, fearing to commit to greater goals: 
"There is no one that comes and says 'we want this'. Not at the country, nor at the 
university" (L81). 
The interviewees also indicated some internal reasons for the inexistence of a strategic 
plan. The first reason was the difficulty to create consensus. To these interviewees, it was 
very hard to get people to agree upon the same strategic lines: "Create consensus 
between different partners (…) is very difficult, and implies a different methodology… 
different technical skills… a different set of concerns" (A48). The second reason 
presented was the difficulty to mobilise people to work on a strategic plan, since many did 
not see its immediate result: "Academics are people that like to do things that are 
different… 'Don't bother me with that. Strategic plan??'" (AH66). The last reason was the 
ineffectiveness of the Rectory, given that, according to a number of interviewees, the 
Rectory could have done it, if it was really willing to. 
The Rector himself acknowledged that even though the building of a strategic plan was 
fundamental, and that the university had been working on it, there was still a lot to do. In 
fact, on his webpage34, he recognised: 
"[The] six indicators [that resulted from the Contract-Programme and 
from the Contract of Confidence], together with the Development Plan 
(talking about the "Development Project for the University of Aveiro", 
then reformulated in the Action Plan of the Rector's candidacy) (…) are 
important elements of a strategic plan. Nevertheless, this [strategic plan] 
must be translated into more measures and key performance indicators 
(…). A strategic plan presumes even more structured actions, with 
targets and a timetable for completion; and, in their definition, greater 
interaction with the university as a whole." 
In the next section, the interviewees' perceptions concerning the importance of having a 
strategy will be analysed. 
                                                
34 In http://www.ua.pt/reitor/PageRector.aspx?p=reflexoes (accessed 22 December 2011). 
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6.3.2. Importance of a strategy 
In spite of the shortcomings, it was common understanding that the university should have 
a strategic plan. A head of department argued: "(…) the more complex the organisation is, 
the more it needs a plan with strategic guidelines" (AH68). According to the interviewees, 
a plan would be important to: establish a direction for an organisation; be accountable; 
and to motivate and mobilise staff:  
"The university should be more proactive, in order to anticipate 
problems." (AH49) 
"If the university has a clear project, and a clear development policy, it 
will have better instruments to do things." (AH68) 
In the next section, the way the strategy was developed and the level of engagement of 
the interviewees in that process will be explored.  
6.3.3. Development and level of involvement 
When asked about the development of the strategy, the majority of the interviewees 
agreed that the Rectory defined the strategic goals centrally: 
"Fundamentally the Rector and Vice-Rectors." (A43) 
"It is a top-down exercise." (A46) 
This was not surprising since, as seen before, most interviewees believed the strategy 
was linked to the Candidacy Programme of the Rector:  
"It became commonly accepted that the candidacy programmes of 
rectors would be strategic plans." (NA54) 
With the old governance structure, after being developed, the Rector used to take the final 
plan to the Senate in order to be approved. To an interviewee, the plan was not really 
discussed there: "When it [went] to the Senate it [was] almost only to be approved" (L82). 
According to the new Statutes, the plan is now taken to the General Council for approval.  
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Apart from governing and coordination bodies, interviewees also pointed out other units 
and actors they considered as taking part in the development of strategic goals. To some 
of them, there was a process of consultation of departments and research units in relation 
to the strategy: 
"Only those who did not want [to participate] did not participate. (…) The 
Rectory, and particularly the Rector, conducted partial meetings in each 
department to present the main strategic goals." (AH62) 
Based on those strategic lines, each department and research unit was asked to develop 
a Contract-Programme for the unit, to be then discussed with the Rectory. As an 
interviewee argued: "(…) the definition of more concrete… more short-run goals is done 
by the units! (…) Always under the command of the Rectory!" (NA50). 
Other actors were considered to have participated in the definition of the strategy: the 
Administrator, who was said to be working closely with the Rectory in the definition of 
strategic goals, indicators and targets; service directors (only mentioned by non-
academics), who defined the main goals for their services and then discussed them with 
the Administrator; the Students' Union and students (only mentioned by students), who 
were asked by the Statutory Assembly about their needs; and an external consulting firm, 
which was said to be working with the Rectory and the Administrator in the definition of a 
strategic plan: "It has studied the financial sustainability of the university (…) [and] 
identified potential areas of investment" (S75). 
In the following section, the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategy will be 
discussed. 
6.3.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the strategy 
When commenting on UA's, only weaknesses, and no strengths, were pointed out by the 
interviewees. To the vast majority of the interviewees, the main problem was the lack of 
communication of the strategy, since it was not known by the entire community: 
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"I think that at least the mission and the main strategic guidelines are 
known within the university, but it's not a generalised knowledge. These 
are mainly known by those involved in the management of the 
university." (A80)  
"The strategic plan is not visible enough to be incorporated by the entire 
university community." (NA54) 
"The lack of communication seems to be the weakest point of the 
university." (AH69) 
In fact, when the Steering Committee conducted a survey to all members of the Senate 
asking about their knowledge concerning the strategic plan, not everyone knew about it. 
To some interviewees, this lack of communication was due to, amongst others: the lack of 
disclosure (this was confirmed by the inexistence of a formal strategy, already discussed 
in Section 6.3.1); the inexistence of more governing bodies meetings, where people could 
discuss strategy; departmental leaders, who kept the information for themselves; 
employees (both academic and non-academic), who did not bother to know the strategy; 
and the lack of more systematised information.  
Other interviewees also regarded the lack of a strategy for the long run as a weakness: 
"The university seems to have (…) some difficulty in defining a strategy 
for the future." (AH66) 
"One of the problems of the university is perhaps its strategic guideline, 
or let's say, not having ten-year plans, so that it can anticipate things." 
(AH49) 
A few interviewees (all academics in top management roles) also mentioned operational 
problems: "(…) there are some problems in formally taking strategic guidelines to the field, 
especially to departments" (A80).  
Having looked at the way UA devised its strategy, the next three sections will analyse the 
interviewees' perceptions concerning the way the university deals with the measurement, 
reporting and management of performance. 
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6.4. Measurement of performance 
The results of the interviews showed that the existence of measurement (see Table 27) 
and the degree of measurement (see Annex 9) varied considerably according to the area. 
Table 27 – Areas where performance is measured at UA 
 Yes No Do not know Total 
Teaching and learning 34 0 0 34 
Research and scholarship 32 0 0 32 
Third mission 3 22 0 25 
Academic staff 30 5 0 35 
Non-academic staff 32 0 1 33 
Students 23 0 0 23 
Support services 15 10 0 25 
Employers 2 21 2 25 
Alumni 11 12 1 24 
Finance 25 0 0 25 
Note: It should be noted that the answers to this question were guided 
by the Prompt Card (see Annex 1). 
6.4.1. Teaching and learning 
According to the vast majority of the interviewees, the performance of 'teaching and 
learning' was measured at the university (see Table 27), even though some considered 
that "(…) more could be done" (A80). To these interviewees, the instruments used to 
evaluate this area's performance were mainly internal (see Table 28), being the most used 
instrument, according to them, the Quality Assurance System (SGQ), comprising the 
Student Survey, the Student Report (a qualitative evaluation performed by student 
representatives) and Academic Reports (evaluations performed, first, by all the academics 
teaching a particular subject, and, then, by the academic responsible for each subject). 
They claimed that data from the Student Survey was summarised in a graphical form by 
the Systems and Information Management Office and that a score from 1 to 9 was 
attributed to the way each course was taught.  
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Table 28 – Instruments used to assess the performance of teaching and learning at 
UA 
n = 33 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 28 
Quality Assurance System (includes the Student 
Survey, the Student Report and Academic Reports) 24 
Internal database 7 
Feedback forms 1 
External instruments 11 
External assessments 11 
Some interviewees also mentioned the data collected by the Systems and Information 
Management Office, including success and failure rates, and the feedback forms that 
some departments (e.g. Electronics and Telecommunications Department) used to ask 
students to fill in after the end of each course. 
Apart from internal measures, some interviewees also mentioned the external measures 
defined by the different external auditors that used to assess the performance of teaching 
and learning at the university, even though as discussed in Section 6.1.2 and as 
confirmed by the interviewees, the national evaluation stopped in 2005: "(…) we are 
experiencing a certain hiatus" (A43). More recently, A3ES started a preliminary process of 
accreditation.  
In addition to the national evaluation system, professional associations35 used to visit the 
university periodically, in order to measure the effectiveness of teaching and learning and 
accredit degrees. Since the creation of A3ES, all the accreditation procedures performed 
by these bodies were suspended (Decree-Law 369/2007). 
Internally, there were two Vice-Rectors responsible for education, one for undergraduate 
and the other for postgraduate studies (now there is only one), and three institutes: the 
Undergraduate University Education Institute, the Postgraduate University Education 
Institute and the Polytechnic Higher Education Institute. These institutes, which were 
extinguished with the new structure, as seen in Section 6.2.2.1, were responsible for 
coordinating teaching and learning within the university.  
                                                
35 These are public corporations for liberal professions (e.g. doctors, lawyers and engineers), which are 
organised in the form of public bodies with an associative basis, working within public law. 
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According to the interviewees, internal measures concerning teaching and learning were 
defined by the Rectory, who decided to introduce the Student Survey and to develop SGQ. 
Some interviewees stated that the survey was developed in collaboration with the 
Pedagogical Council and a task force created for the implementation of Bologna 
instruments – the 'Bologna Task Force' –, which integrated academics from different 
departments and schools and a student. Some task force members did not agree with this 
perspective, stating that the last version of the survey had little to do with the version 
proposed by them.  
To the interviewees, external assessors, namely the National Council for the Evaluation of 
Higher Education (CNAVES) and professional associations before, and A3ES now, 
defined the external measures used.  
When asked about their thoughts concerning the measures used to assess the 
performance of teaching and learning, and even though some recognised that the internal 
system created to assess the area (SGQ) enabled improvements, most interviewees 
pointed out several flaws. To some of them there was a lack of qualitative measures to 
assess the area:  
"We have many instruments that give us quantitative parameters. But 
we still haven't got rigorous qualitative parameters." (A46) 
To these interviewees, the performance measurement of teaching and learning should 
result from the integration of several measures, both quantitative and qualitative: the 
Student Survey, the Student Report, the Academic Report, the Alumni Survey and the 
Employers' Survey.  
Most interviewees were very critical of the Student Survey, mentioning several problems: 
its low response rates (slightly above 50 per cent in the past year), even though "the effort 
to convince students to reply has been enormous" (AH49); the inadequacy of some of the 
questions and the length of the survey, which discouraged students from answering it; and 
the lack of validation of survey results:  
"The results should be validated, in order to understand the type of 
students that answer it and why they do it." (A45)  
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A few interviewees also claimed that there should be a stronger link to employers. To 
them, it was fundamental to assess the adequacy of the degrees to the market, mainly 
through the measurement of employability. They believed it would also be important to 
assess: the type of job the student had; the position he or she had; and if the 
training/education received had any influence in the performance of certain tasks. 
6.4.2. Research and scholarship 
All the interviewees that discussed the performance measurement of 'research and 
scholarship' confirmed that this area's performance was assessed at the university on a 
regular basis (see Table 27): "(…) this is the most evaluated area, without a doubt" 
(AH67). 
To the interviewees, this area's performance was mainly assessed through external 
instruments, namely the external assessment performed by FCT to research units and 
associate labs (already described in Section 6.1.2), and the evaluation of research 
projects conducted by FCT and by the EU (see Table 29).  
Table 29 – Instruments used to assess the performance of research and 
scholarship at UA 
n = 30 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 8 
Internal databases (e.g. number of contracts signed, 
income generated) 8 
External instruments 25 
Evaluation performed by FCT 18 
International citation databases 10 
EU's evaluation system 1 
Internally, there was a Vice-Rector looking after research and there used to be a 
Research Institute, which was responsible for coordinating research activities within the 
university. This institute tried to collect some data on research, but it did not publish it. To 
an interviewee, this lack of interest could be due to the "(…) existence of well-established 
systems outside the university to measure this area's performance" (AH64).
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According to a few interviewees, the Systems and Information Management Office also 
collected statistics on research, but only on demand. To gather the information needed, it 
usually used international citation databases (namely the ISI Web of Knowledge). 
Additionally, the Financial Resources Office gathered financial data concerning research, 
namely, the percentage of research projects successfully completed, number of research 
contracts signed, and income generated. 
In terms of the definition of measures, according to the interviewees, each research unit 
and associate lab decided on the measures used to assess this area's performance, even 
though they had to comply with the ones needed for the assessment exercises performed 
by FCT and the EU. 
When asked about their thoughts concerning the measures used, a number of 
interviewees considered there were already well-established and well-developed 
indicators: 
"Research and scholarship are assessed by international indicators. I 
would say that it is the area where we have evolved more." (A42) 
Given that the majority of the interviewees perceived the performance evaluation of 
research and scholarship to be almost entirely external, some interviewees pointed out, as 
a weakness, the inexistence of an internal system to assess it: 
"The university does not know very well what it is doing [in terms of 
research]. It knows it is doing well, given the good external 
classifications it gets. It has good publication and citation marks, but if I 
wish to know now how many articles the university has published in the 
past year… I know how many articles have been published in ISI, 
because I can search there, but the university does not keep an 
adequate record of that." (A80)  
Interviewees also complained about the different parameters used by different assessors, 
thus increasing the workload tremendously:  
"Quite often, the indicators are not the same from evaluation to 
evaluation! That requires different answers from the researcher, 
generating displeasure… sometimes, almost dullness… for having to fill 
in indicators once again." (A46) 
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Another weakness reported was the lack of assessment of the societal impacts of 
research, meaning the outcomes of research: 
"We are giving too much emphasis to the number of scientific 
publications. (…) That has impacts (…). That should be measured." 
(AH49) 
"There is the scientific production on its own, but the impact of the 
research on the outside world is not measured." (L81)  
Moreover, some interviewees from 'soft-applied' and 'soft-pure' subjects argued that the 
criteria used to assess their areas' performance should be different from the criteria used 
to assess the performance of 'hard-pure' and 'hard-applied' areas. Nevertheless, 
according to an interviewee, this was starting to change:  
"With much negotiation and some quarrels in the middle, it was possible 
to demonstrate that the standards for a job opening to Associate 
Professor for [our department] have nothing to do with the standards for 
the Department of Biology, for example. (…) An article with 2 pages of 
text (…) would be impossible in humanities, design or music. (…) Good 
musicians do not comment on music. They make it!" (AH71) 
Finally, some interviewees also mentioned the subjectivity underlying the publication 
criteria used by each research unit and associate lab: 
"Praxis varies a lot between research units. There are research teams 
that privilege individual publications, valuing articles with one or two 
authors (…), while others think that each article is the result of 
teamwork... not only in Portugal, but also abroad. There are scientific 
areas where it is common to put the name of everyone in the team in 
every article. (…) So, we have an instrument that was objective 
transformed into something subjective! There are people there that have 
done very little or nothing, and that causes some problems." (A46) 
6.4.3. Third mission 
Even though the university always had strong links to the community, as described in 
Section 6.2.1, most interviewees considered the performance evaluation of this area to be: 
"Merely impressionistic." (A42) 
"Not explicit. It is mainly based on the prestige of the university." (AH73) 
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In fact, almost all the interviewees that expressed their opinion on the performance 
measurement of third mission stated that this area's performance was not measured at 
the university (see Table 27): "The performance of third mission is not assessed on its 
own" (A51). 
Even those who argued it was measured mentioned informal measurement, mainly 
through financial data. This tendency was confirmed by the measures identified by the 
interviewees for this area. Actually, it was almost consensual that the measures used 
were mainly financial (e.g. income generated by services provided to society) or finance 
related (see Table 30). For example, the university kept track of the percentage of 
contracts fulfilled: "I want to receive the money" (NA50). The same applied to patents. To 
the interviewees, the revenue generated by this third stream became "(…) increasingly 
relevant in an organisation that became a foundation" (AH52). Moreover, they believed the 
revenue generated to be relatively easy to measure. 
Table 30 – Types of measures used to assess the performance of third mission at 
UA 
n = 13 Number of occurrences 
Internal measures 13 
Income generated 7 
Patents registered 4 
Number of protocols and contracts signed and fulfilled 3 
Number of businesses on campus 2 
Number of invitations for external events 2 
Number of events organised 1 
External measures 0 
In governance terms, there were a Vice-Rector and a Pro-Rector responsible for this area. 
The new structure also contemplated the Cooperation Council (see Figure 28).  
So far, and given that third mission was hardly measured, the few indicators that existed 
were, according to the interviewees, developed by the Rectory. The few departments that 
assessed this area's performance decided on which measures to use.  
When commenting on the measures used to assess the performance of third mission, 
everyone considered this a difficult area to measure: "It is a very heterogeneous area" 
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(A44), which integrated a lot of things. In fact, in its report, EUA signalled third mission as 
an area in need of further development.  
To an interviewee, so far: "(…) third mission has been done on the basis of voluntarism… 
almost structural! (…) The leaders of the university encouraged that voluntarism" (A46). 
That was helped by the departmental structure of the university, allowing things to be 
done in a more informal way. According to an academic, this was now changing: 
"In 1985/86, we were 150, 200 academics… everyone knew almost 
everyone else… and we knew what each other was doing. (…) This 
voluntarism was based on a direct response. (…) People did not have to 
go to the Rectory to ask 'Can I do this?'" (A46) 
That does not happen anymore and some coordination was deemed needed in order to 
avoid the risk of having, for example, two research teams competing on the same market 
for the same project.  
Nonetheless, everyone considered third mission an important area to look at in the future. 
To most interviewees, the measurement of this area's performance should not only be 
based on financial measures, looking at it merely as a good opportunity to generate 
income, but also as "(…) something new that should be strategic" (L81). It was argued 
that its impact should also be assessed.  
6.4.4. Academic staff 
The majority of the interviewees argued that the performance of academic staff was 
measured at UA (see Table 27), even though most agreed it was not measured on a 
regular basis and that the instruments used were not adequate:  
"It is not regularly measured." (AH63) 
"The evaluation methodology is not adequate." (L82) 
In terms of the instruments used to assess academic staff's performance, most 
interviewees mentioned internal ones, namely the Quality Assurance System (SGQ), 
explained in Section 6.4.1 (see Table 31).  
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Table 31 – Instruments used to assess academic staff's performance at UA 
n = 32 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 31 
Quality Assurance System (includes the Student 
Survey, the Student Report and Academic Reports) 25 
Evaluation criteria when applying for posts 15 
Internal database (e.g. number, gender) 6 
External instruments 9 
International citation databases 6 
Automatic progression 3 
Traditionally, academics were mainly evaluated in terms of research. According to most 
interviewees, this happened not only because it was the most easily measured area, but 
also because it was the one that contributed the most to their career progression. To a few 
interviewees, this eligibility criterion changed. More recently, post announcements started 
to incorporate teaching and managerial roles, even though their weight is still low when 
compared to research. 
To a number of interviewees, the Systems and Information Management Office and the 
Human Resources Office also collected statistics on academics, including numbers and 
categories, sorted by age, gender, department and area of speciality. Additionally, the 
Systems and Information Management Office collected data that "(…) [showed] whether 
class summaries and grades [were] registered in due time by academics" (A44). In 
financial terms, the Financial Resources Office gathered data on the cost of staff, per 
category and department. 
According to the old University Teaching Staff Statute, the career progression of 
academics was practically automatic36: 
"The progression from Assistant to Assistant Professor was based on 
having a doctoral degree and a number of years at the university. (…) 
That would be automatic if the Assistant was already in the career." 
(NA55) 
"After becoming Full Professors, academics were not assessed 
anymore." (AH69) 
                                                
36 Being public servants, academics used to rise automatically through pay scales within the university. Owing 
to financial constraints, the Portuguese government froze this progression from August 2005 to December 
2007 and again in 2011. 
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"The parameters that were used were completely unrealistic. They had 
nothing to do with performance, but with the time spent teaching. That 
made no sense." (S77) 
The University Teaching Staff Statute that came out in 2009 established tougher criteria 
for career progression, making assessment mandatory for all academics (at least every 
three years). Based on this Statute, evaluation parameters were discussed at UA, and the 
assessment regulation was published in August (Regulation 489/2011), with effect from 
September 2011 on. The following parameters were established: teaching; research and 
artistic creation and cultural production; third mission; and academic management. The 
performance of each academic can be considered 'Non-Adequate' (3 negative points at 
the end of a triennium), 'Good' (3 positive points at the end of a triennium), 'Very Good' (6 
positive points at the end of a triennium) or 'Excellent' (9 positive points at the end of a 
triennium).  
According to Regulation 489/2011 (art. 49), a positive assessment is necessary to: hire 
assistant professors on a permanent basis; and renew the contracts of non-tenured 
temporary staff. It also has an effect on the alteration of each academic's pay scales, even 
though this is dependent on the maximum amount of money that can be allocated for that 
purpose on an annual basis (this would be determined by the government as a 
percentage of the total amount of money spent by each institution on salaries) and on the 
university budget37. A negative assessment for six consecutive years has the 
consequences determined by the general law. Given that this piece of legislation only 
came out very recently, it was not commented by the interviewees, nor will be analysed 
further in this research. 
Concerning the establishment of internal performance measures for academic staff, the 
interviewees argued that even though the Scientific Council defined the basic criteria that 
had to be met to select the candidates for a certain position at the university, the particular 
criteria for a post and the composition of the recruitment committee were mainly defined 
by each department. In terms of teaching, the Rectory developed the Student Survey and 
created SGQ. Very recently, and as stated above, the Rectory defined the criteria to 
assess academics' performance.  
                                                
37 If an employee is graded 'Excellent' for six years in a row, the university is obliged to change his or her pay 
scale, independently of everything else. 
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Externally, the government imposed the criteria to be used by universities for academic 
progression, through the Teaching Staff Statutes, and FCT decided on the parameters to 
be used when academics submitted research projects or applied for individual research 
grants. 
All the interviewees that commented on the measures used to assess the performance of 
academic staff identified weaknesses. They were particularly critical of the Student 
Survey, namely the way it is used to assess academics' performance, its technical validity, 
and the way it was built: 
"Given that there is not a true evaluation of academics, they have to turn 
to students to get that information." (AH70) 
"What is the technical validity of the survey? (…) What about the 
universality of the survey, if you teach a course with five students? (…) 
It can have an influence, for better and for worst." (A46) 
"What kind of students answer that survey? Those who have failed? 
Those who have passed? It makes you wonder… and this discredits the 
tool." (AH68) 
"What is the relevance of knowing whether an academic uses 
PowerPoint? Does that make him or her a better teacher? I just want 
students to learn." (AH68)  
The argument of lack of validity of results was reinforced by the low response rates of 
students to the survey, which questions the representativeness of the sample.  
As a result, most interviewees argued that survey results should be analysed carefully, 
given that, the way students answer, "(…) may not be very serious" (NA56). Furthermore, 
according to some interviewees, there were big asymmetries between disciplines: 
"You cannot compare the results of a discipline with half a dozen 
students… with other with 500 students… they have to have different 
readings. With this I am not saying that it is easier for an academic to 
get better results by the number of students… but they can deliberately 
influence each other and thus manipulate results (…) and then we fall 
into a perverse action-reaction system." (A46) 
According to a few interviewees, there were also disciplines that were never assessed 
because they had a low number of students: "These will never be assessed, and they 
should" (AH70). 
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Even though the vast majority of the interviewees regarded the Student Survey as 
imperfect, a number of academics claimed that it was better than nothing: "(…) it gives 
heads of department some guidelines and data to act upon" (AH49) (whether this actually 
happens will be discussed later on) and academics "(…) some feedback on their teaching" 
(A45). Nevertheless, almost all the interviewees stated that the Student Survey should not 
be an instrument used on its own, needing to be complemented with other instruments 
(other than the ones that composed SGQ). Even though Regulation 489/2011 added other 
criteria to assess academics' performance concerning teaching, the Student Survey 
remained the most important instrument to assess this component. 
Several interviewees also complained about the excessive focus put on research to 
assess the performance of academics, even though this was starting to change:  
"There are not many indicators at the moment that allow people to show 
their pedagogic quality." (A48) 
"I know of no case where a candidate has been awarded tenure for, 
although having a weak scientific performance, [having] an excellent, 
extraordinary, teaching performance!" (A45) 
Finally, a few academics questioned the uniformity of the criteria used to assess the 
performance of academics from different areas. To them, the criteria should not be the 
same for all academics: "(…) there are areas in which it is easier to publish than others" 
(A53). Concerning this matter, interviewees from hard-pure and -applied areas would 
argue that problem does not exist since academics and researchers are compared to their 
peers and not to people from other areas. Regulation 489/2011 actually establishes 
different weightings for publications according to the scientific area (social sciences, 
engineering and sciences). 
6.4.5. Non-academic staff 
Although most interviewees agreed that the performance of non-academic staff was 
measured (see Table 27), they distinguished between the measurement that existed at 
central level and the one that existed at departments, which was, according to some, "(…) 
lighter" (NA56) and more difficult to do: "[In departments] employees have less specific 
tasks" (AH65). 
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As for the instruments used to assess this area's performance, the majority of the 
interviewees mentioned a national system developed by the government to assess public 
servants – the Integrated System for the Evaluation of Performance within Public 
Administration (SIADAP) (see Table 32). This system, created in 2004, through Law 
10/2004, of 22 March38, integrated the definition of objectives and indicators for each non-
academic staff member. The university started to implement it in 2005. 
Table 32 – Instruments used to assess non-academic staff's performance at UA 
n = 31 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 2 
Internal database (e.g. number, gender) 2 
Staff satisfaction surveys 1 
External instruments 31 
SIADAP 31 
According to the interviewees, within central administration: "(…) the director of each 
service defines objectives for each employee" (NA58). Each member of staff discussed 
with the director of his or her service his or her objectives and ways to reach them, being 
their performance then compared to pre-established objectives. Within departments, 
objectives were defined by the head of department in cooperation with non-academic 
staff, being then assessed by him or her at the end of each year. The performance of each 
member of staff was considered 'Non-Adequate' (1 – 1,999), 'Adequate' (2 – 3,999) or 
'Relevant' (4 – 5). Only 25 per cent of the workers could be awarded a grade between 4 
and 5, and, among these, only 5 per cent could be considered 'Excellent' (5). Departments 
were then grouped, in order to distribute classifications. In 2006/2007, each group 
included 4 departments, comprising between 20 and 24 employees each. There could be 
4 'Relevant' in each group and 1 'Excellent'. In 2008, bigger groups were formed. The 
Evaluation Coordination Council (CCADUA), responsible for coordinating the evaluation 
process within UA, received all the results and revised them.  
                                                
38 Based on the recommendations of the committee that evaluated the implementation of the performance 
evaluation system created in 2004, the government decided to implement a restructured SIADAP at the end of 
2007 (Law 66-B/2007, of 28 December). The new SIADAP includes the performance assessment of services 
(SIADAP 1), top and middle level managers (SIADAP 2) and employees (SIADAP 3). 
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Finally, a few interviewees mentioned the data collected by the Systems and Information 
Management Office and the Human Resources Office on the number of employees, by 
service, gender, position and echelon salaries, and number of absences.  
In terms of the definition of measures, and according to the interviewees, within 
departments, head of department established objectives and indicators for each 
employee, in agreement with them. Results were then sent to CCADUA, presided by the 
Administrator. Within central services, the director of each service or support unit 
assessed his or her staff and was assessed by the Administrator or, in some cases, by the 
Vice-Rector. SIADAP was mandatory by law for all public servants.  
When asked about their thoughts concerning the measures used to assess the 
performance of non-academic staff, most interviewees argued that it was very difficult to 
assess people, especially if the assessors did not see those who are assessed on a daily 
basis: 
"There are people that work [here] that I do not see for days. There are 
cases where I do not see them for weeks." (NA55) 
The law changed this situation and people started to be assessed by their immediate 
supervisor. Before this, service directors relied on the opinion of division directors.  
Even though there was not a single interviewee that was completely happy with SIADAP, 
some interviewees recognised its strengths: it allowed differentiation, since, according to 
them, under the old system everyone was graded Very Good; and people started to think 
more strategically, in terms of objectives and indicators. 
In spite of these strengths, there were a lot of complaints concerning SIADAP: "It is the 
most boring thing I have to deal with as head of department" (AH62); or "(…) it is a terrible 
system!" To the majority of the interviewees, SIADAP was unfair. They complained about 
the quota system, which only allowed 20 per cent of the employees of each service to be 
Very Good and 5 per cent Excellent:  
"It assumes that services have to fight against what they want to 
achieve, which is excellence!" (AH52) 
"[The fact that] quotas have to be applied independently of the final 
result of the evaluation, makes the evaluation very subjective." (NA50) 
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Moreover, to these interviewees, the evaluation criteria varied from department to 
department, depending on the people that represented each department: 
"Some heads of department use the entire scale to assess their staff." 
(AH63) 
"I kept the Very Goods. If the grade changes to Good, that will be their 
fault (talking about CCADUA), not mine!" (AH64)  
What CCADUA did in these cases was to respect the quotas, ranking the employees and 
distributing the grades accordingly. 
To other interviewees, SIADAP was considered unfit, being built for non-skilled workers 
and for big groups of employees: 
"The objectives that are established for each employee are just a small 
part of the work he or she has to perform on a daily basis, and 
sometimes it is not [even] the most representative part of their work. 
Because [sometimes] what is representative can be defined as an 
objective, but it will be hard to assess." (NA61) 
"The system was built for directorates-general, where the director-
general knows the employees in a pyramid system. In the group I am 
inserted in, there are departments where I do not know a single 
employee." (AH71) 
A number of interviewees also argued that SIADAP was too bureaucratic: "(…) too heavy 
and time consuming for the outcome generated" (AH63), especially "(…) when compared 
to what existed before" (NA61).  
Other interviewees mentioned the difficulties in defining objectives and indicators: 
"There are some difficulties in defining objectives, find indicators and set 
things that can be measured without having a member of staff behind 
the other looking at what he or she is doing! That makes no sense!" 
(NA61) 
"The objectives that (…) [are proposed] for employees are merely 
support objectives (…), such as money saved in photocopies, 
implementation of documental management, or implementation of cost 
accounting. Quite often, the assessors and those who are assessed find 
it difficult to understand how these objectives relate to the mission of the 
university." (AH66) 
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The lack of preparation of those who assess was also highlighted by a small number of 
interviewees: "(…) academics are not prepared for that kind of administrative tasks" 
(NA61). Moreover, a few interviewees complained about the constant changes in the 
system: 
"In three consecutive years I had to do three different evaluations, 
because the forms changed." (AH69) 
"When I already had a set of indicators... everything changed." (AH49)  
"When we finally reached an understanding, they changed the groups in 
2008. Everything went down the drain. We were working for nothing." 
(AH69) 
A small number of interviewees also mentioned the lack of instruments and resources to 
support measurement: "(…) there are no reliable instruments yet. It still is very empirical, 
and we know that we are influencing somebody's life" (NA56). Furthermore, in order to 
have a well-built system: "(…) the number of administrative and technical staff should 
increase" (AH65). Apparently, the opposite was happening (the ratio of non-academic to 
academic staff was almost 1:2, as seen in Section 6.2.1). 
Finally, a few interviewees highlighted the lack of preparation. They argued that the 
system did not go through an experimental phase, so that people could believe in it and 
trust it: "The way the system was introduced in universities jumped over a series of 
important steps" (NA54). 
Even though SIADAP allowed differentiation, as a consequence of the perceived negative 
features, non-academic members of staff felt unhappy with the system and did not believe 
in it, feeling "(…) disappointed (…)" (NA56). They did not feel their efforts were recognised 
and felt discouraged: "(…) they thought the system would help them to progress in their 
career and that has not been the case" (NA58). Moreover, the subjectivity of the system 
also favoured gaming. Some interviewees, for example, argued that the trick was to 
establish less demanding objectives, so that everyone accomplished them easily. 
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6.4.6. Students 
Even though the assessment of students' performance was the area that interviewees 
were least interested in commenting (see Table 27), all of those who decided to discuss it, 
stated that the university assessed this area (see Table 27): "Students' performance is 
clearly measured" (A80). According to these interviewees, the instruments used were 
essentially internal, being students' performance very closely monitored in terms of 
educational success: grades, success rates and failure rates (see Table 33).  
Table 33 – Instruments used to assess students' performance at UA 
n = 21 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 21 
Educational success (e.g. grades, success rates, failure 
rates) 19 
Internal database (e.g. number of students, attendance 
rates) 5 
External instruments 1 
RAIDES 1 
According to some interviewees, the Systems and Information Management Office and 
the Academic Records Office also collected some data on students: number of 
undergraduate and postgraduate students; number of international students; number and 
type of internships; attendance rates; entrance grades; university of first, second and third 
choice; region of origin; and so on. To these interviewees, this information was mainly 
gathered due to the need to send it to MCTES on a yearly basis. MCTES created a 
national survey, in 1989, entitled Statistical Survey to Graduates and Students Enrolled in 
Higher Education (DIMAS). This survey, registered in the Portuguese National Statistics 
Institute (INE), was mandatory by law and had to be filled in on an annual basis by every 
HEI. This survey was designed to supply data concerning the number of students, having 
as sampling date the 31st of December. The data collected resulted from the sum of the 
students of all degrees. In 2008, the Survey to the Record of Enrolled Students and 
Graduates in Higher Education (RAIDES) replaced DIMAS. The main difference between 
the two is that RAIDES integrates individual records. 
In terms of the development of measures, the Rectory defined the type of data to be 
collected by the Systems and Information Management Office and by the Academic 
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Records Office, even though the data gathered had to be in accordance with the 
information that had to be inserted into RAIDES. 
When discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the measures used to assess 
students' performance, a few interviewees stressed the difficulty of knowing the exact 
number of enrolled students, since they kept on coming and leaving. Therefore, the 
university decided to "(…) take two pictures every year… thirty-first of December and 
thirty-first of July" (NA57)39.  
6.4.7. Support services 
Even though all interviewees agreed that support services were fundamental to the good 
functioning of the university, there was no unanimity concerning the measurement of their 
performance (see Table 27). Two different quotes reflect this dichotomy of opinions: 
"The performance of support services is assessed." (AH52) 
"Even though people know how each support service is doing, in an 
intuitive way, their performance is not formally assessed." (NA56) 
By the time the interviews were conducted, the university was starting to implement an 
Evaluation and Accountability Framework (QUAR), integrated in the System for the 
Evaluation of Performance within Public Administration (SIADAP), and mandatory by law. 
This framework aspires to measure the attainment of pre-established targets and attribute 
each service a grade. That is why several interviewees stated that this area's performance 
would be evaluated through QUAR (see Table 34), even though it was still starting to be 
implemented: 
"It is still in an experimental phase." (AH64) 
"I still have had no time to look at it." (AH63) 
The recently created Strategic Planning Office (GPE) was coordinating the development of 
QUAR inside the university. 
                                                
39 RAIDES defined the 31st of December as the sampling date. 
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Table 34 – Instruments used to assess the performance of support services at UA 
n = 25 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 15 
Satisfaction surveys 8 
Evaluation system of non-academic staff 5 
Internal databases (collect general data on services) 4 
External instruments 15 
QUAR 15 
Some interviewees also mentioned the satisfaction surveys launched on an annual basis 
by a small number of support services (e.g. Social Services, Academic Management 
Services, the Library, and the Information Technology and Communication Services). 
These online surveys were sent to students, academics and non-academic members of 
staff, in order to assess their level of satisfaction towards the service. They were entirely 
voluntary. 
Other interviewees argued that support services were assessed through the performance 
of non-academic staff, especially service directors: "When service directors are assessed, 
services are evaluated, because they have to accomplish some goals" (NA50). At a 
central level, service directors established their own budgets and goals, together with the 
Administrator, who, at the end of the year, assessed whether those goals had been 
accomplished or not. Each director controlled his or her own budget. If there were 
extraordinary situations, where more money was needed, this had to be approved by the 
Administrator or by the Rector. According to some interviewees, departmental services 
were assessed through the evaluation of non-academic staff's performance, conducted by 
the head of each department, based on the targets set for them.  
Additionally, a few interviewees stated that some services developed databases to collect 
some data on the service, even though those databases were not integrated.  
In terms of measures' development, according to the interviewees, the director of each 
service set, in cooperation with the Administrator, at a central level, and the head of 
department, at a departmental level, the indicators within the plan established for each 
year. Each support service had its own indicators. The Vice-Rector for Strategic Planning, 
Information Management and Quality Enhancement evaluated the Strategic Planning 
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Office (GPE). He set out the objectives for that office, in agreement with the employees, 
being the evaluation of GPE done through the assessment of the person responsible for it. 
In relation to the measures used, the interviewees reported some problems, namely: the 
lack of an integrated system; the excessive focus on administrative tasks; and the lack of 
preparation of assessors, which is then reflected, according to some, in the poorly defined 
activity plans: 
"Even though services have tools that allow them to define some 
indicators and collect data systematically, that is not integrated into a 
single system yet." (NA60) 
"QUAR distorts the function of the university completely (given its focus 
on administrative tasks)." (AH71)  
"There are people who are not completely prepared to work in these 
things (talking about SIADAP and QUAR) in every department." (NA57)  
"The activity plan developed by service directors should not just be a 
repository of the activities developed during an academic year. It should 
be a plan of what should be done, with well defined objectives and 
measures." (NA55) 
6.4.8. Employers 
Apart from third mission, 'links to employers' was one of the areas of the university that 
more interviewees perceived as not being measured (See Table 27): "If it is done, I have 
not heard about it" (NA56). Some interviewees justified the absence of measures: 
"It is a very difficult area to measure." (AH63) 
"It is not easy to get feedback from employers." (AH69) 
In fact, one of the major criticisms made by EUA to the way the Bologna Process was 
implemented in UA, was the non-inclusion of employers in the revision of curricula.  
In terms of the instruments used to assess links to employers, the one most referred to by 
the interviewees was the Employers' Survey (see Table 35): "The university is thinking of 
launching a survey to employers now" (A43).  
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Table 35 – Instruments used to assess links to employers at UA 
n = 10 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 10 
Employers' Survey 7 
Internal databases (e.g. contracts) 5 
External instruments 2 
External assessments 2 
According to the interviewees, the Rectory conceived the survey, together with a task 
force. The survey included questions such as: level of satisfaction with employees and 
level of satisfaction with the competences acquired by those employees during their 
degree: "The idea is to be able to cross what alumni say with what employers say" 
(NA60). In fact, the majority of the interviewees linked these two areas (alumni and 
employers). By the time the interviews were conducted, the university was planning to 
start gathering data on employment rates and places of employment, through their alumni 
database.  
Some interviewees also mentioned the data on employers collected by some 
departments, even though this was not done systematically, according to them. The 
departments that kept in touch with employers knew whether or not they were satisfied 
with their employees or trainees. The Rectory asked departments to send them all the 
information they had on this area, so that the Systems and Information Management 
Office could compile it. 
To a number of interviewees, other offices also collected general data on employers, even 
if not systemically. For example, the Internships and Professional Opportunities Office 
(GESP), which was part of the Academic Management Services, kept records on 
employers and their level of satisfaction with trainees. The Academic Management 
Services created a website called PORTA, ran by GESP, where it linked students and 
alumni to employers. To some interviewees, this site provided indirect indicators. For 
example, if a lot of employers registered in that website, it meant they were probably 
satisfied with the university graduates.  
Externally, when degrees were evaluated (either by the National Council for the Evaluation 
of Higher Education – CNAVES, or by Professional Associations), the evaluation 
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committee always asked for a meeting with employers, although it was nothing 
systematic. 
In terms of the development of measures, and according to some interviewees, the Rector 
and his or her team created the few indicators that existed. The few departments that 
assessed this area decided on which measures to use individually. 
To most interviewees there was still not a good employers database and "(…) that should 
be the starting point" (A48). This would be important to "(…) ask them for advice 
concerning the curricula" (AH68) and to "(…) have their feedback on trainees and 
employees" (AH49). 
Another interviewee showed some concern in relation to the data collected through the 
Employers' Survey: "It can be biased and should be analysed very carefully, since the 
bigger businesses will probably be the ones that will fill in the survey, even though they do 
not represent the majority of the employers" (AH69). 
6.4.9. Alumni 
Although opinions were divided concerning the measurement of 'links to alumni', this was 
one of the areas that more interviewees perceived as not being measured, similarly to 
what happened with third mission and employers (See Table 27). Even those who argued 
that some data was collected agreed that this area was hardly measured: "There may be 
some data available, such as the number of alumni, but not measures" (AH52). Some 
explained the absence of a more rigorous measurement: "This area is extremely hard to 
measure" (AH63). Nonetheless, all interviewees considered links to alumni an important 
area: 
"It is a critical area for the university. (…) They are important 
not only in terms of funding, but also to support the creation of 
new areas and to participate in the governance of the 
university." (AH68) 
"Alumni are the best ambassadors of the university. They are 
the showcases of what we do." (A44) 
"[Alumni] can come back to the university as students." (S77) 
"They are possible employers of future alumni." (NA55) 
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Even though alumni were considered important, the university did not have an 'alumni 
culture' yet, according to some interviewees: "It still does not have 'alumni culture', since 
[it] has not been able to show alumni the benefits of maintaining their links to their former 
university yet" (A46).  
In relation to the instruments used to assess links to alumni, the interviewees mentioned 
the Alumni Survey and internal databases (see Table 36). 
Table 36 – Instruments used to assess links to alumni at UA 
n = 16 Number of occurrences 
Internal instruments 16 
Alumni Survey 9 
Internal databases 9 
External instruments 0 
According to some interviewees, at the time the self-evaluation report was being prepared, 
the committee responsible for it decided to conduct a Survey to Alumni. This was done 
through the Office for the Information Management and Management Indicators (GaGI)40. 
This unit developed an integrated system to manage alumni, which promoted the contact 
between them and the university, through an IT platform called SIGAAA (Integrated 
System to Manage the Follow Up of Alumni), in cooperation with the Alumni Association. 
The Systems and Information Management Office kept a database with the data collected 
from the survey. By the time the interviews were conducted, the Rectory was preparing to 
launch the second survey together with the Alumni Association. The questions did not 
change a lot since the first edition of the survey, in order to allow for comparisons. 
Before this central interest in alumni, some departments (e.g. Biology) had, according to a 
number of interviewees, a website where alumni inserted data stating where they were 
working. These sites were deactivated when the Rectory decided to build a single alumni 
database for the entire university.  
Additionally, some interviewees referred to the data on alumni kept by the Internships and 
Professional Opportunities Office (GESP).  
                                                
40 GaGI is now called Systems and Information Management Office and it has been integrated into the 
Information Technology and Communication Services (STIC). 
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In terms of the development of measures, the Rectory developed the Alumni Survey 
together with a committee created for that purpose. The few departments that assessed 
this area decided on which measures to use. 
When asked about their thoughts concerning the measures used to assess links to 
alumni, the interviewees mentioned several weaknesses. Some pointed out the lack of 
adequate instruments or indicators to measure this area, "(...) namely employability" 
(S75). Some complained about the technical problems that emerged with the treatment of 
the survey data. And others complained about the lack of feedback on survey results to 
heads of department. 
An additional problem identified by a few interviewees was the possible bias of survey 
results. This could happen because, according to them, those who filled in the survey 
were usually those who were still looking for a job or were still doing a postgraduate 
degree and were still around. These were usually still living with their parents, being thus 
more easily reachable. 
6.4.10. Finance 
It was consensual among the interviewees that discussed the measurement of financial 
performance that it was thoroughly measured, both at university and departmental levels 
(see Table 27): "It is super-scrutinized. It is an area with such a tight control that it 
becomes unreasonable" (A42).  
Most interviewees believed financial performance was mainly assessed through external 
measures (see Table 37): "It is mainly measured externally, even though there is an 
internal system" (NA50). 
Table 37 – Types of measures used to assess financial performance at UA 
n = 17 Number of occurrences 
Internal measures 7 
Measures contemplated in SIGEF 7 
External measures 12 
Budget and financial execution 8 
Measures defined by external assessors 5 
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The measure most referred to by the interviewees was the budget and financial execution:  
"There is a budget that is attributed to the university, which has 
to be managed. At the end, the university has to show what has 
done with the money and what has been accomplished." 
(NA56) 
Departments also had limits that could not be overcome: "The rules have to be strictly 
followed. Otherwise, there are penalties" (NA50). At the end of each year, the 
Consolidated Accounts Report had to be presented to the Ministry of Finance.  
Additionally, some interviewees mentioned the external assessments performed on an 
annual base by the Ministry of Finance and by the Court of Auditors41. Moreover, other 
external assessors of different levels (e.g. audit firms) visited the university. Each of these 
assessors defined their own indicators. 
Internally, the Financial Resources Office developed a control system – SIGEF –, which 
integrated some KPIs. Nevertheless, at the time the interviews were conducted, the 
Financial Resources Office was working on a new set of indicators (e.g. the average 
payment period or the average collection period). 
In terms of the development of performance measures, most interviewees argued that 
some data had to be collected by law. These indicators were thus defined by MCTES, 
who asked for them. Even though the KPIs used by the Financial Resources Office were 
developed by that office and agreed upon by the Administrator, they had to comply with 
the ones defined by the law that regulates public spending. Departments had their own 
budget and some autonomy in running that budget, within pre-established rules defined by 
the Financial Resources Office. When there were external assessments, assessors 
defined the indicators used. 
When asked about their opinion concerning the measures used to assess financial 
performance, some of the interviewees pointed out weaknesses, even though most of 
them considered that the existing financial measures were already consolidated. An 
                                                
41 At the jurisdictional level, and working as an independent authority, the Court of Auditors ('Tribunal de 
Contas') is responsible for the external technical-jurisdictional control. It is mainly in charge of scrutinizing the 
legality of expenditures and auditing the state budget implementation in each administrative unit. 
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interviewee complained about the financing formula used by the Ministry, which was 
considered 'very tricky': "They are not sufficiently clear" (NA57).  
Additionally, heads of department complained about the excessive bureaucracy: "It is a lot 
of paperwork" (AH70). Another head also argued that the financial management done at 
the central level was sometimes not adequate for departments: "The areas of intervention 
are different, the projects are different and the cost centres are different" (AH62).  
In the next section, the way interviewees perceived performance to be reported in UA will 
be discussed. 
6.5. Reporting of performance 
Similarly to what happened with measurement, reporting also varied according to the 
area. 
In terms of teaching and learning, some interviewees mentioned the annual evaluation 
reports, written by degree directors, to assess the implementation of the Bologna Process 
in each degree. These reports imposed by MCTES were available on the Pedagogic 
Council website. 
A number of interviewees highlighted the Activity Reports heads of department had to 
present to the Rectory on an annual basis, which included data on teaching and learning. 
To some interviewees, not every head of department sent these reports. 
Other reports on teaching and learning were also referred to. These included: reports on 
the creation of new degrees or the restructuring of existing ones that were sent to the 
Scientific Council, in order to get approved; and the reports that the National Council for 
the Evaluation of Higher Education (CNAVES) produced when it came to the university in 
order to assess degrees.  
No reports were produced with the data collected from the Student Survey, even though 
data was reported. A head of department stated: "I don't get reports. I get data from the 
surveys. Then, each head of department decides on whether to treat that" (AH62). Data 
on each course was published on the intranet, in SGQ's website.  
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Student Reports on the courses taken and on the academics that taught those courses 
were available to: the Degree Director (who inserted the data); the academic that taught 
the course and the one responsible for it (these could be the same or different people); the 
head of department; and an Analysis Committee appointed to examine the improvement 
changes proposed.  
In relation to research and scholarship, the interviewees argued that the results of the 
evaluation conducted by FCT were publicly available. Moreover, each research unit and 
associate lab produced a self-evaluation report on their research activity. These reports, 
required by FCT, were not published. The Research Institute (now extinguished) used to 
have them and analyse them. 
Third Mission's performance was not reported, according to most interviewees: "There are 
not many reports, even though there is some information available" (AH71). For example, 
departments sent some financial data to the Financial Resources Office on the services 
provided, but nothing very structured. Some information on this area (e.g. cooperation with 
the community, protocols signed) used to be taken to the Senate. 
Regarding academic staff, most interviewees confirmed that the individual data that came 
out of the Student Survey was sent to the academic, to the degree director and to the 
head of department: "Students do not have access to data on academics (…) and that 
would be the most appealing information for them" (S76). Few heads of department 
reported taking that data to the Scientific Committee of their department to discuss results 
and compare their department to other departments. 
Also, some interviewees argued that the Scientific Council got reports on academics, 
namely: reports on sabbatical leaves; activity reports presented when academics applied 
for posts; and so on. 
Additionally, according to a number of interviewees, some data on academic staff was 
incorporated into the Activity Report that some heads of department sent to the Rectory 
annually. Moreover, data on the research of academic staff was integrated in the self-
evaluation report produced by each research unit or associate lab. 
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Finally, a few interviewees mentioned the data on the number and qualifications of 
academic staff per institution published online by the Planning, Strategy, Evaluation and 
International Relations Office (GPEARI) of MCTES. 
According to the interviewees, no reports were produced on non-academic staff's 
performance. Within SIADAP, each head of department and service director had to fill in a 
form for each employee, sending everything to the Evaluation Coordination Council 
(CCADUA). Nevertheless, SIADAP results were never published. Only the people that 
integrated CCADUA had access to that information. The final decision made by this 
committee went to the head of each department or to the director of each service, who 
then discussed it with each member of staff. 
The Systems and Information Management Office collected some data on students and 
used to publish it on a webpage, accessed through login and password. At the time the 
interviews were conducted, that page was being restructured. Nevertheless, according to 
some interviewees, this Office did not produce any reports with that data, unless a Vice-
Rector or the Rector asked for them.  
Some interviewees also mentioned the 'Bologna Report' produced annually by Degree 
Directors. In this report, the way Bologna was implemented in each degree was described. 
These reports, which integrated data on students (e.g. success rates, employability, and 
so on), were published on the Pedagogic Council website. 
Additionally, a number of interviewees reported the data received by heads of department, 
every year, on the number of students enrolled by degree. That data was available on the 
intranet, being its access restricted. 
Finally, GPEARI also published data online on the number of students enrolled and 
number of graduate students per degree and institution. 
All interviewees agreed there were no reports on support services. To them, data on 
support services was only disclosed in the Annual Report and Accounts, even though 
some believed there should be reports on this area: "There should be results on the level 
of satisfaction towards these services, especially on the perceptions about life on campus" 
(AH64).  
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It was consensual among the interviewees that there were no reports on the links to 
employers, even though the data from the Employer Survey was being treated, compiled 
and sent to departments, by the time the interviews were conducted. 
Most interviewees perceived that no reports were produced on links to alumni either: "Very 
rarely, there [were] reports on the employability of students that [went] to the Senate" 
(AH64). 
Concerning finance, the interviewees argued that the Financial Resources Office and the 
Administrator produced an Annual Report and Accounts every year, since the external 
financier demanded it. After being certified by an external auditor, the Consolidated 
Accounts used to be "(…) presented to the Senate by the Rector, with the help of the 
Administrator" (AH66), and ratified by this body. These were now taken to the General 
Council for ratification. In the Annual Report and Accounts, the university attempted to 
analyse several areas, "(…) trying not to reduce it exclusively to a financial dimension" 
(A51). An external member considered it "(…) a well done job" (L82). More details 
concerning financial data used to be more thoroughly discussed at the Management and 
Planning Committee of the Senate. 
Some interviewees also mentioned that, occasionally, the Financial Resources Office 
produced reports on demand to the Administrator or to the Rector. 
Moreover, a few interviewees argued that departmental annual activity reports also 
integrated some information on the expenditures and on the revenues generated by each 
department. 
From what was presented, it could be argued that, even though certain areas' 
performance was reported, these reports were not produced systematically, being most of 
them mainly produced on demand. The exceptions were those that were mandatory, 
namely 'Bologna Reports' and the Annual Report and Accounts, and the results of the 
evaluation performed by FCT to research units and associate labs, which were published 
online and available to everyone. 
Having looked at the way UA reported performance data, Section 6.6 will analyse the way 
the interviewees perceived performance information to be used. 
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6.6. Management of performance 
Most interviewees believed it was possible to act upon all areas, or at least most of them: 
"The way of acting is probably different, the diplomacy must differ, but I 
think that if there is will and means to do it, we can act upon all of them." 
(NA61) 
Nevertheless, these interviewees stated that was not done. To an interviewee, that 
happened mainly because there was no tradition of doing it:  
"The problem is that we are people of 'gentle ways', with a culture of 
'gentle ways', and that is the reason for not acting upon something. We 
have ways to act. We have something called 'disciplinary action'. But 
until you get there… There is no tradition. But it is also true that the 
instruments that exist are very heavy (...). We normally have atomic 
bombs to swerve an ant from its path. It is not even to kill it. And that is 
not good. It produces no results." (A42) 
Similarly to what happened with measurement and reporting, performance data was not 
used in the same way across the different areas of the university. 
Some interviewees argued that the management attitude concerning teaching and 
learning was quite recent. It had mainly to do with Bologna (showing the influence of 
European policy) and with the evolution of the job market:  
"The university reoriented its educational offer in 2002 (…) in order to 
respond to changes in the job market. (…) Some degrees were 
restructured (…), others disappeared… new degrees were created in 
growing areas." (A43) 
According to other interviewees, the Rectory could also act upon departments with 
difficulties in attracting students, and it did so in some occasions. It could, for example, 
lower the numerus clausus, try to convert academics to other areas, and so on. 
Some heads of department also mentioned the curricular alignment departments did 
periodically, in order to "(…) correct eventual mistakes that have been made when the 
degrees were created, and also adapt to new realities" (AH62). A head stated that the 
reviewing cycle brought by Bologna was good, since it enabled some changes for the 
better.  
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Moreover, to a number of interviewees, when students complained about certain classes 
or other issues related to teaching and learning, the degree director could intervene and 
try to solve the problem.  
Additionally, according to some interviewees, when results from the Student Survey were 
bad and failure rates were high, an intervention strategy could be implemented. The head 
of department could, for example, talk to the academic and ask him or her to change the 
programme content or the methodology of teaching, give extra-classes or tutorials, and so 
on. 
According to the majority of the interviewees, data on research was closely analysed, 
especially due to the need to prepare for external evaluation exercises. This issue was 
considered particular relevant, since the grade attributed by FCT to research units and 
associate labs was directly linked to the financing of those units. To an academic, since 
the implementation of this evaluation system:  
"Some action was taken in order to improve the performance of 
research teams. The success of these measures varied between units. 
(…) Most indicators and actions were implemented reactively, as a 
response to recommendations, but some were pro-active, anticipating 
what could be mandatory in the future." (A46) 
Another interviewee argued: "(…) the university has been really pro-active in relation to 
research and scholarship, not only in terms of improving its research units, but also in 
terms of creating new research areas" (A43). A non-academic member of staff was less 
optimistic, believing there was still a long way to go: 
"[In] a university that wishes to maintain a strong component of earned 
revenue, with services to society… its attractiveness should be linked to 
the idea that the research that is conducted here is excellent. And, 
therefore, if it is true that the number of units and labs graded Excellent 
or Very Good rose from 75 per cent to 82 per cent, which is a good 
result, it is also true that the media has only published the results of our 
excellence niches, which are not those units that got Very Good, but 
those that got Excellent. (…) It is very important to have research and 
scholarship as the university's trademark." (NA55) 
Most interviewees believed third mission was not acted upon, probably because it was an 
area that was not much measured and upon which few reports were produced. 
Nevertheless, most interviewees agreed that more needed to be done. 
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It was consensual among the interviewees that it was not easy to act upon the 
performance of academic staff: 
"We cannot fire people." (AH63) 
"(…) Unless they kill the Rector or the President." (A51)  
"People have a job for life." (AH71) 
Some interviewees argued that the Academic Statutes were very protective and restrictive 
on what could be done to reward merit and punish bad performances. To these 
interviewees, there was something called tenure that was an "(…) aberration (…)" (AH62), 
since it gave people a job for life, regardless of what they did:  
"Even though, with the new foundational regime, people without this 
type of nomination will have problems, the others will not." (AH62) 
The interviewees mentioned the existence of two different sets: if an academic without 
tenure did not perform, "(…) his or her contract [was] not renewed" (NA56); if academics 
had tenure it would be much more difficult: "I do not know of any cases where there have 
been consequences" (NA56). This does not mean that these cases were not analysed 
and that people did not try to solve them by talking to the people involved, but not much 
else. In face of the latter scenario, some action could be taken: the university could exert 
pressure on that person, by, for example, giving him or her less power within the 
department, less money to do research, and so on; if the situation was not solved, there 
were more radical procedures, even though, in practice, they were seldom applied: "There 
is a Disciplinary Committee that looks at these processes" (AH73). But, although possible, 
it was rather complicated: 
"If a head of department establishes a disciplinary process against an 
academic, most likely nothing will happen, and he or she can be sued 
for persecution." (AH71) 
Moreover, according to several interviewees, only very sporadic actions were taken based 
on the results of the Quality Assurance System (SGQ). Cases where tougher action was 
taken were "(…) rare and not systematic, because the information [was] still not very 
trustworthy" (A43). For now, the results of SGQ were "(…) merely informative" (S77). 
Some interviewees believed continuous bad results could eventually lead to some action.  
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According to several heads of department from all types of subjects (hard-pure, hard-
applied, soft-pure and soft-applied), the lack of action towards poor performers had a lot to 
do with the weak position of some heads of department, who did not have enough 
authority or seniority to feel sufficiently powerful to correct, for example, a full professor: 
"Very hardly you see an assistant professor telling a full professor 'look, 
I have your survey results. They are miserable! Next week you have to 
attend that training programme'." (A51)  
Moreover, some interviewees argued that assistant professors sometimes felt a bit 
constrained because full professors would evaluate them when they applied for posts: 
"They (talking about assistant professors) depend on some full 
professor's will to help them with their careers. People are afraid and 
fear saying or doing something sometimes. That creates multiple 
powers and makes management more difficult." (A80) 
Some heads of department also argued that they would like to have more freedom to act 
upon academics: "If they don't perform well, they should do something else" (AH62). 
Heads also thought they should be given more support to act.  
Other interviewees questioned the relevance of assessing academics given the difficulty 
to progress in the academic career in Portugal: 
"Even though sometimes academics have the conditions to get 
promoted, there may not be a place for them, and that is disappointing." 
(A45) 
According to some interviewees, it should be easy to act upon the performance of non-
academic staff, given the existence of a new system – SIADAP –, which produced direct 
consequences. However, they stated that the actions that could be taken towards the 
performance of non-academic staff were very dependent on the legal framework, which 
was very protective. Since most of the university's employees were public servants, they 
were very difficult to fire. That could be done through formal disciplinary action, but it 
seldom happened: 
"It is very difficult to deal with extreme cases. It is very difficult to fire 
someone who is incompetent and very difficult to reward very good 
employees." (NA58) 
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In relation to students, in order to attract them, some departments tried to make degrees 
more appealing: "It was a strategy (...) that contributed to bring better students to the 
department." (AH62) 
The global results of the Student Survey used to be presented in The Senate, even though 
they were more discussed in the Students' Union, the Pedagogic Council and the 
Undergraduate University Education Institute. Nonetheless, according to a number of 
interviewees, "(…) these discussions led to no action" (NA54). 
A group of people, comprising the Administrator, service directors, and some of the people 
who did FORGEP42, tried to readjust the structure of support services, according to the 
current circumstances, mainly to comply with the changes imposed by RJIES. When the 
new Statutes came out, the university had six months to put everything in order and 
implement changes. These changes are visible when comparing Figure 30 with Figure 31 
(see Section 6.2.2.2). 
Some service directors argued that sometimes it was difficult to manage a service when 
staff did not cooperate and nothing could be done with those people. Sometimes, 
underperformers were sent to another service, but other times they were kept in the 
service and kept on doing nothing. A non-academic member of staff stated that many 
times they chose not to hire anyone new: "When you have a sink with dirty water and you 
put clean water inside, the new water becomes bleary" (NA59). 
Another non-academic argued that even though the law demanded human resources 
planning, the budget plan of most services was based on last year's or the year before 
plan. There was not a needs analysis, mainly because not all services had an Activity 
Plan: "There is no planning, no accountability, and it is difficult to monitor what is 
happening" (NA55).  
When CNAVES evaluated the degrees, they produced some recommendations on 
employers. The university used to look at that data. By the time the interviews were 
                                                
42 FORGEP is a training programme in public management, conducted by the National Institute of 
Administration (INA). It is mandatory by law to those with middle management roles in services or public 
institutions. 
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conducted, there was no information to act upon, according to the interviewees: "When we 
have information we will be able to act upon it" (A47). 
The Rectory sent a copy of the Alumni Survey results to every department. This data 
showed that alumni perceived "(…) the transversal competencies that they acquired 
during their training were not enough for their job" (A44). Even though the Rectory did not 
give instructions for departments to act upon this data, it expected they would make an 
effort to try and give students more of these competences. 
Finally, financial performance was, according to most interviewees, well acted upon in the 
university, based on the data available. The Financial Resources Office managed finances 
centrally. Each department managed the money it received every year up to a certain 
amount, being their financial autonomy quite limited: 
"In terms of financial management, I believe that the degree of freedom 
that I have is reduced, because departments are limited to the 
processing of invoices and not much else. (…) The head of department 
can try to bring in more money to the department, for example, by 
encouraging his or her staff to do it, but not much else, since finances 
are managed centrally." (AH62) 
6.7. Performance management systems 
Having looked at UA's strategy and to the way the university measured, reported and 
managed its performance, the next sub-sections will explore: the importance attributed by 
the interviewees to PMS; the pressures felt by the interviewees to implement control 
mechanisms; the factors perceived to influence the implementation and functioning of 
PMS; and the positive and negative aspects concerning the integration of measurement, 
reporting and management practices. 
6.7.1. Importance of performance management systems 
When asked about the importance of PMS, all the interviews stated that they considered it 
either 'fundamental' or essential'.  
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Performance management systems were considered important for a number of reasons, 
being the primary reason, according to the interviewees, to inform decision-making: 
"The existence of faithful and replicable instruments to measure will 
enable less asymmetries and more justice in terms of decision-making." 
(A46) 
"If we do not have indicators, we cannot make decisions concerning the 
alteration of the strategy. (…) Many times, decisions are based on 
subjective criteria and it is increasingly necessary to decide based on 
objective facts and well measured indicators." (AH62) 
Several interviewees also considered PMS important for a process of continuous 
improvement: 
"It should be intrinsic to the development of processes (…), in order to 
enable the readjustment always needed." (AH72) 
"We can improve based on objective measures and not because there 
is a feeling that things are not going well." (NA58) 
To some interviewees PMS also give people a focus, since their attention becomes 
focused on the objectives they have to accomplish, thus helping individuals and 
institutions to evolve: "If we want to evolve, we have to have the means to do it" (A80). 
Other reasons pointed out by the interviewees were: to increase efficiency; to enhance 
transparency and increase accountability; and to increase competition by allowing 
comparisons.  
Even though data analysis showed that most interviewees, from the four groups 
(academics, non-academic, students and external members), perceived PMS as 
something important, that helped organisations to focus and improve, some interviewees 
argued that the university and individuals should be careful with some of the unintended 
effects that could emerge with the introduction of PMS. According to them, measurement 
should not be seen as an end in itself, since sometimes metrics did not tell the whole 
story: 
"With this fashion of measuring everything (...), we all gather around 
something that leads us nowhere and adds no value." (NA50) 
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Other interviewees believed that, by enabling comparisons, PMS could increase 
competition in an unhealthy way.  
Some interviewees also argued that PMS could lead to deliberate strategies to conform to 
what was demanded, and gave examples of this type of behaviour: 
"People make up indicators (...) and learn how to go around them and 
how to distinguish worthy indicators from other indicators." (AH71) 
"Even now, with quotas, it is easy to determine internally who gets 
certain grades one year and who gets those grades in the following 
year. The system is undermined." (NA54) 
"We create the indexes that we want! Those that suit us better! (…) And 
that is not very difficult." (NA57) 
In the following section, the pressures felt by the interviewees to measure, report and 
manage performance will be discussed. 
6.7.2. Pressures to measure, report and manage performance 
The vast majority of the interviewees argued that there were several pressures, both 
internal and external, to measure, report and manage performance, being the latter the 
most influential ones (see Table 38). 
Table 38 – Types of pressures at UA 
n = 39 Number of occurrences 
External pressures 39 
Internal pressures 25 
Nevertheless, most interviewees still considered these pressures subtle, and argued that 
"(…) there should be more" (NA50), "(…) in order for things to work" (L82).  
The next sections will explore the type of internal and external pressures felt by the 
interviewees. 
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6.7.2.1. External pressures  
All interviewees stated that there were external pressures to measure, report and manage 
performance. Some argued that they were beneficial, or, otherwise, "(…) the way of acting 
would be more relaxed" (AH67). To these interviewees, the main external pressures came 
from the state, the market and Europe.  
State 
Most interviewees felt that the main pressures to measure came from the government and 
were imposed on universities by law: "Law imposed the big changes that are happening, 
otherwise no one would move!" (NA50). In fact, a lot of legislation came out since 2007, 
creating: a new evaluation framework for Portuguese HEIs; the National Agency for the 
Evaluation and Accreditation of Higher Education (A3ES), perceived to be the main 
pressure; a new legal regime for HEIs; and new Statutes for Academic Careers. 
Moreover, the imposition of SIADAP and QUAR to all public institutions, including 
universities, made the definition of objectives and indicators mandatory. These laws, 
which showed the increased interest of the government to know if public money was being 
well spent, led to huge reforms in the Portuguese higher education system: 
"The government has 'turned off the tap' and said 'from now on there is 
only money based on indicators'." (AH71) 
Additionally, and as stated in Section 6.2.1, when the university became a foundation, it 
had to sign a Contract-Programme with the government, which established a set of 
objectives and indicators that had to be accomplished: 
"Now that we are a foundation, we will have new rules. (...) Even though 
it is not a company, it will not be the same thing." (A53) 
In spite of these pressures, some interviewees believed this legislation did not correspond 
to an effective demand: 
"Am I obliged to do it because of that? The proof I am not is that it has 
not been done yet! (...) Most organisations do not do evaluation, either 
those under the direct administration of the state or those under indirect 
administration (...). They do not do it! " (NA50) 
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"The state does not consolidate its accounts. (...) And what is the QUAR 
of the Ministry? I know the one of the General Directorate, but I do not 
know the Ministry's QUAR (…). I would like the Ministry to demand 
things more systemically." (NA54) 
Market 
Even though some interviewees believed the market had not a strong influence in 
Portugal and that it had not influenced what happened inside the university, almost all 
agreed that the competition between universities increased, and some even argued that 
this competition had "(…) benefited universities and other sectors of the Portuguese 
economy" (NA55). To the interviewees: "(…) the number of students is decreasing and the 
students that exist are just those. (...) We are competing for the same universe" (AH67). 
Actually, some departments struggled and others are struggling to get students. That was 
why a number of interviewees mentioned that attracting students became an important 
issue and that universities felt the pressure to be better, which meant "(…) reinforcing their 
marketing (…)" (A43) and "(…) image (…)" (A80): 
"It is interesting to see the level of communication of universities now. 
Before, there was no communication because universities were at the 
top (...). Today, there is competition, isn't there? Generalised 
competition. There are marketing strategies and communication 
strategies." (S77) 
Moreover, some departments started to involve primary and secondary education 
students in their activities and to visit secondary schools regularly. In order to attract 
students, some interviewees highlighted the importance of measuring performance and of 
showing good performance: 
"If we do not show good indicators to the exterior, we will not be able to 
attract good students." (S75) 
"It is important for the university to show that it measures." (A80)  
"Performance evaluation can give good indicators (...) that may bring 
more revenues from outside and increase the visibility, not only 
nationally, but also internationally." (AH65) 
Additionally, society started to demand more accountability from public institutions, 
especially educational ones:  
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"We have to be accountable to taxpayers, to justify the money spent." 
(S75) 
"There is a public environment that makes it difficult for more traditional 
sectors to say 'I do not want to be evaluated'. From that point of view, 
evaluation, at least as a political symbol, cannot be turned down. (…) 
The public opinion exerts pressure and, from that point of view, any 
governmental action that imposes measures will have their support." 
(AH68) 
Finally, a few interviewees argued that it was fashionable to measure:  
"Society wants to evaluate everything, to standardise everything and to 
'mcdonalise' everything." (AH64) 
To a number of interviewees, it was almost certain that evaluation would lead to a 
hierarchy: "Families will prefer those universities that are well ranked" (AH72). In fact, 
some interviewees argued that there had been an increased interest of the media for 
quantitative data, even though not all interviewees agreed with this trend: "They (talking 
about rankings) are dangerous. They can kill an institution" (A44). Nevertheless, to most 
interviewees:  
"Rankings are still not that important [in Portugal]. (...) Even though we 
are walking towards that, it is still not very relevant for decision-making." 
(AH68) 
Europe 
The European Commission published a modernisation agenda for universities, which was 
welcomed by member states and the main stakeholders in higher education. The main 
fields of reform were: curricular reform (also promoted through the Bologna Process); 
governance reform, accomplished through more university autonomy, strategic 
partnerships (e.g. with businesses) and quality assurance; and funding reform, which 
meant finding diversified sources of income better linked to performance (Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 2006 – see Annex 2). It 
became clear that the implementation of these reforms needed to be assessed, thus 
demanding increased measurement. In fact, several interviewees mentioned the pressure 
exerted by European policy to measure: 
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"There have been international pressures (…) mainly European [ones]." 
(A47) 
"Bologna brought a lot of changes." (AH68) 
"If we look at the European rankings where are we? And if we are not 
there, why is that? (...) In order to be there, we have to improve, 
because we will be evaluated by international accreditation agencies." 
(AH52) 
6.7.2.2. Internal pressures 
When the university started to grow, it realised it needed more quality. Some interviewees 
argued that the quality efforts put some pressure on the measurement, reporting and 
management of performance. To an interviewee, the university needed to measure for two 
reasons:  
"To improve, and to become an institution of reference, so that it gets 
Chinese, Dutch and African students. Any countries that know what they 
are doing do not send students to institutions that no one knows about." 
(A42) 
Thus, the majority of the interviewees stated that the Rectory and the central 
administration were pressuring units to prepare for what was coming: "(…) by anticipating 
certain actions, they will be prepared and able to respond more quickly" (AH69). For 
example, the university chose to be evaluated by EUA. 
Furthermore, when it became a foundation, the university started to feel an increased 
pressure to measure, in order to see if the objectives established in the Contract-
Programme were being achieved. Plus, according to some interviewees, the shortage of 
funds, enhanced by the international economic downturn and governmental financial cuts, 
and the will to build a stronger image, also made the university realise that it needed to 
measure and manage things more. 
Even though many interviewees pointed out several types of internal pressures and 
motivations to measure, others argued: "(...) there are no real internal pressures" (NA50), 
or otherwise a PMS would already have been implemented. 
Section 6.7.3 will look at the factors perceived to influence the implementation and 
functioning of PMS. 
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6.7.3. Factors that can influence PMS 
The interviewees pointed out several factors believed to influence, either negatively or 
positively, the introduction and functioning of PMS. On the negative side, the factor most 
referred to was the lack of evaluation culture: 
"Portugal does not have an evaluation culture. Our society does not 
have an evaluation culture (...) and so, evaluation is seen as a negative 
thing." (AH72)  
Most interviewees agreed that the institutional culture could not be changed overnight and 
that, probably, "(…) the academic environment [was] not the most favourable for that" 
(A80). 
A number of interviewees also highlighted resistance to changes. According to them, 
employees (both academics and non-academics) tended to dislike new systems, being 
difficult to convince them about the benefits brought on by the introduction of a PMS, 
especially if it brought extra work and bureaucracy. To them, this resistance could be due 
to: inertia, meaning that there could be a lack of will to change, being, in this case, "(…) 
very difficult (…) to mobilise people" (A48); or difficulties of adaptation to new systems. 
Other interviewees mentioned the fact that too many changes were happening at the 
same time, giving employees a sense of insecurity:  
"We are in a period of so many great changes that the first thing we 
want, me inclusively, is to ensure that the basic gets done within the 
department and that the transition to Bologna is done. (...) There is no 
point in dedicating our time, that is scarce, to performance evaluation 
methods, if they are not taken very seriously." (AH68) 
To some interviewees the lack of resources also influenced the implementation of PMS 
negatively. According to them, even though, sometimes, the university would like to have 
more people involved in the development and introduction of PMS that was not possible 
due to financial constraints: "It is a relatively small team (…) and there are many different 
requests (…). This creates difficulties" (NA60). 
The unclear Teaching Staff Statutes were also considered a drawback to the 
implementation of a PMS: "Who evaluates whom? (…) "I do not think that the new 
Statutes (…) from what I have heard (…) will change things substantially" (A46). 
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Finally, a few interviewees mentioned the hierarchical administrative structure, believing 
that a flatter administrative structure, with less hierarchical levels, would enable faster and 
better decision-making: 
"The is a very vertical administrative structure. (…) The ambition of a 
non-academic member of staff here is to get to the end of the day and 
send an official letter to the service next door that has in the first page 
the following sentence 'please find enclosed'." (A51) 
On the positive side, several factors were mentioned, especially strong leadership. 
According to several interviewees, from all groups, top managers had to be interested in 
implementing a PMS: "(…) there has to be a strong leadership of the process (…) 
recognised by everyone" (AH69).  
Other interviewees mentioned the need to build an evaluative culture within the 
organisation. To them, PMS would only succeed in an institution if they were incorporated 
into institutional practices as something natural and as instruments to improve both 
individual and institutional performances: 
"People have to perceive [PMS] as something fundamental for the 
functioning of the institution." (A51) 
The need to introduce the system step-by-step, to have a simple system, and the 
existence of a centralised IT system, were also regarded by a number of interviewees as 
essential for a well-built and well-functioning PMS: 
"Performance management systems should be implemented step-by-
step and not in an abrupt way. Give it time to mature." (NA54) 
"The simpler the system, the easiest it is to implement." (AH63) 
"It would be fundamental to have a centralised and well-organised IT 
system." (AH62) 
Additionally, the importance of having excellent employees was also considered extremely 
important by some interviewees. 
Finally, a few interviewees regarded the legal obligation to implement measurement, 
reporting and management practices as something positive.  
Next, the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the PMS will be discussed. 
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6.7.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the PMS 
Similarly to what happened in the Warwick case, although the majority of the interviewees 
did not recognise the existence of a fully developed PMS as such, they reported the 
existence of several measurement, reporting and management practices in different areas 
across the university (as seen in previous sections). Therefore, when discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the PMS, interviewees were referring to the existing 
practices (see Table 39). 
Table 39 – Strengths and weaknesses of the PMS at UA 
n = 29 Number of occurrences 
Strengths 19 
Weaknesses 28 
6.7.4.1. Strengths 
The major strength pinpointed by the interviewees was the existence of efforts to 
measure: "We are starting. We are experimenting" (AH52). They gave examples of good 
practices: the Quality Assurance System (SGQ) that had been developed; the evaluation 
of research, "(…) which is well established" (AH64); and the evaluation of finances, "(…) 
which is solid" (AH65). 
Some interviewees also mentioned as strength, the internal awareness of the need to 
evaluate and the importance attributed to quality: "That is clearly a strength and facilitates 
the implementation of such a system" (A43). This issue was not consensual among the 
interviewees, since some considered the inexistence of an evaluative culture as a 
weakness, as it will be seen in the next section. 
Another strength pointed out by the interviewees (all non-academics) was the university's 
matrix structure, since it allowed some coherence and took advantage of a series of 
synergies.  
Finally, a few interviewees mentioned the good external image that the university was able 
to project, even though sometimes that did not correspond to the reality: "I have 
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participated in some things that I know are not well done, but because these services are 
provided by the university, the clients perceive [them] as excellent" (NA54). 
6.7.4.2. Weaknesses 
In terms of weaknesses, several interviewees recognised the need to improve the 
measurement of several areas. To some, teaching and learning still had to improve: "I do 
not know if those surveys are the most adequate" (AH49). Others argued that there should 
be some improvement in the measurement of research success, stating that a database 
that compared the productivity of research units should be built. Moreover, to a number of 
interviewees, the impact of the university on society should also be assessed, not only in 
terms of revenue generated, but also in terms of the quality of the service provided and 
client satisfaction:  
"Society does not perceive the added value of the university (...) and we 
do not give them indicators to show them [that value] (…). When I tell 
entrepreneurs that the salaries of the university are around fifty million 
Euros, they gawk." (A46) 
Other interviewees also believed that: academics should be assessed and not only in 
terms of research; the evaluation of non-academics should become less complex and 
bureaucratic; links to alumni should be improved and their professional and academic 
track followed; and the degree of satisfaction of employers should also be assessed. 
Apart from the problems reported in the measurement of some areas, other weaknesses 
were pointed out. Some interviewees stated that the measurement processes had not 
been completely internalized yet: "The system is disintegrated" (AH72). To them, 
procedures were not well established and dissemination was considered weak. In fact, the 
level of communication was defined as poor at different levels. For example, to the 
interviewees, the main goals of the strategy should be "(…) assumed and communicated 
in an explicit way" (NA58).  
Other interviewees complained about the lack of an integrated vision and about the lack of 
an evaluation culture within the university: 
"There is not an integrated policy or an integrated vision." (A80) 
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"In our culture there is not an evaluation tradition. Therefore, people are 
very afraid when they see all the indicators. They retract because they 
imagine that they are going to lose their position… that there will be 
punishments. That's how people think." (AH70) 
Moreover, most of the instruments that were used to assess performance (e.g. SIADAP 
and SGQ) were considered too bureaucratic and administrative: "The system worries so 
much about correcting mistakes that does not have time to produce results" (AH66). 
A number of interviewees also mentioned the lack of training of those who were trying to 
implement those systems, especially in terms of defining objectives and indicators:  
"The implementation of a performance management system is the most 
complicated part of the system (…), because normally those who define 
the objectives and the indicators (…), and evaluate, are people that do 
not have specific training." (AH65) 
Additionally, a few interviewees also complained about the inexistence of consequences, 
discouraging people from participating and implementing evaluation procedures. To a 
non-academic, the culture that existed in public administration de-compromised 
institutions: "There will always be someone who will pay the bill in the end. (...) Within this 
framework resources will never be optimized" (NA50). 
Finally, some interviewees mentioned the lack of an integrated system that would store all 
the performance information: "We still do not have information systems capable of storing 
all the information wanted (...) [and] indicators can only be defined if we have that 
database" (NA60). 
The following section will look at the interviewees' views on the way the university was 
governed and managed. 
6.8. Governance and management structures 
This section analyses the interviewees' perceptions on the existing governance and 
management structures, namely the type and composition of governing and management 
bodies and their strengths and weaknesses, and on the key actors in the governance and 
management of the university (academics, non-academics, students and external 
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members), namely in relation to: their influence on decision-making; the relationship 
between academics and non-academics; and their position towards PMS. 
6.8.1. Characterisation of governing and management bodies 
By the time the interviews were conducted the old structure still prevailed. Therefore, the 
perceptions of the interviewees concerning the new bodies were based on what they 
expected it to be. The interviewees took into consideration the meetings they had been to, 
documents read, and discussions held with colleagues concerning the subject. 
6.8.1.1. General Council 
Even though there was no consensus among the interviewees, the majority agreed with 
the composition of the General Council, believing that the quality of the people was more 
important than quantity: 
"It is well balanced." (A43) 
"Its members represent the three groups of the university (...) and the 
surrounding society." (AH72)  
Some interviewees argued that it was positive not to have everyone represented, because 
this way people were representing the university and not the interests of their units.  
Concerning external members, most interviewees agreed with their inclusion in the 
General Council: "It works well in other countries and in the Anglo-Saxon world" (AH62), 
presenting several reasons for their presence in governing bodies: they bring in other 
visions and take the university outside; they are free to express their opinion since they do 
not have an hierarchical relationship with other groups; they bring in balance; they can be 
an asset in terms of direction and strategic planning; they can be future employers of 
students; and they raise the accountability of the university. Several quotes are illustrative 
of the reasons presented: 
"Society will be fundamental for the development of the university." 
(A48) 
"They help to create bonds and synergies with the world." (NA56) 
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"(Taking about the fact of the President of the General Council being an 
external member) If it was a member of the university (…) there would 
be two presidents of the Council or two rectors. If they agreed 
everything would be okay. On the first day they disagreed (...) there 
would be an imbalance inside the university." (A42) 
"Having the executive power accountable to a body that has a strong 
external membership is extremely positive." (L81) 
Even though most interviewees agreed with the increased participation of external 
members in governing bodies, some believed there should be some care in the choice of 
those members, who: should be the best; come from different areas; should not be alumni 
or former academics; and should be chosen independently of the Rector's choice: 
"We have to choose the best." (A42) 
"It would be profoundly negative if five of these individuals were 
engineers (...). Those five people have to have different sensitivities, in 
order to portray (…) what society wants." (AH52)  
"I agree that former academics are external members of other 
university's bodies, and vice-versa. Now... a retired academic that 
comes up as an external member because he is no longer professor? I 
think that is an adulteration of the game." (A46) 
"They should be chosen independently of the Rector's choice." (A80) 
To all these interviewees, it would not be easy to find people with these characteristics, 
not only because they are busy, but also because other universities that started to co-opt 
earlier were able to choose first. Nevertheless, interestingly, to an external member more 
was needed than just increasing the inclusion of external members in governing bodies: 
"Cultural changes are needed (...). Otherwise, external members will be 
mere decorative figures. (...) External members can be instruments to 
stimulate, accompany and assist or they can be mere decorative 
elements." (L81) 
In terms of non-academics, and even though there was only one in the General Council, a 
few interviewees believed this number was right, since they did not interfere with the 
process of teaching and learning or with research: "They have a hierarchical relationship 
that may influence their opinions" (S75).  
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A few interviewees also agreed with the number of students (3) in the General Council, 
especially because all the subsystems were represented (university undergraduate 
degrees, polytechnic undergraduate degrees and postgraduate degrees).  
Finally, a couple of academics agreed with the number of academics and researchers (10) 
in this body, if they were in alignment with external members: "Otherwise there will be 
trouble" (A53).  
Even though most interviewees were happy with the composition of the General Council, 
a number of interviewees pointed out some problems. To begin with, a few of them 
claimed that the size of this body was too small: 
"Nineteen is too small... too limited, because that means leaving an 
important component, that makes the machine work, which is non-
academic staff, represented by one member only." (NA63) 
In fact, some interviewees, both academics and non-academics, agreed that non-
academic members of staff should be more represented in this body, especially given the 
increased need for this staff. Other interviewees, including a couple of non-academics, 
disagreed with this vision, believing that non-academic staff should not even sit in 
governing bodies. The strongest opinion came unexpectedly from a non-academic: 
"Why on earth should non-academic staff, that is part of support 
services, that is here to work and to obey orders, be part of governing 
bodies?! Non-academic staff should not govern the house. (...) Support 
services have to support and that is it." (NA50) 
In relation to external members, a couple of interviewees thought they were excessively 
represented.  
Also, some interviewees felt the number of students was not correct, even though 
opinions differed. Some students believed they should be more represented because 
universities did not exist without them, and some academics argued that the number of 
students was too high: 
"I do not like students with power (...). The number of students should 
always be inferior to the number of non-academic members of staff. (...) 
They are students... they are here to learn. They should have rights (...), 
but in a simple body where they could talk." (AH70) 
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Students also complained about the absence of the Students' Union from the new 
governing bodies: "The President of the Students' Union will always feel compelled to run 
for a position in the General Council" (S75). 
6.8.1.2. Management Council 
In terms of the Management Council, every interviewee agreed with its composition. Only 
a student complained about the absence of a student there: "The presence of the 
President of the Students' Union in the former Administrative Council was an added value, 
especially in matters related to students" (S77). 
6.8.1.3. Scientific Council 
The new Scientific Council was reduced to 33 members: "Now there [is] a list and people 
have to show their capabilities to be there" (A45).  
Some heads of department complained about the non-representativeness of every 
department in the new body:  
"Not every department will be represented in the thirty-three." (AH52) 
"The Scientific Council should have all areas represented." (AH67) 
"RJIES was made for universities with faculties. (...) Each faculty has its 
Scientific Council and everything works fine. (...) Since the University of 
Aveiro does not have faculties, it had to create a single Scientific 
Council that, facing restrictions concerning the number of members, 
means that not everyone will be represented." (A80) 
6.8.1.4. Pedagogic Council 
Similarly to what happened with the Scientific Council, some interviewees also complained 
about the non-representativeness of all departments in the 25: "We went from one 
extreme to the other (…). All areas should be represented" (AH67). To an academic: "(…) 
the Rector will have to mobilize Degree Committees to ensure their participation, 
otherwise things will not work" (AH52). 
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In the next section, the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the existing governance 
and management structures will be discussed. 
6.8.2. Strengths and weaknesses of the governing and management bodies 
6.8.2.1. Strengths 
In relation to the new governance structure, the majority of the interviewees perceived the 
change to be positive, since the new structure was considered: simpler; more 
representative of the university's interests; more open to the outside world; more efficient; 
with a clearer leadership structure; and more adequate for strategic decision-making. 
Several interviewees discussed the strengths of the new structure: 
"Things are more structured now." (NA56) 
"The Rector is [now held] more accountable." (S77)  
"It leaves time for coordination bodies (talking about the Scientific and 
the Pedagogic Council) to do exactly what they should (...), which is 
understanding the quality of teaching; if the people doing that are the 
right ones (...); what is the scientific policy of the university. And that is 
what they should be doing!" (A80) 
"It will probably be easier to have twenty out of twenty-five people read 
the documents than three hundred." (A51) 
"These bodies (talking about coordination bodies) are now unique and 
before they were not. They were replicated at departmental level." (A80) 
Interviewees, from all groups, believed the bodies' smaller size to increase efficiency, 
since it made them more flexible, dynamic and operational. Moreover, the existence of a 
more direct line of communication between the Rector and departmental directors was 
perceived to speed decision-making and make management more agile. 
6.8.2.2. Weaknesses 
In relation to the new governance structure, interviewees identified several disadvantages. 
To most of them, it decreased participation and there was the danger of closing the 
university to a restrict group of people:  
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"There will be less people involved in decision-making and (…) there will 
probably be less people that understand what the strategy of the 
university is, if nothing is done about it." (A80) 
A number of interviewees argued that the new structure was less democratic in terms of 
representativeness. They gave an example: before, the Rector used to be elected by the 
entire community, then by a house of representatives, which reduced the number of 
voters, and now that number was reduced even more. 
To other interviewees, the new structure increased centralisation, with more power 
centred in the Rector, and disabled the emergence of counter-powers, since the Rector 
had now more influence on the choice of departmental directors: "This structure does not 
allow for potential leaders to make themselves visible to the entire community" (AH64). 
Finally, the new structure was, according to a few interviewees, too government directed. 
To them, with the creation of the Council of Curators, the government was believed to be 
increasingly participating in university's affairs. 
In spite of the perceived disadvantages, most interviewees regarded the change in the 
governance structure as something positive, that would facilitate the definition of a 
strategy, make decision-making more agile, and enable the introduction of performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices. 
Having looked at the interviewees' views on the governance and management structures 
of UA, the next section will focus on their perceptions concerning the key actors in the 
governance and management of the university. First, the perceived influence of actors on 
decision-making will be discussed; secondly, their perceptions on the relationship between 
academics and non-academics will be analysed; thirdly, their views on PMS will be 
presented; and fourthly, the changes that occurred in the role of the actors that sit in 
governing and management bodies – the four Estates (Academic, Administrative, Student 
and External Representatives) will be explained. 
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6.8.3. Key actors in the governance and management of the university: the four 
Estates 
6.8.3.1. Influence of actors on decision-making 
All the interviewees that discussed the influence of actors (academics, non-academics, 
students and external members) on decision-making stated that academics were the most 
influential group: 
"I believe that academics are still the most influential group for most 
options taken." (A48)  
"They (talking about academics) are the most powerful group in terms of 
decision-making." (NA59) 
Nevertheless, according to a few interviewees, mostly students, a lot of decisions were 
made taking into consideration students' opinion: 
"I really felt that I could influence decision-making often, even when 
things were not related to students… as long as I was able to 
consubstantiate what I was saying." (S76)  
Even though external members became more represented in the new structure, an 
academic argued: "(…) [they] still have very low weight" (A48). 
In the following section, the way the interviewees regarded the relationship between 
academics and non-academics will be looked at. 
6.8.3.2. Relationship between academics and non-academics 
Data analysis showed there was no consensus concerning the relationship between 
academics and non-academics. 
Some saw it as good: "I would generically classify that relationship as very open... healthy. 
(...) I don't see any tensions" (AH62). The reasons supporting this perception were the 
following: each party knowing its role and mutual respect. 
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Others argued that the relationship was bad, due to a number of reasons: ignorance of 
each other's roles; sense of superiority of academics; poor internal communication; and 
different treatment for academics and non-academics: 
"There is an insufficient perception of the importance of non-academic 
members of staff... and that is general." (A46)  
"Non-academics think academics do nothing." (S74) 
"Academics feel superior to non-academic members of staff. Sometimes 
I do not think they treat non-academics with the due respect." (AH49) 
"If you go to Christmas reunions and other events... who do you see 
there? Non-academic members of staff." (NA59) 
"The university should improve the internal communication a lot." 
(NA58) 
"Even though I may be right, I know that if I do certain things [to 
academics], someone will come to rescue them and I will have to draw 
back!" (NA59) 
To a number of interviewees, the other reason justifying the bad relationship between 
academics and non-academics was the lack of a well-defined hierarchy. An interviewee 
gave an example: "Sometimes more than one Vice-Rector asks for things at the same 
time, claiming that their quest is more important than the other. What should I do? Which 
Vice-Rector is in charge?" (NA59). 
Even though some considered it good and others bad, according to the majority of the 
interviewees, the relationship between academics and non-academics varied. To them, it 
depended on: the mutual understanding of each other's roles; people's tempers; and 
personal relationships. 
6.8.3.3. Position towards performance management systems 
When asked about the position of the different groups that composed the governing and 
management bodies of the university (academics, non-academics, students and external 
members) towards PMS, most interviewees agreed that the groups that would be more 
favourable to the introduction of a PMS would be external members and students. The 
first, because "(…) they come from the private sector, and probably that is already being 
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done in their companies" (AH52). The latter, because "(…) they will like to see their 
professors and non-academic members of staff evaluated" (A51).  
The vast majority of the interviewees also agreed that academics would be the group that 
would most likely present more resistance to the introduction of a PMS:  
"They do not accept evaluation, especially individual assessment, 
because they already do doctorates, masters, and they have to apply for 
posts." (NA56) 
"It is like doctors or judges." (NA59) 
In fact, some academics argued that they feared the unknown: "Academics are not used 
to it" (AH67). 
A few interviewees, mostly heads of department, also believed non-academics could be 
against PMS and some of the instruments used, namely SIADAP: "They see it more as a 
problem than as a management tool" (AH63).  
In the next section, the changes that occurred in the roles of the four Estates (Academic, 
Administrative, Student and External Representatives) will be analysed. 
6.8.3.4. Changes in the roles of the Estates 
According to most interviewees, the increased pressures to measure changed the roles of 
the four Estates. 
Academic Estate 
Several interviewees argued that the role of being an academic changed. They stated that 
academics are now held more accountable for their actions, meaning they became 
increasingly assessed, mainly by their students (through SGQ). To an interviewee this did 
not mean they have lost their autonomy:  
"I do not think they have lost their autonomy.… What they have now 
realised is that they cannot have the same future that academics had 
twenty or thirty years ago…. Today, an Assistant Professor does not 
know what chances he or she has to progress in his or her career." 
(A45)  
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To a number of interviewees, this uncertainty increased the competition between 
academics. 
Moreover, academics felt they were increasingly asked to perform bureaucratic tasks, 
which deviated their attention from research and teaching, and for which they were not 
adequately rewarded in terms of career progression. 
Although most interviewees agreed that academics were now more assessed (especially 
due to the introduction of the Student Survey), there seemed to be, according to them, 
little consequences for poor performers, rather than some not frequent 'internal 
reengineering' (e.g. attributing courses to other academics). 
Additionally, academics also worried about having to 'share' their decision-making power 
with external members, whose role increased inside the university. Nevertheless, they 
were still believed to be the most powerful group: "It is obvious that at the end of the day, 
the power lies with academics" (AH49). 
Administrative Estate 
With the introduction of SIADAP, non-academic members of staff became more assessed 
than before. The introduction of this system raised competition and created a bad 
environment within services and departments, according to some interviewees. This group 
felt their efforts were not recognised and felt disappointed and discouraged. Moreover, 
similarly to academics, they felt the workload increased enormously and many of them 
highlighted the need to increase the number of non-academics in the university, especially 
when compared to the number of academics. Additionally, with the governance changes, 
their representativeness in university governing bodies was reduced to one member. 
Student Estate 
Students' roles and influences have changed over the years, especially since they started 
to be seen as 'consumers' of higher education. Therefore, in the last years, attracting 
students and maintaining them satisfied became a concern of every university.  
In fact, and even though students always participated very actively in decision-making 
within this university, they became more influential in terms of assessment with the 
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introduction of SGQ. Actually, their opinions became the main tools used to assess 
teaching and learning. Nevertheless, most interviewees felt they were not very influential 
in terms of strategic management. 
External Representatives Estate 
Due to external demands (resulting first from European policy and later from RJIES) and 
to the internal need to improve quality and raise funds, the university felt, according to a 
number of interviewees, an urge to increasingly have external members participate in 
decision-making: 
"What is behind these changes has to do more with a new paradigm, 
which is related to the need to open up universities to the exterior, to be 
more attentive to what goes on around them and worry more about the 
society that surrounds them... than with individual needs." (L81) 
With the changes that occurred in the governance structure of the university, external 
members were now 30 per cent of the members sitting in the General Council, and 
chaired it. To some interviewees, they were co-opted by the university to participate in 
institutional life. Most of them were from the region and were chosen mainly because of 
their prestige and connections. 
6.9. Summary of the findings at the University of Aveiro 
Even though data analysis showed that UA had a strategy and that the indicators that 
resulted from the Contract-Programme and from the Contract of Confidence (both signed 
with the Portuguese government) were important elements of a strategic plan, it also 
revealed that there was not yet a formally devised strategic document, that looked at the 
university as a whole, with more structured actions, with targets, and a timetable for 
completion. Moreover, the Contract-Programme (the main strategic document) was not 
publicly available and the data collected from the interviews indicated that, with the 
exception of those working closer to the Rectory, the larger community did not know what 
the key objectives or targets of that Contract were. The absence of a formal strategic plan, 
with clear objectives derived from the 'Vision' and communicated to staff, made it difficult 
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to develop measures and targets that reflected those goals, thus complicating the 
implementation of a well-structured PMS. 
Despite this shortcoming, which was recognised by the Rector on his webpage (see 
Section 6.3.1), there was a substantial increase in the measurement of performance in UA 
over the last years. Most areas were assessed, even though some interviewees did not 
agree with some of the instruments used to measure performance and argued that 
information was still very dispersed. The areas that lacked measurement were, according 
to the interviewees, third mission, employers and alumni, regarded as important, but 
particularly difficult to assess. 
This increased level of measurement was greatly influenced by the external environment 
(see Figure 10), resulting mainly from the European policy, namely the Bologna 
Declaration; and from the state, which published a lot of legislation in the last years (see 
Annex 2). The new laws changed the Portuguese higher education system considerably. 
Additionally, the role of the market, even though minimal, started to show, as universities 
started to compete more for students. Therefore, it could be argued that the main 
pressures to measure came mainly from Europe and from the state, being little influenced 
by the market (the three external coordination mechanisms of the 'outer ring' of Figure 6). 
Internally, the new Contract-Programme, which integrated some objectives, indicators and 
targets, led to a different attitude in terms of the need to measure performance. 
Interviewees also expected the external members of the General Council to push more 
towards the introduction of control mechanisms. 
Concerning performance reporting, and according to the interviewees' perceptions, there 
was no systematic reporting in most of the areas of the university, unless these reports 
were externally demanded. Not surprisingly, given the low level of measurement, the 
areas where there was less reporting were third mission, employers and alumni. 
Many of the interviewees also mentioned the lack of use of performance data, especially 
regarding individual performance of both academic and non-academic staff. The reasons 
presented were mainly related to the legal framework, which was considered very 
protective. Since most of the employees of the university were public servants, it was 
regarded as difficult to act upon poor performers, especially if they had tenure. Moreover, 
the existence of individual assessment was even questioned by some interviewees, given 
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the extreme difficulty to progress in the academic career in Portugal. The relevance of the 
assessment of the quality of teaching was also questioned by some students, who 
showed some reservations in filling in the surveys, given the lack of consequences.  
These results suggest that the focus was on measurement, leading to the collection of 
some data with little reporting and even less action. Even though the majority of the 
interviewees regarded PMS as something positive, giving several examples of 
performance improvements, they also mentioned the existence of unintended effects, 
which included number fixation, negative competitiveness and deliberate strategies to 
conform to what was demanded. 
These findings support the inexistence of a fully developed PMS at UA, since, in spite of 
the existence of measurement initiatives in most areas, like SGQ to assess teaching and 
learning and academics, there was still little reporting and a lack of management practices 
in some areas, namely regarding individual performance. Moreover, as explained above, 
the measurement process was not closely linked to the strategic goals, as it would be 
expected from a PMS (see Figure 10). 
In terms of the factors believed to inhibit the introduction and functioning of PMS, the 
interviewees mentioned contextual factors (e.g. too many changes happening at the same 
time); cultural, since there was not, according to them, an evaluation and planning culture 
in Portugal; institutional, related to the lack of resources (financial, human and physical) 
and the lack of training for those who evaluated; and personal, in face of the resistance to 
changes, from both academics, who feared losing their 'academic freedom' to external 
members, and non-academic staff, who did not believe in the instrument used to assess 
their performance (SIADAP). 
In relation to the factors considered to enable the introduction and functioning of PMS, the 
interviewees mentioned: the need for an external 'kick'; cultural factors, which included 
developing an 'evaluative culture' within the institution; the building of trust, accomplished 
through effective leadership, and the development of a clear and simple system, carefully 
introduced and communicated; the existence of a centralised IT system; and a focus on 
inputs, which meant hiring high quality people. In UA, the habit of bringing in high quality 
staff from other universities (both national and international) did not exist. The EUA team 
noted this in their report: 
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"There is an endogamous tendency in academic staff recruitment [in 
UA]. (…) 50 to 60 per cent of academic staff earned their doctorates in 
Aveiro. This is part of a national pattern and the compounded result of 
the Portuguese institution's behaviour, which reduces each institution's 
opportunity for exogamous recruitment. This issue will need attention at 
the level of the system" (EUA 2007). 
In fact, in terms of the components of the PMS (see Figure 10), findings indicated a 
concern mainly with outputs, with several areas being measured (with the exception of 
third mission, alumni and employers). Data showed little preoccupation with inputs and 
processes, being outcomes also not measured, given the difficulties in doing it, as 
explained in Section 3.6. 
In relation to the governance structure, although considered more representative, collegial 
and democratic, the previous structure (prior to RJIES) was regarded as inefficient and 
enormously time consuming, preventing decisions from being made faster and thus 
promoting ossification and making it more difficult to implement PMS. These criticisms 
were mainly due to the excessive number of decision-making bodies and their huge size, 
even though, many times, decisions were made in more agile bodies, such as the Senate 
Management and Planning Committee and the Scientific Council Coordinating Committee, 
and in the Rectory, which had a close relationship with most departments.  
Even if it is still early to understand the real impact of the new structure (imposed on 
universities by law), it was generally regarded by the interviewees as more efficient, given 
the decrease in the number of committees and in their membership. Moreover, the 
leadership structure was considered clearer and the participation of the outside world 
bigger. The lighter, more centralised (the Rector became more powerful), and more 
externally participated structure was thought to enable more strategic decision-making 
and provide increased strategic coherence, which were considered fundamental for the 
introduction and functioning of a PMS. 
Although, there were considerable changes in the university's structure, essentially driven 
by European and national interests, the introduction of measurement, reporting and 
management practices also led to changes in the roles played by each one of the Estates 
involved in the governance and management of the university, with the exception of the 
Student Estate, who maintained relatively the same role in terms of decision-making. 
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In relation to the Academic Estate, the bureaucratic work demanded from academics, 
including work related to performance measurement, reporting and management, 
increased a lot and they were increasingly expected to perform other roles (e.g. 
management roles), which, according to them, left them less time to teach and research. 
Some academics also mentioned the possibility of a decline in the 'academic-voice' in 
institutional decision-making. Nevertheless, it was noted that they still had the most active 
voice in the university, especially in strategic decision-making, and that the 'collegial type' 
of coordination still persisted at this institution.  
Concerning the Administrative Estate, and although non-academic staff were never very 
powerful inside the university, they were now almost not represented in the existing 
governing bodies (there was one non-academic member in the General Council).  
In relation to the External Representatives Estate, the presence of external members 
increased significantly. In the previous governance structure there were two external 
representatives in the Senate, even though they felt they did not participate very much in 
strategic decision-making. Now, there are five external members in the most important 
decision-making body of the university – the General Council – and they chair this body.  
After having analysed the external coordination mechanisms and the role and influence of 
the four Estates in decision-making, UA could be placed in the governance framework 
presented in Figure 6 (see Section 2.4.4.2).  
The 'outer ring' of Figure 32 represents the role of the state and Europe as the main 
external coordination mechanisms, with the role of the market starting now to emerge. 
The 'inner ring' represents the internal coordination exerted by the four Estates – 
Academic, Administrative, Student and External Representatives – and shows that even 
though the number of external members increased in the main governing body, the 
Academic Estate is still clearly the dominant one at UA. 
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Figure 32 – Governance structures in higher education: UA  
In the next chapter, data from both cases will be crossed-analysed and discussed. 
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"The pretension is nothing; the performance every thing. 
 A good apple is better than an insipid peach." 
Leigh Hunt  
"Measurement is complex, frustrating, difficult,  
challenging, important, abused and misused."  
Sink (1991) 
In order to investigate the research aim, which is to explore how universities are 
measuring, reporting and managing performance and how governance structures relate to 
it, four specific research questions were posed at the end of Section 3.7.2: How have the 
changes in different higher education systems impacted on the governance of 
universities? How are PMS working inside universities? What factors are influencing the 
implementation and functioning of PMS in universities? How do governance structures 
influence and are influenced by the implementation and functioning of PMS in 
universities? In this chapter, a cross-case analysis of the data collected at the University 
of Warwick and at the University of Aveiro will be conducted and the main findings of this 
analysis will be discussed. This chapter is organised in light of the four questions 
delineated for the research. In Section 7.1, the impact of the changes that occurred in 
different higher education systems on the governance of universities will be discussed. 
Section 7.2 will focus on the commonalities and differences between PMS at UW and UA. 
In Section 7.3, the factors perceived to influence the introduction and function of PMS in 
universities will be examined. And finally, in Section 7.4, the links between governance 
structures and PMS will be established. 
7.1. Impact of the changes in different higher education systems on the 
governance of universities 
Literature review and documentary analysis showed that European higher education has 
gone through several reforms for more than two decades (Neave 1988; Stensaker et al. 
2007), being considerably influenced by the changes that took place in the general public 
sector (discussed in Section 1.2). 
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As seen in Section 1.3.2, higher education reforms occurred partly due to the budgetary 
consequences of the continuous increase in the size of public higher education (Bleiklie 
and Kogan 2007), resulting in concerns about costs, value for money and efficiency. The 
massification of higher education, which started in the UK and in Portugal in the 1980s, 
led to the introduction of new steering mechanisms. These advocated a shift from state 
control to state supervision (van Vught 1989). 
In fact, some authors (e.g. van Vught 1989) argued that a new state model would be more 
effective than the traditional state-control model. The basic idea would be to strengthen 
self-management in the name of efficiency and responsiveness to consumers' demands. 
To this idea also contributed: the spread of NPM ideologies and the implementation of 
NPM approaches; and the ideological shift towards the market as a coordination 
mechanism, with authors like Teixeira et al. (2004) claiming that, today, in some countries, 
it seems the state is steering the market. 
Indeed, the concept of 'steering from a distance' was regarded as an important 
governance principle at the time (Neave and van Vught 1991), redefining the role of the 
state in the provision of higher education. In Portugal, for example, the development of the 
private sector was encouraged in order to overcome the insufficient supply of state higher 
education and many private HEIs were created. In other countries, such as the UK, the 
visible cuts made in the budgets of some UK universities in 1981, as seen in Section 
5.1.1, led universities to search for new forms of funding. Moreover, reforms aimed at 
reinforcing the executive leadership of universities were introduced. In the UK, for 
example, the 1985 Green Paper (see Annex 2) stressed the need for positive attitudes 
towards business, and, in 1985, the Jarratt Report (see Annex 2) advocated new 
managerial models of governance in universities, designed to strengthen universities' 
capacity to act collectively and decisively in the face of financial pressures. Universities 
were equipped with managerial instruments (e.g. strategic plans, audits), tools (e.g. 
management software), indicators (Cave and Hanney 1992) and practices. As a result, 
new labels and images were proposed for HEIs (Stensaker 2006). To Stensaker (2006), 
the 'corporate enterprise' (Bleiklie 1998) and the 'entrepreneurial university' (Clark 1998) 
are only some of the new organisational ideals, which emphasise the need for more 
dynamic and adaptive institutions. 
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Nevertheless, this shift did not mean that governments did not play a strong and vital role 
in higher education systems (Goedegebuure et al. 1994). Actually, in a study 
commissioned by EUA to look at university autonomy in Europe, Estermann and Nokkala 
(2009) found out that national governments still retained "a central role in the regulation of 
higher education systems, and in a large number of countries, still [exerted] direct control" 
(ibid: 6). The CHEPS Consortium reached similar conclusions in a study of higher 
education governance reform across Europe, conducted in 2008. Results of the study 
indicated that while institutional autonomy had been enhanced in general, "many 
governmental reform efforts [could] imply even stronger state regulation than in the past" 
(CHEPS Consortium 2008)43. Thus, 'steering from a distance' did not mean a diminishing 
role for government, but rather a changing one. In fact, traditional tools did not disappear 
(Bleiklie 2000), remaining, for example, the governing by rules current in many countries 
(e.g. in Portugal, where many changes were implemented by decree – see Figure 22). 
However, new instruments of governance flourished (Ferlie et al. 2008). New intermediary 
bodies, such as research councils, funding councils and quality and accreditation 
agencies were created (the British funding councils, the research councils and the QAA 
are good examples of this distribution of power in the UK; and the recently created A3ES 
also an example of this practice in the Portuguese case) (Neave 2009), and, in some 
higher education systems, ex-ante control was abandoned in favour of ex-post evaluation, 
leading to the expansion of assessment/evaluation bodies (e.g. A3ES in the Portuguese 
case) (Ferlie et al. 2008; Neave 2009). Rather than a disengagement of the state, this 
reflects a new form of state engagement in higher education. Universities are being 
increasingly identified as 'key actors' in 'knowledge societies', being on the policy agenda 
in every country (Ferlie et al. 2008). For example, in the Contract of Confidence signed 
with universities and polytechnics in 2010, the Portuguese government reaffirmed the 
need to develop higher education and science, since they are "fundamental instruments 
for the country's future" (Contract of Confidence: Universities 2010 – see Annex 2). 
Moreover, the nation states also seem to be losing functions, legitimacy and authority to 
the supra-national level (namely EU), where policy agendas and strategic choices are 
increasingly defined. In reality, globalisation, internationalisation and Europeanisation 
challenged the national boundaries of higher education systems, posing new questions to 
                                                
43 In http://ec.europa.eu/education/higher-education/doc/governance/vol1_en.pdf (accessed 27 December 
2011). 
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governments and HEIs (CHEPS Consortium 2008). Several initiatives led to this blurring 
of frontiers (see Annex 2). Examples include: intergovernmental initiatives, such as the 
Bologna Declaration, focused on creating an European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 
2010 (signed, amongst others, by the UK and Portugal); the Lisbon Strategy, aimed at 
developing Europe into one of the strongholds of the new knowledge economy, where 
universities play an important role; EU framework programmes, encouraging HEIs to 
engage in large scale partnerships across national boundaries; the views and initiatives of 
the European Commission, expressed in several communiqués; OECD's initiatives to 
develop international benchmarking and best practices. 
With HEIs having to engage with a wider range of stakeholders and with the distribution of 
power becoming more diffused and pluralist (Ferlie et al. 2008), several changes occurred 
in the governance of different higher education systems and institutions, being a common 
trend the widening of institutional autonomy (Eurydice 2008; OECD 2008). This increased 
level of autonomy meant high levels of accountability, as well as more detailed procedures 
of quality assurance (CHEPS Consortium 2008). Some authors (e.g. Rhodes 1997; 
Frederickson 2005) described this redefinition of the role of the state, where nation states 
are losing functions, legitimacy and authority to an increased range of institutional authors, 
as the 'hollowing out' of the nation state and the emergence of a 'Network Governance' 
mode of public management (Rhodes 1996; Jones et al. 1997; Goldsmith and Eggers 
2004; Klijn 2005; Provan and Kenis 2008) or of a 'New Public Governance' (Osborne 
2006), as described in Section 1.2.3. 
In the UK, where NPM reforms emerged early, under the Thatcher government of the 
1980s, several changes happened, as seen in Section 5.1.1. With the budgetary 
constraints of 1981, universities started to look for new sources of funding. Universities 
like Warwick developed ways to raise extra money, such as the 'save half, make half 
policy' or the 'Earning Income Policy' (discussed in Section 5.2.1). Later, tuition fees were 
implemented at a national level, empowering students as consumers. Increasing demands 
for quality, led to the implementation of new mechanisms to measure the performance of 
both teaching and research (the QAA's assessment and the RAE), with funds being 
attributed to the highest performing HEIs. This stimulated competition for students and 
research funding between HEIs, increasingly developing a 'higher education market'.  
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As a result of these changes, in terms of governance, UK universities became relatively 
autonomous and independent from the state. CHEPS Consortium (2008) defines four 
dimensions of institutional autonomy, based on Verhoest et al.'s (2004) taxonomy of 
institutional autonomy. They distinguish between: organisational autonomy, which refers 
to the capacity of HEIs to decide for themselves on their internal authority and 
responsibility and accountability structures, without any external interference; policy 
autonomy, which is the ability to constitute their own academic community in terms of 
student and staff and to determine their teaching and research programmes; interventional 
autonomy, which is the extent to which organisations are free from ex-post accountability 
requirements (Verhoest et al. 2004); and financial autonomy, related to the ability to 
manage their own financial affairs. 
In terms of organisational autonomy, UK universities have some autonomy in changing 
their governance structures, being able to determine internally, for example, the number of 
Council members, or, in the case of the University of Warwick, the inclusion of a student in 
the Steering Committee. 
In relation to policy autonomy, UK universities are responsible for determining their 
strategic direction (UK HE International Unit 2011). They are free to select staff and 
determine their salary. Moreover, they can select their own students and determine the 
number of study places; and they have autonomy to decide on teaching and research 
programmes. 
As far as interventional autonomy is concerned, UK universities have to report formally on 
some areas, namely on the quality of teaching and research, and on finances, as showed 
in Section 5.5, where the reporting of performance per area at the University of Warwick 
was analysed. 
In terms of financial autonomy, and even though UK universities receive a considerable 
amount of government funding, either through funding bodies or research bodies (as seen 
in Section 5.1.4), they have high autonomy in managing their own financial affairs. The 
UK's HEIs are not owned or run by the government.  
As a result of the changes that occurred in the UK higher education system, namely the 
changing relationship between the government and HEIs, the governance structure of 
most UK universities was altered, with many of the existing university governing bodies 
 
 
319 
changing and some new bodies being established (De Boer et al. 2010). Following the 
recommendations of the Dearing Report and the Lambert Review (see Annex 2), the 
positions of the vice-chancellor and councils were strengthened, becoming the 
surveillance function of the Council more prominent and the relationships between vice-
chancellors and chairs of the Council and other strategically crucial committees more 
intensive (Bargh et al. 2000). In fact, there seemed to be a strengthening of institutional 
leadership, with many powers being located at the top level of institutions and with 
university leaders often running the institution as chief executive officers, with a strong 
focus on strategic planning, management by objectives and results (Bleiklie and Kogan 
2007), even if, sometimes, in reality, they did not always have the possibility to exploit 
these enhanced powers (CHEPS Consortium 2008).  
Moreover, as advised in the Dearing Report and in the Lambert Review (see Annex 2), the 
role of external members in the governance of HEIs increased, being the majority in the 
Council and participating in other important committees (e.g. the Finance and General 
Purposes Committee and the Audit Committee at UW); and the size of university councils 
was also reviewed in an attempt to reduce it. In Warwick, for example, the membership of 
the University Council was reduced to 33 members. 
Additionally, with the Council and the Senate only meeting a few times a year, specific 
committees that met on a regular basis were created in order to facilitate the functioning of 
universities (e.g. the Steering Committee, the Finance and General Purposes Committee, 
and the Audit Committee, in UW). 
In Portugal, "due largely to the historical record of the hegemonic administrative law 
paradigm, public administration continues to maintain a strong legal tradition that 
emphasizes both normative and procedural dimensions" (Tavares and Alves 2006: 392). 
In fact, most of the changes that happened both in the public sector and in higher 
education were mandated by decree.  
In relation to higher education, the major changes occurred after the signing of the 
Bologna Declaration in 1999, which foresaw the creation of a European Higher Education 
Area (EHEA), and especially after the commitment to adopt the Standards and Guidelines 
for Quality Assurance in the EHEA. Actually, since then, a lot of legislation came out, 
especially in the last years (see Annex 2), changing the Portuguese higher education 
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system considerably. The new laws introduced, among others, a new evaluation 
framework (SIADAP), a new legal regime (RJIES), new Teaching Staff Statutes, and 
created an Accreditation Agency (A3ES).  
In terms of organisational autonomy, the government determined, through RJIES, the 
governance structure of HEIs, namely the main governing and coordination bodies, giving 
institutions some liberty to make decisions concerning, for example, the number of Council 
members (between 15 and 35 – UA decided to have 19), the inclusion or not of a member 
of the non-academic staff in the Council (UA opted for having one), or the maintenance of 
the Academic Senate (which UA decided to drop). 
Regarding policy autonomy, Portuguese universities have to open public recruitment 
competitions to select their staff and are unable to determine their salary, given that most 
university employees (both academic and non-academic) are public servants, thus having 
their salaries determined by law. In terms of student selection, there are numerous 
clausus, which limit the number of students per institution. In relation to teaching 
programmes, universities have to submit new programmes or changes to existing ones to 
A3ES. Concerning the contents and teaching methods of the programmes offered there is 
almost full autonomy. 
As far as interventional autonomy is concerned, the formal ex-post accountability 
requirements are relatively low in Portuguese universities. The findings on the reporting of 
performance at the University of Aveiro (see Section 6.5) showed this. 
In terms of financial autonomy, Portuguese universities do not have much autonomy in 
managing their own financial affairs, given their dependency on state funding. The 
universities that became public foundations subjected to private law, such as UA, became 
more autonomous in managing their finances. 
All the changes that happened in the Portuguese higher education system influenced the 
way Portuguese universities are governed. In fact, the existing governing bodies (General 
Council, Management Council and the Rector), and the coordination bodies (the Scientific 
Council and the Pedagogic Council) were established by law, even though HEIs could 
make some choices, as explained above. Moreover, UA chose not to have faculties since 
the beginning, which is not the case in most other Portuguese public universities. 
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According to some interviewees, this enabled a closer line of communication between the 
Rectory and departments. 
The new structure is leaner, given that the number of committees decreased, as well as 
their membership, and more centralised, with the Rector becoming more powerful. 
Moreover, there is a clearer leadership structure, which increases individual 
accountability. The Rector and heads of department are not elected as they use to be, but 
appointed. Moreover, the participation of external members increased, being the Council 
now chaired by one. Looking at the changes that occurred, it could be argued that the 
governance structure of Portuguese universities became closer to the British one, 
following the trend of most European universities (Rhoades 1992; Amaral et al. 2002; 
Amaral and Magalhães 2002): increased centralisation; stronger institutional leadership; 
appointment of Rectors and heads of department, instead of election; increased 
accountability; and increased participation of the outside world in the governance of the 
university. 
7.2. Performance management systems at UW and UA: commonalities and 
differences 
One of the issues that motivated this research was the will to understand how universities 
were measuring performance, reporting the data collected and using that information for 
improvement purposes. In order to investigate this issue, performance management was 
presented through a systems view (see Figure 10 – Section 3.7), using three main 
dimensions – measurement, reporting and management – and performance measures 
were defined within the input-process-output-outcome model (Dochy et al. 1990; Cave and 
Hanney 1992; Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b). This section is structured according to the 
three dimensions mentioned. 
The analysis of the data collected both at the University of Aveiro and the University of 
Warwick showed an increase in the measurement of performance in both universities over 
the years. As a matter of fact, most areas were assessed in both institutions (see Table 
40), albeit some interviewees complained about some of the measures and instruments 
used to assess performance.  
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Table 40 – Instruments/measures used to assess performance at UW and UA 
Area Type UW UA 
Internal 
• Student surveys 
• Internal database (e.g. retention rates, 
dropout rates) 
• Curricular review 
• Annual review process by heads 
• Postgraduate Review Experience Survey 
• Assessment performed by AQSC 
• Evaluation of new courses and modules 
• SGQ 
• Internal database (e.g. success rates, 
failure rates) 
• Feedback forms 
Teaching 
and 
learning 
External 
• External audit performed by the QAA 
• National Student Survey (NSS) 
• Accreditation performed by PSRBs 
• Accreditation process conducted by A3ES 
Internal • Internal databases (e.g. costs, outputs, grants, income generated) 
• Internal databases (e.g. contracts signed, 
income generated) Research 
and 
scholarship External • RAE 
• International citation databases 
• Evaluation performed by FCT 
• International citation databases 
• EU's evaluation system 
Internal 
• Data on volunteer work 
• Income generated 
• Directory of people's links to external 
organisations 
• Income generated 
• Patents registered 
• Number of protocols and contracts signed 
and fulfilled 
• Number of businesses on campus 
• Number of invitations for external events 
• Number of events organised 
Third 
mission 
External • HE-BCI Survey --- 
Internal 
• Student surveys 
• Appraisal system 
• Pulse Survey 
• Internal database (e.g. number, gender, 
research data, number of PhD students) 
• Recruitment process 
• SGQ 
• Evaluation criteria when applying for 
posts 
• Internal database (e.g. number, gender) 
Academic 
staff 
External • International citation databases • International citation databases 
• Automatic progression 
Internal 
• Pulse Survey 
• Appraisal system 
• Internal database (e.g. number, gender) 
• Internal database (e.g. number, gender) 
• Staff satisfaction surveys 
Non-
academic 
staff External --- • SIADAP 
Internal 
• Internal database (e.g. number, 
attendance rates) 
• Measures of educational success (e.g. 
degree results, completion rates, 
retention rates) 
• Recruitment process 
• Student tutoring system 
• Measures of educational success (e.g. 
grades, success rates, failure rates) 
• Internal database (e.g. number, 
attendance rates) 
Students 
External --- • RAIDES 
Internal • ASDAR 
• Complaints 
• Satisfaction surveys 
• Evaluation system of non-academic staff 
• Internal databases (collect general data 
on services) 
Support 
services 
External • International Student Barometer (ISB) • QUAR 
Internal 
• Internal database (e.g. employment 
information) 
• Employment rate 
• Employers' Survey 
• Internal database (e.g. contacts) Employers 
External --- • Measures defined by external auditors (e.g. level of engagement with employers) 
Internal • Fundraising activities 
• Internal database (e.g. contacts) 
• Alumni Survey 
• Internal databases (e.g. place of work) Alumni 
External • DLHE --- 
Internal • Financial measures • Financial measures 
Finance External --- • Budget and financial execution 
• Measures defined by external assessors 
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Table 40 also shows that the instruments and measures used by both institutions to 
measure the performance of most areas were not that different, being most of them 
externally driven, that is used to prepare for external assessment exercises. For example, 
in the Portuguese case, the data collected internally on students was then sent to MCTES 
to be integrated into the Survey to the Record of Enrolled Students and Graduates in 
Higher Education – RAIDES, and the financial data collected was also sent to the Ministry 
of Finance. In the British case, the data gathered on teaching and learning was used by 
the QAA and the data on research integrated into the RAE.  
Nevertheless, it can be stated that there were more externally imposed instruments and 
measures in the Portuguese case (e.g. SIADAP to assess the performance of non-
academic staff; or QUAR to measure the performance of services) than in the British one 
(where even the RAE and the assessment performed by the QAA are voluntary, although 
most universities engage in these exercises in order to get state funding). These 
differences are arguably related to the nature of both higher education systems, namely in 
relation to the level of institutional autonomy (as explained in Section 7.1). 
Being generally less autonomous from the state, even though, as Teixeira et al. (2004) 
argued, the state had been reducing its level of intrusive regulation and moving to a more 
supervisory role, it would be expected that Portuguese universities would be more under 
externally imposed instruments or measures than British ones. 
The areas that seemed to be more thoroughly assessed were, according to the 
interviewees, finance and research and scholarship (in both cases) and non-academic 
staff (in the Portuguese case) (see Annexes 4 and 9). To the interviewees, finance was 
mainly measured because it was essential for institutional survival. As an interviewee 
stated: "(…) finance is the heart of everything" (NA41). The performance of research and 
scholarship was carefully assessed due to the need to prepare for two well-established 
research assessment exercises: the RAE in the UK, and the assessment performed by 
FCT in the Portuguese case. Both exercises influenced the amount of funding to be 
received by institutions, which represented an important slice of the overall income, thus 
being fundamental for each university's survival. Finally, non-academic staff's 
performance was considered highly measured by Portuguese interviewees, due to the 
implementation of an instrument imposed by the state on public servants – SIADAP (see 
Section 6.4.5).  
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The areas that lacked measurement in both universities were, according to the majority of 
the interviewees, third mission, employers and alumni, regarded as particularly difficult to 
measure, but considered important by all. Third mission was seen as exceptionally hard to 
assess due to its heterogeneous character, integrating a lot of activities; and links to 
employers and alumni consisted mainly of keeping a database of contacts, even though, 
in the British case, alumni were carefully looked at in financial terms, since they 
represented an increasingly important funding stream.  
In relation to the type of measures used, and following the components of the system 
presented in Figure 10 (see Section 3.7), data analysis showed an excessive use of 
output measures, in both universities, particularly in UA. In fact, the instruments and 
measures used tended to focus more on what was being achieved, that is to say, the 
products of the institution (Cave and Hanney 1992) concerning, for example, research 
(e.g. number of publications, number of citations, research income) or teaching (e.g. 
student surveys at the end of a course or a semester). In UW there was, however, 
according to most of the interviewees, also a concern with the inputs and processes. 
Indeed, several interviewees referred to the careful selection of students and staff (inputs 
of the system), which could explain the success of the university. Moreover, some of the 
committees at UW – both at university and departmental levels (see Figure 18) –, kept 
close attention to the organisational and administrative aspects related to some areas of 
the university, namely teaching and learning, and research and scholarship.  
There were no signs of outcomes being measured in either university, even though some 
interviewees acknowledged their importance. For example, different people mentioned the 
importance of measuring the impacts of third mission and of research on society. One 
interviewee even stated: "There is the scientific production on its own, but the impact of 
the research on the outside world is not measured" (L81). Eckel (2007: 88) also discussed 
the need to measure the "impact of the students' education on their personal, professional 
and civic lives". To Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b), the measurement of outcomes is 
particularly difficult and challenging, due to a number of reasons. The first is the fact that 
outcomes are generally thought of in qualitative terms, thus being difficult to measure. 
Furthermore, it takes a long time to understand, for example, the contribution of 
universities to the building of a well-educated society or their participation in economic 
development. This contribution is particularly difficult to assess given the influence that 
other external factors can have on outcomes (Boland and Fowler 2000).  
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Regarding the instruments and measures used to assess performance, these were mainly 
based on peer review in the Portuguese case. Peer review instruments were used, for 
example, in the allocation of research funding, through FCT, or to judge the quality of a 
programme, through A3ES. More recently, some universities started to develop tools, 
which are not based on peer review (e.g. UA developed a Quality Assurance System – 
SGQ – to assess the performance of teaching and learning and of academic staff). In the 
British case, and even though instruments and measures based on peer review were 
usually used (e.g. to assess the quality of teaching and learning; to assess the research 
quality; to judge the quality of a department, programme or course), PIs were also 
developed, being widely utilised to inform policy-making and institutional planning and 
strategy, according to HEFCE (2008). Even most of the data collected through peer 
review assessments was then incorporated into PIs. The analysis of the type of measures 
and instruments used in both universities thus confirms the position of the countries in the 
triangle of performance measures presented in Section 3.7.1. UA would be closer to the 
Peer Review corner and UW to the PIs corner. However, both HEIs seemed to show 
some interest in combining different performance measurement tools in the future for a 
better assessment of performance (e.g. associating PIs with peer review). 
As far as the definition or choice of the instruments and measures was concerned, some 
of these instruments and measures were decided externally, in both cases. In terms of 
teaching and learning, for example, these instruments comprised the assessment 
performed by FCT (in UA) and by research councils (in UW), in terms of competitive 
research funding, and the RAE (in UW), in terms of basic funding. In relation to teaching 
and learning, the external instruments used integrated the assessment performed by 
A3ES (in UA) and by the QAA (in UW). Moreover, there were: the indicators defined by 
MCTES (in UA) and by HESA (in UW) for students and teaching and learning; the 
indicators defined by the Ministry of Finance for finance (in UA); SIADAP and QUAR, 
mandatory for non-academic staff and services, respectively (in UA); and the indicators 
established by EUA, when it evaluated Portuguese universities, and by other external 
assessors for different areas (e.g. Professional, Statutory and Regulatory Bodies – PSRBs 
– in the British case).  
Even though departments had a fair degree of freedom in deciding which instruments and 
measures to use in UW (e.g. the centre did not impose the exact nature of feedback forms 
on departments), those measures had to comply with QAA, RAE and PSRBs' guidelines. 
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Therefore, measures regarding teaching and learning, research and scholarship, 
academic staff and students were defined in an interaction between departmental and 
central levels. Indeed, and although each department could decide individually on the 
measures used to assess these areas, some of the information had to be delivered to the 
central administration, who prepared it for external assessment exercises. After measures 
were defined, the Senate, for academic matters, and the Council had to confirm their 
appropriateness, although they rarely rejected them. Measures concerning non-academic 
staff, support services and finance, were mainly decided by the central administration, 
essentially by the Finance Office or by the Steering Committee and usually, as stated by 
an external member, 'rubberstamped' by the Council. Third mission, employers and 
alumni were hardly measured, although the few measures that existed were also 
developed by the central administration. At the time the interviews were conducted, a list 
of KPIs was being developed centrally, as a consequence of the new strategic plan, and 
also to comprise a request from the Council. 
In the Portuguese case, the process of definition of measures was more centred in the 
Rectory, which defined most of the instruments and measures used by the university. In 
terms of teaching and learning and academics, it did so by developing SGQ. Moreover, it 
recently decided on the criteria that will be used to assess academic staff's performance 
(Regulation 489/2011, of 16 August). Departments also defined measures concerning 
academics, when they opened academic posts. Nevertheless, these measures had to 
meet some of the criteria established by the Scientific Council. The few measures used to 
assess third mission, employers and alumni were defined by the Rectory and by some 
departments, which voluntarily chose to assess these areas. Even though the instruments 
utilised to measure the performance of non-academic staff and support services were 
defined externally, service directors and heads of department had to establish the 
objectives and indicators for each employee. The Administrator or, occasionally, a Vice-
Rector, set objectives and indicators for service directors. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the process of definition of instruments and measures to 
assess performance was more centralised in the Portuguese case than in the British one, 
where departments participated more in their development, even if in close collaboration 
with the central administration (see Annex 4). The centralisation of this process in the 
Rectory was perceived as a weakness by some Portuguese interviewees and could 
arguably endanger the trust in the measures developed and increase resistance towards 
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the introduction of control mechanisms. According to de Lancer Julnes (2001), 
participation in indicator development by users may increase the perception of usefulness.  
What the analysis of the data also showed was the close relationship between UW's 
'Vision', and subsequent strategic goals, and the measures chosen to assess the 
achievement of the targets set for each of those goals, especially when compared with 
UA. Indeed, in governance and management terms, there were project teams working in 
each area in UW, having each idea its project team and its project managers, as 
discussed in Section 5.3.1. In the Portuguese case, the absence of a formal strategic plan, 
other than the Rector's candidacy programme, or the Contract-Programme that the 
university had to sign with MCTES, made it difficult for the university to have a clear long-
run vision, and clear strategic objectives that would be shared by the entire community, 
and from which measures and targets should derive (Blundell and Murdock 1997; Thomas 
2004). Even if very concrete objectives were established in the Contract-Programme for 
five areas, with targets set for three and five years (see Section 6.3.1), these should be 
part of a broader vision and should, above all, be entirely disclosed to the university 
community in order to be owned by that community (Johnston and Clark 2008). Conceição 
et al. (1998) argue that values and objectives, if accepted and shared by all, will become 
organisational values and goals. To Thomas (2004: 18), "strategic planning helps 
organisations to clarify their mission, mandate and goals", being, according to Blundell 
and Murdock (1997), performance management the process of communicating 
organisational aims and objectives to all stakeholders, setting performance targets in 
order to measure the achievement of those aims and objectives, thus ensuring continual 
improvement. That did not happen in UA, making it difficult to successfully design and 
implement a PMS, as devised in Figure 10 (see Section 3.7).  
It is not however unusual to find universities without clearly defined strategic plans. 
Actually, and although, according to Larsen and Langfeldt (2005), strategic planning is a 
widely accepted tool, it has been argued that the characteristics of HEIs are incompatible 
with strategic planning objectives. Universities as 'professional bureaucracies' (Mintzberg 
1979), 'organised anarchies' (Cohen and March 1974) or 'garbage cans' (Cohen et al. 
1972) are well-known labels for describing these institutions, as discussed in sections 
1.3.1 and 2.4.2. According to Mintzberg (1979), strategy more or less loses its importance 
in professional bureaucracies, since it is hard to agree upon any common goal in this kind 
of organisation, as goal ambiguity is one of the chief characteristics of academic 
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organisations (Clark 1983). Not only are goals unclear in organised anarchies, but they 
are also highly contested when they are specified (Baldridge 1971). Moreover, given that 
a lot of power lays with professionals (academics), it is difficult for leaders at the central 
level to steer the organisation (Larsen and Langfeldt 2005). Cohen and March (1974) 
highlighted the difficulty to maintain management and leadership at universities in the 
traditional sense of administration.  
As a consequence of the characteristics of HEIs, plans are often general and vague, and, 
consequently, they do not function as a guide to future decisions (Larsen and Langfeldt 
2005), as they should. According to Dill (1996), it would be necessary to design a process 
that integrated the organisation and encouraged cooperation. If the planners succeeded in 
incorporating these elements, strategic planning would be an important tool in integrating 
highly fragmented organisations such as universities (Dill 1996). 
In UA, the reasons presented by the interviewees for the inexistence of a formal strategic 
plan were mainly:  
• Contextual – related to: the strong dependency of Portuguese universities from the 
state, making the university more vulnerable to legislative and financial changes, 
which according to some interviewees, made strategic plans more difficult to 
devise; the history of the country, which was under a dictatorship until 1974, 
delaying the development of strategic thinking; and the Portuguese culture, which 
was perceived by some interviewees as not being particularly strategy-driven; 
• Operational – given the perceived difficulties to mobilise people to work on a 
strategic plan and to create consensus on the goals, as argued by Mintzberg 
(1979) and Clark (1983);  
• Political – since, according to some interviewees, the Rectory could have 
developed a strategic plan, if it really wanted to. 
In terms of reporting, and even though some areas' performance data was formally 
reported at UA, most interviewees argued that was not done systematically. The 
exceptions were teaching and learning, where the development of the 'Bologna Reports' 
was mandatory, and finance, since the Annual Report and Accounts had to be produced 
and presented to the Ministry of Finance every year. All other reports were essentially 
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produced on demand, being normally requested by the Rectory. Moreover, the 
information collected during the measurement process was hardly published. Apart from 
the results of the assessment performed by FCT, the 'Bologna Reports', general student 
survey results, and online statistics on students and academics published by the 
Planning, Strategy, Evaluation and International Relations Office – GPEARI, performance 
information was usually only accessible to a small number of people, namely the Rectory 
and heads of department. Even if some interviewees believed the lack of disclosure of 
information empowered the individuals who held that information, it arguably endangered 
the building of trust between those in management positions and the rest of the university 
community, namely academics and non-academics in non-management roles. As Pollitt 
(1987) argued, performance measurement should be used not as an end in itself, but to 
provide staff with feedback designed to enable them to develop and improve their 
practice. Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b) considered this 'break of trust' extremely 
harmful for the implementation and functioning of a PMS (see Figure 10 – Section 3.7).  
In UW there was, according to the interviewees, a more systematic reporting of 
performance, especially after the publication of the Freedom of Information Act in 2000 
(see Annex 2). The exceptions were, as expected, two of the areas where there was less 
measurement: third mission and alumni. The full QAA report was published on the 
university website; RAE results were accessible online; HEFCE published Unistats on its 
website, including the results of the National Student Survey (NSS); the results of the 
Destination of Leavers in Higher Education Survey (DLHE) were published nationally by 
HESA; a summary of the results of the Pulse Survey was published on the university 
website; a summary of the International Student BarometerTM (ISB) results was available 
on the International Office website; the Academic Office published the Academic Statistics 
every year; and the Finance Office published the annual Statement of Accounts on its 
webpage. Additionally, some internal reports were produced and circulated between 
committees. 
In relation to the use of performance information, there were several reports of 
performance information being utilised for improvement purposes, as desired. For 
example, several interviewees at Warwick mentioned that RAE results were extremely 
positive, being used to improve the research conducted and "(…) to build a reputation" 
(NA34). Others mentioned positive rewards being attributed to good performers (both 
academic and non-academic). Also, in the Portuguese case, some interviewees argued 
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that the Quality Assurance System (SGQ) results promoted the quality of teaching. Others 
mentioned improvements in research due to the assessment conducted by FCT.  
Despite the reports on the positive use of performance information, there seemed to be a 
lack of action regarding the performance data collected in some areas in both universities. 
This issue was particularly raised regarding individual performance, of both academic and 
non-academic staff. In the British case, this happened in relation to poor performances 
and appeared to be mainly due to the fear of getting 'bad publicity' (especially given the 
role of the media in the UK) or having to compensate those people by paying them 'large 
sums of money', as described by an interviewee. Moreover, according to a number of 
interviewees, the vagueness of many job descriptions also did not help heads of 
department to distribute responsibilities inside departments. In the Portuguese case, the 
actions that could be taken towards both academic and non-academic staff were very 
dependent on the legal framework, which was, to most interviewees, extremely protective. 
Being the majority of the employees of the university public servants, it was considered 
difficult to penalise poor performers, especially if they had tenure. That could be done 
through the enforcement of disciplinary procedures, but it could be rather complicated and 
produce no results. Moreover, rewarding good performers was also difficult, given the 
extreme difficulties to progress in the academic career in Portugal. In reality, and despite 
the fact that sometimes academics have all the conditions to get promoted, there might 
not be a place for them. Plus, many interviewees argued that the quota system, 
introduced by SIADAP, made it very difficult for non-academics to progress in their 
careers as well, in spite of the quality of their work.  
There were also reports of some performance information being misused. For example, 
interviewees from both universities stated that some data was 'manipulated' in order to 
make the university look better. Others argued that performance information was, for 
example, "(…) used to bully people (…)" (AH18). 
Given the reported use of performance information in both cases, it was decided to 
propose a typology of performance data use. The use of performance information was 
divided into three categories: 
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• 'Positive use' – happens when universities strive to maximise their results by 
improving the aspects that were signaled during the evaluation process. Rebora 
and Turri (2011) call it 'positive learning'; 
• 'Misuse' – occurs when the effects of assessment contradict the objectives for 
which performance measurement, reporting and management practices were 
introduced. Meyer and Gupta (1994) call it 'wrong lessons' and van Thiel and 
Leeuw (2002) 'perverse learning'; 
• 'Non-use' – happens when nothing is done with the performance information that is 
gathered. 
Table 41 presents some examples of 'positive use', 'misuse' and 'non-use' of performance 
data in both universities. 
Practices of 'positive use' were reported in both universities, and practically in the same 
areas. The main difference resided in the non-existence of instruments to reward the good 
performance of academics in the Portuguese case, mainly due to the lack of policy 
autonomy (CHEPS Consortium 2008) referred to above. In truth, Portuguese public 
universities were unable to negotiate salaries with academic staff. In addition, as stated 
before, even if academics performed well, they had to wait for the opening of a post, which 
could take a long time. 
Practices of non-use were mainly reported in the areas where performance was less 
measured in both universities – third mission, employers and alumni – and in relation to 
academic and non-academic staff's performance (both positive and negative performance 
in the Portuguese case, and negative performance in the British case). 
The examples of 'misuse' given by the interviewees could arguably be grouped according 
to the list of unintended consequences of publishing performance data defined by Smith 
(1995) (see Section 3.3.3). The unintended consequences most reported by the 
interviewees were measure fixation, gaming, misrepresentation and myopia. 
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Table 41 – Examples of 'positive use', 'misuse' and 'non-use' of performance 
information at UW and UA 
 UW UA 
Positive 
use 
• Some data on the performance of teaching 
and learning was used for improvement 
purposes, even if not systematically (e.g. 
the data that resulted from the QAA 
assessment exercise). 
• The results of the RAE were closely looked 
at and used to improve research 
performance. 
• Good performance of academic staff was 
rewarded through merit pays, promotions 
or reduction of teaching loads. 
• If non-academic staff performed well, they 
could be promoted and rewarded. 
• Students were highly monitored and action 
was taken when considered necessary 
(e.g. through the tutoring system). 
• Support services' performance was looked 
at and acted upon by the Registrar. 
• Data on finance was well acted upon. 
• Some data collected through SGQ was 
reportedly used to improve the performance 
of teaching and learning. Nevertheless, 
many interviewees argued that this was not 
done in every department or systematically. 
• Data collected by FCT on research was 
used for improvement purposes, especially 
since it was linked to competitive research 
funding. 
• Very Good and Excellent performances of 
non-academic staff contributed to their 
direct promotion (3 consecutive Very Good 
and 2 consecutive Excellent). 
• Students were monitored and action was 
taken when considered necessary (e.g. 
improving facilities; actions to promote the 
university's image). 
• The performance of support services was 
looked at and acted upon by the 
Administrator. 
• Data on finance was well acted upon. 
Misuse 
• Some people reported using performance 
data to focus their attention on what gave 
them better results (normally research), 
leaving the rest aside.  
• There were reports on performance data 
being used to put pressure on people and 
even to 'bully' them. 
• Some cases were reported where 
performance data became an end in itself, 
with an excessive focus being given to 
metrics. 
• Some interviewees argued that the 
excessive focus on measurement led some 
people to gather around things that added 
no value.  
• A number of heads of department reported 
that some of the departmental groups that 
were created to decide on the attribution of 
grades to non-academic staff (namely 
Excellent and Very Good), used to 
determine internally who got certain grades 
one year and who would get those grades 
the following year.  
• A few interviewees stated that they used the 
performance data collected in a certain year 
to learn how to get around some indicators 
and to distinguish worthy indicators from 
other indicators. 
Non-
use 
• Data on third mission was not used, unless 
the university developed a negative 
reputation. 
• Bad performance of academic staff and 
non-academic staff were seldom acted 
upon. 
• Links to employers were not acted upon. 
To an interviewee, they would, if students 
were not getting jobs. 
• Links to alumni were not acted upon. 
• Data on third mission was not acted upon. 
• Good and bad performances of academic 
staff were seldom acted upon. 
• Bad performances of non-academic staff 
were seldom acted upon, other than some 
infrequent reengineering (e.g. moving 
employees to other services). 
• Links to employers were not acted upon.  
• Links to alumni were not acted upon. 
Interviewees from both universities reported cases of measure fixation. To them, by 
focusing on what was measurable, these institutions sometimes neglected wider 
organisational goals, particularly those goals that were more difficult to quantify. In UW, for 
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example, an interviewee argued that there was a real danger of performance 
management becoming "(…) a number of tick boxes or scoring mechanisms" (AH24). In 
UA, a number of people complained about the fixation on certain measures, namely 
quantitative, often forgetting other important aspects. For example, some interviewees 
mentioned the lack of instruments to assess the quality of teaching, and third mission, 
links to alumni and links to employers, considered important, but particularly difficult to 
measure. Thomas (2004) recognises the need to tell the performance story and not 
become mesmerised by the numbers themselves. 
Several examples of gaming were also reported in both institutions. Because targets 
typically demanded year on year improvements in performance, a few interviewees in UA 
stated that, in relation to the evaluation of non-academic staff (done through SIADAP), the 
trick was to establish less demanding targets, so that everyone accomplished them. Also, 
in relation to the performance of non-academic staff, a number of heads of department 
reported that some of the departmental groups that were created to decide on the 
attribution of grades to non-academics determined internally who got certain grades one 
year and who would get those grades the following year. At UW, some interviewees, 
namely heads of department, argued that it was hard to manage the administrative load of 
academics, since most of them were smart enough to focus their attention on what gave 
them the best results (namely research). Some academics confirmed doing that. 
Interviewees from both universities also gave examples of misrepresentation. In UA, some 
interviewees stated that they deliberately created indexes that improved their status, 
arguing that it was not something hard to do. In UW, a number of interviewees also 
confessed sometimes manipulating the performance measures that were used in order to 
create a good impression. 
Finally, myopia, that is the excessive focus on short-term targets at the expense of long-
term objectives, was particularly reported in UA, where there was not a formal strategic 
plan from which measures and targets should derive. 
Going back to the list of perceived uses of performance information developed by Behn 
(2003), it could be stated that, in UW, performance information was used to evaluate, 
control, budget, promote, celebrate, motivate, learn and improve, even though data on 
third mission, alumni and employers was not used for any of those purposes and 
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performance data on individual staff was poorly used for improvement purposes (at least 
the data related to bad performances). At UW, performance data was also used to be 
accountable (Chelimsky 1997) and to communicate and implement the strategy (Johnston 
and Clark 2008). In UA, performance information was mainly used to evaluate, to budget, 
to promote, to celebrate, to learn, to be accountable, and to improve certain areas (namely 
research and finance), with the exclusion of third mission, alumni and employers. The lack 
of established rewards and punishments linked to the measurement of individual 
performance, and the reported lack of a strategic plan and of organisational and 
departmental goals, made it difficult for the university to use performance data to control, 
to communicate or to improve in most areas. 
The analysis of performance measurement, reporting and management practices at UW 
and UA supports the inexistence of a fully developed PMS at both institutions, even 
though, as expected, since it started the process a long time before, UW was closer to 
accomplishing it than UA. In UW, despite the existence of a clearer link between strategic 
goals and the measurement process, as expected from a PMS (see Figure 10), and the 
measurement and reporting of most areas' performance (with the exception of third 
mission, alumni, employers), there was still a lack of management practices in some 
areas, namely individual performance. In the Portuguese case, despite the existence of 
measurement initiatives in almost every area (similarly to UW, the worst measured areas 
were third mission, employers and alumni), there was still little reporting and a lack of 
management practices in some areas. Moreover, the instruments and measures used to 
assess performance did not derive from the university's formal long-run strategic plan, as 
one would expect, given the absence of one. These findings were consistent with some 
literature on the public sector (see Radnor and McGuire 2004; Hood 2006; van de Walle 
and van Dooren 2008; van Dooren et al. 2010), which suggests that the focus for many 
public service organisations is on measurement, leading sometimes to an excessive 
amount of data collected with little action. The reasons that may explain this behaviour will 
be presented in the next section. 
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7.3. Factors influencing the introduction and functioning of PMS in universities 
Having analysed the way UW and UA measured, reported and managed their 
performance, our interest lied in understanding the factors that could be influencing such 
practices. Data analysis showed there were, in fact, some factors that inhibited the 
introduction and functioning of PMS and others that supported that introduction and 
functioning. For the purpose of this research these were labelled 'inhibitors' and 
'determinants', and their identification resulted from the analysis of the factors that 
interviewees perceived to be influential to the implementation and functioning of PMS and 
of the strengths and weaknesses mentioned by these interviewees in relation to 
performance measurement, reporting and management practices.  
According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, an 'inhibitor' is, in Chemistry, "a 
substance which delays or prevents a chemical reaction" and, in Biology, "a gene which 
prevents another gene from being effective". In this research, an 'inhibitor' is defined as 
something or someone which delays or prevents something from happening (in this case, 
a PMS from being implemented and/or from functioning). The definition of 'determinant' 
used in this research will be the one presented in the Oxford Advanced Learner's 
Dictionary, which defines it as "a thing that decides whether or how something happens" 
(in this case, something or someone that will decide whether or not a PMS is implemented 
and functions). Data analysis enabled the grouping of inhibitors and determinants into six 
categories: contextual, cultural, organisational, structural and technical, resource-related, 
and individual. 
Contextual factors are those related to the external environment. These comprise: socio-
economic and socio-demographic trends, such as the economic and social conjuncture 
and the population growth rate; the legislative framework, which can be more or less 
protective of the employees' rights, for example; the level of institutional autonomy (policy, 
organisational, interventional and financial); and the level of political and public scrutiny 
(e.g. pressures to measure; media coverage).  
Cultural factors comprise the cultural influences, in the form of national and organisational 
cultures, more or less supportive of the implementation of performance measurement, 
reporting and management practices. The cultural approach to organisational learning 
suggests the importance of taking organisational culture into account when considering 
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the use of performance information for decision-making (Moynihan 2005). Organisational 
culture determines not just an institution's strategy and goals, but also its modes of 
operation, including that of performance measurement (Henri 2006).  
Organisational factors are those linked to the way an organisation is divided, in 
governance and management terms; to the level of communication; to the distribution of 
responsibilities inside institutions; and to the type of leadership. In a study on quality 
assurance processes in Finish universities, Haapakorpi (2011), for example, found out 
that outcomes of quality assurance seemed to occur less in large and hierarchical 
universities.  
Structural and technical factors are those related to the way an organisation builds a PMS. 
Bouckaert (1993), for example, argues PMS that serve the purpose of contemporary 
management should not only be technically valid, but also legitimate and functional. 
Structural and technical factors comprise: the link between PIs and organisational or 
programme goals; selection of PIs; the level of involvement of people in the development 
of the system; the type of analysis techniques employed; the type of IT system used; and 
the existence of a system of rewards and punishments linked to the measures.  
Resource-related factors have to do with resource availability, these being financial, 
human and/or physical. In terms of human resources, these factors include not only the 
availability of employees, but also their professional competency, which can be provided 
to them through training, for example. 
Finally, individual factors are associated with the more or less favourable position of 
individuals towards PMS.  
Each group of factors may act as an inhibitor or a determinant in the implementation and 
functioning of PMS. Table 42 shows examples of that. 
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Table 42 – Inhibitors and determinants per group of factors 
Groups of 
factors Factors Inhibitors Determinants 
Socio-economic 
trends 
An unfavourable economic context, such as the current one, 
generally characterised by low growth rates and high levels of 
unemployment, is likely to have a negative impact not only on the 
financing of universities, but also on the number of students that 
drop out of universities. 
A favourable economic context is likely to have a positive 
impact on the financing of universities. 
Socio-
demographic 
trends 
Diminishing birth rates are likely to contribute to a decrease in 
the number of students enrolled in higher education. 
Increasing birth rates are likely to contribute to the rise of the 
number of students enrolled in higher education. 
Legislative 
framework 
Protective legislative frameworks may difficult the implementation 
of PMS (e.g. the Portuguese legislation is very protective of 
employees, making it more difficult to implement sanctions for 
poor performers) 
Less protective legislative frameworks may facilitate the 
implementation of PMS. 
Level of 
institutional 
autonomy 
Less autonomous institutions, namely in financial and regulatory 
terms, as in the Portuguese case, may inhibit the introduction of 
PMS. 
Higher levels of institutional autonomy, such as British 
universities have, are likely to facilitate the introduction of PMS. 
Pressures to 
measure 
The lack of external pressures to introduce PMS may discourage 
the implementation of PMS. 
The existence of external pressures is likely to force 
organisations to adopt efficiency-oriented approaches (Roy and 
Seguin 2000). Interviewees from both universities mentioned 
the need for an 'external push' to introduce performance related 
practices. In Portugal, this external kick was essentially brought 
by European policies (Europe – the external coordination 
mechanism of Figure 6) and national legislation (the State); in 
the UK, the 'push' was brought by the increased competition 
between universities (the Market) and by national legislation 
(the State). 
Contextual 
Public scrutiny Low public scrutiny is more likely to discourage the implementation of PMS. 
The fact that media coverage is perceived to shape public 
opinion suggests that universities would, as far as possible, 
endeavour to avoid negative publicity (Taylor 2011). UK is a 
good example of a country where media is very intrusive. 
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Groups of 
factors Factors Inhibitors Determinants 
National culture 
The absence of an evaluation culture in a country is likely to 
discourage the implementation of PMS. For example, as some 
interviewees pointed out, the absence of an evaluation and 
planning culture in Portugal made it difficult for institutions and 
people to understand the importance of introducing a PMS. 
The existence of an evaluative national culture is more likely to 
foster the implementation of PMS. The evaluative culture is 
particularly developed in Anglo-Saxon countries, being almost 
inexistent in Southern-European Countries, and namely in 
Portugal (Rhodes et al. 2012). This probably constitutes the 
most challenging task, since it cannot be built overnight or by 
decree, requiring time to consolidate. 
Cultural 
Organisational 
culture 
The existence of an organisational culture that is not motivated to 
measure is more likely to negatively influence the implementation 
of PMS.  
The development of an evaluative culture within the institution 
is arguably important for the successful implementation and 
function of PMS. Interviewees of both countries reported the 
existence of evaluative cultures in both universities. 
Type of 
structure 
Complex governance structures are more likely to delay 
decision-making, thus making it more difficult for a PMS to 
function properly. Interviewees at UW reported that the existence 
of too many committees delayed decision-making, thus making it 
more difficult for a PMS to function properly. 
A more centralised, flatter structure, with less hierarchical 
levels, arguably enables faster decision-making (Haapakorpi 
2011), which is essential for the functioning of a PMS. The 
existence of such structure was also considered as a strength 
in many EUA reports (Rosa et al. 2011). This type of structure 
existed in both universities, at least at the management level, 
and was regarded as an advantage by all interviewees. 
Distribution of 
responsibilities 
The lack of a clear responsibility structure is likely to endanger 
the issue of accountability, which is of extreme importance when 
implementing a PMS. At UA, some interviewees mentioned 
difficulties to understand who to be accountable to, for example. 
Clearly defined roles and responsibilities facilitate 
accountability issues, thus enabling an easier functioning of 
PMS. 
Type of 
leadership 
Weak leaders, whose managerial and leadership skills are not 
recognised and respected by everyone, endanger the functioning 
of PMS. Some Portuguese heads of department complained 
about the lack of managerial legitimacy of Assistant or Associate 
Professors to act upon Full Professors. The lack of support from 
the centre to act upon individuals was also reported by heads of 
department at UW. 
The existence of strong leadership may be a sign of 
institutional commitment towards the introduction of PMS, thus 
arguably contributing to build an evaluative culture and 
contribute to trust building. To Larsen and Gornitzka (1995: 
356), "resilience to organisational change in general is to be 
expected within universities where the management potential is 
low". In its reports, EUA recognises leadership as a strong 
point in the promotion of institutional governance and 
management (Rosa et al. 2011).  
Organisational 
Level of 
communication 
Communicational problems (both horizontal and vertical) 
arguably constrain measurement, reporting and management 
practices. Interviewees at both universities reported the 
existence of poor communication at several levels. Moreover, the 
results of the Pulse Survey showed that at UW. 
A system that is well communicated to the entire university 
community is considered important to build trust and for the 
effective implementation and functioning of a PMS. 
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Groups of 
factors Factors Inhibitors Determinants 
Link between 
PIs and 
goals 
The absence of a formal strategic plan from where measures 
and targets are derived is likely to constrain the successful 
implementation of a PMS. In the Portuguese case, the majority 
of the interviewees reported the absence of a formal strategic 
plan, making it difficult to determine indicators and targets. 
The existence a formal strategic plan, which incorporates an integrated 
vision for the university, from where measures and targets are derived, 
arguably fosters the development of a well-built PMS. In fact, some of the 
strengths identified by EUA in their evaluation reports usually covered the 
existence of a mission, vision and strategic plan, which included 
institutional objectives, priorities and strategies, and its implementation 
(Rosa et al. 2011). For example, according to most interviewees, the 
existence of a clear Vision at UW, with clear and focused goals, facilitated 
the development of PIs. 
Selection of 
PIs 
The use of an excessive number of instruments and measures 
to assess performance may lead to measure fixation (Smith 
1995) and to excessive bureaucracy, thus making it difficult to 
focus on what really matters – positive learning. On the other 
hand, the use of few PIs makes it more difficult to obtain an 
accurate report of performance (Meyer and Gupta 1994). To 
van Thiel and Leeuw (2002: 276), "few indicators for a limited 
part of total performance facilitate the occurrence of a 
performance paradox", talking about the discrepancy between 
policy objectives and operational goals. 
The careful selection of PIS is likely to lead to a well-built PMS, arguably 
facilitating its functioning. Not only the number of PIs, but also their quality 
and adequacy are important for the successful implementation of a PMS. 
Level of 
involvement 
The excessive centralisation of the design of PMS may lead to 
the break of trust in those systems. Most of the Portuguese 
interviewees mentioned that the Rectory defined the majority of 
the instruments and measures used to assess performance.  
Trust building can be accomplished by developing a clear and simple-cut 
PMS, step-by-step, which is participated since the beginning. To de Lancer 
Julnes (2001), participation in PIs development may increase the 
perception of usefulness. 
Analysis 
techniques 
employed 
Traditional, simpler analysis techniques, even though useful, 
tend to give a more incomplete picture of performance data. 
The use of more sophisticated analysis techniques, which combine several 
elements, is more likely to lead to the successful functioning of PMS. Some 
authors (e.g. Sarrico et al. 1997; Nyhan and Martin 1999) used, for 
example, Data Envelopment Analysis to analyse performance data. In UW, 
there was a group of non-academics (some with doctorate degrees) who 
analysed performance data by using sophisticated techniques. 
IT system 
used 
Technical problems may jeopardize the successful 
implementation of a PMS. For example, the inexistence of a 
single IT system that aggregates performance data from 
different areas arguably disperses performance information 
across the institution and duplicates administrative work. 
The existence of a single IT system that incorporates all the performance 
information is likely to provide a clearly overall picture of the way an 
institution is performing. Some interviewees at UW argued that the 
university was developing one. 
Structural 
and 
technical 
System of 
rewards and 
punishments 
The absence of a system of incentives is more likely to lead 
people not to perform as expected. At UW, the interviewees 
reported the existence of such a system. 
The development of targets clearly linked to a system of incentives was 
considered important for the implementation of a PMS. 
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Groups of 
factors Factors Inhibitors Determinants 
Resource-
related 
Resource 
availability 
(human, 
financial and 
physical) 
Financial constraints create serious problems both to the 
implementation and functioning of a PMS, since the cost of 
getting data is high. Additionally, the shortage of human and 
physical resources means that performance-related issues will 
take longer to operationalise. Interviewees reported financial 
constraints in both universities. In UA, most interviewees argued 
that the number of non-academics should increase. 
Moreover, some Portuguese interviewees also complained about 
the lack of training programmes for some employees, namely 
those involved in performance measurement and management 
processes. 
Hiring high quality people (both academic and non-academic) 
and training them, when needed, is one of the focal points of a 
well-built PMS. Interviewees from both universities mentioned 
this fact, even though UW was more thorough in the selection 
of its staff than UA, where there was an endogamous tendency 
in academic staff recruitment (reported in EUA's 2007 report). 
Individual 
Position of 
individuals 
towards PMS 
A less positive perception of PMS may lead to resistances to the 
implementation of such systems. The existence of internal 
interest groups, for example, which are less favourable to the 
introduction of measurement, reporting and management 
practices, may endanger the implementation and function of 
PMS. Behn (2002) identified a number of psychological barriers 
to the successful implementation of performance management 
and proposed a mental reorientation, which requires a new way 
of thinking for the many actors involved in PMS. 
Interviewees at both universities mentioned the least positive 
attitude of academics towards PMS, since they feared losing 
their autonomy to external members (in UA) and to non-
academics (in UW). Lockwood (1985) argued that the rise of 
ideals such as 'academic freedom' seemed to create in-built 
resistance to management control. 
Positive perceptions on the importance of PMS are likely to 
lead to fewer resistances to the implementation of such 
systems. 
Interviewees of both universities mentioned the positive attitude 
of external members towards the introduction of PMS, mainly 
due to their experiences in the private sector.  
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Table 43 identifies the 'inhibitors' and the 'determinants' at UW and UA, according to the 
interviewees' perceptions. The 'inhibitors' are represented by a (-), and the 'determinants' 
by a (+). (0) means that the factor is neither an 'inhibitor' nor a 'determinant' for that 
institution. 
Table 43 – Inhibitors and determinants at UW and UA 
Groups of factors Factors UW UA 
Socio-economic trends (-) (-) 
Socio-demographic trends (0) (-) 
Legislative framework (-) (-) 
Level of institutional autonomy (+) (-) 
Pressures to measure (+) (+) 
Contextual 
Public scrutiny (+) (+) 
National culture (+) (-) Cultural Organisational culture (+) (+) 
Type of structure Committee structure (-) Management structure (+) (+) 
Distribution of responsibilities (-) (-) 
Type of leadership (+) (+) 
Organisational 
Level of communication (-) (-) 
Link between PIs and goals (+) (-) 
Selection of PIs (+) (-) 
Level of involvement (+) (-) 
Analysis techniques employed (+) (-) 
IT system used (-) (-) 
Structural and 
technical 
System of rewards and 
punishments 
Rewards (+) 
Punishments (-) (-) 
Resource-related Resource availability (human, financial and physical) 
Human (+) 
Financial (-) 
Physical (+) 
Human (-) 
Financial (-) 
Physical (+) 
Individual Position of individuals towards PMS 
Academics (-) 
Non-academics (-) 
External members (+) 
Students (+) 
Academics (-) 
Non-academics (-) 
External members (+) 
Students (+) 
Table 43 shows that, according to the interviewees' perceptions, there are more 'inhibitors' 
to the implementation and functioning of PMS at UA than at UW, and more 'determinants' 
at UW. These findings are not particularly surprising, given the fact that UA has just 
recently started to worry about performance measurement and management issues. 
Structural and technical factors and cultural factors seem to be the main handicaps to the 
successful implementation of performance measurement, reporting and management 
practices at UA. Even though the lack of an evaluative culture in Portugal is probably the 
hardest thing to change, since it takes time, the structural and technical issues can be 
improved if acknowledged.  
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The study of the 'inhibitors' and 'determinants' of PMS is arguably important to 
comprehend all the factors that can prevent or foster the development of a PMS. Their 
acknowledgement may help to build a good system. This analysis is thus regarded as 
important to help HEIs to properly design PMS and to successfully implement 
performance measurement, reporting and management practices.  
Having explored the main factors influencing PMS, either negatively or positively, the next 
section will explore the relationship between governance structures and PMS.  
7.4. Links between governance structures and performance management systems 
As documentary analysis and the analysis of the data collected through the interviews 
conducted both at the University of Warwick and at the University of Aveiro showed, 
several pressures are forcing universities to renew and reshape their governance 
structures and management practices, often requiring the adoption of methodologies and 
techniques once only used in the private sector. Among these practices, a special 
attention was given to the introduction of performance control mechanisms, with the intent 
of stimulating continuous quality improvement within universities and providing higher 
levels of efficiency and efficacy of academic activities. Therefore, in order to better 
understand the relationship between governance structures and PMS, it was deemed 
necessary to further analyse the pressures felt by the interviewees to introduce control 
mechanisms aimed at measuring, reporting and managing performance at both 
universities. From all the pressures felt, the interviewees reported that external pressures 
were the most influential ones and that internal pressures usually only emerged to help 
deal with the former. 
In the British case, external pressures came mainly from the state and from the market. 
Actually, the state implemented a lot of policies since the 1980s (see Figure 13 in Section 
5.1.1 and Annex 2), destined to promote the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of 
the public sector, and from which universities, even though quite autonomous, were still 
financially dependent (34 per cent from funding bodies and 16 per cent from research 
bodies in 2009/2010 – see Figure 14 in Section 5.1.4). As for the market, actually, in the 
last years, the competition between universities became tougher, and universities started 
competing for students, for staff and for funding, as argued by many interviewees. 
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In the Portuguese case, external pressures came essentially from European policies and 
from the state. In relation to the former, after the signing of the Bologna Declaration in 
1999, a lot of policies were agreed upon by several nation states, with many of them 
committing towards the establishment of common higher education policies (see Annex 
2). The majority of these policies aimed at improving quality within the European Higher 
Education Area (EHEA). In fact, since 1999, the Standards and Guidelines for Quality 
Assurance in the EHEA were established; the European Quality Assurance Register for 
Higher Education (EQAR) was launched; and the European Commission funded two 
projects (van Vught 2009): one to study the possibility of establishing a classification of 
European universities (U-Map), and the other to analyse the implementation of a multi-
dimensional ranking system (U-Multirank). These recent developments will most likely 
lead to a ranking of European universities and to the implementation of a stratified EHEA. 
In relation to the state, indeed the Portuguese government published a lot of legislation 
very recently, which fostered the introduction of control mechanisms (see Figure 22 in 
Section 6.1.1 and Annex 2).  
This analysis showed that all the external pressures identified in both universities are 
included in the 'outer ring' of our governance framework (see Figure 6 in Section 2.4.4.2) – 
the state, the market, and Europe – and relate to each other. First, European policies 
drove national governments to promote quality and assess that quality in order to assure 
it, and also made the different stakeholders more aware of quality issues in higher 
education, as explained above. The exceptions to this trend were Anglo-Saxon countries, 
which started to employ control mechanisms in the public sector, in general, and in HEIs, 
in particular, before the implementation of these policies, often serving as a benchmark to 
them. Moreover, European policies seemed to be sometimes used as justifications for 
carrying out certain national policies that would otherwise be more contested. Second, the 
market also influenced European and national policies, since different stakeholders (e.g. 
students, parents, employers and alumni) started to demand more quality from HEIs (e.g. 
in UW, several interviewees reported that parents started to worry more with their 
children's education and that students became more preoccupied with what the university 
is offering them and with their future). As a result, HEIs started to realise that only by 
offering quality they would be able to survive (e.g. both British and Portuguese 
interviewees reported being increasingly worried with the university image). Third, the way 
governments forced universities to implement control mechanisms, using some of those 
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mechanisms to develop PIs and to create rankings, enabled comparisons between HEIs, 
thus increasing competitiveness between these institutions (e.g. in the UK, university 
rankings are frequently used by students to select universities).  
But how have governance structures been influenced by the urge to introduce control 
mechanisms? The pressures to reform mentioned above led to some changes in the 
governance of both universities. In Portugal, the government demanded a restructuring of 
public HEIs' governance structures, making them flatter and leaner, with a shrinking in the 
number of decision-making levels and in the membership of governing and coordination 
bodies. According to most Portuguese interviewees, even though the new structure could 
endanger democracy and the quality of decision-making, it was considered more efficient 
and effective, and more appropriate for the implementation of performance measurement, 
reporting and management practices. As an interviewee argued: "You have to let go of the 
little things, otherwise you will never choose the big things" (NA14). Moreover, new offices 
aimed at promoting strategic planning and implementing PMS, such as the Strategic 
Planning Office (GPE) at UA, were created. In the British case, not so many changes 
occurred in terms of the existing governance structure, even though the number of Council 
members decreased to 33 and the Senior Management Team became more active in the 
management of the university.  
In spite of the differences between UW and UA, the changes in the institution-level 
governance structures of both institutions followed the general trend towards the 
centralisation of authority referred to in Section 7.1 (e.g. in the Portuguese case, the 
Rector became more powerful and, in the British case, the Senior Management Team 
became more preeminent in institutional management). While some interviewees from 
both universities showed some concerns about this excessive centralisation of decision-
making, others recognised that it would also speed decision-making and facilitate the 
introduction of PMS. As stated in Section 7.2, a high degree of centralisation was an issue 
praised by EUA in the evaluation reports (Rosa et al. 2011). Clark (1983) agreed with this 
line of reasoning, arguing that, in the 'collegial model' of governance, meetings often took 
too long, delaying the decision-making process and not leaving enough room for strategic 
decisions to be made. Moreover, being a foundation, UA became more autonomous from 
the state, even though it also became more accountable, having now to accomplish the 
objectives established in the Contract-Programme signed with MCTES. This widening of 
institutional autonomy has been a trend in many European higher education systems 
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(Eurydice 2008; OECD 2008), as explained in Section 7.1. Similarly to other British 
universities, UW was already quite independent from the state, even though it was closely 
supervised by it. 
Apart from structural changes, there was also a change in the roles and influences played 
by each one of the groups that constituted the governing and management bodies of both 
universities (our four Estates – Academic Estate, Administrative Estate, Student Estate 
and External Representatives Estate), even though not in a similar way.  
Concerning the Student Estate, and although they were one of the less represented 
Estates in the governing bodies of both universities, their voices were increasingly heard 
in these bodies, as keeping them satisfied became a priority. This was more visible in UW, 
where high tuition fees were charged, thus raising quality expectations. However, when 
compared to other Estates, they were not very powerful in terms of strategic thinking and 
decision-making.  
In relation to the External Representatives Estate, external members always played an 
important role in UW, being the majority in the Council, the ultimate decision-making body. 
Nevertheless, there was a general feeling among the interviewees (including external 
members) they could participate more actively in decision-making, namely regarding 
strategic options. In UA, their presence increased considerably. In fact, in the previous 
governance structure there were only two external representatives in the Senate, and, as 
they stated, there was no strategic decision-making there. The new structure 
contemplates five external members in the General Council, the most important decision-
making body of the university, and they chair this body. The increased presence of 
external members in governing bodies has also been a common trend in many European 
universities (Rhoades 1992), as explained in Section 7.1, following the path of Anglo-
Saxon HEIs. The opening of universities to new non-governmental stakeholders, such as 
firms and civil society, and the sharing of decision-making with them, is a good example of 
the move towards a 'Network Governance' model (Rhodes 1996; Jones et al. 1997; 
Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Klijn 2005; Provan and Kenis 2008) or a 'New Public 
Governance' model (Osborne 2006). The bigger participation of external members in 
university decision-making shows the preoccupation of universities with the increasingly 
complex, plural and fragmented nature of public policy implementation (Osborne 2006), 
being considered the best way to achieve the desired outcomes. Moreover, most 
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interviewees regarded the inclusion of external members in governing bodies as a way to 
foster the development of PMS in universities, given the fact that most of them come from 
the private sector, where these mechanisms are widely used. 
Regarding the Administrative Estate, even if they were never very influential in terms of 
decision-making in UA, their participation in governing bodies decreased substantially. In 
the British case, the opposite happened. Although UW was always known for having a 
strong administrative core, which was very important in the transformations that took place 
in the institution (e.g. participating actively in the definition of the 'Earning Income Policy'), 
pressures to become more efficient, effective and accountable led to an increased 
influence of non-academics in decision-making. This change raised concerns among the 
academic community, with some academics fearing that administrators would 'step too far 
over the line', endangering the 'collegiality' element and the 'academic freedom' they 
always had. Nevertheless, data analysis showed that academics were not excluded from 
decision-making at UW. Au contraire, the Academic Estate and the Administrative Estate 
shared responsibilities for the governance and management of the institution. Shattock 
(2006) believed in a 'shared governance' in universities, arguing: "Responsibilities need to 
be shared with the academic community (…). Unless they are fully engaged in critical 
discussion of changes in academic organization, important issues are likely to be 
overlooked" (ibid: 130). 
As a matter of fact, it was noted that the Academic Estate still had the most active voice in 
both universities, especially in strategic decision-making, given that they were the majority 
in all the governing and management bodies in UA, and they were strongly represented in 
the most important governing bodies in UW, being the majority in the Steering Committee 
and the Senior Management Team, the most important management bodies. The 
importance of academics in decision-making was even clearer in the Portuguese case, 
where decision-making was not shared with non-academic staff as in the British 
university. Thus, the fear of losing autonomy, which then translates into tensions between 
managerial and professional norms (e.g. several interviewees reported these pressures 
when asked about the relationship between academics and non-academics), seemed to 
be somewhat of a paradox. Indeed, although academics had a lot of power inside both 
universities, deciding on most of the performance instruments and measures used (see 
Annexes 4 and 9) and on what happened to poor- and good-performing fellow academics, 
they still felt they were losing their autonomy. Moreover, data showed that the level of 
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accountability they were subjected to at both institutions was low, being 'soft' 
accountability measures favoured over 'hard' measures that would involve rewards and 
sanctions. Huisman and Currie (2004) reached similar conclusions on a study conducted 
in four universities from different countries (France, the Netherlands, Norway and the US), 
arguing that despite the strong cries for more accountability from higher education's 
stakeholders in various countries, there was no severe impact on day-to-day practices of 
academics (Huisman and Currie 2004). Why then did academics feel more controlled? 
Kekäle (2005) argued that sometimes academics who reject a managerial label take too 
narrow a definition of the term, since they already carry out a number of managerial roles 
when, for example, they are responsible for resources, curricula or supervision of 
students. Melo et al. (2010) argued that it could be a 'big brother effect', in the sense that, 
although there were little consequences for their poor performance (as discussed in 
Section 7.2), academics still felt they had to perform well because everyone was watching 
them, both internally and externally, especially in the British university. And it seemed to 
work.  
To Huisman and Currie (2004), the reasons for the subversion of accountability 
mechanisms in HEIs could be due to: academic resistance to the implementation of such 
mechanisms, sometimes even subverting them (as seen in Section 7.2, where clear 
examples of unintended effects were presented); the failure of government policies to 
implement more severe control mechanisms; or the fact that university managers willingly 
prefer softer accountability mechanisms over stronger ones, believed to be most suited for 
universities. 
Although the accountability mechanisms imposed on academics were considered soft, the 
bureaucratic work demanded from them increased in both universities. They were 
gradually expected to perform 'new' roles (e.g. management roles and fundraising), which, 
according to them, left them less time to teach and research. So, and even though they 
still had to be professionally accountable, in the sense they had to respond to their peers 
rather than to superiors (Mattei 2009), their degree of 'managerial accountability' also 
raised (they were now more accountable to managers, academic or not). While 
'professional accountability' is based on expertise, to Day and Klein (1987: 27) 
"managerial accountability is about making those with delegated authority answerable for 
carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance". Nevertheless, data 
analysis showed that 'managerial accountability' did not increase at the expense of 
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'professional accountability'. As a matter of fact, academics were still assessed by their 
peers mainly in terms of research and scholarship and teaching (e.g. FCT evaluations and 
the QAA assessment for teaching and the RAE for research are peer review processes). 
Thus, it could be argued that 'professional' and 'managerial' accountability can co-exist, 
not being necessarily incompatible. 
Having analysed the external coordination mechanisms and the role and influence of the 
four Estates in decision-making and in the implementation of performance measurement, 
reporting and management practices, it is possible to place both universities in our 
governance framework (see Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33 – Governance structures in higher education: UW and UA 
The 'outer ring' represents the role of the state, the market and Europe as the main 
external coordination mechanisms, even though, it should be stressed that the role of 
European policy in UW was practically inexistent, with no interviewee referring to it in the 
interviews, and the role of the market was barely noticeable in the Portuguese case, 
although some interviewees believed it was slowly increasing. 
The 'inner ring' represents the internal coordination exerted by the four Estates – 
Academic, Administrative, Student and External Representatives. UW could be placed 
between the Academic Estate and the Administrative Estate, since decision-making was 
mainly in the hands of academics and non-academic staff. External members also exerted 
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some influence in institutional governance, even though some interviewees argued that 
they could and should have a more active role in strategic decision-making. The decision-
making structure at UW left students with the least decisive role, even though their voices 
were heard at the university (it should be reminded that UW was the only British university 
where a student sat in the Steering Committee). The analysis of the data showed that UA 
could be placed very close to the Academic Estate, which was still clearly the dominant 
one in institutional decision-making, even though the number of external members in The 
Council arose. 
It is believed that this governance framework could be used for any HEI, and even for 
higher education systems, enabling researchers and practitioners to comprehend which 
are the most influential external and internal coordination mechanisms, thus arguably 
helping governments to implement policies regarding higher education and university 
managers to better implement strategic planning and performance measurement, 
reporting and management practices. 
Having understood the main external and internal coordination mechanisms in both 
universities, it should be recalled that, in Section 7.2, it was stated that none of the 
universities had a fully developed PMS yet, even though UW was closer to having one 
than UA. It was also argued that the inexistence of such a system was largely due to the 
'misuse' or 'non-use' of performance data, mainly relating individual performance. What 
would be interesting to understand now is how do governance structures and the four 
Estates influence PMS, namely how do they contribute to the 'positive use' of some 
performance data and how do they contribute to the 'misuse' or the 'non-use' of other data. 
Essentially forced by external pressures to adopt strategic management and implement 
performance measurement, reporting and management practices, institutions in general 
tend to conform to prevailing societal beliefs and values and to establish and 
institutionalise homogeneous structures and processes, in the pursuit of legitimacy. The 
organisational tendency to conform and homogenise has been described in the literature 
as 'isomorphism' (Hawley 1968; Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
A combination of these isomorphic patterns can happen (Modell 2001) and has been 
spotted in universities. When looking at the external coordination mechanisms (see 
Figures 21 and 32), the main pressures to introduce PMS were external and came mainly 
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from European policy and from the state, in the Portuguese case, and from the state and 
the market in the British case. This shows the existence of 'coercive isomorphism' 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) in both cases, since both universities were financially 
dependent from the state, and thus had to conform to externally dictated processes and 
structures. This was particularly visible in the Portuguese case, where, for example, 
universities were forced by law to change their governance structures and had to adopt 
external instruments to measure, for example, the performance of non-academic staff or 
support services (SIADAP and QUAR, respectively). With the reduction of governmental 
financial support to universities, direct government provision and control decreased and 
some responsibilities started to be devolved to the market. This trend that started in the 
Anglo-Saxon world is now showing in many other European countries, including Portugal, 
where universities were given the opportunity to become public foundations subject to 
private law (even though only three institutions decided to became a foundation). This 
decrease in governmental support led universities to try to follow 'market leaders', that is 
the best national and international universities, which were disclosed in the 'league tables', 
'for better and for worst', as an interviewee stated. These practices can be called 'mimetic 
isomorphism' (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), where 'market followers' copy 'market leaders', 
in an attempt to improve. For example, in UW some interviewees mentioned the 
benchmarking by other universities of the way they measured, reported and managed 
their finances. Moreover, the reported proximity between the visions of many British 
universities, where many set similar goals, is a good example of that type of behaviour. 
Finally, 'normative isomorphism' (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) can be found both in 
universities managed by professional managers, who brought their values from the private 
sector, thus arguably influencing internal processes (e.g. pushing towards the introduction 
of control mechanisms), and in the universities managed by academics, where academic 
values, namely the concept of 'academic freedom', highly influence the existing structures 
and processes (Mintzberg (1979) mentioned it when he considered HEIs as 'professional 
bureaucracies').  
With the combination of the different isomorphic behaviour patters, it would be expected 
that organisations would become shaped and institutionalised by their environment 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott and Meyer 1991; Scott 1995), but that is not always the 
case, especially in institutions that present such particular features. In fact, organisational 
studies have always considered universities as symbols of complexity with specific 
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characteristics. Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) defined them as 'garbage cans' and 
Cohen and March (1974) as 'organised anarchies', with ambiguous and problematic 
objectives. In this type of organisation, thoughts about strategic planning and PMS present 
a challenge, since the preparation of strategic plans and the definition of measures and 
targets will arguably result in increased coordination, which may take place at the cost of 
individual autonomy. 
In these particularly complex organisations, which, on the one hand, must adapt 
themselves to the various strains of public authority, and where, by contrast, the norms of 
academic freedom and autonomy dominate internally, the introduction of PMS can often 
lead to unintended behaviours, such as the 'misuse' or to the 'non-use' of performance 
information. All these unintended effects can be caused by factors like the absence of a 
strategy with well-defined goals (reported in UA); or the existence of ambiguous strategic 
goals, which makes it more difficult to translate them into operational goals (Clark 1983). 
However, the particular organisational characteristics of universities makes it appropriate 
to consider the 'positive use', 'misuse' or 'non-use' from two different interpretative 
viewpoints: related to the structure and to the actors' expectations. 
According to the 'rational system perspective', structural arrangements within 
organisations are designed for the efficient realisation of ends (Scott 1987). The premise 
upon which this approach is based is that the formal structure guides and influences 
decision-making behaviour. This means that the formal structure can have an instrumental 
value in achieving specific goals and in contributing to the 'positive use' of performance 
information. Nevertheless, our research showed that, even though, for example, in the 
British case, the Council pushed towards the development of KPIs, the main governing 
bodies of both universities were regarded as inefficient, time-consuming, and non-
strategic, being defined by interviewees from both universities as 'rubberstamping bodies'. 
This deprived these bodies from their 'instrumental value', attributing them a 'symbolic 
value'. Larsen and Gornitzka (1995) call it 'window dressing', Meyer and Rowan's (1977) 
'decoupling strategies', and Larsen (2001) describes boards 'as rituals'. Having to adapt 
themselves to the various strains of public authority, with the norms of academic freedom 
and autonomy dominating internally, universities sometimes opt for 'ceremonial 
management' (Meyer and Rowan 1977) or 'ritual' acts, the so-called 'rubberstamping' role 
of many of the governing bodies, and 'misuse' or 'non-use' performance information. Most 
of the times, data gets collected, sometimes it gets reported (more in the British case than 
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in the Portuguese case), but then it is sometimes 'misused' or 'non-used', as explained in 
Section 7.2. 
How can then universities function and be successful, as our cases are? It seems that 
both universities have managed to get around the committee hierarchy, through 
centralisation, operating on a day-to-day basis through more agile bodies: the Steering 
Committee and the Senior Management Team, in the British case; and the Rectory, the 
Senate Management and Planning Committee and the Scientific Council Coordinating 
Committee (within the old structure), in the Portuguese case. These bodies seem to 
belong to a 'parallel structure', composed of senior academics and administrators, in UW, 
and senior academics, in UA, which is more operational and effective, and thus more 
favourable to the introduction of control mechanisms. This structure co-exists with the 
'formal structure', more inclusive (with academics, non-academic staff, students and 
external members), but also heavier and more time consuming. In the 'formal structure', 
decisions take a long time to make and are reviewed over and over by different 
committees, arguably improving the quality of decision-making, but also promoting 
duplication and ossification. In this 'game', the 'parallel structure' seems to manage the 
university, being the reported challenge to find ways to get around the 'formal structure'. 
Even though the general community acknowledges the existence of the 'parallel structure', 
most of its members still believe in the importance of the 'formal structure', which 
occasionally blocks decisions from going further (mainly the Senate, in the British case, 
and the Scientific Council, in the Portuguese case). But, in reality, more important than to 
make important decisions, the 'formal structure' seems to have two important roles: to 
legitimise decision-making to the exterior; and to build trust inside the institution. Indeed, 
by believing they are actively contributing to decision-making within the university, the 
wider community will trust the organisation and the decisions made by that organisation 
and will more easily 'get on board'. Klijn et al. (2010) argues that trust is important for 
achieving better (perceived) outcomes. The only time the two structures seem to collide is 
when the type of decisions to be made conflicts with prevailing values. For example, 
issues related to academic freedom and loyalty to the discipline may be more difficult to 
control. That is why the assessment of academic staff is so controversial. In fact, students' 
opinions are gathered, through surveys, but then not much action is taken towards poor 
performers. This is less problematic in the British case, where, at least, positive incentives 
can be given to overachievers.  
 
 
353 
The second viewpoint for discussing the 'positive use', 'misuse' or 'non-use' of 
performance information is related to the key actors' strategies, actions and reactions in 
relation to measurement, reporting and management activities. There is more than one 
type of organisational reaction to evaluation, since the behaviour of the various actors is 
differentiated due to their different views on the aspects to accept and those to reject 
(Rebora and Turri 2011). For example, the External Representatives Estate will most likely 
encourage the introduction of control mechanisms and the 'positive use' of performance 
information, since external members come from the private sector, being thus used to 
dealing with PMS. The Student Estate may also favour the measurement and reporting of 
performance and the 'positive use' of performance information, since students are 
interested in studying at the best university possible. The Academic Estate and the 
Administrative Estate were reportedly the two Estates that would 'resist' change more. By 
being 'employees' of the university they are most likely the ones more directly affected by 
evaluation practices. If positive incentives are involved (which was not the case in the 
Portuguese university), internationally renowned scholars and brilliant young academics 
will be certainly favourable to the 'positive use' of performance data and will get involved in 
the process because they are aware of the opportunity for their research results to be 
recognised in accordance with criteria that are valid in their particular disciplinary area. 
Therefore, the biggest challenge for the good functioning of a PMS seems to reside in how 
to have all the Estates – the 'inner ring' of the governance framework – accept PMS as 
something important and positive for organisational development, therefore avoiding the 
tendency for the 'non-use' or the 'misuse' of performance data. 
Resistance to changes are arguably potentiated by the lack of participation of some actors 
in the development of PMS. According to Stensaker (2008), studies dealing with the 
organisational aspects of quality issues have been narrow and hierarchically minded, 
considering HEIs to function only in the top-down direction and assuming university 
personnel to be only passive receivers of policy and procedure instructions. He argued 
that a bottom-up approach is needed and, in addition, a new way to view the personnel as 
active contributors. Actually, the interviewees reported feeling more at ease when they 
participated in the preparation process (e.g. most of the interviewees at UW felt as being 
part of the strategy of the university given the wide consultation process conducted by the 
Vice-Chancellor). Also, the lack of disclosure of measures, targets and time frames to the 
general community in the Portuguese case, and the reported poor communication at 
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different levels at Warwick, arguably enhanced resistance to changes. Additionally, the 
inexistence of incentives linked to performance measurement in the Portuguese university 
also tended to induce antagonist behaviours. According to Haapakorpi (2011), personnel 
in universities take advantage of assessments when they are meaningful and they can 
use them for their own purposes. 
Some strategies could be used to try and overcome the 'misuse' or 'non-use' of 
performance information. These strategies mainly involve the determinants of PMS 
identified in Section 7.3 (contextual, cultural, organisational, structural and technical, 
resource-related, and individual). Indeed, it could be argued that even though structures 
are important for the successful implementation of PMS they do not seem to be enough. 
Although it is acknowledged that the governance reforms that took place in many higher 
education systems – more institutional autonomy from the state, increased centralisation 
of decision-making inside the institutions, stronger leadership at the top, increased 
accountability and wider participation of external members – are enablers for the 
implementation and good functioning of PMS, there are still other variables to take into 
consideration. Although there are some that are hard to control, such as contextual factors 
or cultural factors, others are that can be acted upon, being one the level of 
communication, pointed out as a weakness in both universities, and the level of 
stakeholder involvement. These two variables would arguably help to overcome the 
resistances previously mentioned, by generating ownership and building trust, considered 
essential for a well-succeeded PMS (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b), as devised in Figure 
10. This means that it would be desirable, at various moments, to arrange for interaction 
between academics and managers (De Bruijn 2007). Moreover, there should be a clear 
identification of the functions of performance measurement and forums for dealing with 
performance results. This way, the manager and professional could trust that any 
deviation from it would demand consultation. As Thomas (2004) argued, an ideal PMS 
should be embedded in the organisation, stable and widely understood and supported.  
Even though several steps have been given in the direction of a new public governance, 
with higher education systems displaying evidence of network development between HEIs 
and HEIs and other organisations; increased self-steering; and increased participation of 
new actors in university governance, there is still much to do to reach the ideal type of 
managing performance foreseen by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008b): performance 
governance. The next chapter will present the main conclusions of this research. 
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"[H]e liked to organize, to contend, to administer;  
he could make people work his will, believe in him,  
march before him and justify him.  
This was the art, as they said, of managing." 
Henry James 
"The value of achievement lies in the achieving." 
Albert Einstein 
This chapter presents the main conclusions of this research project. It is organised in the 
following way: first, a brief summary of the reasons that led to the decision to conduct this 
research and of the methodological approach chosen to explore how universities are 
measuring, reporting and managing performance and how governance structures relate to 
it will be presented; secondly, a summary of the answers to the research questions posed 
at the beginning of the research and the way the objectives delineated have been 
accomplished will be displayed; thirdly, the overall contribution to knowledge made by the 
research will be made clear; fourthly, a summary of the limitations of the study will be 
provided; and finally, recommendations for further research will be presented. 
8.1. Summary of the research 
Public service organisations in many developed countries have been urged to reinvent 
themselves in the form of what has been termed 'managerialism' (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 
1990), 'NPM' (Hood 1991), 'market-based public administration' (Lan and Rosenbloom 
1992), the 'post-bureaucratic paradigm' (Barzelay 1992) or 'entrepreneurial government' 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The underlying agenda was a pursuit of greater efficiency 
and effectiveness of service delivery, particularly seeking greater outcomes for less input 
cost. That agenda reflects an evident belief amongst politicians and bureaucrats alike in 
the efficacy and applicability of the business model of organisational structure, planning, 
control and performance measurement (Chow et al. 2005; English et al. 2005). Direct 
government provision and control of many services has been replaced by the devolution 
of responsibility for their provision to the market, with government control being retained 
through market incentives, indirect performance indicators and accountability systems 
(Parker 2011).  
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Emerging from a period of relatively secluded existence, serving predominantly elite and 
stable national markets, often supported to a large extent by government funding, 
universities have been launched into a global market (Parker 2011), being encouraged to 
become increasingly responsible for their activities, for finance and for coping with the 
changing environment. Although varying between countries, the reforms that universities 
across the world are undergoing have in common the adoption of managerial 
methodologies and approaches once exclusively adopted by the private sector, following a 
trend to reorganise and restructure HEIs increasingly as entrepreneurial universities 
(Meek 2000; Etzkowitz 2003). Within this new model of governance, strategic 
management has been enforced in universities, and the introduction of performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices, needed for strategic management 
(Thomas 2004), became increasingly important. In fact, the growing interest for the topic 
of performance in the public sector, in general, and in higher education, in particular, led to 
some research, mainly linked to the measurement of performance, essentially related to 
the selection and use of PIs (e.g. Goedegebuure et al. 1990; Johnes and Taylor 1991; 
Cave and Hanney 1992; Tam 2001), or focused on the development, implementation 
and/or analysis of quality assurance mechanisms (e.g. Brennan and Shah 1997; Brown 
2004; Filippakou and Tapper 2010; Langfeldt et al. 2010; Shah et al. 2011; Stensaker et 
al. 2011). 
However, after the literature review conducted in the first three chapters, dedicated to the 
changes that occurred in the nature of public services and of higher education (Chapter 
1), to the governance and management in higher education (Chapter 2), and to 
performance management in higher education (Chapter 3), some gaps were found, 
namely concerning what was being done with the performance data collected during the 
measurement process, and what and who could be influencing measurement, reporting 
and management practices in universities. Moreover, there were very few studies that 
looked at governance and performance (Knott et al. 2004; Aghion et al. 2009), relating the 
two concepts, in spite of some scholars (e.g. Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b) speaking of a 
move from 'performance management' to 'performance governance'. 
Thus, this research proposed to explore the following: how are universities measuring, 
reporting and managing performance and how do governance structures relate to it? 
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Performance management was presented through a systems view, using three main 
dimensions – measurement, reporting and management; and performance measures 
were defined within the input-process-output model (Dochy et al. 1990; Cave and Hanney 
1992). Governance structures were analysed by using the analytical framework proposed 
in Section 2.4.4.2 (Figure 6), which presents the external coordination mechanisms in 
higher education (the 'outer ring') – the state, the market and Europe –, and the internal 
coordination mechanisms (the 'inner ring') – the four Estates (Academic, Administrative, 
Student and External Representatives). 
The use of a qualitative research design employing interpretative means enabled an 
exploratory approach to be taken. This research sought to explore the phenomenon that 
occurred rather than to test and replicate it, being depth preferred over broadness, with 
the intent of providing a more profound and richer analysis. The investigation was carried 
out by examining two case studies in-depth: the University of Warwick, in the UK, and the 
University of Aveiro, in Portugal. Documentary analysis and interviews were used to 
collect data. The documents analysed included policy and strategic documents, minutes of 
meetings, the results of internal surveys, and statistical data collected from secondary 
sources (the list of documents consulted is available in Annex 2). In each location, in-
depth semi-structured interviews were conducted (37 in UW and 39 in UA) to members of 
the four Estates, being the common feature their participation in governing and 
management bodies and/or their close link to the management of the university. Both 
universities were considered innovative and successful, thus being expected that they 
would have implemented adequate systems to measure, report and manage performance. 
The findings from each case study, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the cross-
analysis of both cases (Chapter 7), contributed to the understanding of how universities 
are measuring, reporting and managing performance and how governance structures 
relate to it, thus accomplishing the research aim and contributing to an enhanced 
understanding for future theory development. A summary of the answers to the research 
questions posed and the way the objectives outlined have been accomplished will be 
presented in the next section. 
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8.2. Research questions and objectives 
To accomplish the research aim, four questions were posed and seven specific objectives 
delineated. Table 44 summarises them. 
Table 44 – Research questions and objectives 
Research questions Research objectives 
How have the changes in different higher education 
systems impacted on the governance of universities? 
Analyse how the British and the Portuguese higher 
education systems have evolved over time and how 
the changes that occurred in those systems might 
have impacted on the way universities are governed 
and managed. 
How are performance management systems 
functioning in universities? 
Identify performance measurement and reporting 
practices and the way performance information is 
being used to inform decision-making in universities, 
and discuss the existence of fully accomplished PMS 
in these institutions. 
What factors are influencing the implementation and 
functioning of performance management systems in 
universities? 
Identify and categorise the factors that affect the 
implementation and functioning of PMS in 
universities. 
Identify and analyse the pressures that exist to 
introduce performance measurement, reporting and 
management practices. 
Analyse the influence of the introduction of 
performance measurement, reporting and 
management practices on the existing governance 
structure. 
Discuss the influence of performance measurement, 
reporting and management practices on the roles and 
influences of the four Estates (Academic Estate, 
Administrative Estate, Student Estate and External 
Representatives Estate) and the influence of the 
Estates on decision-making. 
How do governance structures influence and are 
influenced by the implementation and functioning of 
performance management systems in universities? 
Analyse the influence of the existing governance 
structure and Estates on the implementation and 
functioning of PMS. 
In the following sub-sections, a summary of the answers to the research questions will be 
presented, and the way the objectives proposed were achieved discussed.  
8.2.1. How have the changes in different higher education systems impacted on 
the governance of universities? 
The documentary analysis conducted in this research enabled an understanding of all the 
changes that occurred at the European level, in terms of higher education policy, and in 
the British and Portuguese higher education systems, and how these changes have 
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impacted on the governance of universities, thus achieving the first objective delineated 
for the research (see end of Section 3.7.2): analyse how the British and the Portuguese 
higher education systems have evolved over time and how the changes that occurred in 
those systems might have impacted on the way universities are governed and managed. 
All the reforms implemented in higher education over the years led to changes in the 
governance of universities. The role of the state was redefined in the provision of higher 
education. Nation states lost some functions, legitimacy and authority to new intermediary 
bodies, such as research councils, funding councils and accreditation agencies and to the 
supra-national level, namely the European level, where policy agendas and strategic 
choices concerning higher education are increasingly defined (e.g. the Bologna 
Declaration). 
Even though there are some common trends, the reforms did not occur at the same time 
in every country. In the UK, where NPM reforms emerged in the 1980s, several changes 
happened. With the budgetary constraints of 1981, universities started to look for new 
sources of funding. As a result, in terms of governance, UK universities became relatively 
autonomous and independent from the state and the governance structure of most UK 
universities was altered, with many of the existing university governing bodies changing 
and some new bodies being established (De Boer et al. 2010). Following the 
recommendations of the Jarratt Report (1985), the Dearing Report (1997) and the 
Lambert Review (2003), there was a strengthening of institutional leadership and the role 
of external members in the governance of HEIs increased. Moreover, the size of university 
councils was reviewed in an attempt to reduce it and specific committees that met on a 
regular basis were created in order to facilitate the functioning of universities (e.g. the 
Steering Committee). 
In Portugal, most of the changes were mandated by decree. These changes occurred 
mainly after the signing of the Bologna Declaration in 1999. Since then, a lot of legislation 
came out (especially after 2007), changing the Portuguese higher education system 
considerably. In terms of institutional autonomy, even though Portuguese universities are 
still dependent on the state, particularly in terms of funding, the state reduced its level of 
intrusive regulation, moving to a more supervisory role (Teixeira et al. 2004). Moreover, 
governance structures also changed. The new structure established by law is flatter and 
more centralised, with the Rector becoming more powerful. Moreover, there is a clearer 
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leadership structure and the participation of external members increased, being the 
Council chaired by one. Looking at the changes that occurred, it could be argued that the 
governance structure of Portuguese universities became closer to the British one, 
following the trend of most European universities (Rhoades 1992; Amaral et al. 2002; 
Amaral and Magalhães 2002): increased centralisation; stronger institutional leadership; 
appointment of Rectors and heads of department, instead of election; increased 
accountability; and increased participation of the outside world in the governance of the 
university. Some of these changes are important steps towards a new mode of 
governance, which some called 'Network Governance' (e.g. Rhodes 1996; Goldsmith and 
Eggers 2004) and others 'New Public Governance' (e.g. Osborne 2006). This new type of 
governance, regarded as fundamental to deal with an increasingly complex, plural and 
fragmented environment (Osborne 2010), is based, among others, on networks, 
collaboration, diversity, inclusion and devolution (Ferlie et al. 2008). Although, according 
to Ferlie et al. (2008), no country appears to be an index case for the Network 
Governance narrative, most countries display evidence of the development of larger 
networks and of the introduction of new actors in institutional life. 
8.2.2. How are performance management systems functioning in universities? 
In relation to the implementation of PMS, findings offered an insightful understanding of 
how universities define their strategy and measure, report and manage their performance, 
thus achieving the second objective delineated for the research (see end of Section 3.7.2): 
identify performance measurement and reporting practices and the way performance is 
being used to inform decision-making in universities, and discuss the existence of a fully 
accomplished PMS in these institutions. 
Data analysis showed there has been a considerable increase in the measurement of 
performance in both universities, similarly to what happened in other public services. This 
confirms the reports of some authors that claim that a new emphasis has been put on the 
implementation of effective co-ordination and control systems (e.g. Brennan and Shah 
2000; Vilalta 2001). Furthermore, findings revealed that the areas that were more carefully 
measured were finance and research and scholarship (strongly related to the amount of 
funding to be received), being the less assessed areas third mission, employers and 
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alumni, considered particularly difficult to measure. Data analysis also demonstrated that 
even though some instruments were internally designed to measure performance (e.g. 
SGQ in the Portuguese case; or ASDAR in the British case), most instruments and 
measures were externally imposed (e.g. SIADAP and QUAR, in the Portuguese case) or, 
even if not mandatory, 'quasi-imposed' (e.g. the RAE in the British case). The degree of 
imposition of instruments and measures appears to have a direct and inverse relationship 
with the nature of higher education systems, namely concerning the four dimensions of 
institutional autonomy: organisational, policy, interventional and financial. Indeed, less 
organisational, policy, interventional and financial autonomy seems to potentiate the 
existence of more externally imposed instruments and measures. Data analysis also 
showed an excessive focus on output measures in both countries, even though the British 
university also paid attention to inputs, namely students and staff, and processes, with 
some of UW's committees keeping close attention to the organisational and administrative 
aspects related to some areas of the university, especially teaching and learning and 
research and scholarship. Additionally, the analysis confirmed the position of Portugal and 
the UK in the triangle of performance measures, proposed by Barnett (1992) and adapted 
by Rosa (2003), presented in Section 3.7.1, by showing that the instruments and 
measures used in the Portuguese case are mainly based on peer-review judgement, 
whilst in the British case, even though peer-review assessment is also used, PIs have 
been developed, being widely utilised to inform policy-making and institutional planning 
and strategy. 
Regarding reporting practices, these were not very developed in the Portuguese case, 
being more systematically done in the British university. This could be expected, given 
that the most profound reforms in higher education took place in countries associated with 
the Anglo-Saxon model of system level governance (Amaral et al. 2002). 
The most interesting result was however, the lack of action regarding some of the 
performance data collected in both universities, especially in relation to individual 
performance, and the occasional reported misuse of the performance information 
collected, despite some reports on the positive use of that information in both cases. Even 
though these findings are consistent with some public sector literature (e.g. Radnor and 
McGuire 2004; Hood 2006; van de Walle and van Dooren 2008; van Dooren et al. 2010), 
which suggests that the focus for many public organisations is on measurement, data 
being little used, it was interesting to observe this trend in innovative and more 
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entrepreneurial universities. Actually, if some performance information, namely related to 
individuals, was not often used in universities that could be considered 'extreme or unique 
cases' (Yin 2003) in their countries, within the group of state funded universities, then one 
could expect that performance data would be used even less in universities that are less 
entrepreneurial. This means that these results could arguably be expected in other 
universities. 
These findings made us question the utility of performance information, since a PMS 
assumes a direct link between performance measurement and strategic and operational 
planning (Thomas 2004), meaning that its purpose is to create a mechanism for 
intervention and learning (Haas and Kleingeld 1998; Neely 1998). That was not happening 
in some of the areas that were assessed, namely in the Portuguese case, where the 
absence of a formal strategic plan was considered a drawback for the implementation of a 
PMS. 
In order to analyse the use of performance information in universities, a typology of 
performance data use was created for the purpose of this research. The use of 
performance information was divided into three categories: positive use; misuse; and non-
use. Positive use, which happens when universities improve the aspects that have been 
identified during the measurement process, happened namely in relation to financial 
issues, regarded as fundamental by interviewees from both institutions; misuse, which 
occurs when the assessment leads to unintended consequences, such as measure 
fixation, gaming, misrepresentation and myopia (Smith 1995), was reported in both cases; 
finally, non-use, which happens when nothing is done with the performance information 
that is gathered, was particularly reported in relation to the measurement of the three 
areas perceived to be less measured – third mission, alumni and employers – and of 
individual performance.  
The analysis of the way both universities measured, reported and managed their 
performance supports the inexistence of a fully developed PMS at these institutions, even 
though UW was closer to accomplishing one. This result did not come as a surprise, given 
that UW started the process much earlier than UA. 
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8.2.3. What factors are influencing the implementation and functioning of 
performance management systems in universities? 
The next step in the research was to identify and categorise the factors that affect the 
implementation and functioning of PMS in universities (the third objective of the research 
– see end of Section 3.7.2). Data analysis showed that there were some factors that 
inhibited the introduction and functioning of PMS and others that supported that 
introduction and functioning. These factors were thus divided into 'inhibitors' and 
'determinants' and grouped into six categories: contextual, cultural, organisational, 
structural and technical, resource-related and individual.  
Data showed that contextual factors, related to the external environment, had a great 
impact on both universities, being however practically impossible to control. Cultural 
influences were something that clearly differentiated both higher education systems. In the 
Portuguese case, they functioned as an 'inhibitor' for the implementation of PMS, given 
the perceived absence of an evaluative culture at a national level. On the contrary, in the 
British case, they worked as a 'determinant', thus contributing to the implementation of 
performance measurement, reporting and management practices. Although, culture was 
regarded as difficult to change, since, as an interviewee stated, 'it cannot be changed by 
decree', it is believed it should be taken into consideration when devising a PMS. 
Organisational factors (e.g. the way an organisation is divided, the level of communication, 
the type of leadership, and the distribution of responsibilities) were considered very 
important for the successful functioning of PMS. The level of communication and the 
distribution of responsibilities were seen as particularly weak by interviewees from both 
universities, with reports of communicational problems being conveyed at several levels. 
Nevertheless, these are two important factors that could arguably be corrected if 
acknowledged. Structural and technical factors impacted both universities differently. In 
UW, they functioned more as 'determinants', given the high level of sophistication they 
reached over the years. In UA, they were clearly 'inhititors', namely the link between PIs 
and organisational goals. Being in an early stage in the development of a PMS, it is 
believed UA should take these factors into consideration for future improvements. 
Resource-related factors were perceived as harder to overcome, given their strong 
dependency on the financial viability of universities, which is closely linked to state 
funding, especially in UA's case. Nevertheless, some better management of human 
resources was regarded as needed in some departments and support services, 
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particularly in UA, being easier to implement (e.g. there were departments where 
academics taught few hours, while, in other departments, academics were overloaded 
with teaching hours; some interviewees reported the lack of training for some middle and 
top managers and for academics). Finally, in relation to individual factors, which comprise 
the position of individuals towards PMS, a lot of similarities were found in both cases, 
being the Academic Estate considered the most resistant to the introduction of PMS by all 
interviewees. Although individual attitudes were perceived as difficult to control, these 
could arguably be lessened, for example, by involving different actors in the evaluation 
process (Stensaker 2008), by improving communication, and by linking incentives to the 
measurement process. 
8.2.4. How do governance structures influence and are influenced by the 
implementation and functioning of performance management systems in 
universities? 
The final and most important phase of the research consisted in establishing the link 
between PMS and governance structures.  
The first step was to identify and analyse the pressures that exist to introduce 
performance measurement, reporting and management practices (the fourth objective of 
the research – see Section 3.7.2). Findings showed that external pressures were the most 
influential ones and that internal pressures usually only emerged to help deal with the 
former. In the British case, external pressures came mainly from the state and the market, 
and in the Portuguese case from Europe and from the state.  
The second step consisted in analysing the influence of the introduction of performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices on the existing governance structure 
(the fifth objective of the research – see end of Section 3.7.2). Data analysis showed that 
pressures to introduce measurement, reporting and management practices led to some 
changes in the governance of both universities, as discussed in Section 8.2.1, following a 
general trend towards the institutionalisation of homogeneous structures and processes, 
characterised by the centralisation of authority, stronger leadership, and increased 
participation of external members in institutional governance. In UW this process started 
many years ago. In UA, the change was more recent.  
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The third step consisted in discussing the influence of performance measurement, 
reporting and management practices on the roles and influences of the four Estates 
(Academic Estate, Administrative Estate, Student Estate and External Representatives 
Estate) and the influence of the Estates on decision-making  (the sixth objective of the 
research – see end of Section 3.7.2). Findings revealed that the role of being an academic 
changed considerably, mainly due to the managerial roles and fundraising activities more 
and more demanded from them, thus increasing their bureaucratic work and, according to 
them, deviating their attention from teaching and research. Nevertheless, data also 
showed that even though 'managerial accountability' increased, that did not happen at the 
expense of 'professional accountability', with both types of accountability co-existing and 
not being incompatible. It was also noted that, even though academics had to be 
accountable, the control mechanisms imposed on them were quite 'soft', being data on 
poor performers hardly used in both universities, as discussed in Section 8.2.2.  
Data analysis also showed that the Academic Estate still had the most active voice in both 
universities. In fact, this Estate was the most influential in terms of strategic decision-
making, deciding on most of the performance instruments and measures used (see 
Annexes 4 and 9), and on what happened to poor- and good-performing fellow 
academics. Although academics manifested some fear of losing their autonomy, to 
external members in the Portuguese case and to non-academics in the British case, 
findings revealed that was somewhat of a paradox, given the 'soft measurement' imposed 
on them and their great influence on decision-making.  
In relation to the Administrative Estate, non-academics shared decision-making with 
academics in the British case, being almost not represented in the governance of UA. 
Although the External Representatives Estate became increasingly participative in the 
governance of UA, it was still not very influential in terms of decision-making at the time 
the interviews were conducted. In UW, external members participated in many important 
governing bodies (e.g. the Council, the Financial and General Purposes Committee, the 
Audit Committee), even though many interviewees, including external members, believed 
they could be better used in relation to strategic decision-making. 
Compared to the other three Estates, the Student Estate was not very powerful in terms of 
strategic thinking and decision-making in either case, albeit student voices being heard in 
both institutions. 
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The study of both the external coordination mechanisms and the roles and influences of 
the four Estates in decision-making, allowed the placing of UW and UA in the governance 
framework devised in Section 2.4.4.2. In the 'outer ring', the market, the state and Europe 
appear as the most influential external coordination mechanisms, although their weight 
varies between institutions. In UW, Europe's influence was not felt by any of the 
interviewees, and in UA, the market was starting to show its influence. In terms of the 
'inner ring', UW would be placed between the Academic Estate and the Administrative 
Estate, given the way these Estates 'shared governance' at Warwick, with some 
participation of the External Representatives Estate as well, even if not as strong as the 
other two. UA's position would be very close to the Academic Estate corner, considering 
academics' strong dominance over decision-making. 
The fourth step consisted in analysing the influence of the existing governance structure 
and Estates on the implementation and functioning of PMS (the seventh and last objective 
of the research – see end of Section 3.7.2). 
Essentially forced by external pressures to adopt strategic management and implement 
performance measurement, reporting and management practices, institutions in general 
tend to conform to prevailing societal beliefs and values and to establish and 
institutionalise homogeneous structures and processes, in the pursuit of legitimacy. This 
tendency to conform was defined in the literature as 'isomorphism' (Hawley 1968; Meyer 
and Rowan 1977), having practices of 'coercive isomorphism', 'mimetic isomorphism' and 
'normative isomorphism' (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) been identified in both cases. With 
the combination of the different isomorphic behaviour patters, it would be expected that 
organisations would become shaped and institutionalised by their environment (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983; Scott and Meyer 1991; Scott 1995). However, that is not always the 
case.  
In fact, in these particularly complex organisations, which, on the one hand, must adapt 
themselves to the various strains of public authority, and where, by contrast, the norms of 
academic freedom and autonomy dominate internally, the introduction of PMS can often 
lead to unintended behaviours, such as the 'misuse' or to the 'non-use' of performance 
information. The particular organisational characteristics of universities makes it 
appropriate to consider the 'positive use', 'misuse' or 'non-use' from two different 
interpretative viewpoints: related to the structure and to the Estates' expectations. 
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Data analysis showed that although, from the 'rational system perspective', formal 
structural arrangements should have an 'instrumental value', thus guiding decision-making 
and contributing to the 'positive use' of performance data, that did not always happen. 
Albeit many interviewees reported practices of 'positive use' of performance information 
(e.g. to improve the quality of research, the quality of teaching and the image of the 
university), supporting Talbot's (2010) argument that, in spite of the unintended effects, 
there are gains, interviewees from both universities mentioned that many times governing 
bodies had a 'rubberstamping' character. This deprived these bodies from their 
'instrumental value', attributing them a 'symbolic value'. Having to adapt themselves to 
public authority, and with the norms of academic freedom and autonomy dominating 
internally, universities sometimes opted for a 'ceremonial management' (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977) and 'misused' or 'non-used' performance data. Nonetheless, both 
universities seemed to have found a way to operate through more agile bodies on a daily 
basis, such as the Senior Management Team in UW. These bodies arguably form a 
'parallel structure', composed of senior academics and administrators in UW, and senior 
academics in UA, which co-exists with a more inclusive 'formal structure' that seems to 
serve two main purposes: to legitimise decision-making to the exterior; and to build trust 
inside these institutions, considered extremely important for the building of a PMS 
(Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b). 
The Estates' strategies, actions and reactions in relation to PMS differed, being closely 
linked to their expectations concerning those systems. External members and students, 
for example, were considered more likely to induce the 'positive use' of PMS. The former, 
because they usually come from the private sector, being used to measuring, reporting 
and managing performance. The latter, since they pay increasingly higher tuition fees 
(especially in the UK), thus demanding more quality from the universities they choose to 
study in. On the other hand, the Academic and the Administrative Estates were perceived 
as the ones more averse to performance measurement and to the use of performance 
information, especially academics, given their fear of losing autonomy and academic 
freedom.  
Getting all the Estates to truly accept PMS as something important and positive for 
organisational development (and not just rhetorically) is thus regarded as the biggest 
challenge for both institutions, being seen as something important to foster the 'positive 
use' of performance information. Strategies to avoid the 'non-use' and the 'misuse' of 
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performance data would arguably involve looking at the 'determinants' of PMS identified in 
Section 7.3 (contextual, cultural, organisational, structural and technical, resources-
related, and individual). The analysis of these 'determinants' showed that, although 
considered important, structures are not enough to the successful implementation of PMS, 
having other variables to be taken into consideration, namely the level of communication 
and the level of stakeholder involvement. A good level of communication between bodies, 
between units and between individuals, and the involvement of different actors in the 
development of PMS will arguably overcome resistances and build trust, the most difficult 
piece of the performance management framework devised by Bouckaert and Halligan 
(2008b), but arguably a crucial one.  
Given the increased complexity of the environment, with a greater range of actors and 
interactions emerging, and the state increasingly playing a steering role instead of a 
controlling one, organisations, universities included, had to start thinking about their future, 
in order to better cope with high levels of social complexity and uncertainty. The 
researcher agrees with several authors (e.g. Osborne 2006; e.g. Bouckaert and Halligan 
2008b; Sarrico 2010; Halligan et al. 2012) that argue that a new mode of public 
governance is needed, implying a move from 'performance management' to 'performance 
governance' (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b). This move would involve: a greater number 
of relationships and collaborations with other HEIs and other organisations, through the 
establishment of networks, partnerships and coordination mechanisms, built on trust; 
knowledge and best practice spread across the network; devolution of power from the 
state to the institutions and to the European level; greater involvement of different actors 
in institutional life, not only through their involvement in institutional decision-making, but 
also through community feedback, for example; integration of performance across several 
organisational levels; and demonstration of the impact of performance management on 
society (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008b). 
Although several important steps were given in this direction, namely the increased 
institutional autonomy; the establishment of joint policies and projects; the increased 
participation of external members in institutional life; there is still a long way to go, starting 
with the integration of performance across several organisational levels. As discussed 
before, even though structures are important for a successful implementation and 
functioning of PMS, there are other factors that should be taken into consideration (the 
'determinants' displayed in Section 8.2.4). Although they are all important, two were 
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considered fundamental: the establishment of a good level of communication and the 
involvement of different actors in the development of the system. These were considered 
central to overcome an important obstacle found in most universities, given its particular 
characteristics: resistance to the implementation of PMS, especially from academics. By 
being involved in the process, which should be transparent, trust is more likely to be built. 
And that is regarded as a fundamental piece for the existence of an integrated PMS and a 
necessary step to a shift from performance management to performance governance, that 
is, from governing performance to governing for performance. 
The contribution of this research to knowledge and to practice will be described in the next 
sections. 
8.3. Contribution to knowledge 
The aim of this thesis was to explore how universities were measuring, reporting and 
managing performance and how governance structures related to it.  As seen in Chapter 4 
(the research design chapter), this investigation was carried out by examining two case 
studies in-depth. The findings from each case study, as well as the cross-case analysis, 
contributed to: comprehend how changes in different higher education systems impacted 
on the way universities are governed; understand the way PMS are functioning in 
universities; identify the factors that interfere with the implementation and functioning of 
those systems; and comprehend the relationship between governance structures and 
PMS. With varying degrees of novelty to the existing body of academic theory, the case 
studies, both individually and together, contributed to the theory of practice and scholarly 
literature.  
In terms of the functioning of PMS, this research contributed to the creation of a typology 
of 'use' of performance information, dividing use into 'positive use', 'misuse' and 'non-use'. 
This typology is considered particularly relevant to dissect the way performance data is 
dealt with in the different areas of the university, and can arguably be applied to other 
institutions. It is thus considered a contribution to the literature on performance 
management. 
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In relation to the factors that influence the implementation and functioning of PMS, the 
identification of the 'inhibitors' and 'determinants' of PMS and their grouping into six 
categories – contextual, cultural, organisational, structural and technical, resource-related, 
and individual – are considered important to comprehend the factors that can prevent or 
foster the development of a PMS, being also considered a contribution to the performance 
management literature. 
As far as governance is concerned, this research enabled a better understanding of the 
way universities are structured. In fact, the governance framework devised for this 
research, comprising the external coordination mechanisms of higher education (the state, 
the market and Europe), which relate to each other through dynamic relationships, and the 
internal coordination mechanisms (the four Estates – Academic, Administrative, Student 
and External Representatives) is regarded as a contribution to the literature on 
governance. By enabling the positioning of different HEIs inside the diamond, this 
framework facilitates an understanding of the differences between HEIs in terms of 
governance, and even the differences between higher education systems, since it is 
believed this framework could also be used to place these systems.  
Regarding the relationship between governance structures and PMS, the analysis of this 
relationship through two interpretative viewpoints – one related to the structure 
(recognising the existence of two governance structures in universities – a 'formal 
structure' and a 'parallel structure') and the other to the Estate's expectations – is also 
regarded as innovative, arguably contributing to the literature on performance 
management.  
Also important is the recognition that even though structures are important for the 
implementation and functioning of PMS (namely centralised ones, with clearly defined 
responsibilities and strong leaderships), there are other factors that need to be taken into 
consideration when building a PMS: the 'determinants'. Among these, the level of 
communication and the level of involvement of different actors are regarded as particularly 
relevant for the building of trust, needed to overcome some resistances towards the 
introduction of control mechanisms and for the successful integration of performance 
across several organisational levels, that is for the integration of measurement, reporting 
and management practices. This integration of practices, together with other changes that 
started to occur (e.g. increased autonomy, participation of more actors in institutional life 
 
 
372 
and establishment and partnerships and networks), will foster the desired move from 
performance management to performance governance. Above all, it is believed that this 
research contributes to the literature on public management, applied to the context of 
higher education. 
8.4. Implications to practice 
This research could arguably provide some points of advice for university managers who 
seek to improve the performance of their institutions. In addition, some of the findings 
could also benefit policy makers responsible for devising higher education policies, both in 
the UK and Portugal. 
For example, the analysis of 'inhibitors' and 'determinants' is considered important for 
university managers (both academic and non-academic), since it enables a better 
comprehension of the factors that are impeding the successful implementation and 
functioning of PMS in their institution. By doing this analysis, they can correct some of the 
problems found. Moreover, it also enables policy makers to understand which areas are 
the most problematic for the successful implementation of control mechanisms in HEIs, 
providing them with an increased knowledge on what factors to take into account when 
devising higher education policies. 
Moreover, the governance framework devised (see Figure 6) is believed to allow 
practitioners to comprehend which are the most influential external and internal 
coordination mechanisms, thus arguably helping policy makers to devise policies 
regarding higher education and university managers to better implement strategic 
planning and performance measurement, reporting and management practices.  
Additionally, by recognising the existence of two governance structures in universities – a 
'formal structure' and a 'parallel structure' –, and by acknowledging the expectations of the 
four Estates concerning PMS, those building and implementing PMS (being these policy 
makers or university managers) will arguably find it easier to have well-designed and well-
functioning PMS, namely in relation to the 'use' of performance data (the most complex of 
the three stages of a PMS).  
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Overall, it is expected that this research's contribution to knowledge will promote learning, 
foster benchmarking practice exercises between universities and other institutions, and 
inform new policy developments that are taking place. 
8.5. Limitations of the research 
Up until this research there had been very few studies relating PMS to governance 
structures. Whilst it is recognised that the research findings are informative and interesting 
in their own right, it is also acknowledged that the study could have been improved.  
Arguably, the choice of a qualitative methodology made it more difficult to ensure the 
reliability and validity of the data and increased subjectivity, since the characteristics of the 
researcher could have influenced data collection, being impossible for its outcomes to be 
viewed as facts or objective truths (Silverman 2006). Thus, the value of the findings, in 
terms of their reliability and validity, resulted mainly from their evaluation and validation by 
the universities that were involved in the research: the University of Warwick and the 
University of Aveiro. As stated in the research design chapter (Chapter 4), after the 
completion of the study, a detailed report, containing the findings relative to each case 
study, was delivered to UW and UA. Positive feedback was received from both 
universities, thus validating the findings. However, it is recognised that the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods would have improved the reliability and validity of the 
data. In fact, the initial idea was to complement the documentary analysis and the semi-
structured interviews with a survey to all the members of the governing and management 
bodies of each university, thus enabling crossing information from different sources. Even 
though this was not possible due to time constraints, the researcher tried to compensate 
that by performing a thorough documentary analysis, and a deep analysis of the data 
collected through the interviews. The latter was enriched by the use of NVivo, which also 
enabled some quantitative reflections. 
Additionally, being an exploratory research, this study encompassed only two cases, 
which limited the generalisability of the findings. However, a doctoral project is a limited 
piece of research, and every doctoral student has to make a decision regarding the 
breadth and depth of the study. In this case, due to the exploratory nature the study, the 
study was limited to two rich, detailed cases. More case studies, namely covering other 
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types of universities (e.g. less entrepreneurial), could have been incorporated to 
understand the phenomenon being studied, but there is an argument that the resulting 
data would have been less detailed. 
These limitations also led to the urge to do further research in the future. 
8.6. Further work 
After having conducted this research, several ideas emerged concerning the possibility of 
developing new studies.  
The first idea is to do a wider study on the same topic within the Portuguese higher 
education system. This could be operationalised by integrating other types of HEIs in the 
study, comparing traditional vs. innovative, public vs. private, and universities vs. 
polytechnics. This analysis could be done by conducting a survey to all the members of 
each university's governing and management bodies and then by conducting a small 
number of interviews to members of the four Estates within each institution. This study 
would also enable a comparison between the data obtained for UA and other Portuguese 
HEIs. The same type of study could be conducted in the UK. 
The second idea is to do a longitudinal study, following the universities that took part in the 
study to understand how things changed over time. This would be particularly interesting 
to do in UA, where a new governance structure was implemented and new control 
mechanisms were being introduced. 
The third idea is more ambitious and involves a wider cross-country analysis. Data would 
be collected by using both quantitative and qualitative methods, comprising documentary 
analysis, a survey to all the members of each university's governing bodies, and elite 
interviews to key players in each higher education system. The idea would be to analyse 
the relationship between performance measurement, reporting and management practices 
and organisational success. 
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Annex 1 – Interview schedule 
1. General information 
This section focuses on the characteristics of the interviewee: role, participation in committees, 
years at the university, and academic and professional background. 
Q. What is your role in the university? 
Q. In which bodies or committees do you participate? 
Q. How long have you been here? 
Q. Could you tell me a little bit more about your background? 
2. Vision and strategic plan 
This section focuses on the interviewee's understanding of the university's strategy/vision and 
strategic plan and on the way those were developed. 
Q. What are your views on the strategy/vision of the university and on the strategic plan? 
Q. From your understanding how were the strategy/vision and the strategic plan developed? 
Q. Who was consulted on the definition of the strategy/vision and of the strategic plan? 
3. Performance measurement, reporting and management practices 
This section focuses on performance measurement, reporting and management practices. The 
main objective is to understand: (1) the importance attributed by the interviewees to performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices; (2) what areas are measured in the university 
and who/which body(ies) conduct the measurement; (2) what measures (quantitative and/or 
qualitative) are used and who decides on the measures; (3) in which areas is performance data 
reported, to whom and by whom; and (4) in which areas is performance information used, and by 
whom. 
Q. How important would you say performance measurement, reporting and management activities 
are? Why? 
Q. In your view, is performance measured at the university?  
Q. (Show him/her the prompt card) Could you have a look at this prompt card? Which of these 
areas are measured? Could you give examples of the measures used (either quantitative or 
qualitative)? 
Q. Who decides on which measures should be used? 
Q. Which of these areas do you see reports on? 
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Q. In which committees or bodies do you see reports on performance? 
Q. Which of these items are acted upon in the university? Could you give examples? 
Q. Which committees are you on that use the information about these topics? 
4. Integration of practices and context of influence  
This section focuses on: (1) the positive and negative aspects concerning the integration of 
measurement, reporting and management practices; (2) the factors that may influence the 
implementation and functioning of performance management systems; (3) the pressures felt by the 
interviewees to measure, report and manage performance, both externally and internally. 
Q. Having talked about performance measurement, reporting and management practices at the 
university, what do you think about them? What would you say the main strengths and weaknesses 
of these practices are?  
Q. What factors do you think may influence the functioning of performance management systems? 
Q. Are there pressures to measure, report and use performance information?  
Q. In your opinion, what are those pressures and who exerts them (both internally and externally)? 
Q. How would you describe the influence of the government or of government agencies in the 
introduction of performance management systems?  
Q. How would you describe the influence of the market in the introduction of performance 
management systems?  
5. Governance structures and performance management systems 
This section focuses on the relationship between governance structures and performance 
management systems. In order to explore this relationship, the questions are centred on: (1) the 
perceptions of the interviewees on the existing governance structure, namely the type and 
composition of the governing and management bodies and their strengths and weaknesses; (2) the 
relationship between academics and non-academics; (3) the influence on decision-making exerted 
by each one of the groups responsible for the governance and management of the university 
(academics, non-academics, students and external members); (4) the position of these groups 
concerning performance management systems; and (5) the impact the introduction of performance 
measurement, reporting and management practices might have had on the groups responsible for 
the governance and management of the university. 
Q. What do you think about the existing governing bodies (if needed, compare them with the 
upcoming ones)?  
Q. What about the composition of the existing governing bodies?  
Q. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing governing bodies?  
Q. What do you think about the existing management bodies?  
Q. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing management bodies? 
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Q. How do you see the relationship between academics and non-academics? 
Q. Do you think that the introduction of performance management systems may have had an 
influence on the different groups that compose the existing governing bodies (students, academics, 
non-academic staff and external members)?  
Q. From the four groups that compose the existing governing and management bodies (students, 
academics, non-academic staff and external members), which ones would you say influence the 
decision-making process more? 
Q. What is the position of four groups that compose the existing governing and management 
bodies (students, academics, non-academic staff and external members) in relation to the 
measurement, reporting and management of performance? 
 
 
Prompt Card 
 
Finance Students Alumni Employers 
Academic staff Non-academic staff Teaching and learning 
Research and 
scholarship 
Third mission (e.g. 
service to the 
community) 
Support services Other  
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Annex 2 – Documents consulted 
Europe 
Joint Declaration on the Harmonization of the Architecture of the European Higher Education Systems 
by the four Ministers responsible for higher education in France, Germany, Italy and the UK (1998) – 
Sorbonne Declaration, 25 May. 
Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education (1999) – The Bologna Declaration, 19 June. 
European Council (2000) – Lisbon Strategy – intended to develop Europe into one of the strongholds of 
the new knowledge economy. 
ENQA (2005) – Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education 
Area. 
Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education (2005). "The 
European Higher Education Area: Achieving the Goals", Bergen: 19-20 May 2005. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (2006) – Delivering 
on the Modernisation Agenda for Universities: Education, Research and Innovation. 
ENQA (2007) – Report to the London Conference of Ministers on a European Register of Quality 
Assurance Agencies. 
Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education (2007). 
"Towards the European Higher Education Area: Responding to Challenges in a Globalised World", 
London: 17 May 2007. 
Council of the European Union (2007) – Council Resolution 16096/1/07 – stressed the need to moderne 
universities for Europe's competitiveness in a global economy. 
Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education (2009). "The 
Bologna Process 2020: The European Higher Education Area in the New Decade", Leuven: 28-29 April 
2009. 
 
UK 
Committee on Higher Education (1963) – Higher Education, Lord Robbins (Chairman) – recommended 
immediate expansion of universities. 
Green Paper (1985) – The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s – stressed the need for 
positive attitudes to business, entrepreneurialism and vocationalism in higher education and the need for 
a more general focus on students' acquisition of competencies, skills and applicable and relevant 
knowledge. It also advocated the development of PIs. 
CVCP (1985) – Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities, Sir Jarratt 
(Chairman) – advocated new managerial models of governance in universities. 
Act (1988) – Education Reform Act – established the UFC and the PCFC. 
White Paper (1991) – Higher Education: A New Framework – proposed the abolition of the so-called 
'binary line' between universities, and polytechnics and colleges. 
Act (1992) – Further and Higher Education Act – created a unitary system of provision. It also abolished 
CNAA and established HEQC. In addition, UGC was replaced by three higher education funding 
councils. 
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National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (1997) – Higher Education in the Learning Society, 
Sir Ron Dearing (Chairman) – tried to change some aspects concerning teaching and student intake, 
and proposed the creation of the QAA. It also argued that governance structures needed to be updated, 
emphasising the need for a greater control of governing bodies, stronger roles for external members, 
and smaller councils. 
Act (2000) – Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) – created a general right of access to all types of 
recorded information held by English, Welsh and Northern Irish public authorities that are not otherwise 
covered by the provisions of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 and the provisions of the 
Data Protection Act 1998. 
White Paper (2003) – The Future of Higher Education – set out plans to modernise English universities 
and their staff by offering more funding directed at teaching per se rather than at students. 
HM Treasury (2003) – Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration – addressed university-
business cooperation, reinforced the debate on governance and argued for more corporate-type 
structures, including a more profound role for governing boards (instead of senates) and more lay 
involvement in these boards. 
Act (2004) – Higher Education Act 2004 – brought changes to the financial arrangements of higher 
education students.  
HEFCE (2008) – Research Assessment Exercise 2008: The Outcome. 
Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance (2010) – Securing a Sustainable 
Future for Higher Education, Lord John Browne (Chairman) – recommended sweeping changes to the 
university funding system. 
White Paper (2011) – Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System. 
 
Portugal 
Decree-Law 781/76, of 28 October – established the democratic management of higher education 
institutions. 
Decree-Law 448/79, of 13 November – University Teaching Staff Statute – established the University 
Teaching Staff Statute. 
Law 108/88, of 24 September – University Autonomy Act – reinforced collegiality as the norm for 
governing and managing higher education institutions. 
Law 38/94, of 21 November – Higher Education Evaluation Act – established the rules for the 
Portuguese quality assessment system for both public and private institutions.  
Decree-Law 205/98, of 11 July – created the National Council for the Evaluation of Higher Education 
(CNAVES). 
Decree-Law 125/99, of 20 April – defined the legal regime for research institutions, including the basis 
for the evaluation of research units. 
Law 1/2003, of 6 January – Development and Quality in Higher Education – established the 
consequences of the results of the evaluation process and determined the rating of the evaluated 
programmes. It also introduced the concept of academic accreditation. 
Law 37/2003, of 22 August – Funding of Higher Education – established the foundations for the 
financing of higher education. 
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Law 10/2004, of 22 March – SIADAP – created the Integrated System for the Evaluation of Performance 
within Public Administration (SIADAP). 
Decree-Law 42/2005, of 22 February – Regulatory Instruments for the Creation of the European Higher 
Education Area – established the principles that regulated the development of the instruments that 
would contribute to the creation of the EHEA. 
Dispatch 484/2006, of 9 January – officialised the evaluations commissioned to the OECD and ENQA. 
ENQA (2006) – Quality Assurance of Higher Education in Portugal: An Assessment of the Existing 
System and Recommendations for a Future System – report commissioned by the Portuguese Minister 
of Science, Technology and Higher Education. 
MCTES (2006) – Country Background Report: Portugal – background report for OECD. 
OECD (2007) – Reviews of National Policies for Education: Tertiary Education in Portugal – report 
commissioned by the Portuguese Minister of Science, Technology and Higher Education. 
Law 38/2007, of 16 August – New Evaluation Framework – approved the legal framework for the 
evaluation of higher education. 
Law 62/2007, of 10 September – Legal Regime of Higher Education Institutions (RJIES) – approved the 
new legal framework of higher educations institutions. 
Decree-Law 369/2007, of 5 November – created the National Agency for the Evaluation and 
Accreditation of Higher Education (A3ES). 
Law 66-B/2007, of 28 December – restructured the Integrated System for the Evaluation of Performance 
within Public Administration (SIADAP). 
Decree-Law 97/2009, of 27 April – approved the transition of three institutions to the foundational 
regime: University of Aveiro, University of Porto and ISCTE. 
Decree-Law 205/2009, of 31 August – University Teaching Staff Statute – reviewed the University 
Teaching Staff Statute. 
Decree-Law 207/2009, of 31 August – Polytechnic Teaching Staff Statute – reviewed the Polytechnic 
Teaching Staff Statute. 
January 2010 – Contract of Confidence for Higher Education – aimed at increasing the levels of 
qualification in Portugal until 2014. 
September 2010 – Development Plan for Higher Education 2010-2014 – established a plan for the 
development of Portuguese higher education from 2010 to 2014. 
 
University of Warwick 
Academic Statistics Yearbook (all years from 2002 to 2010) – produced on an annual basis, the 
Academic Statistics give an in-depth report on the students and staff of UW, alongside data on the 
destinations of leavers, research grants and contracts, league tables and other comparative information. 
Code of Practice for Corporate Governance – summarises the decisions taken by the Council relating to 
corporate governance. 
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Ordinance 11: Appointment of Heads of Department – explains the procedure that has to be followed to 
appoint heads of department. 
Results of the Pulse Survey 2008 – provided by the University of Warwick. 
Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended 31st July 2010 – presents the university's statutory accounts 
for the academic year 2009/2010. 
Statement of Primary Responsibilities of the Council – outlines the powers and responsibilities of the 
Council derived from the University Statutes. 
University Calendar 2011-2012 – represents a snapshot of the structure and regulatory framework of 
UW, including committee membership and a calendar of the meetings for the academic year 2011/2012. 
University Statutes – Statutes of UW. 
Vision 2015: A Strategy for Warwick – strategic document published in 2007. 
 
University of Aveiro 
Normative Dispatch 52/89, of 1 June – UA Statutes 1989 –– homologated UA's 1989 Statutes. 
Normative Dispatch 10/95, of 24 February – altered UA Statutes. 
Normative Dispatch 51/97, of 21 August – altered UA Statutes. 
UA (2007) – Self-Evaluation Report: University of Aveiro – background report for EUA. 
EUA (2007) – EUA Evaluation Report: University of Aveiro – evaluation report commissioned by the 
University of Aveiro to EUA. 
Normative Dispatch 14 669-BB/2007, of 6 July – altered UA Statutes. 
UA (2008) – Development Project for the University of Aveiro – development plan for the University of 
Aveiro. 
Normative Dispatch 18-A/2009, of 14 May – UA Statutes 2009 – homologated UA's new Statutes. 
MCTES (2009) – Contract-Programme with the University of Aveiro – established the objectives that 
have to be met for funding purposes. 
UA (2010) – Development Programme of the University of Aveiro – delivered to the Ministry, following 
the signing of the Contract of Confidence. 
Assunção, M. (2010) – Action Plan 2010-2014 – candidacy programme of the Rector. 
UA (2010) – Activity Plan for 2010 – defined the strategic initiatives for 2010. 
Regulation 489/2011 – established the evaluation parameters for the academic staff of the University of 
Aveiro. 
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Annex 3 – Departments at the University of Warwick  
Faculties Departments 
Classics and Ancient History  
Comparative American Studies  
English and Comparative Literary Studies  
Film and Television Studies  
French Studies  
German Studies  
History  
History of Art  
Italian  
Faculty of Arts 
Theatre, Performance and Cultural Policy Studies 
Faculty of Medicine Warwick Medical School 
Life Sciences  
Chemistry  
Computer Science  
Engineering  
Mathematics  
Physics  
Psychology  
Statistics  
Faculty of Science 
Warwick Manufacturing Group (WMG) 
Applied Linguistics  
Economics  
Education  
Health and Social Studies  
Law  
Philosophy  
Politics and International Studies  
Sociology  
Warwick Business School  
Faculty of Social 
Sciences 
Women and Gender Studies 
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Annex 4 – Summary of results at the University of Warwick 
Area Degree of measurement 
Examples of 
measures/instruments used Level Who measures Who chooses Main actors/bodies involved 
Teaching 
and 
learning 
High 
• Student surveys 
• Internal database (e.g. retention 
rates, dropout rates) 
• Curricular review 
• Evaluation of new courses and 
modules 
• External audit by the QAA 
• NSS 
• Accreditation by PSRBs 
• Departmental 
• Individual 
Externally: 
• QAA 
• HEFCE 
• PSRBs 
 
Internally: 
• Students 
• Academic Office 
• AQSC 
• Head of department 
• Departments, usually based 
on QAA and PSRBs 
guidelines 
• Central Administration (to 
prepare for the QAA) 
Committees: 
• AQSC 
• Senate 
 
Other: 
• 1 Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Student 
Experience 
• Faculty Boards 
• Board of Undergraduate Studies 
• Board of Graduate Studies 
Research 
and 
scholarship 
Very high 
• Internal databases (e.g. costs, 
outputs, grants, income 
generated) 
• RAE 
• International citation databases 
• Departmental 
• Individual 
Externally: 
• Higher education funding 
councils 
 
Internally: 
• Head of department 
• Departments, usually based 
on the parameters used in the 
RAE 
• Central Administration (to 
prepare for the RAE) 
Committees: 
• Research Committee 
• Steering Committee 
• Senate 
 
Other: 
• 2 Pro-Vice-Chancellors: Arts and 
Social Studies; Science and 
Medicine 
• Faculty Boards 
Third 
mission Very low 
• Data on volunteer work 
• Income generated 
• List of contacts 
• HE-BCI Survey 
• Variable • Variable 
• Departments 
• Warwick Volunteers 
• HEFCE 
• Steering Committee 
Academic 
staff 
High 
(Professors 
are more 
scrutinised)  
• Student surveys 
• Appraisal system 
• Pulse Survey 
• Internal database (e.g. number, 
gender, research data, number 
of PhD students) 
• Recruitment process 
• International citation databases 
• Individual 
• Head of department  
• Central Administration 
(through the Academic Office) 
• Students 
• Departments 
Committees: 
• Academic Staff Committee 
• Remuneration Committee (for senior 
members) 
• Senate 
 
Other: 
• 1 Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Academic 
Resourcing 
• Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
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Area Degree of measurement 
Examples of 
measures/instruments used Level Who measures Who chooses Main actors/bodies involved 
Non-
academic 
staff 
High 
(at central level) 
• Pulse Survey 
• Appraisal system 
• Internal database (e.g. 
number, gender) 
• Individual 
(within Central 
Administration 
and 
departments) 
• Registrar 
• Service Directors 
• Head of department 
• Academic Office 
• Service Directors 
• Head of department  
Committees: 
• Finace and General Purposes 
Committee 
• Council 
 
Other: 
• Vice-Chancellor 
• Registrar 
• Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
Students High 
• Internal database (e.g. 
number, attendance rates) 
• Measures of educational 
success (e.g. degree results, 
completion rates, retention 
rates) 
• Recruitment process 
• Student tutoring system 
• Individual 
• Central Administration 
(mainly through the Student 
Recruitment and 
Admissions Office) 
• Head of department 
• Central Administration (through 
the Academic Registrar's Office) 
• Head of department 
Committees: 
• Campus Life Committee 
• Graduate Studies Committee 
• AQSC 
• Senate 
 
Other: 
• Academic Registrar's Office 
• Board of Undergraduate Studies 
• Board of Graduate Studies 
• Faculty Boards 
Support 
services  High 
• ASDAR 
• Complaints 
• ISB 
• Central  
• Central Administration 
(through the Registrar's 
Office) 
• Independent business (ISB) 
• Central Administration, (mainly 
through the Registrar's Office and 
the Senior Management Team) 
Committees: 
• Finace and General Purposes 
Committee  
• Steering Committee 
 
Other: 
• Service Directors 
• Registrar 
• Pro-Vice-Chancellors 
• Vice-Chancellor 
Employers 
(links to) Very Low 
• Internal database (e.g. 
employment information) 
• Employment rate 
• DLHE 
• n.a • n.a • Careers Centre 
• HESA 
Committees: 
• Steering Committee 
• Senate 
 
Other: 
• Careers Centre 
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Area Degree of measurement 
Examples of 
measures/instruments used Level Who measures Who chooses Main actors/bodies involved 
Alumni 
(links to) Very Low 
• Fundraising activities 
• Internal database (e.g. 
contacts) 
• n.a • n.a • DARO 
Committees: 
• Steering Committee 
• Senate 
 
Other: 
• DARO 
Finance Very high 
• KPIs (e.g. surplus as a 
percentage of income, staff 
cost as a percentage of 
income) 
• All 
• Finance Office (through the 
Finance Director) 
• Central Administration (mainly 
through the Senior 
Management Team) 
• Measures developed by the 
Finance Office or by the Finance 
Team (in departments with 
devolved budget) and agreed by 
Council 
Committees: 
• Finace and General Purposes 
Committee  
• Academic Resourcing Committee 
• Steering Committee 
• Senate 
• Council 
 
Other: 
• Senior Management Team 
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Annex 5 – Departments, autonomous section and polytechnic schools at the 
University of Aveiro 
Biology  
Chemistry  
Civil Engineering  
Communication and Art 
Education 
Economics, Management and Industrial Engineering  
Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics  
Environment and Planning 
Geosciences 
Glass and Ceramics Engineering  
Languages and Cultures 
Mathematics  
Mechanical Engineering 
Physics  
Departments 
Social, Political and Territorial Sciences 
Autonomous Sections Health Sciences  
Aveiro-North School of Design, Management and Production 
Technologies (ESAN) 
Institute of Accounting and Administration (ISCAA) 
School of Health Sciences (ESSUA) 
Polytechnic Schools 
School of Technology and Management (ESTGA) 
Note: The Departments of Didactics and Educational Technology and Education Sciences were merged into the 
Department of Education. This new department was created in May 2009, with the publication of the University Statutes 
(Decree-Law 97/2009 of 27 April, and Normative Dispatch 18-A/2009 of 14 May). 
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Annex 6 – Revenue Structure at the University of Aveiro 
1999 (a) 2000 (a) 2001 (b) 2002 (b) 2003 (b) 2004 (b) Description Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Students - Other 216 006,11 0,5 257 768,72 0,5 384 397,55 0,6 489 961,94 0,7 492 366,90 0,7 571 382,34 0,8 
Students - Tuition Fees 2 882 800,61 6,0 3 179 840,16 5,7 4 132 323,35 6,2 4 883 597,62 7,1 6 116 724,40 8,9 9 740 917,52 13,0 
State - Investment Plan (PIDDAC) 2 251 097,35 4,7 6 936 582,83 12,4 4 743 817,39 7,1 4 110 867,00 6,0 1 465 638,00 2,1 379 700,00 0,5 
State - Current Funding 32 888 039,83 68,7 36 341 521,94 65,0 39 705 250,31 59,3 45 413 800,88 66,3 46 786 852,99 68,3 46 611 495,00 62,1 
EU Financing - ERDF 0,00 0,0 400 948,92 0,7 6 032 892,11 9,0 1 644 030,32 2,4 2 539 086,96 3,7 2 175 467,54 2,9 
EU Financing - Other 1 070 191,68 2,2 1 668 933,56 3,0 1 472 962,95 2,2 2 089 738,20 3,1 1 107 587,51 1,6 2 072 582,75 2,8 
EU Financing - PRODEP 2 177 088,67 4,5 802 339,47 1,4 874 195,79 1,3 567 384,83 0,8 686 963,58 1,0 1 233 233,12 1,6 
Private Institutions 664 547,83 1,4 658 354,26 1,2 644 718,02 1,0 721 341,98 1,1 873 860,46 1,3 938 229,14 1,2 
Public Institutions 3 629 647,70 7,6 2 683 866,62 4,8 5 346 514,30 8,0 5 101 282,60 7,4 4 093 270,73 6,0 7 196 070,86 9,6 
Other 2 075 454,69 4,3 2 973 631,95 5,3 3 627 354,42 5,4 3 482 928,49 5,1 4 351 272,93 6,4 4 155 975,69 5,5 
Total 47 854 874,47 100,0 55 903 788,43 100,0 66 964 426,19 100,0 68 504 933,86 100,0 68 513 624,46 100,0 75 075 053,96 100,0 
             
2005 (b) 2006 (b) 2007 (b) 2008 (b) 2009 (c) 2010 (c) (d) Description Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Students - Other 583 810,72 0,8 692 834,77 0,9 699 943,34 0,9 701 148,89 0,9 555 907,28 0,6 647 910,68 0,6 
Students - Tuition Fees 10 090 466,06 13,6 9 884 551,65 12,6 11 499 012,28 14,0 12 102 266,20 14,8 12 362 626,09 12,7 12 371 630,60 12,4 
State - Investment Plan (PIDDAC) 697 182,00 0,9 610 335,50 0,8 294 923,00 0,4 231 250,00 0,3 1 710 000,00 1,8 1 440 000,00 1,4 
State - Current Funding 45 309 257,00 61,1 44 980 147,00 57,2 41 523 982,00 50,7 42 105 559,00 51,5 48 644 128,49 49,8 54 446 100,00 54,5 
EU Financing - ERDF 1 698 333,43 2,3 718 649,49 0,9 550 005,85 0,7 316 680,34 0,4 518 927,41 0,5 87 003,37 0,1 
EU Financing - Other 2 165 591,85 2,9 3 169 675,09 4,0 2 659 508,37 3,2 2 999 717,37 3,7 2 758 651,84 2,8 2 523 508,11 2,5 
EU Financing - PRODEP 1 321 598,29 1,8 1 351 233,50 1,7 1 519 879,73 1,9 553 449,78 0,7 521 637,88 0,5 338 500,97 0,3 
Private Institutions 1 186 180,25 1,6 1 871 226,50 2,4 1 429 345,29 1,7 920 184,76 1,1 1 468 715,23 1,5 2 026 877,74 2,0 
Public Institutions 7 275 093,63 9,8 10 087 021,88 12,8 15 167 293,69 18,5 14 700 188,61 18,0 22 736 002,79 23,3 18 681 103,85 18,7 
Other 3 815 680,16 5,1 5 277 531,00 6,7 6 561 793,35 8,0 7 183 218,94 8,8 6 373 324,12 6,5 7 288 196,29 7,3 
Total 74 143 193,39 100,0 78 643 206,38 100,0 81 905 686,90 100,0 81 813 663,89 100,0 97 649 921,13 100,0 99 850 831,61 100,0 
(a) It only integrates the values from UA            
(b) Consolidated values UA + ISCA             
(c) ISCA was integrated into UA             
(d) Provisional figures             
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Annex 7 – Expenditure Structure at the University of Aveiro 
1999 (a) 2000 (a) 2001 (b) 2002 (b) 2003 (b) 2004 (b) Description Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Personnel Costs 26 107 913,79 55,2 29 829 943,75 53,1 36 169 645,59 55,5 39 165 158,40 59,0 41 038 117,47 59,8 42 879 348,75 58,6 
Research Project Additional 
Costs 4 068 724,39 8,6 5 829 752,35 10,4 4 945 323,10 7,6 6 011 612,28 9,1 6 512 949,11 9,5 7 562 898,96 10,3 
Other Current Expenses 9 264 560,92 19,6 10 392 586,72 18,5 12 102 913,58 18,6 11 560 981,20 17,4 13 444 110,69 19,6 16 239 165,87 22,2 
Investment Plan 7 883 460,21 16,7 10 111 920,27 18,0 11 991 791,83 18,4 9 656 117,60 14,5 7 589 955,60 11,1 6 504 187,74 8,9 
Total 47 324 659,31 100,0 56 164 203,09 100,0 65 209 674,10 100,0 66 393 869,48 100,0 68 585 132,87 100,0 73 185 601,32 100,0 
             
             
2005 (b) 2006 (b) 2007 (b) 2008 (b) 2009 (c) 2010 (c) (d) Description Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Personnel Costs 45 973 210,70 61,3 47 704 570,34 58,3 51 067 185,71 62,2 55 581 822,15 66,6 59 355 993,55 62,6 62 224 203,68 63,2 
Research Project Additional 
Costs 8 692 212,74 11,6 15 030 248,72 18,4 12 745 081,04 15,5 10 819 655,05 13,0 10 688 162,97 11,3 13 023 336,89 13,2 
Other Current Expenses 14 755 780,53 19,7 15 510 402,70 19,0 15 080 448,16 18,4 14 662 338,15 17,6 15 359 157,86 16,2 16 781 204,40 17,0 
Investment Plan 5 571 375,60 7,4 3 569 869,05 4,4 3 176 782,69 3,9 2 439 889,23 2,9 9 425 109,36 9,9 6 461 436,62 6,6 
Total 74 992 579,57 100,0 81 815 090,81 100,0 82 069 497,60 100,0 83 503 704,58 100,0 94 828 423,74 100,0 98 490 181,59 100,0 
(a) It only integrates the values from UA            
(b) Consolidated values UA + ISCA             
(c) ISCA was integrated into UA             
(d) Provisional figures             
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Annex 8 – Matrix Organisation at the University of Aveiro 
 
For Study Programmes 
Study Programme 1 Study Programme 2 ... Study Programme n  
[Degree Director] [Degree Director]  [Degree Director] 
Department 1 ! !  ! 
Department 2 !    
...     
...     
Department n ! !   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Research Units 
 Research Unit 1 Research Unit 2 ... ... Research Unit n 
 [Unit Coordinator] [Unit Coordinator]  [Unit Coordinator] 
Department 1 ! !  ! 
Department 2 !    
...     
...     
Department n ! !   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources 
Resources 
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Annex 9 – Summary of results at the University of Aveiro 
Area Degree of measurement 
Examples of 
instruments/measures 
used 
Level Who measures Who chooses 
Main elements/bodies in the 
governance structures 
involved 
Teaching and 
learning Medium 
• SGQ 
• Accreditation process 
conducted by A3ES 
• Departmental 
• Individual 
Externally: 
• A3ES 
 
Internally: 
• Students 
• Rectory 
• A3ES 
Bodies: 
• Rectory 
• Pedagogic Council 
 
Other: 
• 1 Vice-Rector for First Cycle 
and Second Cycle Studies 
and Lifelong Learning 
• 1 Pro-Rector for Study Cycles 
Accreditation 
Research and 
scholarship Very high 
• Evaluation performed 
by FCT 
• International citation 
databases 
• EU's evaluation system 
• Departmental/research 
units/associate labs 
• Individual 
Externally: 
• FCT 
• EU 
 
Internally: 
• Head of 
department/director of 
research unit/director of 
associate lab 
• Financial Resources 
Office 
• Research units and associate 
labs, usually based on the 
parameters used in the 
evaluation performed by FCT 
and EU's panels of international 
experts 
• Financial Resources Office 
• Administrator 
Bodies: 
• Scientific Council 
 
Other: 
• 1 Vice-Rector for Research 
and Third Cycle Studies 
Third mission Very low 
• Income generated by 
services provided to 
society 
• Number of patents 
registered 
• Number of protocols 
and contracts signed 
and fulfilled 
• Number of businesses 
on campus 
• Variable 
• Financial Resources 
Office 
• Office for Technology 
Transfer 
• Rectory 
• Financial Resources Office 
• Administrator 
• Office for Technology Transfer 
Bodies: 
• Rectory 
 
Other: 
• 1 Vice-Rector for Cooperation, 
Innovation, Technology 
Transfer and Post-Secondary 
Training 
• 1 Pro-Rector for Regional 
Cooperation 
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Area Degree of measurement 
Examples of 
instruments/measures 
used 
Level Who measures Who chooses 
Main elements/bodies in the 
governance structures 
involved 
Academic staff Medium 
• SGQ 
• Evaluation criteria 
when applying for 
positions 
• Research CV when 
applying for grants 
• Individual 
• Students 
• Jury nominated to assess 
academics when they 
apply for academic 
positions 
• FCT/other grant providers 
• Departments (when opening 
positions) 
• Rectory 
• Scientific Council 
• Pedagogic Council 
• FCT/other grant providers 
Bodies: 
• Scientific Council 
• Pedagogic Council 
 
Other: 
• Human Resources Office 
 
Non-academic 
staff Very high 
• Objectives and 
indicators integrated in 
SIADAP 
• Staff satisfaction 
surveys 
• Individual (within 
Central Administration 
and departments) 
• Heads of department 
• Service directors 
• Administrator 
• Vice-Rector for Strategic 
Planning, Information 
Management and Quality 
Enhancement 
• Central Administration (the 
Director of each service) 
• Head of department (for 
departmental staff) 
• Administrator 
• CCADUA 
• Human Resources Office 
Students High 
• Measures of 
educational success 
• RAIDES 
• Individual 
Externally: 
• MCTES 
 
Internally: 
• Systems and Information 
Management Office 
• MCTES 
• Academic Records Office 
• Systems and Information 
Management Office 
 
Support 
services Low 
• QUAR 
• Satisfaction Surveys 
• Central  
• Departmental 
• Heads of department 
• Service directors 
• Vice-Rector for Strategic 
Planning, Information 
Management and Quality 
Enhancement 
• Heads of department 
• Service directors 
• Administrator 
• Vice-Rector for Strategic 
Planning, Information 
Management and Quality 
Enhancement 
• Administrator 
• 1 Vice-Rector for Strategic 
Planning, Information 
Management and Quality 
Enhancement 
Employers 
(needs and 
satisfaction) 
Very Low 
• Employers' Survey 
• Measures defined by 
external assessors 
• University 
• Departmental 
Externally: 
• External assessors 
 
Internally: 
• Rectory 
• Rectory 
• Task Force 
• External assessors 
• Rectory 
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Area Degree of measurement 
Examples of 
instruments/measures 
used 
Level Who measures Who chooses 
Main elements/bodies in the 
governance structures 
involved 
Alumni Very Low • Alumni's Survey • University 
• Departmental • Rectory • Rectory 
• Rectory 
• Internships and Professional 
Opportunities Office 
Finance Very high 
• Internal financial 
measures (e.g. surplus 
as a percentage of 
income, staff cost as a 
percentage of income) 
• Measures defined by 
external assessors 
• All 
• Financial Resources 
Office 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Court of Auditors 
• External assessors 
• Financial Resources Office 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Administrator 
• External assessors 
Bodies: 
• General Council 
• Management Council 
• External auditor 
• Council of Curators 
 
Other: 
• Administrator 
 
 
